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 SUMMARY 
 The purpose of this research was to investigate the implications of networked 
public management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance 
measurement systems. A multiple, instrumental case study of four public health programs 
funded by CDC and implemented nationally through vertical and horizontal network 
structures was conducted. Cross-case findings suggest that the networked implementation 
structures for the four federal-level, public health programs have important implications 
for the design of the performance measurement systems. Specifically, the performance 
measurement systems were affected by four consequences of the implementation 
networks: the political influence of collaborative stakeholders; network variability; 
dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners to achieve outputs and outcomes; 
and jointly produced outcomes that compromise assigning agency-specific attribution and 
accountability.  While these four factors did not deter the use of performance 
measurement by any of the programs, all had important consequences for the 
development and subsequent design of the performance measurement systems, including 
limiting the choice and types of measures, level of measurement, potential uses of the 
measures, and resources needed to implement and support the systems. 
xvii 
 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the implications of networked 
public management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance 
measurement systems through a multiple, instrumental case study of four national public 
health programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Performance 
measurement has gained prominence at CDC over the past 15 years, advanced by the 
influence of the New Public Management (NPM) and its accompanying reforms on 
national-level public health programs. One emphasis of NPM, which advocates the 
integration of corporate values in government, is increased accountability; that is, holding 
government programs responsible for achieving program outcomes and demonstrating 
their “value added” (Frederickson 2003). Performance measurement, a management tool 
involving the ongoing monitoring of indicators of organizational and program 
performance (Poister 2003), has been widely promoted and adopted as a tool to enhance 
accountability while also contributing to program improvement (Kelly 2002). 
Additionally, the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) designated 
performance measurement a statutory requirement, mandating that federal agencies 
develop annual performance plans and submit annual performance reports inclusive of 
performance data. 
Because of my responsibilities at CDC related to GPRA and, more recently, the 
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) program assessment and rating tool (PART) 
process, I felt compelled to question the implications of the complex public management 
context in which public health programs are implemented on the design and 
 1
 implementation of federal-level, performance measurement systems. This situation 
involves extensive decentralization among vertically-integrated, intergovernmental 
partners at the state and local level, as well as private and non-profit agencies that operate 
on more horizontal levels. In contrast to the traditional hierarchical approach to 
governing, this environment is better described as involving “networks.” Fundamentally, 
public health problems reflect the complex intersection of social, environmental, 
behavioral, and biological factors (Institute of Medicine 2003), so achieving effective 
outcomes necessitates collaboration and coordination among networked partners across a 
variety of sectors. In fact, CDC readily acknowledges that no one agency or program can 
effectively achieve desired health outcomes and strongly endorses a collaborative 
approach in public health practice1.  
This approach to the delivery of public health services by CDC, a federal 
government agency, demonstrates organizations operating in a governance framework. 
Governance involves the processes of administration and management in an environment 
characterized by multiple societal forces, that is, in a context where broad relationships 
exist between government and its political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl 
2002; Stoker 1998). A central characteristic of governance involves networks, in which 
more traditional, vertical, intergovernmental arrangements exist alongside horizontal, 
voluntary associations (Hill and Lynn 2005). Kettl (2002) suggests that networked 
governance has emerged, in part, to facilitate more integrated and coordinated service 
delivery in response to complex social problems like those in public health. In a report for 
the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Center for The Business of 
                                            
1 http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm. (accessed 02/01/09). 
 2
 Government, Kettl (2005) even highlights CDC as an example of an agency shifting to a 
more flexible, networked approach. Empirical studies describing public management in 
networked governance structures are just beginning to appear in the literature. 
The practice of federal-level performance measurement has primarily been 
described based on the traditional view of bureaucratic hierarchy, where established lines 
of formal authority and, therefore, accountability, are relatively straightforward 
(Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Perrin 1998). The implications 
of networked governance are noteworthy, especially the severe compromising of 
hierarchical authority, which impose new and greater challenges on the design and 
implementation of performance measurement, especially at the national level. Frankly, 
little research has focused on what Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) suggested is 
“the most critical factor accounting for the effectiveness of performance measurement – 
third-party government” (p. 10). By better understanding the influence of networked 
governance on the design and implementation of federal performance measurement 
systems, its use as a management tool may be improved in the future. Subsequently, this 
research contributes to a fledgling theory building in the area of performance 
measurement (Jennings and Haist 2004), an undertaking encouraged by some key leaders 
in the field (Wholey 1999). 
In this first chapter, relevant background supporting the dissertation study is 
provided. An important research gap is identified and the research purpose is stated. In 
addition, background is provided on CDC, where the research was conducted, the 
theoretical basis for the research is provided, and the research questions are detailed. 
Finally, a brief summary of the methodology is included.  
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 1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The Emergence of Networked Governance 
Since the early 1990s, “governance” has emerged as a new organizing concept for 
public administration and management in response to various social and political 
influences (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Frederickson and Smith 2003). The term 
governance has been part of common parlance for decades, but more recently, the term 
has been used to describe a meaningful shift in how we are governing (Frederickson and 
Smith 2003). Indeed, governance has emerged as an organizing framework intended to 
capture an important turn in the practice of public administration and management, that 
is, the processes of governing (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). In particular, the more 
recent focus on governance signals a change in the relationship between the state and 
society and reflects the broader relationships that exist between government and its 
political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl 2002). This view of governance 
recognizes that government operates within a vast environment of multiple societal forces 
rather than viewing it as a ‘stand alone’ institution (Stoker 1998). 
Governance provides the overall context for this study for two reasons. First, a 
dominant feature of governance involves third parties and networks (Lynn, Heinrich, and 
Hill 2000). Within the governance framework, the government’s work is carried out, in 
part, through interdependent networks rather than traditional hierarchy alone. In 
governance, it is networks, rather than the formal institutions of government, that 
dominate public policy and are increasingly responsible for delivering public services 
(Frederickson and Smith 2003; Milward and Provan 2006; Peters and Pierre 1998). 
Second, using governance as the context for this study reflects the larger backdrop within 
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 which NPM, with its emphasis on results and its promotion of performance measurement, 
is practiced. Governance, then, provides the overall political and organizational context 
for this study and, as such, becomes relevant in our understanding about how networked 
management affects the practice of performance measurement. 
Scholars have suggested that the move to networked governance is associated, in 
part, with the devolution of government as a direct provider of public programs to the 
“hollow state,” a situation in which policy implementation is dominated by third parties 
(Boyt 2005; Milward and Provan 2000). As noted earlier, networks may also have 
emerged as potentially more effective organizational structures to support the 
collaborative relationships necessary to address complex social problems (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001b; Keast et al. 2004; O’Toole 1997). Harmon and Mayer (1986) dubbed 
these “wicked” problems, those complex problems influenced by a variety of often 
interrelated factors. Such problems demand coordinated responses across sectors and 
levels of government in order to assure integration and efficiency in the delivery of varied 
programs and services (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a).  
Consequently, a networked model of governance has emerged and public policy 
implementation now occurs in the context of actors who are mutually dependent and who 
are linked by a web of relationships between various organizations, sectors, and levels of 
government (Salamon 2002). In this environment, government represents just one of 
many actors and institutions involved in addressing issues and concerns of the polity 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001a). This shift has led to what Kettl (2002) has termed the 
“fuzzy boundaries” problem wherein new challenges are posed by the loss of hierarchy’s 
clear lines of responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. In a network model, 
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 interdependent relationships exist between the state and other third-party actors from the 
private and non-profit sectors resulting in power dependencies (Stoker 1998). These 
interdependencies imply that in a networked context, government loses its capacity for 
direct control and must rely on strategies of influence and leverage (Peters 2001). 
However, as Milward and Provan (2006) suggest, “networks have proven to be a very 
valuable public management tool . . . because they are the only organizational forms that 
can operate horizontally, across a range of organizations, and integrate the strengths and 
talents of a variety of organizations in the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors to 
effectively address critical public problems” (p. 7). 
Additionally, the collaborative approach inherent in networked governance 
reflects the recognition that outcomes, both individual and organizational, result from the 
actions of varied actors addressing a multitude of factors that are contributing to the 
problem. For results to be achieved in this context, leaders must effectively collaborate 
across public, private, and non-profit sectors as well as across levels of government 
(Abramson, Breul, Kamensky 2006). This structure presents what has been called the 
“joint production problem,” the challenge of coordinating program implementation across 
a potentially broad and decentralized service implementation network, each with its own 
goals and priorities (Milward and Provan 2004). As noted above, it is well recognized 
that a complex interplay of factors contribute to public health problems and that 
representatives from various sectors and levels of government must be engaged to 
effectively address them.  
But both the fuzzy boundary and joint production problems lead to a central 
challenge or dilemma of governance, that of accountability (Kettl 2002; Peters and Pierre 
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 1998; Stoker 1998). In fact, challenges to accountability abound in networks as program 
implementation is decentralized, traditional hierarchical authority is compromised, 
political resources are shared, and monitoring channels are diffused and become 
unreliable (Goldsmith and Eggers 2005; O’Toole 1997; Peters 2001; Posner 2002). 
Melissa Stone expressed valid concerns about accountability in these contexts asking, 
“How must we conceptualize accountability when the actual implementers of public 
policy are removed from government agencies and have their own notions of to whom 
and for what they are accountable?” (Cited in Boyt 2005, 537). 
1.1.2 NPM and the Rise of Performance Measurement 
At the same time that networked governance has achieved higher levels of 
prominence, performance measurement, with an emphasis on outcomes, also has gained 
attention given the results-based management reforms of recent years associated with 
NPM (Behn 2003; Jennings and Haist 2004). NPM emerged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s; Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 best seller, Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, is seen as a leading text for the 
movement. NPM advocates that government adopt market-based approaches perceived as 
more efficient and effective (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Peters and Pierre (1998) 
suggested that in contrast to governance, which is process-oriented and based in 
democratic theory, NPM is more appropriately viewed as an ideological movement 
emphasizing responsibility and accountability through a focus on outcomes and results. 
They argue that NPM and governance are distinct approaches with a number of 
fundamental differences (Peters and Pierre 1998). The principles of NPM have been 
widely adopted in practice and translated into government reform that emphasizes 
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 decentralized government, increased contracting through third parties, and an expanded 
use of policy tools2 to increase competition (Frederickson and Smith 2003). In fact, these 
three aspects of NPM are likely to support a networked governance structure.  
In contrast to governance, where accountability is seen as problematic, NPM 
claims it as a particular strength (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Peters and Pierre 1998). 
Outcome-based performance is so central to NPM that it is often recognized as “results-
oriented government.” Because of its emphasis on outcomes over processes or outputs as 
a means to assess policy implementation, NPM shifts the focus of accountability from the 
elected official to the administrator, holding public managers responsible for results 
(Dubnick 2005). NPM’s emphasis on results and accountability led to a defining moment 
for the movement, the passing of the 1993 GPRA (Light 1997). GPRA was intended to 
primarily addresses perceived weaknesses in government management and introduce 
greater accountability for results (Frederickson 2003; GAO 2004).  
The influence of NPM and GPRA has spurred what some have viewed as an 
“accountability movement” characterized by the widespread implementation of 
performance measurement systems (Behn 2003; Blalock and Barnow 2001; Coplin, 
Merget, and Bourdeaux 2002; Grizzle 2002; Radin 2006; Schick 2001). Through the 
influence of NPM, performance measurement is now recognized as a fundamental public 
administrative reform (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Kelly 2002; Radin 2006). 
While evidence of the effectiveness of performance measurement is still mixed, it has 
been widely adopted and supported in practice (Barry 2000; Hatry 1997; Kelly 2002; 
Turnock 2000; Wholey 2002). In addition, there has been substantial political and policy 
                                            
2 Policy tools or instruments reflect the activities performed by a federal agency to 
address public problems or achieve objectives (Frederickson 2001; Salamon 2002). 
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 impetus for performance measurement, such as GPRA and its inclusion in former 
President Bush’s Presidential Management Agenda (PMA) PART (GAO 2005). The 
overriding benefit and promise of performance measurement is its contribution toward 
more sound public management, including increased accountability and transparency. 
“What gets measured gets done,” and, “You can’t manage what you don’t measure,” are 
common adages reflecting the potential of performance measurement to support 
improved management and leadership (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Poister (2003) 
suggests that the inherent logic of performance measurement engenders support for it: “ 
… performance measurement systems provide incentives for organizations and programs 
to perform at higher levels, and this is the core of the logic underlying the use of 
monitoring systems as performance management tools” (p. 99). 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study 
In a report from the IBM Center for the Business of Government (Abramson, 
Breul, and Kamensky 2006), performance management and network governance are 
identified as two of six trends transforming government. Both represent central features 
of contemporary public management. Researchers have suggested, however, that 
performance measurement is based on assumptions rooted in a hierarchical model of 
bureaucracy (Frederickson 2003; Perrin 1998; Radin 2006), implying that its practice has 
largely been described based on a context where accountability structures are 
considerably more fixed than in a networked model. As previously noted, the NPM 
reforms emphasize results-based performance measurement as a means for assuring 
accountability (Jennings and Haist 2004). Unfortunately, the performance measurement 
literature has only begun to address the design and implementation of performance 
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 measurement systems in networked environments (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; 
Goddard and Mannion 2004; Mandell and Keast 2006; Voets, De Rynck, and Wouter 
2006). And, as noted above, accountability has been identified as one of the greatest 
challenges facing networked governance. Radin (2006) has suggested that advocates of 
performance measurement make a number of assumptions that goals can be clearly 
defined and are the responsibility of specific actors, outcomes can be quantified and 
measured, data are available and accurate, and an actor will have authority to act on the 
results. These assumptions and their implications for the practice of performance 
measurement are compromised in the networked context. As reflected in the title of this 
dissertation, a potential conflict emerges when accountability for results meets a 
networked context (Milward and Provan 2006; Radin 2006). 
Given such challenges, the design and implementation of federal performance 
measurement systems is likely more difficult in networked than hierarchical settings. 
And, while much has been written about the NPM reforms and the centrality of 
performance measurement to improved public management and accountability, the 
literature does not address the tensions and/or opportunities created based on its use in a 
framework of networked governance. Because of this gap in the literature, the purpose 
of this research was to investigate the implications of networked public management 
on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance measurement 
systems through a multiple, instrumental case study of four national public health 
programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  
The proposed research builds on earlier work by David Frederickson (2003), a 
qualitative grounded theory study of GPRA’s implementation in five U.S. Health and 
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 Human Services (HHS) agencies Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National Institutes for Health 
(NIH), Indian Health Services (IHS), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Although Frederickson started the study intending to explore how these five agencies 
measure their performance under GPRA, the research evolved in focus to trying to better 
understand how well these agencies measure third party performance (Frederickson and 
Frederickson 2006). His findings were important because he identified a number of 
factors influencing the implementation of federal performance measurement suggesting 
that third-party governance and “network articulation3,” were the most influential factors 
(Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). 
This dissertation research extends and builds on Frederickson’s work. It is 
intended to provide a better understanding of how federal public health programs are 
grappling with the challenges posed by networked governance in developing program-
specific, performance measurement systems. Based on the research, recommendations are 
made to enhance the future use of performance measurement in federal public health 
programs implemented in networked environments. In addition, this research contributes 
to early theory building in the area of performance measurement initiated by Jennings 
and Haist (2004). 
1.3 Study Context: CDC’s National Public Health Programs 
CDC, an agency of HHS, is the nation’s leading public health institution. Several 
of CDC’s national public health programs provide rich examples of initiatives committed 
                                            
3 Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) define articulated as “extent to which separate 
organizations or institutions in a network are coupled, fit together, linked, or combined 
and the nature and quality of those connections,” (p. 8). 
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 to strengthening their use of performance measurement while being implemented through 
a networked governance model. Like other federal agencies, CDC has been influenced by 
NPM through both GPRA and PART and has worked to develop strategic plans and 
related performance measurement systems. Staff at CDC have developed and reported 
GPRA measures, programs have been reviewed by OMB’s PART process, and evaluators 
have developed program-specific performance measurement systems for varied purposes. 
Goal-based strategic planning efforts are also underway at the agency level, an effort seen 
as generally reinforcing performance management efforts at CDC. 
In addition, CDC increasingly relies on networks and partnerships to solve 
multifaceted public health problems. Such problems involve social, medical, economic, 
political, and moral dimensions which require multiple-level responses addressing 
individuals, communities, and populations. CDC’s “Future’s Initiative” is a recent 
leadership effort to both increase CDC’s capacity to effectively collaborate with and 
leverage its partners while also improving accountability. Under this initiative, CDC has 
defined six key strategies to guide its work including two that align with the prominent 
issues of this study: (1) emphasizing leadership through leveraging partnerships and 
networks and (2) stressing accountability to sustain public trust and confidence4.  
Accountability is further emphasized as one of CDC’s three core values in conjunction 
with respect and integrity5. Other federal organizations support CDC’s priorities 
including a 2003 report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) (IOM 2003). In that report, 
IOM calls for constructing an intersectoral public health system based on collaborative 
                                            
4 http://www.cdc.gov/osi/goals/strategicimperatives.html (accessed 02/02/09). 
5 http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm (accessed 02/02/09).  
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 arrangements that emphasize partnerships and networks (IOM 2003). This 
recommendation is not intended to disregard the importance of the traditional, 
intergovernmental pubic health structure that is comprised of federal, state, and local 
health agencies. From a constitutional and historical perspective, state and local agencies 
have a central responsibility in assuring the public’s health (IOM 2003). In fact, many of 
CDC’s federal public health programs are structured around the decentralized, 
intergovernmental relationships that exist between CDC and its state partners, who in 
turn, frequently fund public health agencies at more local levels. 
There is, however, an increasing emphasis at CDC to employ mechanisms, often 
informal, that engage other sectors in addressing public health concerns. The premise 
underlying this broader networked approach is two-fold. First, it is expected that strategic 
collaboration will ensure that greater resources of all kinds (e.g., monetary, expertise, in-
kind contributions) are brought to bear on the problem. And second, due to the potential 
of partner-generated synergy, networked approaches are more likely to have greater 
influence on health outcomes than what government could accomplish alone. It is 
noteworthy that the public health literature acknowledges the importance of partnerships 
and coalitions in achieving public health goals that require resources and capabilities 
beyond any single agency or sector (Lasker, Weiss, Miller 2001; Shortell 2002; 
Wandersman, Goodman, and Butterfoss 1997). While the move to a broader, networked 
public management approach is considered advancement for the field of public health, it 
also underscores the complexity of applying performance measurement to federal-level, 
public health programs.  
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 As noted above, CDC typically implements national public health programs 
through decentralized, intergovernmental relationships. Some CDC programs support 
upwards of sixty or more grantees (e.g., CDC’s National Breast and Cervical Cancer 
Early Detection Program and National Diabetes Prevention and Control Program). Most 
often, cooperative funding agreements, a type of grant, are used as a policy tool, a choice 
that provides grantees some discretion in program implementation. The “cooperative” 
nature of the policy tool provides program-level managers greater flexibility to structure 
programs in ways best suited to the needs and culture of their communities while 
preserving some level of control for CDC. This reinforces a long standing tradition in 
public health of more localized, public health service delivery.  
In addition, based on CDC’s institutional priorities for increased collaboration, 
many CDC funding announcements encourage or even mandate broad partnerships at the 
state and local level aimed at increasing coordinated efforts across networks. For 
instance, as part of CDC’s National Comprehensive Cancer Control Program (NCCCP), 
health departments facilitate comprehensive, state-, tribe-, or territorial-wide planning for 
cancer prevention and control. Planning efforts typically engage state and local public 
health agencies, representatives of the health care and pharmaceutical industries, leading 
non-profit organizations such as the American Cancer Society (ACS) and Lance 
Armstrong Association, universities and other research institutions, cancer treatment 
centers, and so forth. Goals established by these planning groups often reflect the need 
for diverse implementation approaches on the part of coalition members. Although these 
networks are more informal in nature than some described in the network management 
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 literature (e.g., Milward and Provan 1998; Milward and Provan 2006), they provide an 
example of public health programs implemented in a networked context.  
In summary, CDC’s public health programs provide the opportunity to explore the 
confluence of networked governance and performance measurement. As described above, 
in order to more effectively address the “wicked” public health problems facing our 
country and the globe more broadly, CDC is increasingly adopting networked public 
management approaches. At the same time, federal programs are struggling to develop 
and implement effective and useful performance measurement systems to answer calls 
for accountability in this more complex context.  
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
Although the literature related to performance measurement is vast, little effort 
has been undertaken to develop related theory (Frederickson 2003; Jennings and Haist 
2002, 2004). More recently, however, Edward Jennings and Meg Haist (2004) have made 
an effort intended to encourage systematic empirical research. In a chapter of The Art of 
Governance: Analyzing Management and Administration, edited by Patricia Ingraham 
and Laurence Lynn (2004), Jennings and Haist propose twenty-five hypotheses 
predicting the impact of performance measurement. Their work is positioned in a larger 
logic or framework of governance that is proposed by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill in the 
book’s first chapter.  
The logic of governance offered by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) suggests that 
outcomes or outputs (i.e., performance) are a function of five general classes of variables 
environment, consumer characteristics, treatments, structures, and managerial roles or 
actions. That is, P = E + C + T + S + M. The authors clarify that they are not offering a 
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 theory per se, “but rather an organizing device for conceptualizing and interpreting 
empirical research,” (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004, p. 7). Given this model, Jennings 
and Haist recognize that performance management falls under the managerial efforts (i.e., 
“M”) as a mediator of performance. The authors noted, “The broad features of the 
governance model suggest that performance measurement or management is only one of 
many factors that shape the impacts of a policy. As such, the effects are likely to be at the 
margin” (Jennings and Haist 2004, p. 175). 
In offering their hypotheses for performance measurement, Jennings and Haist 
build on earlier work by both Gormley and Weimer (1999) and Dixit (2002). Gormley 
and Weimer draw their theoretical ideas about performance measurement from literature 
related to accountability, incentives, and competition. Dixit’s work (2002) is primarily 
drawn from literature exploring the role of incentives, that is, how a focus on results via 
performance measures serves as an incentive to influence and direct performance. 
Jennings and Haist’s twenty-five hypotheses for future empirical study consider 
incentives and accountability (nine hypotheses), organizational characteristics (eight 
hypotheses), political context (three hypotheses), agency type (three hypotheses), and 
leadership (two hypotheses). See appendix A for a full listing of the twenty-five proposed 
hypotheses. 
Given my particular research interests and the intended study context, I have used 
two of three hypotheses offered by Jennings and Haist related to agency type as a 
theoretical basis for this study. These two hypotheses were developed based on James Q. 
Wilson’s (1989) typology of four agency types: production, procedural, craft, and coping 
agencies. This well-known typology incorporates two dimensions, one related to whether 
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 outputs are observable and another to whether outcomes are observable. Feller (2002) 
also cites Wilson in pointing to the relevance of organizational production characteristics 
on performance measurement systems. 
Production agencies have observable outputs and outcomes (e.g., postal service) 
while craft agencies have outputs that are difficult to discern but observable outcomes 
(e.g., Army Corp of Engineers). Outputs and outcomes are both difficult to observe in 
coping agencies (e.g., police departments). And in procedural agencies, outputs are 
evident, but agencies are challenged to attribute outcomes to their efforts. CDC is an 
example of a procedural agency, in that outputs can be observed but outcomes are 
typically difficult to observe and/or not easily attributable to the agency. For instance, 
one can easily count the number of cooperative agreements, contracts, or grants (i.e., 
outputs) that CDC awards to partner agencies. However, observing outcomes based on 
those outputs is more difficult. First, as noted above, it is a more complicated proposition 
to suggest that eventual changes in longer-term outcomes, such as morbidity or mortality, 
are attributable solely to CDC, especially given the nature of public health problems and 
the networked contexts of interest here. In reality, health outcomes are influenced by 
multiple factors; therefore, they are more likely the result of many different interventions 
and environmental factors. Next, several of CDC’s prevention programs, which count 
incidents of disease, accidents, or suicides that are avoided, are typically problematic if 
not impossible to measure. Finally, many public health outcomes, such as changes in 
morbidity and mortality, take years to achieve, another factor moderating the ability to 
observe agency outcomes. 
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 In table 1 below, Jennings and Haist revise Wilson’s typology to offer the 
expected impact of performance measurement for each agency type (Jennings & Haist 
2004, p. 185). Jennings and Haist define “observability” in two ways – the ability to 
measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to a particular 
agency. 
 
 
Table 1. Expected Impact of Performance Measures by Type of Agency6
  
Outputs Observed 
 
Outputs Unobserved 
 
Outcomes 
Observed 
 
Production Agency: 
Substantive impact is clear; 
performance measures likely to 
be used and to have impact. 
 
Craft Agency: Because outputs are 
difficult to observe (and therefore to 
control), expectation is for symbolic 
impact or the adoption of outcome-
focused performance incentive systems 
as a means of improving agency 
effectiveness. 
 
Outcomes 
Unobserved 
 
Procedural Agency: Substantive 
impact on procedures or 
outputs, but may be difficult to 
assess whether outcomes are 
impacted by performance 
measurement-driven changes in 
outputs being measured. 
Attention will focus on 
efficiency, and the relationship 
of inputs to outputs. 
 
Coping Agency: Because neither outputs 
nor outcomes can be observed, indirect 
measures may be used; however, 
impacts will be unclear or measures will 
be at the activity level. 
 
 
 
                                            
6 Copyright 2004 by Georgetown University Press. Edward T. Jennings and Meg Patrick 
Haist, "Putting Performance Measurement in Context". From The Art of Governance: 
Analyzing Management and Administration, Patricia W. Ingraham and Laurence E. Lynn 
Jr., Editors, p. 185. Figure 8.2: Expected Impact of Performance Measures, by Type of 
Agency. Reprinted with permission. www.press.georgetown.edu. 
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 Jennings and Haist’s first two hypotheses organized around agency type are 
derived directly from the table above and are based on the premise that the use and 
impact of performance measurement is affected by the extent to which (1) outputs and 
outcomes can be observed and attributable to the agency and (2) the extent to which 
outcomes are controlled by the agency. However, the authors also recognize that political 
influences may override the actual ability of agencies to control outcomes. For instance, 
although strong political rhetoric demands schools’ accountability for results, student 
outcomes are extremely difficult to attribute to a particular educational institution or 
program (Jennings and Haist 2004).  
The first two hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the types of 
measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes can be 
observed” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185). 
H2: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater impact when 
agencies have greater control over outcomes” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185). 
The third hypothesis relates to the extent to which measures are consistent with 
the agency’s task and goals. There are different types of performance measures, some 
that focus on processes and others on program outputs and outcomes. Jennings and Haist 
(2004) suggest that the choice of what types of measures to include in any given 
performance measurement system will depend, in part, on which types best reflect 
whether the agency is achieving its mission. Their third hypothesis is as follows:  
H3: “The impact of performance measurement depends on the design of a set of 
measures appropriate to agency tasks and goals” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185).  
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 These three hypotheses provide a constructive, theoretical focus and offer 
valuable direction for this research. Together, the hypotheses emphasize the potential 
influence of organizational context and function on the design and impact of performance 
measurement. This seems a useful point of departure to explore the implications of 
networked public management on the design and implementation of federal performance 
measurement systems in public health. In particular, one observed limitation of Jennings 
and Haist’s work is their lack of explicit attention to either the decentralized nature of 
social programs in the public sector or to the increasing emergence of networked 
governance. This shortcoming has been noted by others (Frederickson and Frederickson 
2006). None of the twenty-five hypotheses, or in fact any of their chapter’s text, 
explicitly addresses the reality of decentralized implementation structures characteristic 
of many public programs, including those at CDC. The three hypotheses highlighted 
above account for agency type or function, but are not particularly attendant to varied 
implementation structures. This weakness is not limited to the work of Jennings and 
Haist; neither GPRA nor much of the vast literature on performance measurement 
addresses the complexities imposed on performance measurement by more complex 
implementation structures. This limitation in the theory development work of Jennings 
and Haist, however, invites an opportunity for this research to contribute to their theory 
building by extending on their theoretical propositions. 
On a more pragmatic level, the research contributes to a better understanding of 
the development and implementation of performance measurement in highly 
decentralized environments. For instance, the first hypothesis is based on the assertion 
that performance measurement is more likely to be used and to have a greater impact in 
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 agencies where outputs and outcomes can be observed (and are attributable to the 
program or agency). Based on this proposition, Jennings and Haist (2004) suggest that 
production agencies (e.g., sanitation) will more frequently and effectively use 
performance measurement than, say, coping agencies (e.g., police department) or 
procedural agencies (e.g., public health) where outputs and outcomes are not easily 
attributable to the agency. How then, do network contexts, in which outcomes are more 
often the result of cooperative efforts and accountability is highly fragmented, affect the 
use of performance measurement, the types of measures employed, and its perceived 
impact?  
The second hypothesis suggests that performance measures are less likely to be 
applied and to have less effect in organizations where control over outcomes is weak 
(Jennings and Haist 2004). In networked environments, the role of public management 
shifts from a focus on command and control to one based on negotiation and bargaining 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Milward and Provan 2006). Cooperative strategies 
become necessary to facilitate coordinated responses that are needed to more effectively 
address social problems. Consequently, and as noted earlier, networks involve 
interdependencies among agencies and partners, and these interdependencies further 
compromise government’s authority over agencies and programs (Peters 2001). What 
then are the effects on performance measurement of these interdependencies and the 
decreased level of control over program outcomes? 
Finally, the third hypothesis relates to the idea that performance measures will 
reflect the agency’s function. Therefore, even in today’s political climate where outcomes 
are emphasized, an agency focused on service delivery may value indicators of process 
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 over outcome measures (Jennings and Haist 2004). How, then, are performance 
measurement systems structured to reflect the agency tasks and goals in a networked 
context?  
1.5 Research Questions 
Given the purpose of the research and the theoretical framework described above, 
three research questions were developed to guide the study. The research questions 
reflect the dominant feature driving the research, helping to maintain attention to the 
major concerns of the study and attending to the complexity and contextuality of the case 
(Stake 1995). The three research questions are directly derived from the first two 
hypotheses above. These research questions, along with the theoretical hypotheses above, 
guided all aspects of the research, focusing both data collection and analysis. 
• How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC 
program outputs and outcomes? 
• How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used? 
• How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
 
1.6 Overview of Methodology and Scope of Study 
Two key characteristics of qualitative research include its aim at understanding 
and description as well as its focus on context and process (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; 
Peshkin 1993). For this study, qualitative research methods are particularly suitable given 
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 the interest to better understand and describe the implications of network public 
management environments (context) for the development and implementation of 
performance measurement systems (process). Qualitative methods allow an in-depth 
exploration of the relevant processes and contextual influences reflected in Jennings and 
Haist’s three hypotheses (Miles and Huberman 1994). These methods are also 
appropriate given the limited understanding of the role of networked contexts on 
performance measurement evident in the extant literature. The field currently lacks the 
depth of understanding needed to support a quantitative study exploring the influence of 
specific variables that could be used to make broader generalizations through statistical 
analysis.  
Case study is most appropriate when the nature of the research addresses 
questions of “how” and “what” and is consistent with the research questions posed above 
(Creswell 2007). Recognizing the importance of context to the practice of performance 
measurement, Joseph Wholey (1999), a long-time leader in the field of policy evaluation, 
has encouraged the conduct of case study research, particularly cross-case analysis, to 
develop related theory and improve practice. Within the traditions of qualitative research, 
case study has been increasingly utilized in public administration and public health 
research (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Case 
study research is especially valuable to capture individual differences from one program 
setting to another or from one program experience to another (Patton 2002; Stake 2006). 
Although several approaches to case study have been described (Merriam 1998; 
Stake 1995, 2006; Yin 2009), Stake’s methodology was used given its wide use, his 
attention to the inclusion of multiple cases, and his specification of unique case study 
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 approaches. Stake (1995, 2006) differentiates between intrinsic and instrumental case 
studies. While intrinsic case study aims to understand a particular case, instrumental case 
study is used to gain broader insight; that is, the case becomes “instrumental” in 
understanding something broader than the individual case. Multiple case study attempts 
to broaden instrumental understanding by including more than one case (Stake 2000). 
The aim of this research was to better understand the development and implementation of 
performance measurement in networked contexts rather than to understand aspects of a 
particular “case” per se. Therefore, a multiple, instrumental case study design was used. 
A detailed description of the methodology is included in chapter 3.  
1.7 Summary 
A growing number of programs including those in STD, preparedness, tobacco, 
and cancer, have shifted to emphasizing collaboration within networks as a means to 
achieve public health goals. This model of networked governance reflects the realities 
imposed by complex public health problems that require coordinated responses across 
agencies and sectors in order to effectively address them. Not only does CDC’s 
leadership endorse this approach, it recognizes the importance of accountability and 
transparency in government. Toward that end, performance measurement has been 
increasingly adopted across CDC and the wider government as a performance 
management tool supporting accountability. 
This research explored the implications of networked public management on the 
design and implementation of federal-level performance measurement systems. As noted 
earlier, performance measurement and networks have been identified as two of the six 
leading trends transforming government today. Given that performance measurement has 
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 been principally described based on a hierarchical view of public management and that 
accountability has been cited as the greatest challenge within networked governance, a 
need emerged to explore the potential difficulties this intersection of context and practice 
presents. The literature has only begun to explore this issue. Initial theory building 
proposed by Jennings and Haist (2002, 2004) provides a valuable framework to help 
guide this investigation. Of Jennings and Haist’s twenty-five proposed hypotheses, three 
based on agency type shaped the development of this study’s research questions.  
Given the fledgling state of research in the area of performance measurement as 
applied in networked public management environments, a multiple, instrumental case 
study was used to gain valuable understanding. Four “cases” of federal-funded public 
health programs administered by CDC were included and traditional qualitative methods 
were applied for data collection and analysis. By better understanding the influence of 
networked governance on the design and implementation of federal performance 
measurement systems for four public health programs administered by CDC, 
recommendations for future practice were developed. In addition, the research 
contributed to expanding the theoretical development that has been initiated by Jennings 
and Haist. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study is informed by relevant literature in performance measurement, public 
health, and networked management. Broader concepts, most prominently, governance 
and New Public Management (NPM) offer important contextual understanding helping to 
frame the proposed study. In the first part of this chapter, literatures related to 
governance, NPM, and the performance movement are all introduced. In the second part 
of the chapter, empirical and other literature related to performance measurement, public 
health, and networked management are presented.  
2.1 Governance 
The term governance has been part of common parlance for decades, but more 
recently, the term has been used to describe a meaningful shift in how we are governing 
(Frederickson and Smith 2003). Indeed, governance has emerged as an organizing 
framework intended to capture an important turn in the practice of public administration 
and management, that is, the processes of governing (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). In 
particular, the more recent focus on governance signals a change in the relationship 
between the state and society and reflects the broader relationships that exist between 
government and its political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl 2002). This 
particular view of governance recognizes that government operates within an 
environment of multiple societal forces rather than viewing it as a ‘stand alone’ 
institution (Stoker 1998). This perspective also suggests that society is departing from the 
more traditional view of government with its “assumptions of a collective public interest, 
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 hierarchical authority that compels compliance with mandates, and separation between 
politics and public administration” (Stone and Ostrower 2006, 5). 
Although definitional consensus for the term governance is lacking, Heinrich and 
Lynn (2000) in their 2000 text, Governance and Performance, defined governance as 
“regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, 
prescribe, and enable government activities, where such activity is broadly defined as the 
production and delivery of publicly supported goods and services” (p. 3). Given that any 
particular governance regime involves compromise and bargaining across the competing 
interests, priorities, and values of varied stakeholders, the Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 
(2000) suggest that governance is an inherently political concept, a view purported earlier 
by Peters and Pierre (1998) and Stoker (1998). More simply, Kettl (2002) suggested, 
“Government refers to the structure and function of public institutions. Governance is the 
way government gets its job done” (p. xi).  
As noted in chapter one, governance provides the overall context for this study for 
two reasons. First, a dominant feature of governance involves third parties and networks 
(Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000). Within the governance framework, the government’s 
work is carried out, in part, through interdependent networks rather than traditional 
hierarchy alone. In governance, it is collaborative networks, rather than the formal 
institutions of government, that dominate public policy and are increasingly responsible 
for delivering public services (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998). 
The second reason for using governance as context for this study is that it reflects the 
larger backdrop within which NPM, with its emphasis on results and its promotion of 
performance measurement, is practiced. In fact, performance or accountability for results 
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 is often specified as the dependent variable to be explained by governance dimensions 
(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Stone and Ostrower 2007). Governance, then, provides 
the overall political and organizational context for this study and, as such, becomes 
relevant in our understanding about how networked management affects the practice of 
performance measurement. 
Although the field recognizes that the concept of governance currently lacks a 
causal theory (Frederickson and Smith 2003), some academics have attempted to describe 
it in more explicit terms. For instance, Pierre and Peters (2005) propose five distinct 
modes of governance, each based on a unique model of state and society interaction, that 
are currently operational in existing democratic systems. Stone and Ostrower (2007) 
identify three features of governance. Stoker (1998) offers a list of five propositions that 
help describe the concept of governance. Salamon (2002) emphasizes the tools of policy 
implementation as he identifies five key concepts of governance. Salamon argues that the 
unit of analysis in the study of governance has shifted from the public agency or program 
to the tools of governance. Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) assume a multidisciplinary 
approach in conceptualizing governance as an expanded view of public administration. 
These various characterizations of governance are distinct, yet they have much in 
common including their emphasis of the following: the actors involved; the 
organizational context comprised predominantly of networks; the tools for policy 
implementation; the processes of governance; accountability challenges; and the 
recognition of the multitude of factors potentially influencing results. These 
characteristics overlap to some extent, but are helpful nonetheless in enhancing our 
understanding of governance. Each is described in greater detail below. 
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 2.1.1 Actors  
As mentioned previously, governance involves two principal actors, the state and 
society. This simple dichotomy, however, belies greater complexity, particularly for the 
state. While the state is commonly divided by policy areas or “stovepipes” and levels 
(i.e., multilevel governance comprised of federal, state, county, and city factions as in the 
U.S.), society is differentiated by various private and non-profit sectors each with varied 
goals (Pierre and Peters 2005). The important point here is that governance involves 
actors and institutions that are drawn well beyond government alone (Stoker 1998).  
Pierre and Peters (2005) proposed five distinct modes of governance, each based 
on a unique model of state and society interaction, that are currently operational in 
democratic systems. Although the authors describe each model based on a set of 
characteristics, the most prominent criteria involves the balance of power between the 
social and public sector actors. The models cover a continuum from intensive 
government involvement and control to nearly no involvement. On one end of the 
continuum sits the “Etatiste” model in which government is assumed to be the principal 
actor and is able to control the involvement of other social actors, usually keeping their 
participation at a minimum. At the other end of the continuum resides the model titled, 
“Governance without Government;” scholars argue that this model is characterized by 
“self-steering government arrangements” controlled primarily by private actors (Pierre 
and Peters 2005, 12). Stoker (1998) also suggested that governance involves 
“autonomous self-governing networks of actors” (p. 18). This metaphor of governance 
without government is similar to that of the “hollow state,” a characterization which 
implies a shift in focus from traditional public administrative practice within a 
 29
 bureaucratic state to one that recognizes the loss of state power to other social actors in 
the policy process (Milward and Provan 2000).  
In the governance without government model, the state is viewed as having lost 
its legitimacy, is less relevant to the policy process, and has, therefore, lost its capacity to 
govern (Pierre and Peters 2005). In between the etatiste and governance without 
government models, Pierre and Peters (2005) described three other models (i.e., liberal-
democratic, state-centric, and the Dutch governance school models) that reflect shades of 
this balance between the public and private realms participating in contemporary 
governance activities.  
Given the varied actors involved in governance, Stoker (1998) suggests that there 
has been a blurring of responsibilities and boundaries in addressing social and economic 
issues. This is similar to Kettl’s (2002) articulation of “fuzzy boundaries” inherent in 
governance based on the involvement of different actors and their changing roles. The 
fuzzy boundaries represent the challenges posed by the loss of traditional hierarchy’s 
clear lines of responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. Kettl identifies a number 
of “fuzzy boundaries” related to the multitude of actors that are relevant for program 
management and suggests, “The fuzzy boundary problem confounds the central task of 
administration building coordinated efforts to solve complex problems” (p. 59). 
2.1.2 Organizational Context Comprised of Networks  
As mentioned earlier, a defining feature of governance involves organizational 
networks and their role in dominating public policy (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000; 
Pierre and Peters 1998; Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). Frederickson and Smith (2003) 
state, “Governance is the modern theory of network management” (p. 125). Peters and 
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 Pierre (1998) suggest that the prominence of networks in governance has occurred, in 
part, because of the de-legitimization of the state due to its perceived bureaucratic, slow, 
and seemingly unresponsive nature. Salamon (2002) argues that today’s emphasis on 
indirect policy tools has also contributed to the increasing role of networks in 
governance. And, as noted earlier, others suggest that networks have evolved to more 
effectively tackle complex public management problems that demand a collective and 
coordinated response (Agranoff and McGuire 2001b; Milward and Provan 2006; O’Toole 
1997). 
In a governance framework, networks involve interdependent relationships 
between the state and other third-party actors from the private and non-profit sectors. 
Although the state acts as an important partner in the network, it is conceptualized as just 
one of the interdependent actors. As noted in the section above, Pierre and Peters (2005) 
describe varied models of governance differentiated, in part, by the strength (or lack 
thereof) of the state’s power in this balance. Of relevance here, is that in a governance 
framework, power dependencies exists within the relationships involved in the collective 
action of the network (Stoker 1998). 
Given the network’s composition and power differentials, the straightforward 
command and control administrative mechanisms of the past are compromised by the fact 
that varied organizations now control some of the traditional tasks of government 
(Milward and Provan 2006). In a governance relationship, various organizations may 
dominate certain processes, but no one agency can easily command given that problems 
are no longer controlled within the boundaries of one agency (Milward and Provan 2006; 
Stoker 1998). Subsequently, a mutual resource dependency is created among network 
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 partners, including those from the public sector, whereby a single organization (i.e., the 
state) cannot command but is more often dependent on the compliance of the other 
participating actors (Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998).  
However, hierarchical relations with command and control structures are not 
entirely replaced by a configuration of networks; our governance system is rooted in a 
constitutional scheme that requires some amount of hierarchical relations that address 
political and judicial requirements for accountability (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). 
Heinrich, Hill and Lynn (2004) argue that less likely are the extremes of pure hierarchy 
or networks (i.e., governance without government), instead, the more practical problems 
of governance rest “where networks are hierarchical ‘tools of government’” (p. 10). 
Obviously, this leads to consideration of how government can most effectively manage 
networks (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). 
To some extent, the networks of governance are related to the issue networks 
described by Hugh Heclo and others in the policy literature (Heclo 1978; Parsons 1995). 
However, in governance networks, the network goes beyond influencing policy formation 
and adoption to actually “taking over the business of government” (Stoker 1998, p. 23). 
Whereas Heclo described the role of issue networks in policy formation, governance 
networks play a more significant role in long chains of policy implementation. Stoker 
(1998) suggests that these networks forge their capacities by blending their resources and 
expertise to form a long-term coalition or “regime” which represents the ultimate act of 
power in a system of governance.  
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 2.1.3 Multiple Factors Affecting Outcomes  
As noted, Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) propose an analytic framework to 
guide the empirical study of governance. Explicit in their “logic of governance,” is the 
recognition that performance (i.e., individual or organizational level outcomes) are 
dependent on several classes of variables including environmental factors, client or 
consumer characteristics, treatments or interventions, structures (administrative or 
organizational), and aspects of management. This characteristic of governance and its 
implications for performance measurement is revisited later in this section. 
2.1.4 Tools of Policy Implementation 
Salamon (2002) is the strongest proponent of the expanded use of policy tools as a 
defining characteristic of governance. Salamon defined a policy tool or instrument of 
public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem” (p.19). Stoker (1998) also recognizes that, within this new 
framework of governance, government can apply new tools and techniques to “steer and 
guide” rather than relying on the “power of government to command or use its authority” 
(p. 18). And Pierre and Peters (2005) acknowledge the importance of policy 
implementation in governance and the expanded use of less-intrusive policy instruments 
that often depend on private sector actors.  
Salamon (2002) suggests that within governance the unit of analysis has shifted 
from the public agency or program to the tools of governance. Salamon (2002) argued 
that individual tools used in policy implementation both dictate the actors involved and 
represent a critical factor in structuring the implementation process. Consequently, by 
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 focusing on the policy tool, one can predict the actors who will be involved, the roles 
they will play in the implementation process, the structure of that process, and its 
outcomes (Salamon 2002). Furthermore, as noted earlier, Salamon (2002) emphasized 
that the indirect nature of many of the policy tools used today have contributed to the 
increasing role of networks which, he contends, are largely shaped by the tool used as 
those tools play a large role in defining the actors and their roles.  
2.1.5 Processes of Governance 
Pierre and Peters (2005) identified a number of processes involved in governance 
including identifying and selecting the collective goals of society, makings decisions 
about how to realize those goals, mobilizing resources across the public and private 
sectors to reach the goals, choosing the appropriate implementation tools, and providing 
feedback based on evaluation to support future decision making. In all these processes of 
governance, the private sector may play a significant role. This is in contrast to 
hierarchical government, which, based on its authoritative orientation, acts primarily 
through mechanisms of control and regulation.  
In governance, the relational interdependencies among actors involved in 
networks implies that the state loses the capacity for direct control and must rely, instead, 
on influence and leverage via a continual processes of bargaining, negotiation, 
persuasion, and mediating (Kettl 2002; Peters and Pierre 1998; Pierre and Peters 2005; 
Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). In the context of governance, cooperation and collaboration 
between horizontally arranged stakeholders in the public and private sectors replace 
competition (Milward and Provan 2006; Salamon 2002). The recognition of the role for 
negotiation, compromise, and bargaining among actors coming to the table with different 
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 agendas, goals, and priorities again emphasizes the political nature of governance 
(Frederickson and Smith 2003) and points to the need for a different set of enablement 
skills rather than management skills among public sector employees (Salamon 2002). 
2.1.6 Accountability Challenge 
The shift in administrative practice described above highlights what Stoker (1998) 
and others (Kettl 2002) identify as new dilemmas related to democratic accountability 
inherent in the governance framework. Peters and Pierre (1998) echo this concern 
suggesting that the issue of accountability, in particular, is unresolved in contrast to the 
traditional channels of answerability inherent in the bureaucratic state. Several of the 
other aspects of governance noted above contribute to the accountability challenges in 
governance. The increased devolution and resulting administrative fragmentation based 
on the growing involvement of the private sector in policy implementation, the 
challenges posed by fuzzy boundaries, the reliance on bargaining and lack of formal 
chains of command, the nature of the indirect policy tools used all these contribute to 
making accountability more difficult to assign within a governance structure.  
2.1.7 Summary of Governance 
The features outlined above help to understand how government is getting its 
work done in a framework defined as governance. In governance, producing and 
delivering public goods and services is increasingly dependent on non-governmental 
partners whom are often arranged and organized through networks and participate with 
government in processes of goal setting, decision making, resource mobilization, and 
feedback. The networks involved in governance do not entirely replace the hierarchical 
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 organization of more traditional government structure, but augment those by imposing a 
new horizontal layer of stakeholders involved in policy formation and implementation 
(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). The value of networks may be their ability to more 
effectively address outcomes that often reflect the influence of multiple factors. Networks 
are addressed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Governance also involves the use of an expanded array of policy tools, often 
indirect in their nature. Without the strict lines of authority imposed by hierarchy, the 
public sector must focus on negotiation and bargaining in the governance context, in what 
is essentially a political process. Finally, given the extensive involvement of third parties, 
the network structure, use of indirect policy tools, and reliance on negotiation and 
bargaining, accountability becomes particularly problematic in the governance 
framework, an issue that will be addressed in more detail in the sections below.  
2.2 New Public Management (NPM) 
While governance may best be characterized as a political concept based in 
democratic theory, it relates closely to NPM, an influential reform movement in public 
management that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Peters and Pierre (1988) 
argue that fundamental differences exist between governance and NPM which demand 
that they be viewed as separate concepts. Although some similarities between the two at 
the operative level are acknowledged, the authors have identified a number of 
fundamental differences on a more theoretical level. These differences include the 
following: (1) governance is about process while NPM emphasizes outcomes and results; 
(2) governance is inter-organizational in concept while NPM has an intra-organizational 
focus; (3) governance is based in democratic theory whereas NPM is seen as ideological 
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 in nature calling for the adoption of market practices for the delivery of public sector 
goods; (4) forms of governance maintain some public sector resources under government 
control in an effort to support government’s ability to act, whereas NPM advocates a 
larger transformation of the public sector; and (5) forms of governance are seen as easier 
to adopt in contrast to NPM which requires more substantive cultural shifts (Frederickson 
and Smith 2003; Hood and Peters 2004; Peters and Pierre 1998). Hood and Peters (2004) 
also acknowledge the ideological nature of NPM, describing a number of paradoxes that 
have emerged during its tenure – chastising “one size fits all” approaches while adopting 
such forms in practice, promoting “evidence-based learning” while often adopting 
“evidence-free” approaches, and advocating for rational techniques of budget control 
despite the incremental budgeting experience of previously, like-minded reforms. 
Peters (2001) suggests that advocates of NPM contend that government cannot do 
anything well so it should do as little as possible. Advocates of the NPM reform 
movement suggest that government is drowning in its own, overgrown bureaucracy 
resulting in widespread inefficiency. From this view, government is seen as out of touch 
with the public, economically complacent, preoccupied with due process, and indifferent 
to the needs of its clients or “customers” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). The thrust of NPM 
is an advocacy for the adoption of market-based approaches which are believed as 
operating more effectively and efficiently. Proponents of NPM argue that the 
management and methods of the private sector are inherently superior to those applied in 
the traditional public sector (Peters 2001). Therefore, advocates of NPM view the public-
private dichotomy as obsolete (Peters and Pierre 1998) and suggest that government 
should adopt fundamental corporate notions of competition to create internal markets. 
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 Through markets, government will be enabled to do more with less by increasing 
efficiencies at multiple levels. Although governance models also incorporate an 
introduction of competition to the public sector, it is not to the same degree and instead, 
the focus is toward blending private and public resources through a more cooperative and 
collaborative approach involving inter-organizational partners (Peters and Pierre 1998).  
The principles of NPM or “new managerialism” have been widely accepted in the 
practice of public administration although extensive empirical study supporting the 
approach is lacking (Frederickson and Smith 2003). In general, NPM can be described as 
a generic management philosophy as the approach assumes that, regardless of whether 
working in the private or public sector, similar management challenges prevail and 
should be addressed in a similar fashion (Peters and Pierre 1998). David Osborne’s and 
Ted Gaebler’s1993 book, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector, is viewed as a guiding text for NPM. The authors 
suggest that America faces a deep crisis in how government operates and called for a new 
kind of government, an “entrepreneurial government,” to represent a paradigm shift in 
how government does its work (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). In their text, NPM is 
represented through ten principles, each summarized in an independent chapter. Their 
tenets of NPM include a government which (1) “steers” rather than rows, (2) empowers 
rather than serves, (3) encourages competition, (4) endorses a mission-based organization 
rather than one which is rule-driven, (5) funds outcomes rather than outputs, (6) assumes 
a customer-focus, (7) earns rather than spends, (8) prevents rather than cures, (9) works 
through decentralization characterized by participation and teamwork rather than 
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 hierarchy, and (10) applies a market-approach to government (Osborne and Gaebler 
1993).  
These principles translate into a government reform emphasizing decentralized 
government, contracting through third parties, deregulation, increased competition, 
citizen or customer choice, increased discretion among managers, and outcome 
measurement as a means to assess effectiveness (Frederickson and Smith 2003). 
Similarly, Kettl (2000) identifies six core issues of NPM including productivity, 
marketization, service orientation, decentralization, policy, and accountability. 
2.3 The Performance Movement: Policy Reforms 
As noted above, performance is central to NPM with results so fundamental to the 
reform that it is often referred to as “results-oriented government.” Performance, as 
measured through outcomes rather than outputs, is emphasized in NPM as a means to 
assess management and policy as well as a means of accountability (Peters 2001).  As 
mentioned earlier, where accountability is viewed as problematic in the governance 
framework, it is perceived as a particular strength of NPM (Peters and Pierre 1998). In 
fact, a central theme in NPM is the improvement of government performance through 
accountability mechanisms that more directly connect providers and consumers of public 
services. From this view, the point of accountability is substantially shifted from the 
elected official to the administrator (Barberis 1998; Dubnick 2005). 
Paul Light, in his respected 1997 text, Tides of Reform: Making Government 
Work, 1945-1995, inventories federal reform statutes passed during the 50 year period 
1945-1995 and identifies four major public management reforms, or tides, including, “(1) 
scientific management with its focus on tight hierarchy, specialization, and clear chains 
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 of command, (2) war on waste, with its emphasis on inspectors, auditors, cross checkers, 
and reviewers, (3) watchful eye, with its embrace of sunshine and openness, and (4) 
liberation management, with its cry to let the managers manage, albeit with a bit of 
market pressure” (p. 1).  
Light (1997) suggests that the most recent reform of liberation management is not 
new, but instead reflects aspects of earlier reforms, particularly, scientific management. 
Light identifies competition through increased privatization of the public sector and 
deregulation as the main tools of liberation management which attempts to encourage 
more entrepreneurial approaches to management through public agencies emphasizing 
“steering” rather than rowing. The goal of liberation management, according to Light, is 
higher performance based on outcomes or results, which are seen as the reform’s key 
products. Al Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR) passed in 1993 is recognized as 
the defining moment for liberation management and the 1993 Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA) as its defining statute (Light 1997). Light noted the influence of 
Osborne and Gaebler on the movement as a whole, but, in particular, on Gore’s NPR 
stating “Osborne in particular was so important to the NPR that the final report was 
known as REGO (for reinventing government) in his honor” (p. 36). The NPR, later 
called the National Partnership for Reinvention Government, was headed by Vice 
President Gore and had strong political visibility throughout the Clinton Administration. 
Not surprisingly, a chief tenet of NPR involves holding public managers accountable for 
results (Affholter 1994). 
GPRA was not necessarily a new idea. It is a statute that has roots in several 
earlier reforms including the Program, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) from the 
 40
 1960s, Management by Objectives (MBO) in the early 1970s under Presidents Ford and 
Nixon, and President Carter’s Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) in the late 1970s (Light 
1997; Nathan 2001; Radin 2006). In fact, the General Accounting Office (GAO7) 
suggests that GPRA improves on those earlier reforms by incorporating their best 
features (GAO 1997c). These reforms, including GPRA, are generally aimed at 
improving federal management by introducing greater rationality into government 
decision making, particularly the federal appropriations and budgeting process (GAO 
1996).  
GPRA was passed as part of a larger statutory framework to improve federal 
management that included the Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO), other legislation 
related to information technology such as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act (GAO 1997c). GPRA is seen as the centerpiece of this framework 
which is intended to instill a results-orientation in the federal government. It is 
worthwhile to note that several features distinguished GPRA from the earlier reforms 
(e.g., MBO, PPBS) noted above. Most importantly, GPRA was passed as federal statute 
and, as such, mandates roles for Congress and the legislative branch that previous 
reforms did not. In other words, GPRA does not go away with a changing administration 
like executive reform initiatives such as the Clinton and Gore’s NPR.  
As the federal fiscal environment tightened, GPRA was intended to address some 
long-standing management problems that were seen as undermining government’s 
efficiency and effectiveness and to introduce greater accountability for results (GAO 
2004). The law specifies the following purposes: (1) to improve the confidence of the 
                                            
7 The General Accounting Office has been renamed the Government Accountability 
Office. 
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 American people in the federal government; (2) improve program effectiveness through 
promoting a new focus on results, customer service, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction; (3) help Federal managers improve service delivery; (4) improve 
congressional decision making; and (5) improve the internal management of the federal 
government (GPRA 1993). David G. Frederickson (2003), in his study of GPRA’s 
implementation in five HHS programs, stated, “While measures of government 
performance and the logic of strategic management have been around since the 1930s, 
GPRA is certainly the most ambitious and comprehensive approach to measuring 
government performance and results that has ever been attempted” (p. 13).  
Specifically, GPRA’s requirements include the development of five-year strategic 
plans by all federal agencies, followed by program-specific performance plans with 
specific performance goals and corresponding performance indicators that allow for 
comparing actual results with the established performance goals (GPRA 1993). Through 
annual program performance reports, progress toward meeting goals based on 
performance information is reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
The Act allowed for a seven year start-up period with the first strategic plans due to OMB 
in 1997 and the first performance reports supplemented with actual data due in 2000. In 
addition, a number of pilot demonstration projects were included as part of GPRA to 
assess its implementation (GPRA 1993). When passed by law in 1993, the bill received 
overwhelming support from Congress as well as the Clinton Administration and was 
endorsed by the National Academy of Public Administration (Affholter 1994). Its 
passage was accompanied by strident political support such as this from Senator William 
Roth, one of GPRA’s chief authors, “For the first time, the American people will be told 
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 what levels of service and program results they can expect from their tax dollars, 
followed by reports on what was actually achieved. It may sound like common sense for 
the government to do this – and it is – but is has not been done before by the federal 
government” (Cited in Light 1997, 235).  
The specific focus on results or outcomes, rather than inputs or processes, is 
another distinguishing feature of GPRA from earlier reforms. This move to a results-
orientation requires a shift in organizational culture that may necessitate new ways for 
administrators to conduct their work (Mihm 2000). GPRA does not aim, like some earlier 
reforms or executive initiatives, to reorganize government in any structural way. Rather, 
as noted previously, it takes government structure as a given and emphasizes improving 
management through goal setting and achieving results (D.G. Frederickson 2003). By 
attempting to replace the rule-based compliance type accountability of more traditional 
bureaucracy with performance and results-based accountability, GPRA’s focus on results 
reflects the tenets of NPM (Light 1997).  
As for any political reform, GPRA embodies the varied agendas of different 
stakeholders, some not so readily reflected in its statutory language (Radin 2006). First, 
some advocates of performance measurement view GPRA as a means toward better 
government. These stakeholders assume that government activities are measurable and 
measurement is the most objective means to inform public policy decision making (D.G. 
Frederickson 2003). This view of GPRA, and the reinventing movement in general, 
reflects a commitment toward a rational decision making model whereby politics are 
avoided and “objective” performance data will be managerially used in the policy process 
to improve decision making, and, in particular, decisions about budgeting (Broom, et al. 
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 2002; Kravchuck and Schack 1996; Peters, 2001; Radin 2006). However, as Broom and 
her colleagues (2002) pointed out, “Virtually all systematic examinations suggest that a 
focus on performance does not preclude political considerations from driving decision 
making” (p. 2).  This is especially true for the federal budgeting process, one that is 
intrinsically pluralistic, political, and incremental in nature (Frederickson, DG, 2003; 
GAO 1997c; Nathan 2001; Radin 2006; Schick 2001). There is, in fact, no evidence to 
suggest that GPRA has affected the federal appropriations process (Frederickson 2001; 
GAO 2005).  
Other stakeholders, particularly professional government accountability experts, 
see GPRA as a means for budget cutting and government reduction through the 
identification of duplicative and ineffective government programs (Radin 2003). And still 
others view GPRA from a more apolitical stance, to address issues related to public 
relations or budget maximizing objectives (D.G. Frederickson 2003). Given the political 
nature of the policy process, the promise of GPRA, and performance measurement more 
generally, may lie on its potential contribution to improve decision making by policy 
makers, administrators, and program managers and increase government accountability to 
its citizens (Fredrickson 2001, 2003). As Wholey and Newcomer (1997) suggested, “The 
theory behind the Government Performance and Results Act is that planning and 
performance measurement will help agencies communicate performance expectations and 
results – and that the use of performance information will improve management and 
program effectiveness, improve policy decision making, and improve public confidence 
in government” (p. 93). 
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 An evaluation of GPRA on its tenth anniversary conducted by GAO (2004) based 
on a randomized survey of federal managers as well as interviews, focus groups, and 
document reviews identified a number of positive findings. These include: (1) federal 
managers surveyed reported having significantly more of the types of performance 
measures (i.e., outcome measures) required by GPRA than at earlier times; (2) 
interviewees reported GPRA having positive effects on planning and reporting; and (3) 
reviews of plans suggested that GAO feedback was incorporated to improve plans, goals 
became more quantifiable over time and more results-oriented, and agencies provided 
increasing detail about their goals and strategies to address concerns about performance 
and accountability (GAO 2004). In general, research suggests that GPRA has contributed 
to improved program management but has not been used by legislators for influencing 
decision making related to appropriations (Frederickson 2001; GAO 2004). 
Although GPRA has strong support, it also has its share of critics. Beryl Radin 
has written extensively about GPRA and the performance movement more generally 
(1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003, 2006). She suggests that the GPRA legislation can best 
be viewed as an example of a government-wide, one-size-fits-all reform that endorses 
generic activities and requirements (2006). She argues that GPRA “does not fit easily into 
the institutional structures, functions, and political realities of the American system,” 
rendering GPRA, like previous reforms to, “operate largely as rhetorical positions or 
arguments without the ability to influence substantive policy and budgetary processes” 
(Radin 2000a, 111).   
Others have identified important limitations in the legislation itself, including 
GPRA’s failure to recognize a number of unique attributes of public programs including: 
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 (1) varied goals and contexts of different federal agencies, (2) the extensive degree of 
decentralization in program implementation structures, (3) the variety of policy 
instruments employed by each for implementation, and (4) the unique challenges faced 
by agencies in measuring the performance of public programs (D.G. Frederickson 2003). 
Studies of federal agencies’ experience with GPRA have confirmed these issues as 
challenges (Frederickson 2003; GAO 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2000; Mihm 2000). Given the 
uniform nature of GPRA and its requirements (i.e., Radin’s claim that GPRA is another 
one-size-fits-all, government-wide reform), these areas of variability challenge its 
implementation.  
Of particular note are those challenges to GPRA posed by key attributes of NPM, 
specifically, its emphasis on decentralization, the increased use of third parties, and 
expanded use of policy tools. Several researchers have pointed out that GPRA does not 
acknowledge government’s extensive decentralization and use of third parties, including 
those that are arranged in networks, nor does it recognize the characteristics or purposes 
of those arrangements (Fossett, Gais, and Thompson 2001; Frederickson 2001, 2003; 
Radin 2001b). Given a decentralized context, Radin (2000b) suggests that GPRA’s 
requirement that federal agencies define performance goals rather than the states, reflects 
the law’s “compliance” orientation which contradicts NPM’s advocacy for increased 
autonomy to third parties. In his qualitative dissertation study, briefly introduced in 
chapter one, David G. Frederickson explores the experience of five HHS agencies 
implementing GPRA8. All five agencies utilize implementation structures Frederickson 
                                            
8 Agencies involved in the study included Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National Institutes for 
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 (2003) described as “articulated vertical networks of third parties.” His most important 
findings center on the implementation challenges to GPRA posed by third party 
governance and the influence of varied policy instruments used by each federal agency9. 
The term “articulated” reflects the “extent to which separate organizations or institutions 
in a network are coupled, fit together, linked, or combined and the nature and quality of 
those connections,” (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006, 8).  
In a book written by Frederickson along with his father, H. George Frederickson, 
the authors expand on the younger Frederickson’s dissertation research to discuss how 
these varied “articulated vertical networks” relate to government performance 
(Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). Based on grounded theory methodology, the 
authors identified the following explanatory factors or variables influencing the 
implementation of GPRA in the five agencies (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006, 
152): 
1. level of third-party policy implementation 
2. accountability to federal program purposes 
3. nature and quality of network articulations 
4. characteristics of goals 
5. level of centralization of policy implementation 
                                                                                                                                  
Health (NIH), Indian Health Services (IHS), and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). 
9 Frederickson adopted Salamon’s (2002) view of policy tools. The FDA uses regulatory 
policy tools; CMS uses grants for Medicare and contracted services for Medicaid; HRSA 
uses grants; IHS uses grants to support direct service; NIH uses grants to support 
intramural research 
 47
 6. precision and characteristics of performance measurement 
7. level and character of client and stakeholder support 
8. level of professional identity 
In Frederickson and Frederickson’s text (2006), each variable is presented as a 
heuristic continuum and the five cases placed appropriately. For instance, the continuum 
for the level of third-party implementation extends from completely hollowed out to that 
of direct government. While IHS is placed toward the latter end of the spectrum, HRSA 
and Medicaid reflect the hollowed out end. Frederickson and Frederickson deduce that 
variability in types of third parties, types of policy tools, implementation models, and 
arrangements in federal agency-third-party articulations and vertical networks all have 
significant influence on the development of useful performance measurement systems for 
GPRA. So although the law itself may seem a “one size fits all” type policy, programs 
seem to have developed varied approaches given the factors noted above. 
Others address methodological issues related to GPRA arguing that the legislation 
makes an implicit assumption that information about performance, the heart of 
performance measurement, is accessible, affordable, and reliable (Perrin 1998; Radin 
2006). Even more fundamentally, some point to the challenges in measuring social 
phenomenon arguing that it is often quite difficult, if not impossible, to develop 
indicators for social programs in the same way that economic indicators relate to profit 
are used (Perrin, 1998; Barry 2000).  
Although GPRA remains in place following the close of Clinton and Gore’s NPR, 
it has been overshadowed to some extent by the former Bush Administration’s effort to 
link the executive branch budget recommendations to performance. While GPRA had bi-
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 partisan support from both Congress and the White House when it was passed as law in 
1993, the Bush administration implemented its own approach to performance 
measurement as part of its wider President’s Management Agenda (PMA) (Gilmour 
2006). The effort on the part of the Bush administration to integrate performance 
information into budget decision making is one of the PMA’s five government-wide 
management priorities, the Budget and Performance Integration initiative (Brass 2004). 
Called the Program Assessment Rating Tool or PART, the instrument was developed by 
OMB and includes a standard series of approximately twenty-five questions. PART is 
viewed as a diagnostic tool intended to make conclusions about the benefits of federal 
programs based on program performance and evaluation information (GAO 2005). The 
questions fall under four topic areas including: (1) program purpose and design; (2) 
strategic planning; (3) program management; and (4) programs results (GAO 2005). Each 
of these dimensions is weighted in the instrument’s numerical scoring and then converted 
into an overall qualitative rating that can be compared across federal programs. PART 
was developed to assess different types of federal executive branch programs in order to 
direct funding and management decisions and brings even greater attention to outcomes 
and results than GPRA (Brass 2004; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006).  
PART was initiated in 2002 for use in the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle and has 
been incrementally applied in a systematic assessment of executive branch programs that 
have funding associated with them (Brass 2004). GAO conducted an assessment in 2004 
of the first 234 programs assessed by OMB for PART for fiscal year 2004 budget cycle 
(GAO 2005). Their analysis identified over 600 recommendations made by OMB as part 
of those reviews. GAO found that OMB judged one-half of the programs reviewed as 
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 having inadequate results-based information (GAO 2005). Additionally, GAO found that 
half the recommendations made by OMB related to improving program assessment, in 
particular, to identify program outcome measures and collect or obtain improved 
performance data or program evaluations (GAO 2005). In 2005, GAO conducted another 
assessment to review whether programs had, in fact, improved their evidence base for the 
PART review. They found that while the PART process stimulated agencies to build their 
evaluation capacity, programs more typically designed evaluations to meet their own 
needs related to program improvement rather than broader, impact level evaluations 
(GAO 2005). In addition, early analysis of PART suggested that assessment results are 
not effectively impacting the budget recommendations of the executive branch, despite 
their claims to the contrary (Brass 2004).  
The relationship between GPRA and PART has not been well described by OMB 
except to note that both are central to maintaining a focus on results (Brass 2004; GAO 
2004). GAO has repeatedly recommended that OMB articulate an integrated, 
complimentary relationship between the two policies (GAO 2004, 2005); others have 
suggested that a stronger integration of the two would strengthen the executive and 
congressional management reforms (Brass 2004). In sum, while there is limited evidence 
to date of GPRA or PART’s success as results-based reforms, especially in terms of their 
impact on federal budgeting or improving performance, they both reflect the influence of 
NPM and the prominence given organizational performance in government today 
(Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004; Schick 2001). Significant time and resources on the part of 
federal agencies are spent addressing both policies (Dubnick 2005). These two “results-
based” initiatives, grounded on the assumption that increased accountability through 
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 performance measurement will, in fact, lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness of 
government, have been central to NPM and have held substantial sway in the 
management operations of federal agencies. 
2.4 Performance Measurement 
In her book about performance measurement Radin (2006) suggests, “It is not an 
exaggeration to characterize the concern about performance as ubiquitous” (p. 4).  
Similarly, Coplin, Merget, and Bourdeaux (2002) state, “Performance, in a word, 
captures the zeitgeist of the 1990s among professional researchers in public 
administration” (p. 699). This view is endorsed by others (Behn 2003; Blalock and 
Barnow 2001; Grizzle 2002; Schick 2001) and reflects the importance of performance 
measurement in government today. Attention to performance, long standing in the private 
sector, now seems infused in our culture, cutting across all levels of government and 
extending to the nonprofit arena as well (Hendricks 2002). 
Performance in education is given particular attention by the press, but the media 
also addresses performance in health, the environment, welfare, transportation, foreign 
policy, national security and other areas of the public sector (Radin 2006). An assumption 
of unquestionable benefit is presumed. For instance, writing about the U.S. News & 
World Reports annual college rankings, David Leonhardt stated, “Human beings do a 
better job of just about anything when their performance is evaluated and they are held 
accountable for it. You can’t manage what you don’t measure, as the management adage 
says, and because higher education is by all accounts critical to the country’s economic 
future, it sure seems to be deserving of rigorous measurement” (Leonhardt 2006, C1). 
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 In this section, relevant literature on performance measurement is summarized. 
The literature is vast, therefore, this review is limited to publications and journal articles 
about government-based performance measurement, and, in particular, addresses 
empirically-based quantitative and qualitative studies (e.g., studies based on surveys as 
well as case studies by GAO and others). Literature related to the principles and practice 
of performance measurement is also included. Given that performance measurement is a 
central feature of governance and NPM’s recent reforms (i.e., GPRA and PART), the 
practice has strong champions. Consequently, Frederickson (2003) and others (Forsythe 
2001; Nathan 2001) suggest that a dominant literature for the field has a distinct 
normative or advocacy tone that tends to promote an idealized view of the contribution 
performance measurement can make to improve government. In contrast, as noted earlier, 
others have adopted a more critical stance. This literature, both positive and negative, 
might be best characterized as “commentary” and some, relevant to this study, is included 
here as well.  
2.4.1 Principles and Practice of Performance Measurement 
An extensive literature is available addressing the principles of performance 
measurement and approaches for conducting it. Lead authors in this arena include Hatry 
(1999), Newcomer (1997), Poister (2003), and Wholey (2002). Performance 
measurement is rooted in management theory and practice, in particular, in performance 
management. Performance management involves several independent processes 
including: (1) the development of agency or program mission, goals, and strategies; (2) 
the development of performance measurement instruments and systems; (3) the use of 
analytic techniques to interpret performance measures; and (4) use of performance 
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 information for strengthening accountability, improving program effectiveness, and 
supporting policy-related decision making (Smith and Goddard 2002; Wholey 2002). A 
performance management system involves the continuous use of all four practices so that 
they are integrated into the core operations of an organization (Landrum and Baker 
2004). Central to performance management, then, is performance measurement which 
Poister (2003) defines as “the process of defining, monitoring, and using objective 
indicators of the performance of organizations and programs on a regular basis” (p. 1). 
Some definitions overtly emphasize outcomes and efficiency as the object of 
measurement (Hatry 1999) while others are more inclusive of program inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes at various stages (e.g., intermediate outcomes, end or long-term outcomes) 
(Newcomer 1997). The indicators of performance, or performance measures, are most 
often quantitative, objective measures related to some aspect of agency or program 
performance (Poister 2003). Although some make a distinction between performance 
measures and performance indicators, the terms will be used interchangeably here. 
The development and implementation of a performance measurement system 
typically involves several key steps (Hatry 2002, p. 30; Poister 2003, p. 23): 
1. Assure management commitment 
 
2. Clarify purpose and system parameters 
 
3. Identify mission, objectives, and clients of the program 
 
4. Identify outcomes and other performance criteria 
 
5. Define, evaluate, and select indicators 
 
6. Identify data sources and data collection procedures, providing for quality 
assurance 
 
7. Develop an analysis plan 
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8. Specify the system design (reporting frequencies and channels, analytical and 
reporting formats, software applications, roles and responsibility for system 
maintenance) 
9. Conduct a pilot and make indicated revisions 
 
10. Implement (full-scale) 
 
11. Use, evaluate, and modify system as appropriate 
 
Because of its relevance to this study, categories of performance information used 
in performance measurement systems should also be defined. These categories are 
summarized in table 2 (Hatry 1999, 2001; Newcomer 1997; Poister 2003). 
 
 
Table 2. Categories of Performance Information Used in Performance Measurement 
 
Inputs: Inputs reflect the resources actually used to produce or deliver program outputs 
or outcomes. Inputs are typically described based on amount of funding, number of 
employees, etc. 
 
Outputs: Outputs are the products and services completed or delivered based on the 
inputs. Outputs are the things that the program has done such as the number of trainings 
delivered, the number of condoms distributed, or the number of breast cancer 
mammograms provided.  
 
Outcomes: Outcomes reflect the program’s consequences and can include intermediate 
and long-term outcomes. Outcomes are typically influenced by external factors beyond 
an individual program’s control. 
• Intermediate outcomes are those expected to lead to longer-term outcomes, but 
are not ends in themselves. For instance, using the mammography example above, 
increasing the number of women re-screened annually for breast cancer is an 
intermediate outcome.  
• Long-term or end outcomes are the intended results of the program. Again, 
using the example above, a reduction in the rate of late stage breast cancer 
diagnosis (morbidity) reflects a long-term outcome. 
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 2.4.2 Assumptions and Orientation of Performance Measurement 
Radin (2006, 19) describes a set of assumptions intrinsic to conducting 
performance measurement which include: 
1. Goals can be defined clearly and set firmly as the basis for the performance 
measurement process. 
 
2. Goals are specific and the responsibility of definable actors. 
 
3. Outcomes can be specified independently of inputs, processes, and outputs. 
 
4. Outcomes can be quantified and measured. 
 
5. Outcomes are controllable and susceptible to external timing. 
 
6. Data are available, clear, and accurate. 
 
7. Results of the performance measurement can be delivered to an actor with 
authority to respond to the results.  
 
As mentioned previously, some suggest that much of what has been advanced 
regarding performance measurement assumes a hierarchical context composed of two-
party direct government and where accountability structures are clear (Frederickson 
2003; Goddard and Mannion 2004; Perrin 1998). In a hierarchical context, performance 
measurement is seen as an important public management tool of command and control 
between principals and agents to assess accountability by ensuring results or outcomes 
are achieved.  
2.4.3 Uses and Purposes of Performance Measurement 
A good deal of literature advances the benefits of performance measurement 
including its use: (1) as a management tool for program oversight and to link goals and 
objectives to performance; (2) as an accountability mechanism to assess whether results 
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 are achieved, contribute to more efficient budgeting, and improve confidence in 
government; (3) to support data-driven planning and decision making; (4) to increase 
government transparency; (5) as a monitoring tool to identify potential implementation or 
program theory problems and make revisions; (6) as a means to identify areas for in-
depth evaluation; (7) to compare patterns of performance over time; (8) for public 
relations, including substantiating funding requests; (9) to inform policy makers and 
contribute to the policy process; (10) for responding to Congressional inquiries; and (11) 
for benchmarking to allow comparisons across similar programs (Barry 2000; Broom et 
al. 2002; Hatry 1999; Kravchuck and Schack 1996; Mark, Henry, and Julnes 2000; Mihm 
2001; Poister 2003; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsy 1999; Wholey and Newcomer 1997). 
Others recognize the political use of performance measurement (Feller 2002; Jennings 
and Haist 2004; Pollitt 1986). Feller (2002) emphasizes the influence of the political 
organizational context on performance measurement and stated, “Performance 
measurement systems and related performance indicators are political instruments used 
within organizational settings” (p. 439). 
Behn (2003) identifies improved performance as the ultimate purpose of 
performance measurement, but he also described seven other distinct managerial 
purposes evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, and learn. Behn (2003) 
suggests different measures are needed based on the unique purpose for the system. For 
example, performance indicators used to support budgeting require efficiency measures 
and indicators to support motivating require real-time measures (Behn 2003). The 
literature, then, suggests that the choice of measures may be influenced by the use and 
 56
 purpose of the performance measurement system (Behn 2003), agency type (Jennings and 
Haist 2004), and the level of decentralization (Frederickson 2003).   
2.4.4 Empirical Research 
As discussed earlier, given prominence of performance measurement and its 
accepted practice in the field, a relatively small amount of empirical research has been 
conducted (Barry 2000; Goddard and Mannion 2004; Jennings and Haist 2002; Kelly 
2002; Poister 2003; Turnock 2000; Wholey 2002). Kelly (2002) comments, “I think that 
performance measurement, as a tool of accountability for outcomes, is the rare situation 
where we understand the practice more than the theory. We know a lot about how to 
construct and report performance measures, but we cannot say specifically why we go to 
all the trouble. According to our best evidence, nothing much changes as a result of 
adopting performance measurement systems” (p. 375). 
Based on a comprehensive literature review of impact studies related to 
performance measurement, Jennings and Haist (2002) note, “We have limited evidence 
of the impact that it [performance measurement] has on the effectiveness of government 
systems, the conditions under which it works or does not work, and the factors that affect 
the success of performance measurement” (p. 2). It was the recognition of this deficit that 
led Jennings and Haist to begin the theory development that provides the foundation for 
this research study. 
Empirical research on performance measurement based on survey data represents 
studies at varying levels of government, but studies of public agencies at the city, county, 
and state levels predominate. Much of this research focuses on the level of adoption and 
use of performance measurement as part of the management for results (MFR) 
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 framework. For instance, Moynihan and Ingraham (2003) assessed the adoption of MFR 
systems, Melkers and Willoughby (1998, 2004, 2005) conducted studies of performance 
budgeting, Poister and Streib studied performance management systems and their use in 
municipal government (1999a, 2005), and Berman and Wang (2000) examined 
performance measurement systems. 
Based on studies conducted in 1998 and 2004, Melkers and Willoughby find 
widespread adoption of performance budgeting at the state-level, much of which has been 
either legislated or required through administrative dictates (Melkers and Willoughby 
2004). Similarly, Moynihan and Ingraham (2003) examined state-level data to assess the 
implementation and use of MFR efforts. Based on data from 2000 collected as part of the 
Government Performance Project (GPP), the authors found that all fifty U.S. states were 
using some type of MFR system.  
In a more recent study by Melkers and Willoughby (2005), the authors examine 
the use of performance measurement, again, primarily for budgeting purposes, based on 
year 2000 survey data from budgeters and administrators at the state and local levels. In 
this study, sixty-eight percent of respondents said that either all of their departments or at 
least half of their departments use performance measures. Poister and Streib found 
somewhat slow adoption of formal citywide strategic planning and the use of 
performance measurement. Based on a 1997 survey of managers representing cities with 
populations of 25,000 and greater, the researchers found that forty percent or less of these 
municipalities were using performance information in meaningful ways to support 
management and decision processes (Poister and Streib 1999a). In a study conducted 
with the same sample in 2004, Poister and Streib found that only twenty-two percent of 
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 cities used performance measures to track progress in meeting goals and objectives 
detailed in strategic plans (Poister and Streib 2005). Similarly, Berman and Wang (2000) 
analyzed survey data from public managers working in counties with populations of 
50,000 or greater and found thirty-three percent of counties using some type of 
performance measurement but only twenty percent demonstrating “high use.”  
These results suggest that although programs have often adopted performance 
measurements systems of various types, the meaningful use and integration of 
performance information has lagged. In an interesting look at factors associated with the 
adoption and implementation of performance measurement, Julnes and Holzer (2001) 
used data from a national survey of state and local government officials and found that 
the adoption of performance measurement is influenced by rational and technocratic 
factors such as goal orientation, resources, internal requirements, and information, 
whereas implementation was influenced by political and cultural factors. 
Studies have found that performance information is perceived as useful for 
communications and management activities such as strategic planning, but has not been 
used in fiscal decision making (Melkers and Willoughby 2005). To date, little research 
supports the use of performance measurement for informing fiscal decision making 
(Melkers and Willoughby 2004). This is interesting given that budgeting is often seen as 
the driving force behind performance measurement (Newcomer 1997). The research by 
Poister and Strieb (1999a) found that cities using performance measures did so based on a 
desire for improved decision making and accountability rather than for simply meeting 
reporting requirements. 
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 Studies examining factors affecting the use of performance information provide 
insights as well. Berman and Wang (2000) found that technical capacity and stakeholder 
support are significantly associated with increased use of performance measurement. 
Capacity was defined as jurisdictions’ ability to: (1) relate outputs to operations; (2) 
collect timely data; (3) analyze data; (4) access adequate information and technology 
systems; (5) garner support from department heads; and (6) garner support from elected 
officials. They also found that widespread use of performance measurement increased 
satisfaction with its impact (Berman and Wang 2000). A study of federal-level managers 
working in the twenty-four largest executive agencies used GAO survey data to also 
explore factors influencing the use of performance measurement (Cavalluzzo and Ittner 
2003). These results found that organizational factors such as managerial commitment to 
the use of performance measurement, decision making authority, and training in the 
techniques of performance measurement have a significant influence on its development 
and use. 
Again at the federal level, Heinrich (1999, 2002) has conducted research based on 
data from the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Findings suggest that 
although the use of administrative data in performance measurement results in relatively 
imperfect data, it still can provide useful information to inform program improvement. In 
addition, Heinrich’s results suggest the importance of considering the effects of other 
factors, including organizational structure and complexity, policy choices and constraints, 
and service delivery practices in assessing program performance. This is consistent with 
the framework for governance she proposes along with Hill and Lynn discussed earlier 
(Heinrich, Hill, Lynn 2004). 
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 Other than the studies of JTPA, research at the federal level has largely involved 
data collected by GAO to study various aspects of GPRA, and more recently PART’s, 
implementation. Most of this research involves smaller, qualitative studies aimed at 
increasing understanding of GPRA’s implementation, including challenges federal 
agencies have faced. In an evaluation of GPRA’s first ten years involving both survey 
data and qualitative interviews, GAO found that federal managers reported having more 
outcome measures required by GPRA, identified positive effects of GPRA on 
requirements for planning and reporting, and had more quantifiable, results-based goals 
in place (GAO 2005).  
Other GAO studies identify the many difficulties federal agencies have faced in 
moving toward the results-based framework inherent in GPRA. These include challenges 
at various stages of developing performance measurement systems such as identifying 
goals, developing measures, collecting data, and analyzing and using data. Programs have 
struggled to translate long-term goals into annual performance goals and develop related 
outcome measures (GAO 1997a, 1997b, 2004, Mihm 2000). This has been complicated 
by difficulties uncovered in coordinating cross-cutting federal programs (Mihm 2000) 
and the mission fragmentation that challenges program’s ability to think about how their 
own activities contribute or are related to common outcomes (GAO 1999). Programs 
have faced challenges in data collection (GAO 2004) and, in regard to measurement, they 
have struggled to obtain valid, reliable, and useful data in a timely fashion (GAO 2004; 
Mihm 2000). Limited capacity (i.e., analytic and methodological expertise) and training 
have also been identified as impediments, no doubt contributing to the measurement 
challenges (GAO 2004; Mihm 2000). 
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 A major issue identified through this research has been an inability for agencies to 
confidently attribute changes in outcomes to a particular program effort (GAO 1996, 
1997a, 2004; Mihm 2000). By focusing on outcomes, it becomes difficult to distinguish 
results produced by federal programs from results caused by other, external factors. This 
is especially true for complicated social issues for which outcomes are undoubtedly 
influenced by a complex interaction of factors. Much of the methodological literature on 
performance measurement recognizes the important limitation of performance 
measurement related to attribution (Broom, et al. 2002; Hatry 2001; Poister 2003; 
Wholey and Hatry 1992).  Blalock and Barnow (2001) stated that “the major 
methodological problem in most [performance] management systems is the tendency to 
attribute the outcomes collected in these systems to social programs or entire human 
investment systems – that is, to assume that these programs or systems are responsible for 
the outcomes collected” (p. 503). Indeed, many suggest that there remains an assumption 
that performance measurement assumes causality (Blalock and Barnow 2001; 
Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Perrin 1998; Radin 2006). In an article describing 
their efforts to develop a performance management system for the Ryan White 
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (CARE) which is funded by HRSA, 
Kates, Marconi, and Mannle (2001) stated that the crux of performance measurement as 
conceived by GPRA is “measuring that impact, or, the difference between having a 
program and not having it” (p. 147), when, in reality, that type of scientific measurement 
is not possible through performance measurement systems (Broom et al. 2002; Kates, 
Marconi and Mannle 2001). 
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 Similarly, Hatry (2001) noted “…the outcome data likely to be obtainable from 
ongoing performance measurement systems will seldom, if ever, reveal the extent to 
which the program has caused the outcome. Other factors – over which the program only 
has partial control – will inevitably be present” (p. 30). Given the influence of external 
factors, Hatry (2002) argues that public managers cannot be held fully accountable for 
results. Instead, he suggests that only limited, outcome-level accountability is present in 
such situations, and shared accountability may provide the best means to reach a fuller 
degree of accountability for outcomes (Hatry 2002). These same academics often 
encourage more rigorous evaluation studies to assess cause and affect relationships 
between the structure and processes of programs to outcomes (Blalock and Barnow 2001; 
Harkreader and Henry 2000; Hatry 1997; Perrin 2006).  
Given this limitation, performance measurement experts have encouraged the 
inclusion of short-term and intermediate outcomes for which programs may have more 
control. Such outcomes may provide a more comprehensive view of the program and 
may allow for more plausible claims of attribution (Derose et al. 2002; Hatry 2001; 
Poister 2003). In other words, performance measurement systems need to attend to the 
“entire results chain” (Perrin 2006, 8).  
Similarly, authors emphasize that although performance measures can help assess 
how well an organization is performing, these measures do not typically reveal why or 
how an organization achieved that level of performance (Behn 2003; Hatry 1997; 
Newcomer 2001). Again, other evaluation methods are needed to answer questions 
related to what exactly is happening and why. These issues related to attribution and the 
kinds of questions performance measurement can and cannot effectively address 
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 highlight the important relationship between outcomes research and performance 
measurement. Perrin (2002) stated that “outcomes research, quality improvement, and 
performance measurement are closely related activities, each of which depends critically 
on one factor: the ability to establish a reasonably firm relation between the structure and 
processes that are within the control of the individual, institution, or system whose 
performance is being judged and the outcome that is considered desirable” (p. III-91). 
Other research has addressed the unique challenges to performance measurement 
posed by decentralized implementation structures (Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and 
Frederickson 2006; GAO 1997a, 1997c, 1998a, 1998b). An important issue addressed by 
the reinvention movement is the role of the federal government. As discussed earlier, a 
central tenet of NPM involves devolution of federal responsibilities to third parties 
including state and local government, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit agencies. A 
shift in government has involved the reduction in the direct delivery of federal programs 
by federal staff and, instead, the use of varied policy tools to increase the involvement of 
third parties. Salamon (2002), who writes about the proliferation of policy tools, noted, 
“What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public action is that they involve 
the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function; the exercise 
of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds” (p. 2). By 
giving third partners greater authority and discretion in decision making, decentralized 
institutions are seen to offer a number of advantages including an ability to more flexibly 
respond to local needs and changing circumstances, a desire to implement more 
innovative strategies, and the ability to act more effectively than centralized institutions 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993).  
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 As addressed earlier, however, a central dilemma emerges in benefiting from third 
parties advantages while avoiding the creation of public programs that are so complex 
and unwieldy that accountability is impossible (Frederickson 2001). Some suggest that a 
paradox has emerged based on incompatible strategies related to NPM. On one hand, 
increased decentralization is meant to provide greater autonomy and discretion to third 
parties. On the other hand, the performance movement is based on more traditional, 
compliance-oriented accountability (Goddard and Mannion 2004; Hood and Peters 2004; 
Radin 2001, 2006). Advocates of NPM, however, counter that performance measurement 
in fact serves as bridge between these to aims. From their view, performance 
measurement is a means to avoid the traditional command and control mechanisms by 
substituting outcome requirements (i.e., results) for the flexibility and discretion provided 
third parties in implementation (Wholey 1999). Others suggest, however, that NPM has 
focused on performance at lower levels of analysis rather than addressing the more 
complex situations which involve multiple organizations, cross-organizational policy 
arenas, or fields involving multiple actors from varied sectors all contributing to 
outcomes (Bouckaert and Peters 2002). Forsythe (2001), in his text on performance in 
government noted, “No government-wide strategy for performance management will 
magically solve the difficult problems of monitoring the results of federally funded 
programs administered by state and local governments and by private contractors” (p. 
547). 
At any rate, the introduction of third party governance, including networks, 
imposes greater complexity for performance measurement at the federal level than at the 
state or local levels given the intergovernmental and intra-governmental relations 
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 involved (Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Mandell and Keast 
2006; Radin 2000b). The policy implementation literature has long exposed the 
convolution for program implementation imposed by decentralized structures (Bardach 
1977; Derthick 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). In fact, implementation studies, 
many of which were conducted in the 1970’s, contend that decentralized implementation 
is, in fact, the source of problems that leave public policy programs falling short of their 
expectations (deleon and deleon 2002; Salamon 2002; Scheirer 1981; Lester and Goggin 
1998). The NPM reforms have only further complicated the implementation process with 
Lester and Goggins (1998) characterizing the 1990s as an “implementation era.”  
The recent reform movements point to the complexity of the contemporary 
implementation process one involving varied policy tools for multiple actors among 
multiple agencies each influenced by its own set of values, goals, stakeholders, and 
context. The effects of inter-agency interaction that occur during policy implementation 
result in extensive evolution in the implementation process whereby policy goals and 
objectives are modified by the process itself (Majone and Wildavsky 1979). As a policy 
is implemented across (and down) levels of government, a mutual adaptation occurs 
between the organizational setting and the program (Berman 1978). In other words, 
decentralized implementation can lead to extensive variability in implementation across 
sites, especially given that legislative statutes tend to fairly vague (Elmore 1978). In 
addition, increasing numbers of actors are involved, each with their own goals and 
organizational culture. It is not surprising then that new challenges emerge for 
performance measurement in this context. As Fossett, Gais, and Thompson (2001) 
contend, “Proclaiming the virtues of mission-driven federalism is, of course, one thing 
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 and success in implementing it quite another. Intergovernmental arrangements complicate 
virtually all aspects of performance management – agreement on key goals, the 
development of indicators, the timely collection of pertinent and valid performance data, 
the interpretation of these data, the implementation of an incentive system (e.g., rewards 
for strong performers), and more” (p. 208).  
A study by GAO in 1998 assessed the challenges in measuring program results in 
decentralized contexts. Not unexpectedly, goal conflicts often emerge as agencies at the 
state or local level have differing sets of priorities (GAO 1998a). In addition, programs 
frequently have different purposes for performance measurement (e.g., accountability, 
program improvement) (GAO 1998a). Adding more complexity is the variability in 
activities implemented at each site which is well documented in the implementation 
literature but also by studies of performance measurement (GAO 1998a). Frederickson 
(2003) suggests that GPRA makes an implicit assumption of homogeneity in regard to 
agency service provision activities. In reality, however, program variation can be 
extensive for a national program that works through state and local agencies and or 
community based organizations. Under this scenario, it is not uncommon for each site to 
modify program elements to meet the needs and fit the structure and culture of their 
respective environments and target populations. However, research suggests this 
variability challenges the ability of federal agencies to identify a common set of uniform 
national indicators (GAO 1998a, 1998b).  
In regard to measurement, research indicates that decentralized program 
implementation compromises data quality and introduces variability in data collection 
across sites as it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to control data collected by third 
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 parties (Frederickson 2003; GAO 1997a, 1998a). This has lead to documented problems 
in aggregating data from numerous sites at a national level (GAO 1998a). And finally, 
studies show that the training and capacity issues identified earlier are also exaggerated in 
a decentralized context as limits in analytic resources and experience with measurement 
exist on a wider scale (GAO 1998a). 
Other studies have explored how performance information is being used. This 
area of research is important because it is the use of performance measurement that must 
justify its costs, and performance measurement is likely to influence behavior only if it is 
used (Schick 2001; Wholey 1997). An evaluation of GPRA by GAO in 2004 found that 
although managers had more performance data, results were mixed on whether they were 
using it to improve performance (GAO 2004). In another study that examined the use of 
performance measurement in sixteen federal programs, researchers found that 
performance data was being used for four purposes: (1) to trigger corrective action; (2) 
identify best practice; (3) motivate behavior; and (4) plan (Hatry et al. 2004). Based on 
their study, these researchers also characterized a number of barriers to the use of 
performance measurement including the lack of authority to make changes based on 
performance information, limited understanding of how to use outcome data, and data 
problems more generally (e.g., data may not be timely, data may be old by the time it is 
available, data may not be disaggregated to a useful level) (Hatry et al. 2003, Hatry et al. 
2004). And finally, the study found that some outcomes included in performance 
measurement systems can take years to achieve which, again, compromised the system’s 
usefulness given that performance measurement systems are based on the premise of 
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 providing frequent, timely information (Hatry et al. 2003, Hatry et al. 2004). The 
empirical research presented above is summarized in a table format in appendix B.  
2.4.5 Theory Building  
Given a deficit in theory development for performance measurement, Jennings 
and Haist (2002, 2004) made an effort to propose theory intended to help predict the use 
and consequences of performance measurement by identifying factors that influence the 
implementation and impact of systems of performance measurement. As noted in chapter 
one, using the framework for governance articulated by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004), 
Jennings and Haist propose twenty-five hypotheses for empirical study (Jennings and 
Haist 2004)10. The larger governance framework developed by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 
suggests that government performance is a function of structure, treatments, environment, 
client characteristics, and management (P = S + T + E + C + M) (Heinrich, Hill, and 
Lynn 2004). In this model, performance measurement is reflected in the “M” as one type 
of management tool that may affect performance outcomes in the public sector. From this 
perspective, the authors suggest that performance measurement is likely to have relatively 
marginal effects in shaping the impacts of a policy given that there may be a myriad of 
challenges related to administrative structures, the treatments (interventions) available, 
the environmental factors, and client characteristics (Jennings and Haist 2004).  
The twenty-five hypotheses proposed by Jennings and Haist are based on three 
features of the governance system that may mediate the implementation and impact of 
performance measurement. These mediating factors include: (1) incentives that support 
managers’ participation in performance measurement systems; (2) politics, that is, the 
                                            
10 All twenty-five hypotheses are listed in appendix A. 
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 degree to which political interests agree on the goals of the policy and the validity of the 
measures; and (3) organizations, including their structure, features, culture, and 
leadership (Jennings and Haist 2004). As discussed in the first chapter, three of these 
hypotheses are proposed as a theoretical framework to guide this study.  
2.5 Public Health and Performance Measurement 
2.5.1 Developments in Public Health Practice 
In the field of public health, attention to performance measurement has increased 
over the course of the past decade or more. Although public health may have lagged 
behind in the performance measurement movement in contrast to the health care sector 
(Handler, Issel, and Turnock 2001; Roper and Mays 2000), CDC has been influenced by 
GPRA, PART, and other aspects of NPM. The literature related to performance 
measurement in public health is limited, but reflects many of the same challenges 
highlighted in the section above. More importantly, the context of the public health 
system and the nature of national public health programs contribute to the existing 
challenges facing the effective use of performance measurement. Given that this study is 
based in a public health context, some background on the field is provided in this section.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s important advancements in the practice of 
public health occurred. Two notable works were published by the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) reflecting these changes. First, in 1988, the IOM published a report titled The 
Future of Public Health which outlined three core functions of public health including 
assessing health status and related health needs, policy development, and assuring that 
needed services are provided (IOM 1988). This landmark IOM report defined public 
health as “what we as a society do collectively to assure the conditions in which people 
 70
 can be healthy” (IOM 1988, 1). The report articulated a mission for public health and 
communicated a common approach for the field.  
Following this important work, HHS11 convened the Public Health Functions 
Working Group in 1994 to define a set of essential public health services derived from 
the three core functions. This working group developed the ten essential public health 
services (table 3 below) meant to provide a foundation for public health efforts in the 
United States (IOM 2003).  
 
 
Table 3. The 10 Essential Public Health Services 
 
Assessment 
1. Monitor health status to identify community health problems 
2. Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community 
 
Policy Development 
3. Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues 
4. Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems 
5. Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts 
 
Assurance 
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety 
7. Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of health 
care when otherwise unavailable 
8. Assure a competent public health and personal health care workforce 
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based 
health services 
 
Serving All Functions 
10. Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems 
 
                                            
11 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is comprised of following 
federal agencies: Administration for Children and Families, Administration on Aging, 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Food and Drug Administration, Health Resources and Services 
Administration, Indian Health Services, National Institutes of Health, and the Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. 
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 Other important guidance for the field of public health was provided by Healthy 
People 2000 and, more recently, Healthy People 2010 both of which reflect a vision for 
disease prevention and health promotion for the country. Healthy People 2010 details 
public health objectives for the Nation and provides a basis for public health planning at 
all levels of government12. The report includes twenty-eight focus areas, some of which 
are disease specific (e.g., cancer, sexually transmitted diseases) and others that are 
behavioral in nature (e.g., physical activity, tobacco use).  
In 2003, IOM published a follow-up to its 1988 report titled The Future of the 
Public’s Health in the 21st Century (IOM 2003). This report explicitly defines health as a 
public good and describes government’s fundamental responsibility in promoting and 
protecting the public health. The report emphasizes several important developments that 
affect our approach to public health and also have direct relevance to performance 
measurement as applied to federal-level, public health agencies. First, it is recognized by 
scientists today that health is influenced by a multitude of interacting factors. Building 
from the work of Dahlgren and Whitehead (1991), a conceptual model reflecting 
determinants of population health was specified in the report providing a heuristic to 
facilitate our understanding about the multiple factors that interact in complex pathways 
to effect population level health (IOM 2003, 52).  
The model helps to unravel the relationships between macro-level and micro-level 
determinants of health. At the individual level, personal traits such as sex interact with 
disease-related factors such as the virulence of a particular disease agent. These micro 
level factors “interact along complex and dynamic pathways” (IOM 2003, 53) with more 
                                            
12 Healthy People 2010. http://www.healthypeople.gov/About/whatis.htm  (accessed 08/21/06). 
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 proximate determinants such as individual risk behavior and social, family, and 
community networks as well as with mid-level determinants like living and working 
conditions. These in-turn, interact with the larger, up-stream, determinants at the macro 
level including social, economic, cultural, and environmental conditions (e.g., economic 
inequality, cultural values, urbanization) and policies at all levels (e.g., local, state, 
national, global) (IOM 2003). Consistent with lessons learned from community 
collaboration action (Fawcett 1999), the implication is that multiple strategies (e.g., 
education, healthcare, health systems, communication, policy action) are needed to more 
effectively impact health outcomes. The consequences for program evaluation more 
generally, and performance measurement specifically, are increasing challenges to 
disentangling individual program effects on particular health outcomes (Barry 2000; 
Straw 1996) 
The complexity involved in assuring and improving the public’s health reflected 
in this model points to a second major development in the field of public health that is 
addressed in the IOM report. More precisely, there has been a recognition that problems 
are too complex and resources too limited to depend on the traditional public health 
system (i.e., national, state, tribal, and local health departments) alone to assure the 
public’s health. “Health is shaped by both innate factors (i.e., genes, age, and sex) and 
other influences from the social economic, natural, built, and political environments, 
ranging from the availability of shelter and food to questions of social connectedness and 
behavior. These multiple determinants of health, among others, constitute a reality that 
makes it impossible for one entity or one sector alone to bring about population health 
improvement,” (IOM 2003, 41).  
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 Indeed, in their report, IOM (2003) clearly calls for constructing an intersectoral 
public health system based on collaborative arrangements that emphasize partnerships 
and networks. This system depends on the contributions of varied sectors of society 
including the public health system, but also, the health care system, academia, 
communities, businesses, employers, the media, and individuals (IOM 2003). By 
leveraging the resources of such diverse partners, the public health system will be 
strengthened through increased expertise, resources, and broadened perspectives for 
public health action (IOM 2003). This shift in the view about the actors needed in a 
public health system is reflected in the fourth essential public health service listed above, 
“Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems.”  As stated in 
the report, “There is strong and growing evidence that ‘healthy’ policy must include 
consideration of domains that are not traditionally associated with health but whose 
influences have health consequences (e.g., the education, business, housing, and 
transportation domains)” (IOM 2003, 34).  
This does not discount in any way the importance of the traditional public health 
structure of federal and state agencies that, from a constitutional and historical 
perspective, have a central responsibility in assuring the public’s health (IOM 2003). This 
is consistent with Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn’s (2004) point that hierarchical elements 
remain intact within a governance framework. In fact, many of our public health 
programs continue to be structured based on the decentralized relationship between the 
federal, state, and local government. For instance, at CDC, more traditional lines of 
authority remain intact through intra-governmental funding systems in which CDC 
distributes federal dollars to both state and local health departments. CDC also funds non-
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 governmental partners as well, including community-based organizations and national 
organizations. Table 4 below summarizes customary program service delivery and 
accountability structures for many of CDC’s national public health programs.  
 
 
Table 4. CDC National Public Health Program Service Delivery and Accountability 
Structures 
 
 
Federal government 
CDC 
• Distributes public funds via cooperative agreements 
(i.e., a form of a grant) to state and local government, 
non-profit community based organizations, academic 
institutions, etc. 
• Provides technical assistance and support 
• Assures appropriate fiscal stewardship 
• Manages federal-level performance measurement 
systems for its national programs 
• Reports annually to OMB on GPRA requirements 
• Reviewed by OMB PART 
 
State, Tribal, Territorial 
government 
State, Tribal, or Territorial Health Agency 
• Distributes public funds to local government and non-
profit community based organizations 
• Provides technical assistance and support 
• Assures fiscal stewardship for funds distributed 
• Delivers public health services (i.e., the 10 essential 
public health services) 
• Reports to CDC on program activities and fiscal 
expenditures 
• Reports performance measurement data to CDC 
 
Local government or 
NGO 
Local or Regional Government, Nongovernmental Agencies, 
Health Providers 
• Delivers public health services 
• Reports data as required 
 
 
 
But while these traditional approaches to public health service delivery remain 
steady, there is also increasing emphasis on mechanisms, both formal and informal, to 
engage other sectors in addressing public health concerns. For instance, in efforts to 
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 address comprehensive cancer control and prevention13 federal and state partners are 
working to encourage the involvement of many sectors and agencies. These include 
multiple departments within state public health agencies (e.g., cancer surveillance, 
screening programs, nutrition and physical activity programs, tobacco prevention 
programs, adolescent and school health), leading non-profit groups (e.g., ACS, Lance 
Armstrong Foundation, Susan G. Koman Foundation), business (e.g., pharmaceutical 
companies), and universities14. This approach to cancer prevention and control uses 
strategic partnerships to leverage public outcomes more effectively than what 
government could accomplish alone. This is clearly an important advancement for the 
field, however, it again underscores the complexity of applying performance 
measurement to federal public health programs when multiple partners are involved in 
delivering varied implementation strategies to affect particular health outcomes. 
Finally, a third development in public health reflects the increasing emphasis on 
evidence-based practice and policies. Given the array of public health interventions 
available, the complicated pathways from program implementation to health outcomes, 
and limited public health resources, efforts are underway to encourage the use of 
strategies with some evidence regarding their effectiveness (IOM 2003). One means to 
increase accessibility to evidence-based public health practice has been the creation of the 
Task Force on Community Preventive Services. This group parallels the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force (USPSTF) which conducts scientific evidence reviews of clinical 
                                            
13 Comprehensive Cancer Control address the continuum of care encompassing 
prevention, screening (early detection), treatment, palliation, and survivorship 
14 http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/ncccp  Accessed 8/26/06. 
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 preventive services and publishes the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services15.  The Task 
Force on Community Preventive Services, an HHS initiative that is organized by CDC, 
reviews scientific information in order to make evidence-based recommendations for 
public health programs that promote population health. The Guide to Community 
Preventive Services was published in 2005 and provides a review of evidence-based 
interventions in a number of areas including tobacco, physical activity, diabetes, and 
cancer (Task Force on Community Preventive Services 2005). The emphasis on 
identifying evidence based strategies and encouraging their implementation is promising 
for performance measurement as the causal links between structures, processes, and 
outcomes will be more fully understood. At this time, however, given the limited amount 
of rigorous evaluation research of public health practices, there is a significant lack of 
scientific evidence (Derose, et al. 2003; Perrin and Koshel 1997; Perrin, Durch, and 
Skillman 1999).  
A fourth development in the field reflects the influence of NPM and relates to the 
importance of improving systems of accountability to ensure health goals are met as well 
as the quality and availability of public health services (IOM 2003). Of course GPRA and 
PART apply to federal public health programs, but there is increasing attention on the 
development of more specific standards for program and workplace performance that 
extend more broadly among stakeholders (IOM 2003).  
                                            
15 http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/pocketgd.htm  Accessed 08/26/06. 
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 These four developments in the field of public health described above are 
reflected in the IOM (2003, p. 33-34) report’s identified six areas for change and action.  
These include: 
1. Adopt a population health approach that builds on evidence of the multiple 
determinants of health. 
 
2. Strengthen the governmental public health infrastructure – the backbone of any 
public health system. 
 
3. Create a new generation of partnerships to build consensus on health priorities 
and support community and individual health actions. 
 
4. Develop appropriate systems of accountability at all levels to ensure that 
population health goals are met. 
 
5. Assure that action is based on evidence. 
 
6. Acknowledge communication as the key to forging partnerships, assuring 
accountability, and utilizing evidence for decision making and action.  
 
2.5.2 Empirical Research on Performance Measurement in Public Health 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on performance measurement in public health, 
especially empirical studies, is small. Two reports published in the 1990s and 
commissioned by the National Research Council (NRC) at the request of HHS address 
performance measurement in the context of a proposed performance partnerships grants 
program (Perrin and Koshel 1997; Perrin, Durch, and Skillman 1999). These reports 
summarize some of the key challenges to performance measurement as applied in public 
health and make some recommendations for improving its practice. Many of the 
challenges addressed in these reports reflect those described earlier including: (1) issues 
related to attribution (i.e., the lack of firm causal links between inputs, processes, and 
outcomes; program resources often represent a small part of the total resources 
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 contributing to the outcome; public health outcomes are influenced by multiple factors); 
(2) issues related to data (i.e., limits of available data sources; quality and comparability 
of available data; difficulties in specifying numerators and denominators for specific 
indicators; costs of data collection and reporting); and (3) issues related to achieving 
outcomes in public health (e.g., the length of time needed to achieve health outcomes 
such as lowering the incidence of cancer is often extensive) (Perrin and Koshel 1997; 
Perrin, Durch, and Skillman 1999).  
Given that this study explores issues for performance measurement imposed by 
the increasing involvement of networks in our Nation’s public health infrastructure, the 
final section of this chapter provides a more detailed summary of the emerging literature 
in networked public management. 
2.6 Networked Public Management 
2.6.1 Defining Networked Public Management 
As discussed earlier16, a defining feature of governance involves organizational 
networks (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000; Pierre and Peters 1998; Salamon 2002; Stoker 
1998). Milward and Provan (2000) use the term “hollow state” as a metaphor to describe 
this phenomenon in which the government increasingly funds but does not directly 
provide public services. As noted in the section above, given the complexity of public 
health problems as well as the influence of NPM, networks are increasingly being used to 
more effectively and synergistically implement public policy and achieve public health 
goals.  
                                            
16 Section 2.1.2 addressed networks as a characteristic of a governance framework 
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 O’Toole (1997) defines networks as “structures of interdependence involving 
multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal 
subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some 
structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policy-
legitimated ties” (p. 45). O’Toole’s definition has been widely cited and goes on to state, 
“The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange 
relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single multi-unit 
structure” (O’Toole 1997, 45).  
Milward and Provan cite a definition by McGuire that more explicitly recognizes 
the linkages that are the foundations of networks, “networks are ‘structures involving 
multiple nodes – agencies and organizations – with multiple linkages. A public 
management network thus includes agencies involved in a public policy making and 
administrative structure through which public goods and services are planned, designed, 
produced, and delivered (and any or all of the activities). Such network structures can be 
formal or informal, and they are typically intersectoral, intergovernmental, and based 
functionally in a specific policy or policy area” (McGuire cited in Milward and Provan 
2006, 9). The networks of interest for this study are also collaborative in character. 
Collaboration can be defined as “a concept that describes the process of facilitating and 
operating in multi-organizational  arrangements for solving problems that cannot be 
achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations” (McGuire 2006, 678). 
As mentioned in chapter one, networks impose horizontal relationships aimed at 
improving service integration, often with nongovernmental partners, on top of vertical, or 
hierarchical ones reflecting the intergovernmental relationships of traditional federalism 
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 (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Milward and Provan 2004). As noted earlier, Heinrich, 
Hill, and Lynn (2004) contend that networks will continue to include the hierarchical 
relations with command and control structures given that our governance system is 
fundamentally rooted in a constitutional scheme that includes political and judicial 
requirements for accountability. In fact, intergovernmental relationships reflect the most 
typical form of network connections in carrying out public programs (O’Toole and Meier 
2004).  
Within a network structure, policy processes become more complex because 
collective decision making and problem solving are required among mutually 
independent actors, each representing various organizations, sectors, and levels of 
government (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Salamon 2002). As mentioned previously, 
these interdependent relationships are often established and maintained based on the 
exchange of resources, expertise, information, and technology (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001a). Salamon (2002) identifies key attributes characterizing network settings. These 
include the following: 
1. Pluriformity – Networks exhibit pluriformity by involving a diverse range of 
agencies and organizational types which often have limited experience 
collaborating as well as a limited understanding of each other’s styles of 
operation.  
 
2. Self-referential – Networks are self-referential in that each organization 
participating in the network has independent interests and each approaches the 
relationship with a unique set of perspectives and incentives. 
 
3. Asymmetric interdependencies – Networks involve asymmetric interdependencies 
in which all network actors are interdependent, but in asymmetric ways. 
 
4. Dynamic – The features of networks constantly change in response to various 
conditions requiring network membership to shift, leadership to change, and goals 
and strategies to evolve. 
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 2.6.2 Increasing Role of Networks in Public Management 
Networks are not necessarily a new phenomenon in government; in fact, Kettl 
(2003) notes that since World War II there has been an increase in government partnering 
with nongovernmental partners as a means to practically deal with the increased 
complexity of public programs. However, the prominence of networks has grown in 
recent years for several reasons. First, where the bureaucratic form of governance 
dominated the industrial age, networks are seen as more appropriate in an information 
and global age where the world is more complex and diverse (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001b).  
Second, NPM’s emphasis on increased decentralization and reliance on third 
parties for policy implementation has contributed to the network model (Milward and 
Provan 2004). Related, Salamon (2002) suggests that the rapid expansion of indirect 
policy tools used in decentralized government has also played a role in contributing to 
network management. Agranoff and Meier (2001b) suggest that particular policy tools 
encourage the utilization of network models.  
Third, the emergence of more wicked social problems which require the 
involvement of many actors in order to effectively address them has also contributed to 
the increase of networks in public management (O’Toole 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 
2001b). As noted above, this is certainly the case in public health where many problems 
reflect the collision of economic, social, physical, and environmental factors. Fourth, in a 
government funding atmosphere characterized by “silo” grant-making and contracting, 
network management may be the best structure to achieve goals that require more holistic 
solutions.  
 82
 And finally, networks may be emerging simply based on funders’ requirements 
for collaboration and other political imperatives that encourage networking (O’Toole 
1997; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Again, in public health, there has been an increase in the 
number of these partnerships and coalitions over the past decade as more people 
recognize achieving public health goals requires the resources and capabilities of more 
than any single agency or sector (Lasker and Weiss 2003). Many federal agencies include 
collaboration such as state-wide coalitions as a funding requirement (Wandersman, 
Goodman, and Butterfoss 1997). 
2.6.3 Network Types and Structures 
Networks can vary in structure, size, and complexity (O’Toole and Meier 2004) 
and are referred to as “partnerships, coalitions, alliances, strategic alliances, consortiums, 
and networks” (Milward and Provan 2004, 8). Based on a study of twelve networks in the 
Midwest, Agranoff (2003) identified four types of networks including informal networks, 
developmental networks, outreach networks, and action networks. In a more recent 
report, Milward and Provan (2006) also describe four types of networks service 
implementation networks, information diffusion networks, problem solving networks, 
and community capacity building networks. Each is briefly summarized in table 5 below 
(Milward and Provan 2006, 11). 
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 Table 5. Public Management Networks – Types and Characteristics 
Network Type Key Characteristics 
 
Service 
Implementation 
Networks 
• Government funds the service under contract but doesn’t directly 
provide it (frequently health and human services). 
• Services are jointly produced by two or more agencies. 
• Collaboration is often between programs of larger organizations. 
• Horizontal management of service providers is a key task. 
• A fiscal agent acts as the sole buyer of services. 
• Key management tasks include encouraging cooperation, 
negotiating contracts, planning network expansion, etc. 
 
Information 
Diffusion 
Networks 
• Horizontal and vertical ties between interdependent government 
agencies. 
• Primary focus is sharing information across departmental 
boundaries. 
• Commonly used for disaster preparedness and other “high 
uncertainty” problems. 
 
Problem 
Solving 
Networks 
• Primary purpose is to help organizational managers set the agenda 
for policy related to a critical national or regional problem. 
• Focus is on solving existing complex problems rather than building 
relationships for future problems. 
• Often emerges from information diffusion networks. 
• Relationships may be temporary, to address a specific problem, and 
then become dormant after the problem is resolved. 
• May be either designed or emergent. 
 
Community 
Capacity 
Building 
Networks 
• Primary goal is to build social capital in community-based settings. 
• Network purpose is both current and future oriented. 
• May be created by participants (bottom-up) or by private and 
government funders (top-down). 
• Often involves a wide range of agencies with many emergent sub-
networks to address different community needs that may arise. 
 
 
 
2.6.4 Challenges of Managing in a Network Public Management Context 
Network management is understood as different from hierarchical public 
management. Some specific challenges to managing in a network context are summarized 
below. 
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 2.6.4.1 Joint production problem 
Intrinsic to networks is what has been termed the “joint production problem,” the 
challenge to coordinate program implementation across a potentially broad service 
implementation network (Milward and Provan 2004). In networks, leaders must 
effectively collaborate with representatives from the public, private, and non-profit 
sectors as well as across levels of government (Abramson, Breul, Kamensky 2006). As 
previously discussed, the complex issues addressed by networks require the actions of 
varied actors to address the multitude of factors contributing to them. The joint 
production problem points to a central management challenge in network settings, that is, 
achieving program success in an environment that often involves voluntary collaboration 
with a variety of actors over whom public managers have little formal authority (O’Toole 
and Meier 2004). However, a qualitative study of twelve networks in the Midwest 
conducted by Agranoff (2003) found that government actors were often the conveners of 
networks. And although trust was found to generally replace more formal authority in this 
context, government retained status as a core actor and key partner given their legitimacy 
to address social problems (Agranoff 2003).   
2.6.4.2 Fuzzy Boundary Problem 
As noted above, in a networked model, government represents only one of many 
actors and institutions involved in addressing social problems (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001a). This has led to what Kettl (2002) has termed the “fuzzy boundaries” problem, 
that is, new management challenges created by the loss of hierarchy’s clear lines of 
responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. As Kettl (2003) suggests, “Managing 
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 government programs effectively thus increasingly depends on bridging the fuzzy 
boundaries that separate those who make policy from those in the complex 
interdependent chain of those who share responsibility for implementing it” (p. 60). 
These interdependent relationships that exist between government and other third-
party actors from the private and non-profit sectors result in power dependencies 
(Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). Responsibility for management in networks is shared, 
therefore, traditional hierarchical authority is compromised (O’Toole 1997). The central 
authority of government hierarchy is replaced by voluntary cooperation and strategies of 
influence and leverage (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Peters 2001). For public managers, 
more time is spent managing the interdependencies between their organization and the 
others involved in the network (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a). In part, this stems from 
the multiplicity of interests and values represented in a network; the participants each 
come with their own set of values, interests, and goals that must somehow be reconciled. 
2.6.4.3 Management Capacity 
Agranoff (2003) says of network management, “Network management is 
considered to be a different type of non-hierarchical management, where information and 
expertise is substituted for authority structure, through a self-organizing process, held 
together by mutual obligation that develops over time, by reaching consensus-based 
decisions, and by blending knowledge bases from different organizational arenas into 
innovative technologies that can become the ‘DNA’ of networks” (p. 6). To effectively 
manage in networks, different capacities are needed than those applied in hierarchical 
arrangements (Agranoff and McGuire 2001b). But, at this time, horizontal management 
across organizations is poorly understood and government has limited capacity to 
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 effectively manage networks (Milward and Provan 2004, 2006). Kettl (2002) suggests a 
“management gap” exists, that is, government has not adapted its public management 
systems to administer effectively in a network environment. Similarly, Milward and 
Provan (2004) suggest that government lacks effective coordinating structures for 
managing in network settings. 
O’Toole (1997) identified four factors differentiating management in networks – a 
lack of direct managerial supervision over those for whom their performance is judged, 
diffuse monitoring channels that are often unreliable, the absence of a shared 
organizational culture, and a need to integrate potentially diverse organizational needs 
into action. A study of intergovernmental networks in public school districts 
differentiated between a “structural network,” which the authors defined as the more 
stable, intergovernmental network, and a “behavioral network,” the larger network of 
partners with whom managers collaborate (O’Toole and Meier 2004). Results suggest 
that public management, measured by stability in personnel within the structural network 
and behavioral networking, was positively related to improved performance (O’Toole 
and Meier 2004). Using the same data set and building on the idea of behavioral 
networking, Goerdel (2006) found that proactive management on the part of public 
managers supported organizational success. That is, public managers who initiated 
contact and collaboration with network actors more frequently achieved organizational 
success (Goerdel 2006). 
Kettl (2002) and others (Mandell and Keast 2006; Agranoff and McGuire 2001a) 
recognize managing networks as primarily a “people problem” and emphasize skill 
building in the areas such as communication, negotiation, facilitation, and persuasion 
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 skills that will support the bridge-building and “boundary spanning” necessary to 
effectively navigate this context as well as ability to effect network arrangements in way 
that further coordination.  
2.6.4.4 Accountability 
Accountability represents another major management dilemma in network 
environments. As noted earlier in the section addressing governance, accountability is 
seen as particularly problematic given the network structure (Page 2004; Peters and 
Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). Both the fuzzy boundaries and joint production problems 
contribute to making it more difficult to assign accountability in a network structure. In 
addition, monitoring channels may be more diffuse and unreliable (O’Toole 1997).  
Posner (2002) offers three reasons for accountability challenges in networks. 
First, in network settings, authority and political resources are shared and third parties 
have significant power. The goals and objectives of those third parties may differ 
significantly from those of government (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Stakeholders may 
represent competing values and be held responsible for different outcomes (e.g., ones 
related to efficiency vs. effectiveness) (Milward and Provan 2004). Second, as discussed 
earlier, in networks, information asymmetries exist whereby third parties often have more 
information and insider-knowledge about what is occurring in the field. Third parties can 
also hide information about performance, and government often has not supported more 
costly monitoring to track and assess performance, especially when decentralized 
programs are involved (Posner 2002). And finally, implementation can involve several 
layers of actors, including levels of government, non-profit organizations, and for-profit 
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 sectors (Posner 2002). The layers of agencies and actors further fragments and challenges 
accountability structures. 
In summary, given a network structure where program implementation is 
decentralized, authority is compromised, political resources are shared, and monitoring 
channels are diffuse and unreliable, demands for accountability are particularly 
challenged (Goldsmith and Eggers 2005; O’Toole 1997; Peters 2001; Posner 2002). This 
situation is exacerbated by the current lack of capacity and tools of governance to 
effectively navigate in a network environment (Kettl 2002; Milward and Provan 2004, 
2006). Accountability may need to be conceptualized differently for networks than for 
single organizations, considering ideas of responsibility and responsiveness (Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001b). 
2.6.5 Network Public Management and Theory 
Although public administrators have been working in a network environment for 
many years, related empirical analysis and theory building is more recent and has been 
relatively slow to develop (Kettl 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Kettl (2003) 
acknowledges a lack of consensus in the field on whether networks reflect an approach, 
theory, or loose construct; he suggests that to date, the analysis of networks best 
represents a framework that may offer some early steps toward the development of tools 
for better managing within a network model.  
The literature clearly reflects, however, increased attention to issues related to 
managing public agencies which operate in environments characterized by networks. 
There seems little question that networks have emerged as an important form of 
governance (Agranoff 2005; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Frederickson and Smith 2003; 
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 Kettl 2002; O’Toole and Meier 2004). In fact, their importance has led some to call for 
the development of a paradigm for network management similar to the hierarchical, 
bureaucratic model that proceeded it (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001b). 
In a forum held in 2005 and sponsored by The IBM Center for The Business of 
Government, public management experts identified using networks to organize in 
response to “non-routine” or wicked problems as one of the three most important 
challenges facing the U.S. government (Kettl 2005). This group concluded that, although 
hierarchical management structures continue to work well in addressing more routine 
problems (i.e., Social Security, garbage collection), networked approaches are needed to 
more effectively tackle complex problems (e.g., social service problems, terrorism) where 
responsibility for solving them is more diffuse (Kettl 2005). The group also concluded 
that problems such as those related to public health and homeland security must rely on 
distributed organizations, that is, efforts that integrate hierarchical and networked 
approaches (Kettl 2005).  
The report included a case study example of how CDC Director, Dr. Julie 
Gerberding, has recently reorganized CDC in order to more effectively respond to public 
health emergencies (e.g., bioterror episodes, bird flu outbreaks). Central to this 
reorganization was facilitating CDC’s ability to more effectively collaborate through 
networks to improve information sharing within and outside the institution and to 
leverage needed expertise of CDC’s partners (Kettl 2005). Kettl (2005) argues that the 
twenty-first century problems facing CDC called for its transformation from a more 
 90
 traditional hierarchical organization to one that reflects new goals and an emphasis on 
performance, increased collaboration, and improved service delivery. 
2.6.6 Performance Measurement and Network Governance 
Only a few sources were identified in the literature explicitly investigating the 
relationship of performance measurement and network governance and most of it comes 
from Europe and Australia. The study of GPRA implementation by Frederickson and 
Frederickson (2006) previously described is relevant here as well. Based on a review of 
performance systems in seven different public sectors within the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
Goddard and Mannion (2004) explored whether performance measurement systems can 
also support horizontal relationships more characteristic of a network approach to 
governance. They differentiated vertical with horizontal performance measurement 
systems based on aspects of measurement, analysis, and action (use). These 
characteristics are summarized in table 6 below (Goddard and Mannion 2004, 82). 
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 Table 6. Characteristics of Vertical and Horizontal Performance Measurement 
Systems 
  
Vertical, Hierarchical Approach 
 
Horizontal, Network Approach 
 
Measurement: 
Scope 
 
• National (center) perspective 
• Focus on dimensions of 
performance important to 
center 
• Quantitative orientation for 
indicators 
• Lack of consultation on 
system design 
 
 
• Focus on issues of concern to 
customers, clients, and provider 
staff 
• Participative process of system 
design 
• Include qualitative elements of 
performance 
• Focus on dimensions of 
performance important to local 
partners 
 
Measurement: 
Purpose  
 
• Accountability (financial 
and political) and external 
control 
• Focus on attaining minimum 
standards/uniform standards 
• Use performance data to 
mediate relationships 
between different parts of 
the system 
 
• Emphasize use by organizations 
for their own purposes 
• Focus on improvement across all 
organizations 
• Use of data to support informal 
systems and channels of 
communication and 
dissemination 
• Use of peer review process 
 
Analysis 
 
• Center focuses on providing 
data definitions and ensuring 
consistency in data 
collection, analysis, and 
presentation 
• Analysis undertaken by 
center and fed back down to 
organizations 
• Organizations collect data 
only for the purpose of 
meeting central priorities 
• Analysis highlights best and 
worst performers 
 
• Some use of anonymized 
information collected by and 
shared between, participating 
organizations 
• Organizations use the data they 
collect for local purposes 
• Analysis focused on continuous 
quality improvement across all 
organizations 
• Use of inspection to cover 
“softer” areas of performance not 
captured by quantitative 
indicators 
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Vertical, Hierarchical Approach 
 
Horizontal, Network Approach 
 
Action: 
Dissemination 
Incentives 
 
• Focus on achievement of 
indiscriminate targets by all 
regardless of starting point 
• Publication of results in 
league table format 
• Focus on meeting needs of 
external stakeholders (e.g., 
public) 
• Incentives targeted at poor 
performers 
• Incentives targeted at 
institutional level 
• Incentives directed largely at 
extrinsic motivation 
 
• Encouragement for organizations 
to access and use the data for 
their own quality improvement 
purposes 
• Focus on helping organizations to 
make sense of the data and share 
best practice 
• Incentives exist for encouraging 
performance improvement 
regardless of the starting point of 
the organization 
• Incentives directed at the 
individuals whose behavior 
affects performance 
• Incentives directed at intrinsic 
motivation 
 
 
The authors found both vertical and horizontal features of performance 
measurement systems in the seven different public sectors reviewed in the U.K. That is, 
they found that vertical and horizontal approaches seem to exist on a continuum with 
agencies having adopted elements of both in their performance measurement systems. 
This is consistent with Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn’s (2004) contention that in the 
governance framework a continuum emerges related to the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of administrative structures rather than simply one or the other alone. Like 
Radin (2006), Goddard and Mannion argue against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to a 
performance measurement system and suggest a more nuanced strategy to integrate top-
down approaches with ones more horizontal in nature. Their findings promote more of a 
contingency perspective, suggesting that vertical approaches may be more effective when 
policy dictates a small number of important targets by focusing the actions of agents. 
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 Their review also identifies unintended consequences related to gaming and misconduct 
that can emerge under these circumstances. In contrast, they find a key benefit of 
horizontal approaches to performance measurement in the creation of a more open 
environment that supports freer exchange of information leading to continuous learning 
and program improvement (Goddard and Mannion 2004). 
In a recent paper by Mandell and Keast (2006), both from Australia, the authors 
suggest that newer, “non-traditional,” performance measures are needed to evaluate 
performance in collaborating networks. They argue that traditional performance measures 
focusing on tasks completed and clients served may be appropriate for single agency 
efforts but are inadequate for network arrangements. Rather, the authors suggest that 
these types of performance measures must be augmented by ones assessing the 
performance of the network itself. Outputs and outcomes of importance to networks 
include those related to the processes that occur throughout the development of a network 
as well as relationship building, trust, and more tangible elements such as revised policies 
and procedures (Mandell and Keast 2006). Mandell and Keast (2006) suggest that the 
effectiveness of collaborating networks is not based on the effectiveness of any single 
agency, but rather “by the ability of all organizations in the network to act as a cohesive 
whole” (p. 4). Consequently, the authors argue that performance measures must be 
developed with input from all network members rather than imposed by a government 
agency (Mandell and Keast 2006). In addition, they acknowledge that network structures 
will compromise the ability to hold individual government agencies accountable for 
individual outcomes (Mandell and Keast 2006). In fact, within a network, Page (2004) 
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 suggests that the attempt to hold individual agencies responsible for broad outcomes may 
actually risk setting them up for failure. 
When operating through networks, then, the issue emerges of including common 
measures of collaborative performance. That is, to better manage networks, should an 
effort be made to develop measures that capture the performance of the network itself as 
suggested by Mandell and Keast?  In an earlier paper by Keast et al. (2004), the authors 
noted, “The difficulty is that the types of results that occur through network structures do 
not have to do with generating programs or numbers (although that is part of the 
secondary results), but have to do more with changing relationships and perceptions, 
which are much more intangible” (p. 367). The authors advocate for the recognition of 
outcome measures that reflect the benefits of network operations – “systemic change, 
relationship building, innovative operating procedures, and community inclusion” (Keast 
et al. 2004, 370).  
Similarly, Voets, De Rynck, and Van Dooren (2006), all from Belgium, consider 
the challenge of measuring collaborative performance in networks given that it may offer 
an important tool when managing in these contexts. They ask, “Do we need a different 
conceptualization of performance, if precisely these less tangible and measurable 
dimensions are at the heart of collaborative networks?” (Voets, De Rynck, and Van 
Dooren 2006, 21).  
In the U.S., Robert Agranoff (2005) has given this idea some attention as well, 
considering how to develop measures that capture the “value-added” of the collaborative 
network. Agranoff (2005) proposed developing measures relating to the individual level 
(e.g., individual gains based on network participation), the organizational level (e.g., 
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 access to new information or expertise, increased integration), and collaborative levels 
(e.g., process related to relationship building, etc.). 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarized several literatures relevant to the proposed study 
including those related to governance, NPM, policy reforms related to NPM and 
performance measurement, performance measurement, public health, and networked 
public management. These literatures all contribute to framing the study in the current 
discourse. Governance provides an important overall context given the centrality of 
networks in the framework. New Public Management, with its policy reforms (i.e., 
GPRA, PART) and emphasis on performance measurement, also provides invaluable 
context for the study.  
As the dissertation title suggests, the literature recognizes potential challenges for 
developing and implementing performance measurement in networked public 
management contexts. Although performance measurement has been widely adopted in 
practice, network contexts pose unique challenges given their characteristics outlined 
above. Studies by GAO and Frederickson addressing GPRA’s implementation imposed 
by third-party government and decentralized implementation structures provide an 
important foundation from which to build the proposed study. Theoretical work by 
Jennings and Haist also provide an essential basis for the research. 
The literature suggests that government is struggling to adapt and transform its 
public management practices to fit new structures that support more agile and 
coordinated responses to the complex policy problems facing the country today.  
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 Performance management is one strategy that has been advocated as a means to improve 
the results of public programs in these contexts (Kettl 2005). However, a better 
understanding of how programs are addressing the challenges posed by network 
governance in developing and implementing performance measurement is needed in 
order to enhance its practice. Therefore, more research is needed. The next chapter 
describes the methodology used for this study that addresses this gap in the research. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Fundamentally, the selection of research methods is dictated by the researcher’s 
philosophical view, as well as the study’s purpose, the nature of the research questions, 
and the available resources (Creswell 1998; Patton 2002). Qualitative methods are most 
suitable when a subject is simply insufficiently understood and researchers are exploring 
the “how” and “what” (Creswell 2007; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Both are 
relevant here. First, as already noted, the extant literature addressing the convergence of 
performance measurement and networked governance is scarce. Second, as reflected in 
the research questions, the proposed study is exploratory in nature, aimed at better 
understanding the implications of networked public management on the design and 
implementation of federal-level performance measurement. Consequently, a qualitative 
methodology is applied because it enables a more detailed description and explanation of 
federal performance measurement applied in these contexts. 
The field of qualitative research has grown substantially over the past two decades 
with its methods increasingly utilized by researchers in the applied social sciences, 
including among others, those in public policy, public management, public health, and 
evaluation (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000; Miles and Huberman 1994; Rossman and 
Rallis 2003; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Notably, some classic texts in the field of 
public policy have been based on qualitative research including Pressman and 
Wildavsky’s (1973) account of policy implementation and Allison’s (1971) analysis of 
the Cuban missile crisis. Agranoff and Radin (1991) argue the importance of systematic 
and rigorous case study approaches to explore complex issues in public administration 
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 that cannot be effectively addressed using other research methods. Furthermore, 
qualitative research can make an important contribution toward building a bridge 
between theory and practice that will benefit public managers (Agranoff and Radin 1991; 
Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000).  
This chapter summarizes the study’s research methods. First, some key 
characteristics of qualitative research are described to introduce the broad research 
approach adopted for this study. This is followed by a justification of the qualitative 
approach chosen for the study, case study methodology. In particular, features of a 
multiple, instrumental case study, the specific type of case study applied here, are 
detailed. The chapter then presents a thorough overview of the sampling, data collection 
processes, data analysis procedures, and the presentation of findings. Next, the chapter 
addresses issues related to the study’s rigor, particularly those of reliability and validity. 
The chapter closes by attending to ethical considerations, study limitations, and 
researcher assumptions. 
As introduced in chapter one, the three research questions guiding the study are as 
follows: 
1. How does networked public management affect the observability of program 
outputs and outcomes? 
 
2. How does networked public management influence the use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used? 
 
3. How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance 
measurement? 
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 3.1 Characteristics and Strengths of Qualitative Research 
The characteristics of qualitative research reflect many of its strengths and 
contributions as a broad research method. Qualitative research can be characterized by its 
1) naturalistic approach, 2) aim toward understanding, 3) focus on interpretation, 4) 
inductive strategy, 5) use of multiple methods, 6) emergent and flexible design, 7) 
simultaneous conduct of data collection and analysis, and 8) the researcher’s role as the 
primary instrument of data collection. First, qualitative research involves data collection 
and methods that are applied in real-world settings that unfold “naturally” (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985; Rossman and Rallis 2003). The naturalistic approach emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the context in which the phenomenon or person operates 
based on the belief that the setting significantly influences human behavior (Bogdan and 
Biklen 2007).  
Second, in contrast to quantitative research, with its aim at explanation, 
prediction, and broader generalization, qualitative research is intent on generating deeper 
understanding of the whole as well as of the specific and particular (Miles and Huberman 
1994; Patton 2002; Stake 1995). By simultaneously applying data collection and analytic 
methods that are open-ended yet rigorous, qualitative research uncovers nuance and 
complexity related to the object of study (Janesick 2000). This allows researchers to 
uncover a richness that is often conveyed in “thick” or “rich” description a narrative 
providing a deep level of understanding intended to facilitate theory building, explicate 
relationships, or provide important contextual details not possible through quantitative 
methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).  
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 Third, in qualitative study, the researcher strives to understand the multiple 
perspectives of those closest to the phenomenon of interest and achieve an “emic” or 
insider perspective of the view of those studied (Stake 2000). In other words, qualitative 
research aims to make meaning of phenomena based on individuals’ perceptions of them 
(Creswell 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Stake (1995) suggests that interpretation is 
the single most distinctive characteristic of qualitative research.  
Next, interpretations are largely drawn inductively in qualitative research rather 
than deductively, as in the quantitative arena. Categories, themes, and patterns are 
derived directly from the data (Janesick 2000). It would be misleading to suggest, 
however, that qualitative work is solely inductive; theoretical frameworks and research 
questions provide essential structure for research (Miles and Huberman 1994). That is, 
qualitative research often begins deductively with a conceptual framework and a set of 
analytic categories, and then it proceeds inductively to derive meaning from the research 
experience and collected data (Miles and Huberman 1994). But fundamentally, 
qualitative research involves an effort to inductively derive meaning from the multiple 
perspectives of those included in the study (Ezzy 2002).   
Fifth, qualitative research utilizes multiple methods to collect varied empirical 
data. Most frequently, data collection involves interviews, observations, and document 
review (Patton 2002). The use of these varied approaches facilitates a more holistic view 
of the phenomenon under study and allows for the triangulation of data sources, 
improving the study’s reliability and validity.  
Sixth, the methods selected in qualitative research are used in a flexible manner, 
that is, the approach involves emergent research design (Rossman and Rallis 2003). Miles 
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 and Huberman (1994) recognize the need to “bend the methodology to the peculiarities of 
the setting” (p.5). This requires that investigators understand the theoretical or policy 
issues under study as they must make analytic judgments throughout data collection (Yin 
2009). This suggests a seventh, closely related characteristic – that “analysis begins in the 
field” as researchers are attentive to emerging themes and patterns, consistently reflecting 
on data to help shape the study design (Glesne and Peshkin 1992). Consequently, data 
collection and analysis occur concurrently in qualitative research necessitating the 
flexibility noted above (Creswell 2007). For instance, an interviewee may identify 
another important person to interview; an observation may reveal new issues for study; 
and a specific document examined may suggest another for analysis (Janesick 2000).  
Lastly, in qualitative work, the researcher becomes the instrument for data 
collection (Creswell 2007; Miles and Huberman 1994). There is a purposeful researcher-
subject interaction intended to facilitate deeper understanding. Within this relationship, 
the researcher assumes a neutral or nonjudgmental approach emphasizing empathy, 
respect, sensitivity, and responsiveness (Patton 2002). This is in contrast to quantitative 
research where the researcher assumes the role of objective observer (Stake 1995). Given 
the role of the researcher in qualitative researcher, attention to voice and reflexivity is 
essential. Patton noted, “The qualitative researcher owns and is reflective about her or his 
own voice and perspective; … the researcher’s focus becomes balance understanding and 
depicting the world authentically in all its complexity while being self-analytical, 
politically aware, and reflexive in consciousness,” (Patton 2002, 41).   
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 3.2 Methodological Approach: Multiple, Instrumental Case Study 
Case study, one tradition of qualitative research, is an empirical method most 
appropriate when the nature of the research addresses “how” and “what” (Creswell 
2007). Case study research aims to deepen understanding by closely studying the 
complexities of an individual case in order to produce rich description (Rossman and 
Rallis 2003). The case can focus on individuals, programs, communities, or states, but 
regardless of the unit of analysis used, a qualitative case study “seeks to describe that unit 
in depth and detail, in context, and holistically” (Patton 2002, 54).  
Case study has been identified as a valuable method for the study of public policy 
and public administration. Stake suggested, “The utility of case research to practitioners 
and policy makers is in its extension of experience,” (Stake 2000, 449). For this study, 
case study serves as a useful qualitative approach given the research questions and the 
unit of analysis (i.e., public health programs nationally administered by CDC). The 
“case” is defined more precisely in section 3.3 below.  
Stake (1995, 2006), Yin (2009), and Merriam (2009) are all widely cited for their 
approaches to case study research. For this study, Robert Stake’s methodology has been 
adopted because of its wide use, his attention to the inclusion of multiple cases, and his 
specification of unique case study approaches. Stake (1995, 2006) differentiated between 
intrinsic and instrumental case studies. While intrinsic case study aims to understand a 
particular case, instrumental case study is used to gain broader insight; that is, the case 
becomes “instrumental” in understanding something broader than the individual case. 
Instrumental case study may involve a single case or multiple cases. Multiple case study 
attempts to broaden instrumental understanding by including more than one case (Stake 
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 2000). Consequently, multiple case study research starts with the phenomenon of interest 
and studies individual cases for what they can tell us about that phenomenon (Stake 
2006). 
This study incorporates a multiple, instrumental case study design. Multiple, 
instrumental case study allows the researcher to study the phenomenon of interest, 
performance measurement, in different networked management contexts. The researcher 
examines the individual cases’ similarities and differences in order to better understand 
the object of study (Stake 2006). Although each case is explored in depth, it is always 
with a view toward better understanding the phenomenon of interest (Stake 2006). Stake 
(2006) noted, “It is supposed that the complex meanings of the Quintain17 are understood 
differently and better because of the particular activity and contexts of each Case” (p. 40). 
Therefore, by studying the development and implementation of federal-level performance 
measurement in different contexts, each involving networked public management, a more 
nuanced understanding of the phenomenon may be unveiled. Both the unique situational 
analysis of each case and the similarities and differences across cases contribute to a 
greater understanding of performance measurement designed and implemented in 
networked environments. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (2009) recognized that the inclusion of 
multiple cases can enhance the confidence of findings. By examining multiple cases that 
may be both similar and contrasting, the validity and stability of findings are strengthened 
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009). Finally, while multiple, instrumental case studies 
often involve a research “team,” Stake (2006) emphasized that the approach is also 
                                            
17 Stake introduces the term “Quintain” in his most recent text on multiple case study to 
represent the broader phenomenon under study in multiple, instrumental case study. 
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 appropriate for dissertation research although the student occupies all roles (e.g., director, 
data gatherer, and analyst). This issue will be revisited later in the chapter. 
3.3 Defining the Case 
In conducting a case study, the first obligation is to define the “case” (Yin 2009). 
Stake (2006) defined the case as a “bounded system,” reflecting the fact that the case is 
an object rather than a process. A case is purposive, an integrated system; the case 
represents a context and experience (Stake 2006). In sum, the case reflects the unit of 
analysis and defines the scope for which findings and conclusions can be made (Patton 
2002)18.  
For this study, the “case” is defined as “a federally-funded, public health program 
nationally administered by CDC and implemented through a decentralized network that 
has developed or is in the process of developing a national-level performance 
measurement system.” This definition provides a “boundedness, context, and experience” 
that usefully defines the case (Stake 2006). The case is bounded at the federal level, 
specifically at CDC. While the national program involves a decentralized, network 
implementation structure, the primary interest is to describe the federal-level experience 
in developing and implementing performance measurement systems. This choice is 
largely driven by pragmatic considerations related to both scale and regulations imposed 
by OMB19. 
                                            
18 Case study has come to mean more than the unit of analysis, however. The term also 
reflects a methodological approach as well as the product of analysis (Stake 1995; Patton 
2002). 
19 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires Health and Human Services 
(HHS) approval for research involving nine or more persons as part of the Paperwork 
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 The multiple, instrumental case study provides an in-depth study and analysis of 
each of four selected public health programs administered by CDC and allows for 
valuable cross-site analysis. Stake (2006) suggested that the inclusion of at least four 
programs provides more useful variation and is preferable to two or three. At the same 
time, Stake (2006) emphasized that the first objective is always to understand the 
individual case and, in particular, its functioning and activities. For this study, the 
researcher aimed to interpret patterns across each case, examining it in terms of its own 
situation, prior to conducting any cross-case analysis (Stake 2006).  
3.4 Sample Selection: The Cases 
Well chosen cases are essential to assuring that the phenomenon of interest is 
understood (Stake 2006). In contrast to quantitative research, which often uses random 
sampling techniques derived from statistical probability theory in order to assure 
generalizability, qualitative research involves purposeful or judgment sampling, with the 
principle aim of selecting information-rich cases leading to the greatest understanding 
(Patton 2002; Stake 1995; Yin 2003). Purposeful sampling allows researchers to “tailor” 
the sample to the study (Stake 2006). Cases are selected based on conceptual rather than a 
representative basis (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
Stake (2006) suggested broad criteria for sample selection in a multiple, 
instrumental case study that included assuring that the cases: (1) are relevant to the 
phenomenon of interest; (2) provide diversity across contexts; and (3) provide 
opportunities to learn about both complexity and contexts. However, the most important 
                                                                                                                                  
Reduction Act of 1995. At CDC, this approval process takes approximately 12-15 
months. OMB approval is not required for research involving federal employees.  
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 factor for case selection is that the case provides a meaningful opportunity to learn (Stake 
2006). Of course, case selection is also influenced by more practical issues. For instance, 
issues of access and willingness to participate must be addressed (Rossman and Rallis 
2003). For this study, the researcher’s association at CDC facilitated entrée with relevant 
stakeholders in the proposed program areas. Based on preliminary discussions with CDC 
staff from each national program, a willingness to participate was assured prior to the 
dissertation proposal defense; formal introduction, approvals (i.e., Division Directors 
support to participate), and permissions (e.g., CDC human subjects review) were secured 
prior to initiating field work.  
As noted above, for this study, a case is defined as a federally-funded, public 
health program nationally administered by CDC and implemented through a 
decentralized network that has developed or is in the process of developing a national-
level performance measurement system. Consideration was given to whether cases could 
be included that would be differentiated based on a relevant variable. For instance, in his 
dissertation research addressing GPRA, Frederickson (2003) included five cases from 
HHS20, each of which used different policy tools (e.g., regulation, grants, contracts, direct 
service). This was consistent with his research questions to explore the influence of 
policy tools on programs’ choice of GPRA measures.  
For this research, a differentiating variable relevant to the proposed research 
purpose and questions involves the network structure itself. It is presumed that while all 
of the potential cases (i.e., federally-funded, public health program nationally 
                                            
20 Frederickson included the following five federal agencies in his study of GPRA 
implementation: National Institutes of Health (NIH), Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), Indian Health Services (HIS), Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), and Heath Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). 
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 administered by CDC) are vertically integrated in their implementation structure (e.g., 
funding may move from CDC to a state health department to a county health 
department), some have more extensive horizontal network characteristics than others. 
By including cases that represented both types, there is an opportunity to make some 
comparisons in addressing the research questions. Consequently, a stratified, purposeful 
sampling strategy is used. Stratified sampling is one of a number of approaches to 
purposeful sampling described by Patton (2002) in qualitative research and involves 
breaking the sample into categories. For this study, the sample is stratified based on 
characteristics of the network structure. 
Four cases, each unique in context, were selected based on a set of broad criteria 
that were derived from the study’s purpose and research questions. The criteria assured 
that the individual cases would share important key characteristics and are “categorically 
bound” (Stake 2006, p. 6) in their representation of the study’s focus. The overall criteria 
were as follows: 
1. The cases should reflect programs with widely decentralized implementation 
networks.  
 
2. The cases should be domestic (e.g., within the U.S. and its territories) and include 
programs that fund thirty grantees or more21. The large number of grantees 
funded by a single program poses unique challenges in identifying a common set 
of national indicators. 
 
3. The cases should involve cooperative agreements22 or grants as the policy tool. 
 
                                            
21 Many of CDC’s national programs are funded across all 50 U.S. states. Tribal 
organizations and U.S. territories are sometimes funded as well. 
22 Cooperative agreements are typically used by CDC as the policy tool to provide 
funding to grantees. Cooperative agreements are a type of grant and require that grantees 
“cooperate” with CDC for various programmatic decision-making. The funding 
announcement for each program specifies the roles and expectations for both the grantee 
and CDC. 
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 4. The cases should reflect programs with a program-specific, performance 
measurement system either in development or fully implemented. The 
performance measurement system does not necessarily need to include GPRA 
measures. 
 
5. The cases should provide ample and rich opportunities for studying performance 
measurement systems in contexts of networked public management environments. 
This implies that the maturity of the performance measurement system should be 
considered. 
 
The cases were stratified as follows: two cases represent programs with primarily 
vertical, integrated networks and two others represent programs with more extensive 
horizontal, network composition. Unfortunately, CDC does not maintain an inventory of 
its national programs with performance measurement systems. Therefore, the researcher 
sought advice from several CDC colleagues about case selection. All those who were 
consulted work at senior levels and are well versed with programs across the agency. 
Through this first set of discussions, a group of ten potential CDC programs were 
identified meeting the criteria above. Next, individual meetings were held with staff from 
most of those programs to further explore their program structure, performance 
measurement system, and interest in participation.  
Based on the information collected, four cases were proposed for inclusion: (1) 
the National Diabetes Prevention and Control Program (NDPCP); (2) the Comprehensive 
STD Prevention Systems (CSPS); (3) the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early 
Detection Program (NBCCEDP), and (4) the National Tobacco Control Program 
(NTCP). Upon initiating field work, the NDPCP was dropped and replaced with the 
Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program. This change was made 
based on advice from representatives in NDPCP. The evaluation team in the Division of 
Diabetes Translation was revisiting their performance measurement development process 
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 and suggested that the researcher identify a more fully developed system. The 
replacement of cases is appropriate in qualitative research, especially when the change 
will enhance the utility of the study (Stake 1995).  
In regard to stratification, the CSPS and the NBCCEDP represent vertically 
integrated networks while the NTCP and PHEP include vertical along with more 
extensive horizontal network dimensions. Each program included in the study is briefly 
introduced below. 
3.4.1 Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR), Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness (PHEP) Program 
DSLR is located in CDC’s Coordinating Office on Terrorism and Preparedness 
for Emergency Response (COTPER). Through DSLR, over $700 million is awarded to 
62 state, local, and territorial health grantees in the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness (PHEP) Program. The program aims to build public preparedness for a 
range of hazards including natural disasters as well as terrorist, chemical, biologic, 
radiologic, and nuclear emergencies. The PHEP program was initiated in 1999 and has 
changed substantially from year to year. The program is generally viewed as ‘new’ and 
the discipline of public health preparedness is still evolving. Working in a complex 
political environment, grantees collaborate with both vertical and horizontal partners. Six 
national-level performance measures are currently place and an effort is underway to 
further develop the indicator set. 
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 3.4.2 Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention (DSTDP), 
Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems 
CDC’s DSTDP is located in the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB 
Prevention (NCHSTP). The primary grantee program of the DSTDP is called the 
Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems (CSPS). The purpose of the program is to 
support STD programs in designing, implementing, and evaluating comprehensive STD 
prevention systems. Some grantees receive additional funding to address STD-related 
infertility, syphilis elimination, and specific surveillance activities. Just over $104 million 
dollars is distributed to all fifty U.S. states, the District of Columbia, six U.S. cities, and 
seven U.S. territories. Program activities vary by grantee, but include the implementation 
of community and individual behavior change programs, medical and laboratory services, 
partner notification and counseling services, surveillance activities, and planning to 
address STD outbreaks. 
The program has a strong vertical dimension in its implementation structure with 
funding often moving from CDC to state health departments to county or other local 
health jurisdictions. However, horizontal features are also present as programs are 
encouraged to collaborate closely with other public health programs including those 
addressing HIV and hepatitis, the correction and detention systems, drug treatment 
facilities, family planning clinics, and private medical providers. CDC began requiring 
grantees to report on a set of twelve core indicators in 2004.   
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 3.4.3 Division of Cancer Prevention and Control (DCPC), National Breast and 
Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program 
CDC’s DCPC is located in the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention 
and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP). DCPC funds the National Breast and Cervical 
Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCECP) which was established by Congress in 
1990 with the passage of the Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Prevention Act. The law 
requires that CDC provide funds to state, territorial, and tribal health agencies to carry out 
the program. The law specifies six activities for implementation: (1) breast and cervical 
cancer screening; (2) referrals for medical treatment and other support services; (3) public 
information and education; (4) professional education; (5) quality assurance; and (6) 
monitoring and evaluation, including surveillance. Although NBCCEDP funds can be 
used for some diagnostic procedures, funds may not be used for cancer treatment. The 
NBCCEDP serves low-income, uninsured, or under-insured women23. 
Currently, the program provides approximately $160 million dollars in funding to 
68 state, tribal, and territorial grantees. Since the program’s inception, over 3.2 million 
women have been screened and nearly 8 million screening tests provided. State, tribal, 
and territorial agencies manage the NBCCEDP through varied implementation structures, 
but these typically involve a fee-for-service model whereby providers of breast and 
cervical screening services are reimbursed by the state, region, or county for services 
rendered. 
Although the service delivery structure is primarily vertically integrated, 
programs collaborate at more horizontal levels with organizations such as the American 
                                            
23 HHS, CDC, Request for Application DP07-703 
 112
 Cancer Society (e.g., local chapter), the Komen Foundation, the state comprehensive 
cancer control programs, and local level community based organizations. In addition, 
given shared risk factors, NBCCEDP programs typically collaborate with other chronic 
disease programs such as those addressing diabetes, heart disease, physical activity, 
nutrition, and tobacco prevention. These collaborations often facilitate coordinated efforts 
for public and provider education and client outreach. Extensive patient-level screening 
and diagnostic data are collected and reported semi-annually to CDC. A performance 
measurement system has been in place since 2005 and is used by CDC for program 
monitoring and as part of a performance-based budgeting formula. 
3.4.4 Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco Control Program 
CDC’s Office of Smoking and Health (OSH) supports the National Tobacco 
Control Program (NTCP) providing a total of $63 million in funding to all fifty U.S. 
States, the District of Columbia, and seven U.S. territories. Program goals include 
preventing the initiation of tobacco use among young people, eliminating exposure to 
second hand smoke, promoting tobacco cessation among adults, and addressing tobacco-
related disparities among certain population groups. Funding supports implementation of 
community interventions and mobilization, counter-marketing efforts, policy 
development, and surveillance/evaluation24. 
The implementation structure for the NTCP is fairly networked at the state and 
local levels often involving extensive collaboration with partners representing a broad 
spectrum of sectors and levels of government (e.g., school system, non-profit 
                                            
24 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/stateandcommunity/index.htm#a
bout. (accessed March 7, 2007). In addition, HHS, CDC, Program Announcement 03022. 
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 organizations such as American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association, 
health maintenance organizations, business associations, and other chronic disease 
programs). In many states, the CDC awards are augmented by other funding sources 
(e.g., state legislature allocations) often derived from tobacco excise taxes and/or the 
1998 Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement. 
In 2005, OSH published Key Outcome Indicators for Evaluating Comprehensive 
Tobacco Control Programs (CDC 2005) which identifies120 evidence-based, outcome-
level, performance measures. Given the variability in implementation activities among 
grantees, programs have flexibility in selecting measures for which to report to CDC. 
More recently, OSH identified a subset of twenty-five of these key measures (i.e., core 
indicators) for which all grantees will be required to track and report to CDC. 
3.5 Sample Selection: The Individuals 
Persons involved in developing, implementing, and or managing the performance 
measurement system for each of the four programs were recruited for study participation. 
These persons included CDC staff, contract employees, and external stakeholders, 
including directors for state-based programs. It is common for CDC to contract with 
agencies for a variety of evaluation and research activities, including developing 
performance measurement systems. Likewise, CDC often involves external stakeholders 
(e.g., representatives of state or national organizations) in an advisory capacity for such 
efforts as these. Miles and Huberman (1994) recognize the value of including those 
“peripheral” to the case as well as those closer to the phenomenon being studied, and 
suggest that those on the periphery of the case offer a unique perspective and contribute 
to a stronger contextual understanding. 
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 Purposeful sampling was used to select interviewees for each case. Interviewees 
represented a group with experience in the development, implementation, or management 
of the performance measurement system. Again, these individuals represented persons 
who had the most extensive experience with the performance measurement system or 
who otherwise offered an important perspective. To increase the comparability of data, an 
attempt was made to interview persons in similar positions or roles across the four cases. 
These roles and the number of people interviewed for each25 included: 
1. The person(s) involved in the development and/or implementation of the 
performance measurement system (n=19) 
 
2. The person(s) responsible for the CDC data management system used to 
manage performance data reported by grantees (n=7) 
 
3. The Branch Chief or Section Chief for the program services branch (i.e., the 
branch that oversees the cooperative agreements or grants for the national 
program) (n=7) 
 
4. Program consultants from the program services branch who work directly 
with funded grantees to oversee the cooperative agreements or grants (n=11) 
 
5. Policy staff responsible for managing GPRA and PART reporting (n=5) 
 
6. Program Directors who manage the state-based programs26 or CDC field staff 
that work in the grantee program (n=7) 
 
The researcher identified persons who directed the development of the 
performance measurement systems for all four programs. These people served as 
“gatekeepers” to the larger program staff and stakeholders. Once human subjects’ 
approvals were obtained in the fall 2007, the researcher met individually with each 
gatekeeper and formally requested their participation in the study. The researcher 
                                            
25 Some participants fit two roles (e.g., a program consultant who was on a performance 
measurement workgroup to help develop the measures). 
26 The researcher was limited by the number of non-federal employees that could be 
included in the study given the absence of OMB Paper Reduction Act approvals. 
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 provided the gatekeeper an invitation to participate by email with information about the 
study. The gatekeeper assisted the researcher in securing Division approval for 
participation and identifying others important to the development, implementation, and/or 
management process. Potential interviewees were contacted by email and invited to 
participate in the study. The email explicitly stated that the research was being conducted 
to fulfill dissertation requirements and that human subjects’ review had been obtained 
from both CDC and Georgia State University (GSU). Individual emails to participants 
were modified slightly to personalize them as appropriate.  
3.6 Data Collection Methods 
The research protocol was approved by the institutional review boards for both 
CDC and Georgia State University (GSU). As noted in the section addressing the 
strengths of qualitative research, the approach allows for a variety of methods. Rossman 
and Rallis (2003) suggested that case studies in particular are “methodologically 
eclectic.” In fact, case study requires that multiple methods or sources of evidence be 
used (Yin 2009). The most common data collection methods used in case study are 
interviews, document review, and observation, although quantitative methods are also 
often incorporated (Patton 2002; Stake 2006; Yin 2009). These three methodologies were 
adopted here as a means to facilitate a holistic understanding of each case while also 
allowing for methodological triangulation of data, which supports the reliability and 
validity of findings (Yin 2009). Most importantly, a systematic, objective approach to 
data collection was practiced so that generalizations could be made about the case(s) as 
patterns and themes were identified (Stake 1995).  
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 3.6.1 Interviews 
In case study, interviews are an extremely important data source (Yin 2009), in 
part because they can provide such rich data. Interviewing aims to “discover the 
informant’s experience of a particular topic or situation” (Lofland and Lofland 1995, p. 
18). While various approaches to interviewing are described (Patton 2002), a semi-
structured interview guide approach was adopted here. This approach involved 
combining topic-initiating questions that were derived from the research questions with 
follow-up questions or probes aimed at gathering more detailed information (Rapley 
2001). The interview guide is included as appendix C. The guide assured that relevant 
subject areas were addressed consistently across interviews, while allowing flexibility for 
the researcher to probe in order to further clarify particular topics (Miles and Huberman 
1994; Patton 2002). For multiple cases, Miles and Huberman advocate for a structured 
data collection instrument to improve internal validity and assure that comparisons can be 
made across cases.  
Interviews were conducted in person, in a private office, typically at CDC. 
Written, informed, voluntary consent was secured from all interviewees. The consent 
form is included as appendix D. For individuals physically located in another city; 
telephone interviews were performed. Incentives were not provided for participation. All 
interviews were audio recorded with the permission of participants. Email was used to 
facilitate interview scheduling and to remind participants of interview dates and times. In 
all 55 people were invited to participate and, of those, 52 (95%) agreed to participate. Of 
the three who did not participate, two never responded to repeated emails and one 
recommended another individual as more appropriate for inclusion. 
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 In sum, a total of 50 interviews were conducted with 52 individuals (table 7). Two 
people were interviewed together in two different interviews (i.e., a total of four people 
interviewed); the participants explicitly requested that they be interviewed together and 
represented similar roles (i.e., two policy staff persons; two data management staff). 
Interviews were conducted from January 22 through June 4, 2008. For the most part, 
interviews were conducted by “case”; that is, all 13 interviews with participants 
representing the CSPS were conducted before moving to the second case (PHEP), and so 
forth. The order in which cases were addressed in the study was established based on the 
availability of staff. The average interview length across the four cases was 67 minutes 
(range: 33-133 minutes). All interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional 
transcriptionist.  
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 Table 7.  Interviews Conducted by Case 
Number of 
Participants 
 
Case 
Male Female
 
Total 
Interviewees
Average 
Interview 
Length 
(minutes) 
 
Dates of 
interview data 
collection 
Public Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
 
2 
 
11 
 
13 
 
67 minutes 
 
March 13, 2008 – 
April 4, 2008 
Comprehensive 
STD Prevention 
System 
 
8 
 
5 
 
13 
 
69 minutes 
 
January 22, 2008 
– March 24, 2008 
National Breast 
and Cervical 
Cancer Early 
Detection Program 
 
5 
 
8 
 
13  
(12 
interviews) 
 
70 minutes 
 
March 31, 2008 – 
May 14, 2008 
National Tobacco 
Control Program 
 
5 
 
8 
 
13  
(12 
interviews) 
 
57 minutes 
April 23, 2008 – 
June 4, 2008 
 
Totals 
 
20 
 
32 
 
52  
(50 
interviews) 
 
67 minutes 
January 22, 2008 
– June 4, 2008 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Document Review 
In case study, documents provide valuable information that can corroborate data 
collected from other sources, provide additional evidence, and spawn new paths of 
inquiry (Patton 2002; Yin 2009). Documents may also, however, contradict data gathered 
through interviews and observation, encouraging the researcher to explore these 
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 discrepancies in greater detail (Rossman and Rallis 2003). For this study, relevant 
documents were systematically collected and reviewed. Program-specific web sites were 
reviewed to identify potential documents for review, and participants in individual 
interviews were queried about relevant documents.27  Government websites were also 
accessed and reviewed (e.g., Office of Management and Budget’s ExpectMore.gov).  A 
document review or summary form (appendix E) was completed for each document 
selected for study inclusion. Documents included the funding announcement for the 
specific program, reports on the development of the performance measurement system, 
summaries of stakeholder input on the performance measures, minutes from relevant 
meetings, presentations about the performance measures, relevant policy documents, 
guidance documents summarizing the selected performance measures, and monitoring 
reports used to provide feedback to grantees among others. Appendix F lists the 57 
documents and websites collected and reviewed for each case. Some cases provided a 
greater number of documents than others. Given the researcher’s role as a CDC-
employee, participants were generous in providing varied documents, including drafts of 
documents and internal reports for which an external researcher may not have had access.  
3.6.3 Direct Observation 
Observation allows the investigator to enter the research context or setting and 
explore its complexities (Rossman and Rallis 2003). For this study, data collected 
through observation provided additional information about the performance measurement 
systems, the stakeholders involved in their development, and the context in which they 
                                            
27 As a CDC employee, the researcher has access to both internal (CDC Intranet) and 
external (CDC Internet) web sites for CDC programs. 
 120
 have been developed. Key stakeholders for each program were queried about 
opportunities for observation during the data collection phase of the study. Observational 
opportunities included internal CDC meetings of performance measurement workgroups, 
external stakeholder meetings to assist in developing performance measures, conference 
presentations, other presentations, and a Congressional hearing. A total of 12 formal 
observations were conducted across the four cases with at least two conducted for each 
case. Table 8 summarizes the observations conducted for each case.  
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 Table 8. Formal Observations Conducted by Case 
Case Observation Date of Observation 
Length of 
Observation 
American Evaluation Association 
Conference presentation, “Getting 
from War Stories to Science: 
Developing Performance Measures in 
Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness” 
 
November 
2007 
 
1.5 hour 
CDC Evaluation Forum Presentation, 
“Strategies for Ensuring Data 
Integrity in Performance 
Measurement: Lessons Learned from 
the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative 
Agreement” 
 
December  
2008 
 
1.5 hours 
National Association of County and 
City Health Officials (NACCHO) 
Public Health Preparedness Summit 
presentation, "Are We Prepared?" 
 
February 
2008 
 
1.5 hours 
National Association of County and 
City Health Officials (NACCHO) 
Public Health Preparedness Summit 
presentation, "Developing and 
Implementing a National PHEP 
Measurement System to Support 
Accountability and Program 
Improvement" 
 
February 
2008 
 
1.5 hours 
Public Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Meeting of Evaluation Workgroup 
Sub-committee– Incident 
Management workgroup 
 
April 2008 
 
Two days 
 
Comprehensive 
STD 
Prevention 
Program 
American Evaluation Association 
Conference presentation, “How Do 
You Keep It Going: Steps that One 
CDC Program Takes to Keep 
Performance Measures Relevant” 
 
November 
2007 
 
1.5 hour 
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 Case Date of Length of Observation Observation Observation 
STD Performance Measurement 
Workgroup meeting 
March 2008 2 hours 
 
U.S. Congressional Hearing – 
Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives: The National Breast 
and Cervical Cancer Early Detection 
Program 
 
January 29, 
2008 
 
3 hours 
Meeting of CDC Minimum Data 
Element (MDE) Committee 
April 2008 1.5 hours 
National 
Breast and 
Cervical 
Cancer Early 
Detection 
Program 
Montana Statewide Comprehensive 
Cancer Meeting – Presentation “The 
Montana Breast and Cervical Health 
Program) 
May 2008 45 minutes 
 
Meeting of the Core Indicator 
Workgroup 
May 16, 2008 1 hour National 
Tobacco 
Control 
Program Meeting of the Core Indicator 
Workgroup 
May 28, 2008 1 hour 
 
 
 
Observation length varied depending on the context. A meeting of the STD 
performance measurement workgroup lasted approximately two hours, while an external 
stakeholder meeting convened by COTPER lasted two full days. The researcher took an 
unobtrusive approach to conducting observations rather than a participatory one (Patton 
2002). An observation guide (appendix G) was used to collect field notes, including 
descriptive data about the physical environment, interactions among those observed, and 
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 investigator’s impressions and analytic insights (Rossman and Rallis 2003). The 
researcher took extensive field notes for each observation. These notes represent the 
observation as data or evidence, comparable to an interview transcript (Schwandt 2001). 
Raw notes compiled during the observation were further refined into more detailed 
summaries recorded on the observation guide following each observation.  
3.6.4 Summary of Data Collection Methods 
The majority of data collection was conducted between November 2007 and June 
2008, although some document and website review continued through December 2008. 
Table 9 summarizes data collection for the entire study, which included a total of 50 
interviews with 52 individuals, 57 document or web-site reviews, and 12 formal 
observations.  
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 Table 9. Summary of Data Collection  
 
Public Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Comprehensive 
STD 
Prevention 
Program 
National 
Breast and 
Cervical 
Cancer 
Early 
Detection 
Program 
National 
Tobacco 
Control 
Program Total 
Number of 
Interview 
Participants 
13 13 13 13 52 
Number of 
Interviews 
Conducted 
13 13 12 12 50 
Number of 
Documents 
Review 
15 15 14 13 57 
Number of 
Observations 
with Field  
Notes 
5 2 3 2 11 
 
 
 
3.7 Data Management 
Given the extensive data that were collected through the methods detailed above, 
attention to effective data management was essential. A well-organized database supports 
the study’s reliability by assuring that other investigators can directly review the case 
study evidence (Yin 2009). In addition, effective data management is critical to 
supporting analysis. A number of strategies were used to ensure an efficient approach to 
data management.  
1. Microsoft Excel – Detailed Excel spreadsheets were maintained to track all data 
collection and analysis efforts according to the individual case. The spreadsheets 
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 included details about the data collection method (e.g., observation, interview, 
document review); relevant dates and times (e.g., dates of correspondents with 
participants, interview date/time/place, observation date); participant names, 
pseudonyms, and contact information; data file names for audio recordings and 
transcriptions; document names with corresponding electronic document file 
names; etc. Excel was also used to develop the analytic codebook and facilitate 
case and cross-case analysis. 
 
2. Atlas.ti Scientific Software Atlas.ti was used to facilitate data analysis. Atlas.ti 
allows for the efficient coding and retrieval of data, along with other analytic 
functions (e.g., content analysis, memoing, mapping relationships). All text-based 
data was stored in Atlas.ti, including interview transcripts, document review 
summaries, and observation summaries.  
 
3. Microsoft Word Microsoft Word was used to maintain all electronic documents 
including interview transcripts, document review summaries, observation 
summaries, a researcher’s journal, the analytic codebook, and the written chapters 
developed for inclusion in the final dissertation.  
 
4. Digital audio recordings – Sony digital audio recorders were used to record all 
interviews. The digital audio files were maintained on a personal computer and 
deleted once a written transcript was completed. 
 
5. Electronic data – All electronic data were maintained on a personal computer, 
password protected, and backed up daily to a FireLite Smartdisc.  
 
6. Hard copies Hard copies of some documents were maintained separately (e.g., 
reports, power point presentations received at observations events, signed 
informed consent forms) in a locked storage cabinet. 
3.8 Data Analysis Procedures 
Although analysis is, to some extent, intuitive and an “art,” there are systematic, 
analytic methods that can be applied to all evidence gathered that assure a “scientific” 
approach (Creswell 2007; Merriam 2009; Miles and Huberman 1994; Schwandt 2001; 
Stake 2006; Yin 2009). As noted earlier, in qualitative research, analysis is conducted 
simultaneously with the data collection effort. Emerging themes generated from one 
interview are explored in future ones; something observed leads to reviewing another 
document; analytic insights are recorded; and potential themes are explored with other 
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 participants. This is possible given both the researcher’s role as the primary instrument 
for data collection and the flexible nature of qualitative research. The researcher 
terminated data collection based on practical considerations related to resources (i.e., 
time) and also influenced by the number of available sources, research limitations (i.e., 
inability to interview more than nine non-federal stakeholders), and data saturation.  
Rossman and Rallis (2003) identified seven analytic procedures to guide analysis 
that were followed for the study. These include: (1) organizing the data; (2) becoming 
familiar with the data; (3) generating categories and themes; (4) coding the data; (5) 
interpreting the data; (6) searching for alternative explanations; and (7) writing the 
dissertation. As described below, these procedures are not necessarily conducted in a 
linear manner, but rather, iteratively. 
3.8.1 Organizing the Data 
A central challenge in qualitative research is making sense of such vast amounts 
of data (Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). This challenge was relevant for the 
current study given the vast amount of data collected and the involvement of a single 
researcher. Several approaches, described above in section 3.7, were used to organize the 
data, making it more manageable. In particular, the data were organized by each case and 
Atlas.ti allowed the researcher to filter data in various ways (e.g., by creating “families” 
of data by case). Therefore, data were easily grouped and sifted to facilitate analysis (e.g., 
by case, participant role, related codes). 
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 3.8.2 Familiarizing Yourself with the Data 
Knowing the data intimately requires immersion in the data itself. For this study, 
the investigator conducted all research activities including data collection and the 
development of analytic memos maintained in a journal. In addition, once the written 
interview transcript was received back from the transcriptionist (typically within 2-3 
days), the researcher vetted it against the original audio recording, allowing a second 
“listen” of the interview and assuring accuracy of the transcription..  
Further immersion occurred as part of codebook development and data coding. 
For instance, to construct the codebook (see 3.8.3), the researcher “open coded” over half 
of the interview transcripts (n=29), again offering an opportunity to closely review the 
data. Next, the researcher coded all interview transcripts, document review forms, and 
observation field notes – this work continued to facilitate a deeper understanding of the 
data. Finally, one other strategy supported the researcher’s constant reflection on the data. 
The investigator maintained an analytic journal throughout the study where ideas were 
recorded about emerging insights, potential themes, and methodological issues (Glesne 
and Peshkin 1992; Stake 2006). An example of an entry in the journal is noted below: 
March 29, 2008: Lack of direct line control over local level implementers 
(and network partners) diminishes perceived influence on the part of CDC 
on grantees’ performance, data collection and reporting for the 
performance measures, and resulting performance. CDC managers and 
grantees seem very cognizant of what is and isn’t within the grantees’ 
control -- issues of “fairness” are frequently cited by grantees. 
 
As part of the journal, the researcher tracked key decision points made by the 
researcher and important reflections on the researcher’s role in data collection and 
analysis (Janesick 2000).  
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 April 20, 2008: I initiated NBCCEDP interviews in mid March – Feona 
invited me to present on the study at one of their all-staff branch meetings. 
Everyone has been very supportive of the study. As with the other cases, I 
interviewed two program directors (PDs) who were well versed in the 
topic; they were two long-serving PDs, one of which is the current 
NBCCEDP Program Director Council chairperson. 
 
All of these efforts – data collection, vetting the transcripts, open coding to 
develop the codebook, final coding of all data, and maintaining an analytic journal – 
contributed to the researcher’s effort to maintain an intimate understanding of the data. 
3.8.3 Generating Categories and Themes 
As data were collected, potential categories and themes were identified and noted 
in the researcher’s analytic journal. For instance, while interviewing participants in the 
first case, a potential theme emerged around the notion that, given the network context, 
performance measurement systems evolve over time – that is, the systems may develop in 
an incremental fashion, gaining in complexity and sophistication. As themes like this 
were identified, the researcher documented them in the analytic journal and began to 
explore them further in other interviews, document review, and observations. Similarly, 
categories emerged during data collection. For instance, the researcher observed varied 
descriptions of the use of performance measurement data in networked contexts as well 
as different aspects of the process of developing performance measures in networks. 
The process used by the researcher to develop the codebook also facilitated the 
identification of categories and themes. Although there are different approaches to 
building codes, two methods were used here. First, a priori codes were identified 
deductively based on the theoretical framework, research questions, and interview 
questions (Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, the descriptive codes “horizontal 
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 networks” and “vertical networks” were drafted given their significance to the research 
questions themselves. 
Next, codes were developed inductively from the text using open coding, a 
technique first described by Strauss and Corbin (1990), but also by Charmaz (2006). 
Open coding involves creating codes tied to the data itself by reading the text and 
identifying codes directly related to that text, thus preserving elements of the study 
context (Miles and Huberman 1994). The approach helps ensure that the analysis is 
“grounded” in the data. This two-level strategy to coding, a priori coding and open 
coding, results in both “etic” codes that are more conceptual and broad in nature, as well 
as “emic” codes, those closer to the data and participants’ perspectives (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). The open coding technique was especially valuable in deriving 
categories and themes from the data itself. 
While some (Charmaz 2006) advocate the use of gerunds and a rigorous line-by-
line coding for the first step of open coding, a less painstaking approach of deriving codes 
or categories was used here (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Patton 2002). More specifically, 
an initial round of open coding was conducted on a subset of just over half the transcripts 
for each case using Atlas.ti (n=29 total transcripts). In this exercise, initial codes were 
developed based on the actual text although every line of text was not coded. Based on 
the open coding of 29 interview transcripts, over 1400 initial codes were developed and 
were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. At this first stage, the “codes” were fairly raw in 
form including some that were in-vivo text (e.g. “at CDC this program is so 
decentralized,” “networks challenge ability to see who has responsibility for 
performance”) and others that were more descriptive (e.g. challenge in measuring a less 
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 direct service, no consensus on what to do). This inductive approach to coding resulted in 
codes that were emergent and, as noted earlier, directly tied and “grounded” to the data. 
Using the constant comparative method, originally described by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) as part of their grounded theory approach, the researcher reviewed and 
compared the initial 1400 open codes. Atlas.ti allowed the researcher to move easily from 
a code back to the original text in order to maintain a contextual perspective. By 
comparing codes with codes, data with data, and codes with data, the researcher was able 
to begin sorting and grouping codes into broader themes and categories. This step 
allowed the researcher to move toward developing codes that were more conceptual in 
nature. Charmaz (2006) describes this phase as “focused coding”; Miles and Huberman 
(1994) describe it as “pattern coding” and suggest it is especially valuable for multiple 
case studies as it helps begin to identify common themes. 
This second phase of reviewing, sorting, and organizing reduced the 1400 initial 
codes to 147 codes that were grouped around topics or categories. For instance, under the 
broad category of “networks,” the researcher identified the following codes: building 
networks; conflicts in networks; policy tools to support networks; managing networks; 
value of networks; challenges of networks; unintended consequences of networks; 
compromise in networks; and competition in networks. 
Microsoft Excel® was used to help sort and organize the codes. The 1400 original 
open codes were maintained in the Excel spreadsheet as data were grouped allowing for 
detailed examples to be maintained. For instance, as illustrated in table 10, the researcher 
identified an emerging theme during this phase of analysis and codebook which she titled 
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 “conflicts in networks.” The individual cells in the table are filled with some of the 
original open codes that the researcher grouped under this theme. 
 
 
Table 10. Codebook Development: Conflicts in Networks 
Can be 
competing 
priorities to 
PM at 
grantee 
level* 
Can be 
different 
agendas 
between 
states and  
locals 
Local -federal 
tensions 
Differences in 
priorities for 
feds vs. states 
Different 
missions 
for jails 
Do we have 
any 
agreement 
on what 
we're trying 
to do? 
I don't even 
know if 
CDC is on 
the same 
page 
Network 
partners can 
impede 
public 
health 
performance 
FBI 
wouldn't let 
CDC in 
during 
Katrina 
Public 
health’s voice 
can be lost in 
preparedness 
network/arena
Philosophical 
battle between 
control and 
influence 
Political 
demands to 
bend to 
grantees' 
demands 
too often 
Politically 
it would be 
hard to 
raise the 
targets 
Problems of 
turf 
Some 
doctors view 
toward the 
health 
department 
is I don't 
have to talk 
to them 
Strongly 
influenced by 
Dept of 
Homeland 
Security and 
Dept of 
Defense 
Varied 
disciplines in 
preparedness 
result in 
different 
interpretations, 
reflect 
different 
cultures that 
effect PM  
We disrupt 
the routine 
of jails 
when we 
come in 
How does 
public 
health 
contribute 
in the larger 
network 
response? 
Who pays 
for testing 
in the jails? 
Whose 
performance 
are you 
measuring?        
*Each cell is filled with an “open code” which has been organized under the broader code 
“Conflicts in Networks” 
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 Next, this smaller set of 147 codes was again closely reviewed by the researcher 
and new categories or themes were identified by collapsing, condensing, or expanding 
certain codes (Creswell 2007). During this third wave of comparisons, the 147 codes 
were reduced to a group of 60 codes. Again, the original open codes were maintained in 
the Excel spreadsheet, providing detailed examples for each of these 60 codes. During 
this phase, conceptual categories emerged for the codebook; Miles and Huberman (1994) 
suggest such a structure is essential. Groups of codes began to naturally fit together under 
these larger categories. For instance, there were a number of codes which reflected the 
process of developing performance measures; other codes congealed around the issue of 
measurement while still others reflected notions of cultural shifts and network 
characteristics. Particular attention was given to developing codes not only at the 
descriptive level, but also at deeper, more analytic levels reflected in the categories and 
themes (Charmaz 2006; Schwandt 2001).  
After this round of sorting and grouping, the code “conflicts in networks” that was 
developed in the second stage (see table 10) was abandoned. Instead, a new code of 
“value and goal conflicts” was created under a broader category of “network 
characteristics.” Several dimensions of networks were included under this category, 
including the a priori descriptive codes such as “network characteristics: vertical 
relationships” and “network characteristics: horizontal relationships,” but also inductive 
codes related to process such as “network characteristics: bargaining, consensus building, 
and relationship building.” Table 11 below reflects the original open codes maintained 
for the new code, “Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts.” 
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 Table 11. Codebook Development: “Network Characteristics: Value and Goal 
Conflicts” 
There are so 
many fingers in 
the pot 
Jail partners 
need to see a 
benefit 
FEMA region 
vs. public 
health regions 
are different 
and have 
different focus 
Program 
crosses so 
many 
disciplines big 
challenge 
Their mission is 
public safety, 
ours is public 
health 
Trying to 
understand the 
critical linkages 
between public 
health and 
hospitals 
Networks can 
be complicated 
by things like 
mixed areas of 
responsibility 
Can be 
competing 
priorities to 
performance 
measurement at 
grantee level 
Can be 
different 
agendas 
between states 
and locals 
COTPER 
influenced by 
homeland 
security value 
system vs. 
public health 
has a different 
value system 
Differences in 
priorities for 
feds vs. states 
Different 
missions for 
jails 
I don't even 
know if CDC is 
on the same 
page 
Making 
arguments with 
jails that public 
health is 
important 
Syphilis 
elimination is 
HIV prevention 
 
 
 
The final phase in this step of analysis to form the codebook involved the 
development of operational definitions for all 60 codes. These definitions are essential to 
ensure that the researcher applies the codes consistently over time (Miles and Huberman 
1994). The researcher adopted an approach to codebook development described by 
McQueen and colleagues (2008), public health researchers. Definitions included seven 
components – a code name, brief description, long description, when to use, when not to 
use, coding rules, and examples. The Excel spreadsheet, with its elaborate detail of sorted 
open codes, proved invaluable to the development of the operational definitions. Table 12 
illustrates the codebook definition for “network characteristics: value and goal conflicts.” 
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 Table 12. Example of Codebook Definition 
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts   
 
Brief Description: Conflicts/issues between network partners around values, goals, 
mission, priorities, etc. 
 
Long Description: Given the network structure, conflicts or issues may arise in 
developing performance measurement related to differing 
agency values, goals, mission, priorities, areas of responsibility 
/ turf, culture, etc. These conflicts may impede the development 
of a common set of measures or the collaboration needed to 
collect/report performance related data. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to or describes tension 
between network partners that is related to fundamental 
differences in values, goals, etc. 
 
When NOT to Use: N/A 
 
Coding Rules: N/A   
 
Example:  “Human nature, again, I could be part of this myself if I was out 
there, I have been out there in the past, but you’ve got your own 
little kingdoms and queendoms and fiefdoms and all that and 
the HIV STD programs are a great example of that. They’re still 
not really working together out there and it’s now 2008.”    
 
“You know, I think each State determines who their screening 
population is going to be, and in [state name] it’s not just the 
Department of Health at the site, we have stakeholders, and we 
have a really strong Komen presence in our State” [referring to 
partners who want women aged 40-50 screened vs. CDC policy 
of screening women 50-64]. 
 
 
 
 
Once the draft codebook was completed, the researcher coded a subset of eight 
interviews (i.e., two from each case), in order to further refine the codebook. During this 
time, definitions were revised and four new codes were added. The final codebook, then, 
included 64 codes (see appendix H).  
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 3.8.4 Coding the Data 
The final codebook was entered into Atlas.ti so that the full definition (i.e., all 
seven components) was easily visible as the researcher coded the textual data. Coding 
data involves chunking the text into more manageable segments and attaching a code to it 
(Bogdan and Biklen 2007; Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). Charmaz (2006) 
suggested that coding represents the “analytic frame from which you build the analysis” 
(p. 45). The researcher coded all data for each case in sequence; that is, all interviews, 
document review forms, and observation field notes were coded for one case before 
moving on to the next. This approach supported the tenet of immersion in qualitative data 
the researcher was able to focus entirely on the data collected for each case. Throughout 
the coding process, the researcher developed “comments,” a feature supported by Atlas.ti. 
The software allowed the researcher to attach comments to particular segments of text, 
offering the opportunity to record insights during the coding process. Those comments 
were saved in the database and could be easily retrieved. Data coding proved a critical 
analytic process allowing the researcher to both examine the whole as she reviewed each 
transcript, document review form, and observation field notes, but also to extrapolate data 
and attach codes to build empirical evidence for categories and themes observed in the 
data. 
3.8.5 Interpreting the Data 
 Rossman and Rallis (2003) differentiate analysis from interpretation. They 
suggest that while analysis involves coding to organize the data, interpretation involves 
the more complicated process of making meaning from the data (Rossman and Rallis 
2003). As a process of meaning-making, interpretation is shaped by the research 
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 questions, conceptual framework, and ideas that were the starting point of the inquiry 
(Peskin 2000). The efforts to develop comments during the coding process (described 
above) and maintain an analytic journal throughout the study represent strategies that 
support interpretation. 
An important analytic strategy involved “memoing” throughout the coding 
process. Atlas.ti includes a memo feature that allowed the researcher to develop and 
maintain numerous memos. A method adopted from grounded theory, the writing of 
memos promotes continual reflection on the data. For this study, memo writing helped 
maintain a focus on the data, capture analytic insights, note relationships between and 
among codes, make personal reflections on the researcher’s analytic process, and 
continually document new ideas and impressions. Given that the research was conducted 
by a single investigator, memoing proved invaluable in increasing the level of abstraction 
in analysis. Although memos are maintained as part of the Atlas.ti database, memos were 
viewed as an extension of the analytic journal maintained by the researcher. 
Specific “memos” were developed for each case (e.g., NBCCEDP, PHEP) as well 
as for some key topics (e.g., “control within networks,” “accountability”). The writing 
process itself, including efforts to memo, was fundamental in elucidating a more nuanced 
analysis. The researcher used the memo function of Atlas.ti to record free flowing 
thoughts as the coding proceeded rather than fully developed analytic deductions. An 
example of a memo is provided below: 
Coding Memo: June 2008 “The data here seems to suggest that with 
"wicked problems" and in a networked context, it takes time to develop 
more sophisticated performance measures -- the measures evolve over 
time from more simple, "low hanging fruit" to more complex measures 
that stakeholders at different levels can accept and deal with. Over time 
(i.e., it’s a process!), data collection and management systems are 
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 developed, the field integrates the practice of data collection and reporting 
at various levels (with PHEP they're starting just at the state level, but 
want to move to measures at the local level), developmental measures are 
piloted and tested, analytic methods develop that improve measures, the 
science base evolves, capacities develop in the field to collect and report 
data in ways  that support data validity, and stakeholders build an 
appreciation for the utility of the data.” 
 
Again, the constant comparative method was used extensively to aid 
interpretation. Comparisons of data were made at various levels. At first, data were 
compared with data within an individual interview to identify similarities and differences 
and to assess its relevance (Charmaz 2006). Using Atlas.ti, coded data were easily sorted 
in multiple ways to help make comparisons across interviews, cases, and data collection 
methods. Atlas.ti also provides a function to calculate code frequencies which helped 
assess the potential strength or importance of specific categories and themes. Similarly, 
co-occurrences of specific codes could be assessed; for instance, the researcher could 
examine all text that was coded as both “network characteristics: horizontal dimension” 
and “design: control over performance on measures.” 
In multiple case study, data analysis must attend to both the individual case and 
the aggregate of cases. Stake (2006) addresses the tension that exists in balancing these 
two imperatives. Given that performance measurement will be better understood through 
its examination in unique contexts, analysis of each individual case is essential (Stake 
2006). Yin (2009), Merriam (2009), and Stake (2006) all emphasize the importance of 
first conducting “with-in case analysis” that includes individual case descriptions that 
convey a holistic understanding. Each case provides an opportunity to study how the 
phenomenon operates under specific conditions (Stake 2006).  
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 Consequently, attention to within case analysis preceded cross-case analysis. 
Once coding was complete for a particular case, the researcher developed an individual 
case description and summary before moving forward to code the next case. This 
approach allowed the researcher to maintain a concentrated focus on each case. The case 
description and summary were organized in a report format so that it could be returned to 
representatives from each program for review. With that audience in mind, the format 
used included a brief introduction to the study and its purpose; a review of the methods 
and data collection; three main sections organized around 1) the program, 2) the 
networks, and 3) the performance measurement system; and an overall summary of the 
case. In writing the case reports, the researcher reviewed data associated with specific 
codes to develop the individual report sections (e.g., the networks); that is, data for the 
same set of specific codes associated with a report section were reviewed and analyzed 
for each case. This approach was meant to ensure a consistent approach to analysis across 
the four cases. 
As the case description reports were completed, they were sent electronically to 
the person who had helped coordinate the case study for his or her review and member 
checking. The investigator encouraged that individual to share the report with others for 
review and comment. Member checking involves engaging the research participants in a 
review of tentative findings or interpretations in order to assess their plausibility 
(Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that 
member checking is the most important technique to establish credibility and support 
internal validity. Following the review of the report, the researcher met individually with 
the key program or evaluation staff to discuss the accuracy of the report. A minimum of 
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 two people from each case reviewed their report and provided comment. Appropriate 
revisions were made based on the meeting and the final report was provided to the 
individual program.  
Once the individual reports were verified through the member-checking process, 
the researcher developed more in-depth findings for each case based on the research 
questions. Using Excel spreadsheets, the researcher first developed extensive and detailed 
matrices for each of the three major areas used to describe the case – the program, the 
networks, and the performance measurement system. The matrices summarize descriptive 
data for each of these three areas and are included as appendices (program characteristics 
are summarized in appendix I; network characteristics in appendix J; and the performance 
measurement systems in appendix K). 
Next, the researcher developed a list of potential findings for each case according 
to each of the three research questions – this process was aided by the matrices described 
above. The potential findings for each case were organized in an Excel spreadsheet 
(appendix L) and then sorted and combined into more formal statements that comprise 
the findings for each case. “Cross-case analysis” was principally guided by the research 
purpose, theoretical framework, research questions, and findings from the individual 
cases (Stake 2006). More specifically, the cross-case analysis considered the findings 
across the four cases in order to make assertions that fit across the four cases while also 
preserving the “situationality” of the individual case findings (Merriam 2009; Stake 
2006; Yin 2009). A process described by Stake (2006) to facilitate the cross-case analysis 
was used.  
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 In the cross-case analysis, the researcher applied findings from the individual 
cases to the study’s topic of interest – that of performance measurement applied in 
networked contexts. Working from the individual case findings, the researcher assessed 
the potential prominence of one case or another in addressing the research questions. 
Given the unique aspects of each case (e.g., the extent of its network, the sophistication 
of its performance measurement system) some cases were more relevant to a specific 
research question than another. As before, Excel spreadsheets helped to organize this 
process – individual sheets were used to develop a matrix for each hypothesis (Jennings 
and Haist 2006) and related research question. Matrix columns included those for case 
findings (tagged by case name), the effect of the specific finding on the performance 
measurement system, potential broader implication of the finding for performance 
measurement, specific evidence for the finding, relevant information about the case 
context (i.e., case situationality), other cases that support the finding, and other cases that 
counter the finding (see appendix M).   
By using this systematic approach, the researcher was able to move from the 
individual case reports to develop the cross-case findings and related assertions 
addressing the study’s research questions. Also, by tagging the individual findings by the 
case from which they were derived, the researcher could take into consideration the 
importance of particular cases in addressing specific research questions and how typical 
or atypical that particular case was to the study. Developing the assertions related to the 
research questions was not only a matter of assessing what was common across the four 
cases, but also considering the unique findings of each case (Stake 2006) – both advanced 
understanding. The intention was to develop assertions that had a single focus, provided 
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 an orientation for understanding the research topic, and were supported by evidence 
(Stake 2006). In summary, the multiple sources of data represented in the four cases were 
used to help clarify meaning and build more complex explanations reflected in the key 
assertions. The data displays (i.e., matrices developed as excel spreadsheets) described 
above helped to draw conclusions at this stage.  
3.8.6 Searching for Alternative Explanations 
During analysis, rival explanations were identified and considered (Yin 2009). 
For example, as data were collected for the NBCCEDP, the researcher formed an 
explanation about the use of the performance measures for budgeting purposes. In 
subsequent interviews, rival explanations were explored to further understanding of the 
issue. In addition, negative instances those situations that are not consistent with the 
emerging explanation were explored and used to refine understanding (Merriam 2009). 
For instance, the researcher explored why one participant had a different perception about 
potential gaming of performance measures than the others interviewed. The constant 
comparative method described above helped to identify negative or discrepant cases. By 
consciously exploring competing explanations and negative cases, a stronger, more 
logical explanation that is well grounded in the data was developed (Rossman and Rallis 
2003). 
3.8.7 Writing the Dissertation, Report, or Manuscript 
The analytic process continues through writing and reflects the interpretive act of 
bringing meaning to the data through narrative (Rossman and Rallis 2003). Good writing 
is critical in qualitative research as understanding, explanation, and findings are 
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 interpreted through text (Richardson 2000). In particular, the researcher must represent 
the findings in rich detail in order to communicate meaning to the reader (Brower, 
Abolafia, and Carr 2000). Qualitative writing should reflect three qualities according to 
Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) – authenticity, plausibility, and criticality. First, the 
account must be authentic, providing a rich description to assure the reader that the 
investigator has done sound research. Second, the account should provide a plausible 
explanation to the reader, that is, have face validity. And third, the writing should 
encourage and challenge the reader to think critically and deeply. For this study, the 
researcher attempted to attend to these qualities as guiding tenets for the writing.  
As noted above, individual case reports were developed for representatives of the 
participating cases. The researcher, in consultation with her dissertation chairman, chose 
to present findings of the four cases in individual chapters (chapters 4-7). This approach 
seemed most appropriate given the unique characteristics of each case, their importance 
to the study, and the length of the initial reports. Others (Yin 2009; Stake 2006) have 
supported this approach. Like the initial reports developed for each site, a common 
structure was adopted for these four chapters to facilitate both readability and cross-case 
analysis – such an approach is consistent with a linear-analytic structure described by Yin 
(2009).  
The findings for each of the four programs are presented in chapters 4 through 7. 
A summary of the findings for all four cases is provided in appendix N. Each chapter 
begins with a case description followed by a detailed presentation of the findings and 
then a chapter summary. The case description includes a synopsis of the overall program, 
its implementation network, and its performance measurement system. The typology used 
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 is organized based on the literature review as well as inductive analysis of the data 
collected (table 13).  
 
 
Table 13. Typology Used for Case Description 
CDC organizational context 
Program goals 
Stage of program development 
Budget stability 
Stakeholders 
The Program 
Political context 
Network structure: vertical relationships 
Network structure: horizontal relationships 
Network function: authority and control within the network 
Network function: shared organizational goals and priorities 
within the network 
The Implementation 
Network 
Network function: variability in context, resources, capacity 
Process to develop the performance measurement system 
Performance measurement system design including: 
• Purpose  
• Level of measurement 
• Types of measures 
• Use of targets or standards 
• Quality assurance efforts 
Performance 
Measurement System 
Use of performance measurement system and data 
 
 
 
The literature review suggests that network public management has emerged, in 
part, based on the complexity of the social and health problems faced today. 
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 Consequently, the description of each case begins with a narrative about the program. 
Inductive analysis identified six common characteristics of each program: CDC 
organizational context, program goals, stage of program development, budget stability, 
stakeholders, and political context.  
Next, the implementation network is described based on five characteristics, two 
related to the structure of the network and three related to the network’s function. These 
characteristics were identified both through the literature review and inductive data 
analysis. For network structure, both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the 
network are addressed. For network function, three aspects are considered – issues of 
authority and control within the network; shared goals and priorities between network 
members; and topics of context, resources, and capacity. 
Finally, the performance measurement system is described including the process 
for developing the system used by each program, its overall design, and use of the 
performance measurement system and data. Five aspects of the performance 
measurement design are described including its purpose, level of measurement, types of 
measures, use of targets or standards, and quality assurance efforts. 
Following the case description, each chapter concludes with a summary of case 
findings, including evidence for each. As noted above, development of individual case 
findings were directed by the study’s research questions. Chapter 8 includes a descriptive 
summary of the four cases and presents findings from the cross case analysis organized 
by the three research questions.  
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 3.9 Data Validity and Reliability 
Trustworthiness is proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as an appropriate 
criterion to assess qualitative inquiry that differs from traditional positivist criteria for 
assessing research quality. The trustworthiness construct replaces traditional views of 
validity and reliability with credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). Others offer varied typologies of validity (Maxwell 1992; 
Schwandt 2001). Merriam (1995) states, “Unlike experimental designs in which validity 
and reliability are accounted for before the investigation, rigor in qualitative research 
derives from the researcher’s presence, the nature of the interaction between researcher 
and participants, the triangulation of data, the interpretation of perceptions, and rich, thick 
description” (p.151). 
3.9.1 Internal Validity  
Internal validity is conventionally defined as the congruence between one’s 
findings and the reality of what is studied (Merriam 2009). Validity refers to the 
interpretations drawn from the data, not the data themselves (Creswell and Miller 2000). 
For this study, internal validity is based on how well the investigator represents the 
various perceptions and interpretations of those included in the study (Lincoln and Guba 
1985; Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Several strategies were used to improve 
the internal validity of the proposed study, including emersion in the field, triangulation, 
member checking, searching for disconfirming evidence, and colleague examination.  
As discussed earlier, emersion in the field refers to the researcher’s engagement in 
the research context in order to understand the phenomenon of interest holistically and in 
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 all its complexity. For this study, the investigator gathered primary data over a seven-
month period and used varied data collection methods to facilitate a deep understanding 
of the research topic. In addition, the researcher conducted all aspects of analysis, many 
of which supported a continued “closeness” to the data that benefits internal validity. 
Triangulation verifies the repeatability of an interpretation or observation to 
confirm findings (Merriam 2009; Stake 2006). Different types of triangulation have been 
described in the literature (Mathison 1998; Patton 1999), and two approaches were 
applied here. First, methodological triangulation, considered the strongest form of 
triangulation, was applied. Methodological triangulation involves assessing data from the 
multiple data collection methods (e.g., interviews, document review, and observation) 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Another form of triangulation, data source 
triangulation, was also used; this form uses several data sources (e.g., data from more 
than one person or data collected from more than one point in time) to strengthen 
findings (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Both approaches increase validity by 
ensuring a systematic process of searching through the data to identify common themes 
and by relying on more than a single source of evidence (Creswell and Miller 2000). 
Atlas.ti was helpful in assessing triangulation given its capability to sort text in varied 
ways and produce reports that identify the unique data sources. 
Aside from concerns for validity, triangulation is also useful during data analysis 
to clarify meaning by considering multiple perspectives (Stake 2006). Mathison (1988) 
suggested that triangulation can result in three possibilities including convergence, 
inconsistency, or contradiction. As triangulation identified inconsistencies or 
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 contradictions in results, the investigator considered plausible explanations to account for 
them. This approach actually helped to extend and enrich meaning and understanding.  
Member checking, discussed earlier, was also used to strengthen internal validity 
(Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that 
member checking is the most important technique to establish credibility. As noted 
above, individual case reports were developed and disseminated to each program. The 
researcher then met individually with key representatives to discuss the accuracy of 
descriptions, the plausibility of case summaries, and whether adequate evidence was 
provided in support of the findings. As noted, a minimum of two participants from each 
case reviewed the reports. Participants provided detailed feedback in the face-to-face 
meetings, typically providing written edits on the report or an electronic copy of the 
report with tracked changes.  
Identifying negative or disconfirming evidence involves searching through the 
data to either confirm or disconfirm preliminary themes or categories (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Patton (1999) describes both inductive and logical approaches to 
searching for rival explanations and negative cases. This approach strengthens validity by 
further supporting the credibility of findings (Creswell and Miller 2000). For this study, 
the identification of negative evidence served to facilitate deeper exploration of the data 
and generate more insightful and nuanced understanding. 
Finally, the researcher enlisted a colleague at CDC to examine findings and 
comment on their perceived credibility (Merriam 2009; Patton 2002). The colleague 
reviewed all case-specific chapters and the cross-case analysis chapter, offering 
suggestions and identifying areas of clarification. In addition, presentations of 
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 preliminary results were made at the American Evaluation Association annual conference 
(November 2008) and at an evaluation forum at CDC (December 2008). Colleagues were 
especially helpful by raising important issues that encouraged thoughtful consideration 
about the analysis, the researcher’s role in the study, and about how findings are 
conveyed in the writing.  
3.9.2 External Validity 
In research involving quantitative methods, external validity refers to the 
generalizability of the findings. As discussed earlier, qualitative findings are not intended 
to be generalized but to expose a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of interest at a 
particular time and in its unique context. Although efforts have been described to 
strengthen generalizability in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009), 
an alternative conceptualization was applied for this study. “User or reader 
generalizability” is a way to conceptualize external validity. Lincoln and Guba referred to 
this as “transferability” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This concept is based on the idea that 
the reader or user of the findings has responsibility for determining how well the results 
transfer to his or her own situation (Merriam 2009). Given this view, two techniques were 
applied to strengthen the external validity of this study. First, the dissertation findings 
reflect rich, thick description that enable readers to determine how well the findings 
might fit their own situations (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Merriam 2009). Second, the 
multiple case study design contributes to extending variation in the study of performance 
measurement and allows readers to assess a greater range of experiences and contexts 
(Merriam 2009). 
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 3.9.3 Reliability 
In quantitative research, reliability refers to whether results would be the same if 
the study were replicated. Given the nature of qualitative research and the fact that human 
behavior is dynamic and fluid, this view of reliability is inconsistent with the approach 
(Merriam 2009). The idea of reliability has been recast by some as “dependability” and 
“consistency” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). That is, reliability involves assessing whether 
the findings are consistent with the data collected (Merriam 2009). To strengthen the 
reliability in this study, the researcher: (1) maintained a detailed audit trail as part of the 
researcher’s analytic journal to assure transparency in research methods; (2) used data 
source triangulation; (3) used methodological triangulation; and (4) involved peer review 
(Merriam 2009). All of these have been described previously except the use of an audit 
trail. An audit trail was maintained as part of the researcher’s analytic journal to 
document the research and included the following: (1) listing of all data collection 
efforts; (2) summary of data reduction and analysis products (e.g., codebook, field notes); 
and (3) process notes including key decision points made throughout the research 
process. Other written sources supporting reliability include the study proposal, data 
collection instruments, and final reports and written analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985).  
3.10 Ethics 
As noted earlier, the study protocol was approved by institutional review boards 
at both GSU and CDC. High ethical standards were maintained throughout the research 
process. The written, verbatim transcripts were returned to the interview participants 
whom were offered the opportunity to review the transcript and remove any statement(s) 
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 he or she was not comfortable including. Pseudonyms were used to help protect 
confidentiality – all names were replaced with pseudonyms in transcripts, document 
review forms, and observation field notes. 
The thick description inherent in qualitative research presents an important 
challenge to “inferred” identification (Anastas 2004). Even without identifying 
information, there is the possibility that certain readers may infer a specific participant. 
Participants were made aware, in the informed consent form and verbally at the time of 
the interview, that their name would not be used in any written reports, but that only the 
overall program (e.g., NBCCEDP) would be associated with specific statements. And, as 
described earlier, several steps were taken to assure proper data storage (e.g., password 
protected laptop for electronic data, locked file cabinet for hard copies of data). 
3.11 Researcher Assumptions and Biases 
While limitations refer to issues related to methodology, qualitative research must 
also address the researcher’s personal assumptions and biases that he or she brings to the 
research process (Peshkin 1998). Addressing researcher reflexivity is another strategy 
viewed as strengthening the credibility and validity of the research (Creswell 2000; 
Mauthner and Doucet 2003). Mauthner and Doucet (2003) advocate for researchers to 
practice greater reflection and accountability in their work, suggesting that a higher level 
of self-consciousness will lead to improved confidence in the findings. The need for self 
reflection is essential given that the researcher represents the primary instrument of data 
collection in qualitative research. For this section, then, first person is used to describe 
my own subjectivities that may potentially have influenced the conduct of this research 
and my interpretations of findings.  
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 Although I am a doctoral student at GSU and GT, I am also an employee at CDC. 
Therefore, while I conducted this research as an affiliate and representative of GSU, I 
also was conducting it as a CDC employee, which raised a potential conflict. One result 
of this dilemma was to disclose these relationships to participants which I did in the 
introductory e-mail to all participants and within the informed consent form. Given my 
working relationship at CDC, there were also concerns about the willingness of 
participants to be open about their experiences. However, I found participants to be 
incredibly transparent, openly sharing their perspectives and providing me internal 
documents and materials unlikely to have been made available to an “outsider.”   
Another issue related to my fifteen years of work experience at CDC. This 
experience contributes to underlying generalizations, assumptions, and perspectives I 
hold about CDC’s national public health programs. For instance, I served as a program 
consultant for 7 years, working closely with state and city health department officials. 
While this experience provides me a deeper understanding of the program context, I also 
had to recognize my own preconceived judgments about those programs and remain 
vigilant in my awareness of when these assumptions affected my perceptions. For 
instance, I have developed strong views about the importance of providing state and local 
partners scientific guidance while also allowing for local tailoring of community-based 
public health programs in order to fit their unique context. While my experiences at CDC 
certainly enhanced my ability to relate to participants and more quickly assess and 
understand certain situations or dynamics, I tried to stay aware and avoid making 
inappropriate conclusions based on preconceived notions.  
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 In my proposal, I wrote that I had concerns about the current emphasis on 
indicator development at CDC, which I often saw at the expense of other evaluation 
approaches. While I stayed attuned to this perception, my conversations with participants 
led me to overcome this particular bias and recognize the importance this strategy offers 
public health programs. Although I believe that there are unique challenges to 
implementing performance measurement systems at the federal level and am concerned 
that advocates lack an understanding of the complexity of its application in these setting, 
I realized a new appreciation for performance measurement for program management and 
evaluation. 
Finally, my theoretical framework introduced a necessary bias that framed both 
what I explored and how I interpreted the data collected. While this is appropriate and 
necessary, it is important to remember that I explored this issue from a particular and 
specific lens.  
3.12 Study Limitations 
Several limitations must be acknowledged. First, the results of this study are 
applicable only to the four cases studied. The small sample of cases that were included in 
the study, as well as the limited number of participants, precludes broader generalization 
in the statistical sense. As addressed above, generalizability in case study research is 
better conceptualized as “user generalizability.” Second, there are limits given that one 
investigator conducted all aspects of the study. My experience on team-based qualitative 
research efforts has demonstrated the value additional researchers bring to interpretation. 
The team approach allows for critical thinking and dialogue across team members that is 
largely absent here. 
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 Third, given that the researcher did not pursue OMB approvals, she could only 
include up to eight non-federal participants in the study. OMB approval was not pursued 
given the lengthy review process involved (i.e., twelve to eighteen months or more 
following IRB approvals). The inability to include more representation from the grantee 
programs, in particular, is an important limitation to the study. The researcher attempted 
to address this limitation by including CDC program consultants who work closely with 
the grantees (two from each case), CDC field staff assigned to specific health 
departments (this was limited to the CSPS), and a small number of program directors 
working for state health departments. In addition, several program consultants who were 
interviewed for the study had, in the past, worked for state programs.  
 Next, the investigator conducted the research in her workplace. Although the 
researcher’s role at CDC was perceived to facilitate access, her role as a colleague may 
have inhibited some respondents. However, as noted above, the researcher found her 
position afforded greater access to people, documents, and opportunities for observation, 
and also facilitated more open and frank dialogue from participants. In the end, the 
researcher’s “insider” position was perceived as a valuable asset in conducting the 
research.  
Fifth, a majority of those interviewed were involved in the development and 
implementation of the performance measurement system and may have conveyed a more 
positive impression than others. However, the study included participants (in each case) 
that were not directly involved and invested in the performance measurement effort (e.g., 
program consultants, grantee representatives). 
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 Sixth, federal performance measurement is, to some extent, politically motivated 
and politically charged given policies such as GPRA and PART and the use of 
performance measurement data for decision making related to individual grantee budgets. 
The nature of the topic may have inhibited some respondents from speaking freely about 
their perceptions about it. In particular, there was political sensitivity in writing about 
some of the programs and their political contexts. After working at CDC for fifteen years, 
I am acutely aware of these sensitivities and had an inherent conflict of not wanting to 
“bite the hand that feeds me.” However, I have attempted to honestly reflect the political 
context for these programs while also remaining sensitive to the political issues inherent 
to performance measurement. I found the member checking phase an important 
opportunity to assess these issues with the program staff and garner feedback and advice 
about their representation. Finally, limited resources in terms of time limited the data 
collection and analysis process. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (PHEP) PROGRAM 
4.1 PHEP Case Description 
As outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.8.7, the case description is presented for this 
case and all others using a standard typology. The description includes a summary of the 
program, the implementation network, and the performance measurement system. 
4.1.1 The Program 
4.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context 
In 1999, CDC began funding state, local, and territorial health agencies to address 
terrorism-related public health emergencies. In 2002, following the September 11th and 
the 2001 anthrax attacks, Congress authorized funding for the PHEP cooperative 
agreement to support public health preparedness activities nationally, and funding for the 
program skyrocketed from about $45 million in FY 2001 to nearly $1 billion in FY 2002. 
During same time, the overall preparedness budget at CDC exploded from roughly $180 
million to over $3.2 billion. 
CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) in the Coordinating Office 
for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) administers the PHEP 
cooperative agreement, providing consultation and technical assistance to grantees. The 
current cooperative agreement (PA #AA154) has been in place for eight years. In fiscal 
year 2008, CDC awarded over $700 million in funding through the PHEP program to 62 
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 state, local, and territorial health agencies28. Awards are based, in large part, on 
population size and ranged from $330,743 to $50,161,370 with an average award of 
$11,368,829 (median award $8,897,688).  
PHEP’s organizational context can be distinguished, in part, by the fact that the 
PHEP program is situated in a “coordinating office” (i.e., COTPER) rather than a CDC 
center, reflecting a horizontal dimension of the program within CDC itself. As a 
coordinating office, COTPER provides funding to programs across the CDC centers, and 
DSLR staff draw on expertise (i.e., subject matter experts) from diverse areas such as 
infectious disease, influenza, environmental health, quarantine, and laboratories to 
support the PHEP program. For instance, scientists from other parts of CDC who 
specialize in infectious pathogens such as E. coli assist in the development of policies, 
provide technical assistance to grantees, and advise on the development of performance 
measures. 
The organizational context for the PHEP program can also be characterized by 
constant change, high political visibility, and significant demands from federal 
government levels above DSLR. In particular, the political requirements imposed on the 
program from Congress, other federal agencies [e.g., Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)] as well as CDC’s Office of 
the Director, are constant. PHEP staff are inundated by seemingly endless Congressional 
inquiries, new policy directives, and changing priorities (see political context, section 
4.1.1.6 below).  
                                            
28 The 62 grantees represent public health agencies for all 50 U.S. states, Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles County, Washington 
D.C., and eight U.S. territories. 
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 Several of those interviewed used the term “wild, wild west” to describe the 
program culture of PHEP, reflecting an environment where unexpected demands from 
“above” were common and staff were challenged to feel a sense of control. Some 
expressed frustration over a situation in which efforts to implement a thoughtful, science-
based approach were often derailed by demands from levels above them.  
4.1.1.2 Program Goals 
Since its inception, the PHEP program has morphed and expanded in its scope, 
often in response to critical events (e.g., 9/11, anthrax, Hurricane Katrina) or emerging 
threats (e.g., West Nile, pandemic flu). Today the program is tasked to address “all-
hazards” which includes natural disasters as well as terrorist, chemical, biologic, 
radiologic, and nuclear emergencies. Addressing such a diverse range of hazards only 
begins to hint at the complexity of public health preparedness.  
And unlike many other programs at CDC, the PHEP program’s focus has been 
significantly shaped by a number of federal-level policy initiatives such as the DHS’ 
National Response Plan, National Preparedness Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List; 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP); the 2007 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 21; and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA). In 
addition, staff are sensitive to the need to define the program in alignment with nine 
strategic preparedness goals that have been established by CDC.  
One of the most significant challenges for DSLR staff is in defining public health 
preparedness, which can be described as sitting at the intersection of several disciplines 
including emergency management, defense, and medical services. Given that an “all-
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 hazards” program encompasses such diverse events, the dimensions of public health 
preparedness are expansive – surveillance, epidemiology, laboratory operations, response 
and recovery, and program implementation. At the same time, preparedness reflects many 
standard public health functions; consequently, differentiating it from CDC’s typical 
public health work is also a challenge.  
Acknowledging that the field is relatively new, DSLR staff have struggled to 
build an operational definition of what it means to be “prepared” by a limited science 
base and a lack of federal standards. Consensus on key aspects of what people viewed as 
a somewhat nebulous concept had not been achieved, although a concerted effort to do so 
is being led by DSLR’s Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation Branch (OMEB) and a 
framework is emerging (see performance measurement system, section 4.1.3 below). 
Unlike most other public health programs, preparedness cannot be easily described using 
incidence and prevalence data or morbidity and mortality rates. Preparedness more 
accurately represents a process to build infrastructure, plans, and partnerships rather than 
an “end state” that could be eventually achieved and easily measured.  
4.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development  
As noted above, what is now called the PHEP program was initiated in 1999 and 
has changed substantially from year to year. The program is generally viewed as “new” 
and the discipline of public health preparedness is still evolving. In part, the program has 
been challenged to define itself given the lack of a solid science base and the inherent 
complexities reflected in the issue itself. The characterization of the program as the 
“wild, wild west” reflects participants’ feelings that they were often “blazing new paths” 
as they helped to define the field of public health preparedness. 
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 Overall, PHEP is a program still in development with more learning needed by 
CDC in collaboration with its grantees to better define the program’s parameters. 
Accordingly, CDC expectations of grantees consider the program’s developmental stage, 
recognizing the need for flexibility in regard to expectations. At the same time, however, 
PHEP faces significant accountability demands and policy requirements from HHS, 
many of which are viewed as unrealistic and insensitive to program realities (see political 
context, section 4.1.1.6 below). 
4.1.1.4 Budget Stability  
As noted earlier, the PHEP program experienced a phenomenal increase in 
funding in FY 2002, reaching $999 million. Effectively managing the influx of funding 
was challenging at all program levels, including CDC. At the state level, programs 
receive funds from multiple sources to support public health and medical preparedness 
(e.g., CDC, DHS, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response) and are stretched 
to manage the reporting requirements for multiple federal agencies while also distributing 
funds to local levels needed to implement the program. Since its peak in 2002, annual 
funding allocations for the PHEP program have been consistently reduced, and staff 
recognize the importance of demonstrating accountability in order to defend current 
funding levels.  
PAHPA, which was passed as law in 2006, requires that performance-based 
budgeting be instituted for the PHEP program in 2009 and mandates that funds be 
withheld for programs who “fail” to meet established targets or submit a pandemic flu 
plan meeting required criteria. Recently, HHS requested that CDC provide draft 
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 performance measures that will be used to meet PAHPA requirements so that the 
measures could be published in the Federal Register for public comment.  
DSLR staff expressed concerns about a shift to performance-based budgeting, 
especially given the stage of program development, lack of a strong programmatic 
science base, and on-going data quality concerns with the program-level performance 
measures currently in place. Many are afraid that the performance measures required by 
PAHPA will be used as “sticks” to reduce funds for “failing” programs. Philosophically, 
participants have concerns that reducing funds from a public health program may only 
worsen a grantee’s capacity to protect the public. Others fear that PAHPA’s approach to 
performance-based budgeting will damage relationships with grantees, lead to a “high 
stakes” testing environment where programs will simply “teach to the test,” or result in 
gaming of the measures. 
4.1.1.5 Stakeholders 
A significant group of stakeholders at both the federal and state level exert 
influence on the PHEP program through their relationships with CDC. Within CDC, 
members of the Office of the Director represent a major stakeholder internal to the 
organization. PHEP is the single largest cooperative agreement administered by the 
agency, and, subsequently, the CDC Director works closely with the Director of 
COTPER.  
Executive agencies at the federal level, including DHS, HHS, ASPR, and FEMA 
all represent important stakeholder groups for the program. In addition, Congress has a 
stake in the program given all 50 states are funded and that U.S. constituents across the 
country and U.S. territories are affected. Data suggest a top-down, hierarchical approach 
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 to the PHEP program from those in Washington DC, with more extensive stakeholder 
involvement than typically experienced by CDC programs. For instance, program 
funding announcements for PHEP are closely reviewed by HHS. Some participants 
described a “cultural clash” between the federal agencies involved in preparedness and 
those in public health; in particular, they felt the preparedness field, in general, was more 
closely aligned with the military and its characteristic command and control approach. In 
contrast, public health typically assumes a collaborative stance with its partners and 
stakeholders to accomplish its goals. 
The PHEP grantees represent another group of key stakeholders for the program. 
And national groups representing the grantees such as the National Association of City 
and County Health Officials (NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials (ASTHO), the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) are all important groups with a stake 
in the PHEP program. ASTHO has an active subgroup – the Directors of Public Health 
Preparedness – comprised of state and territorial public health preparedness directors that 
advocates on behalf of its representatives. Both the individual grantee programs and the 
national organizations attempt to exert political influence on the PHEP program through 
regular consultation and interaction. 
4.1.1.6 Political Context  
The political context represents a dominant theme for the PHEP program. In fact, 
analytic codes related to the topic were the most frequently applied of any in the dataset. 
The sections above already hint at the political environment for the program. In part, the 
political context for PHEP reflects the public visibility and perceived importance of 
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 preparedness in today’s culture. But the program’s political context may be impacted to 
an even greater extent by the substantial and complex intergovernmental arrangements at 
federal, state, and local levels that comprise the homeland security system in general. 
That system requires the integration of efforts from a myriad of federal agencies and 
offices including DHS, Department of Defense (DoD), FEMA, HHS, ASPR, CDC, 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and others. Congress and the 
former President (George W. Bush) also instituted policy initiatives, legislation, and 
executive measures that directed or influenced preparedness efforts. 
DSLR faces a difficult political climate that seems to regularly shift the program 
from one focus to another. As noted, political actions from those “above” CDC in the 
institutional hierarchy are frequent and limit CDC’s control over the program’s 
implementation. At the time of data collection for this study, DSLR staff were dealing 
with two initiatives that had direct effects on the program – PAHPA and HSPD-21. 
Under PAHPA (PL 109-417), the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 
(ASPR) was established within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
PAHPA directs CDC to require grantees to contribute non-federal matching funds 
beginning in FY 2008 and, as noted earlier, to institute a performance-based budgeting 
formula for the PHEP program beginning in FY 2009. PAHPA also requires that PHEP 
grantees develop pandemic flu plans that meet criteria established by HHS and requires 
“evidence-based benchmarks and objective standards” to measure levels of preparedness 
(to include outcome goals). The law dictates standardized funding cuts (i.e., 5% cut for 
first year of failed performance, 10% for second consecutive year of failed performance) 
for grantees that fail to meet established targets.  
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 HSPD-21, drafted by the Homeland Security Council and issued by the White 
House in October 2007, establishes the National Strategy for Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness. The national strategy is built on key principles set forth in the Biodefense 
for the 21st Century (April 2004) and its intent is to articulate an approach to protect the 
health of all Americans against all disasters. Among other requirements, the presidential 
directive commands that the PHEP program assure state and local capacity to distribute 
countermeasures (e.g., drug treatment for anthrax exposure, prophylactic treatment for 
pandemic flu) within 48 hours after a decision to do so. Furthermore, HSPD-21 requires 
that standards and performance measures be developed within 270 days of the date of the 
directive “for state and local government countermeasure distribution systems, including 
demonstration of specific capabilities in tactical exercises in accordance with the 
National Exercise Program, and establish a process to gather performance data from state 
and local participants on a regular basis to assess readiness.” The requirement related to 
the National Exercise Program reflects a DHS initiative called the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that sets out guidelines for planning and 
conducting security exercises at all levels of government. Finally, as part of HSPD-21, 
CDC is directed to begin collecting performance data within 180 days after the 
development of the measures and to use the data for determining future grant funding.  
In summary, PHEP is situated in a complex political context with a strong top-
down, compliance orientation. Some of the political directives have been difficult to 
translate into the public health realm given their orientation in emergency management or 
defense. And finally, COTPER faces frequent inquiries from Congress, the Inspector 
General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as on-going reporting 
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 requirements for the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and OMB’s 
Performance Assessment and Rating Tool (PART). In the end, the constant political 
demands have been wearing for both DSLR and for PHEP program grantees. More 
importantly, those demands have compromised a planned, science-based approach to 
public health preparedness and a collaborative implementation process with state, local, 
and territorial partners. 
4.1.2 Implementation Network 
4.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships  
The vertical relationships that comprise the PHEP program begin at the federal 
level with Congress, the President, and executive agencies including HHS, DHS, and 
others. From a hierarchical perspective, three primary levels cascade below represented 
by 1) CDC and DSLR, 2) the 62 state, city, and territorial health agencies, and 3) 
thousands of local level jurisdictions across the U.S. These vertical relationships are 
primarily intergovernmental and formalized by legal and fiscal arrangements: Congress 
authorized funding for PHEP in 2002; CDC, in turn, receives an annual budget allocation 
for the PHEP program from HHS; the 62 grantees, in turn, receive annual cooperative 
agreement funding awards from CDC; and those grantees use contracts or other 
mechanisms to distribute funds to regional or local levels. Over 50% of CDC funds are 
distributed by grantees to more local levels. 
Many participants used the catchphrase, “all preparedness is local,” reflecting the 
idea that public health responses will typically be initiated at the local level. A more 
accurate description, however, is that “initial response is local” and that all levels are 
needed in response to large scale events. For instance, an individual at the local level will 
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 be the first to encounter a person with anthrax infection, but network members at other 
levels (state, federal) will be needed to implement activities (distribution of prophylaxis 
treatment) to reduce morbidity and mortality.  
4.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
 While vertical relationships ensure financial and other technical support 
from the federal government down to the local level, horizontal relationships are 
equally as important at all levels of government in preparing for and responding 
to public health emergencies. In nearly any scenario imaginable, multiple 
disciplines and sectors will be required to work collaboratively in order to 
effectively respond to an emergency for which public health may be only one 
relevant component. Using the anthrax example from above, participation of 
partners in the education, transportation, senior services, postal services, police 
and security, health care, and business may all be needed to manage the 
distribution of prophylactic treatment on a large scale. Consequently, PHEP has a 
significant horizontal dimension at every level in the vertical implementation 
chain.  
The importance of collaboration with horizontal partners is evident in federal 
policies that affect many parts of the emergency management framework, including 
public health. HSPD-21 cites key principles derived from other federal strategy 
documents (e.g., Biodefense for the 21st Century, April 2004, National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction) which include “vertical and horizontal 
coordination across levels of government, jurisdictions, and disciplines” as well as 
“engagement of the private sector, academia, and other nongovernmental entities in 
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 preparedness and response effort.” In support of collaboration at the federal level, HSPD-
21 required the establishment of the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Task Force 
to include broad representation from relevant agencies. The Task Force is chaired by the 
Secretary of HHS and include in its membership the Secretaries of State, Defense, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, Veteran’s Association, and Homeland 
Security as well as the Director of OMB, Director of National Intelligence, and the U.S. 
Attorney General. 
At CDC, COPTER works horizontally across the broader agency to coordinate 
efforts in support of preparedness activities. As noted earlier, PHEP draws on subject 
matter experts from many parts of CDC to make technical and scientific contributions. At 
the state-level, coordination is needed across government departments and with other 
sectors to carry out activities including planning and preparedness exercises. Such 
coordination may involve working with departments of education, transportation, 
emergency management, and environment, but also with hospital systems, commerce, 
and others. And at the local level, public health must collaborate with many of these same 
partners as well as the first responder agencies (e.g., fire, police).  
4.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control Within the Network 
Control within the vertical network is exerted, in part, based on the institutional 
relationships – for instance, as a federal agency, CDC is directed by Congress, HHS, and 
others in the Executive Branch. And, as noted earlier, DHS, ASPR, and others also have 
influence over CDC’s PHEP, primarily through the imposition of policy initiatives that 
dictate programmatic requirements. Cooperative agreements are used by CDC to fund the 
62 PHEP grantees. This particular funding mechanism defines explicit responsibilities for 
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 both the grantee and the CDC, allowing for substantial federal involvement in program 
implementation, including on-going programmatic monitoring and the provision of 
technical assistance. States have discretion to use the policy tools of their choosing in 
awarding CDC funds to local jurisdictions.  
A primary challenge of the vertical structure is CDC’s diminishing level of 
influence on actual program implementation with each step down the intergovernmental 
chain. While CDC has some formal authority over the grantee by virtue of the 
cooperative agreement, CDC’s control over local level partners in the PHEP network is 
weak to nonexistent. CDC and grantees have even less control over the horizontal 
network dimension, but are nonetheless reliant on their participation to provide a 
seamless emergency response. Most of these horizontal relationships tend to be informal 
and unfunded. Developing effective relationships with these horizontal partners, 
therefore, becomes a critical part of public health managers’ jobs and involves working 
across disciplinary cultures.  
4.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the 
Network 
As noted above, preparedness demands the involvement of multiple disciplines 
and sectors working collaboratively across both vertical and horizontal networks. But 
differences or conflicts between agencies about priorities and goals can make 
collaboration difficult. For PHEP, there was more evidence of goal conflicts between 
vertical partners than across horizontal ones – probably because participants spoke more 
directly about those vertical relationships and few state-level representatives were 
included in the study. Given the top-down nature of the program itself, goals and 
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 priorities of those upstream (e.g., HHS, ASPR, DHS) were privileged, but were often 
viewed as “out of touch” with programmatic realities and lacking sensitivity to variability 
in grantee context.  
In addition, as in any vertically decentralized structure, implementation “drift” 
occurs – that is, at each level (e.g., state, regional, local) the priorities and goals of a 
particular grantee influence how activities are, in fact, carried out. In terms of the 
horizontal dimension, participants spoke more about the challenges of earning a “place at 
the table” and engaging partners than of specific conflicts across agencies in defining 
common goals and objectives. Public health is a relative newcomer to the emergency 
management arena and has struggled to define its role and earn recognition from the 
others who have a longer history in the preparedness or emergency response arena. The 
lack of available time on the part of horizontal partners to engage in planning efforts or 
preparedness exercises led by public health is another barrier to their engagement. Even 
at CDC, content experts in other parts of the agency have other priorities in terms of their 
work responsibilities that conflict with their participation in the PHEP program efforts. 
Similar challenges were faced at the state and local levels.  
4.1.2.5 Network Function: Context, Resources, and Capacity 
The 62 PHEP grantees vary considerably in terms of context, agency capacity, 
and resources, all of which influence network functioning within each grantee’s 
jurisdiction. In terms of context, grantees differ in both geography and in their risk for 
specific “hazards” (e.g., bioterrorist attack, natural disaster, radiation disaster) – just 
consider the gulf of differences between New York State and South Dakota. 
Consequently, the relevance of specific hazards influences the agencies that participate in 
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 the network – a state prone to natural disasters may have a network comprised of 
uniquely different agency participants than a state seen at higher risk for a bioterrorist 
attack. In overseeing the PHEP program, CDC must remain sensitive to these contextual 
distinctions that require unique program models and program activities. 
Resources and capacity also vary across grantees and, to some degree, influence 
grantees’ ability to effectively work within the network structure. Resource levels are, in 
part, a consequence of the CDC funding award size, but also influenced by whether the 
individual grantee receives support from its own state or territory. Participants suggested 
that the current funding cuts in PHEP were negatively affecting grantees’ capacity to 
carry out the requirements of the cooperative agreement, including collaborating with 
network partners.  
4.1.3 Performance Measurement System 
4.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System 
The PHEP program has had some form of a performance measurement system in 
place for several years. The measures have evolved extensively over that time; currently, 
six performance measures are in place for the national program and a dedicated effort is 
underway to refine and expand them. The current measures are summarized in table 14; 
the measures relate to three of CDC’s nine Preparedness Goals that are also detailed in 
the same table.  
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 Table 14. PHEP Performance Measures (2008)  
Performance Measure Public Health 
Capability 
CDC Preparedness Goal 2: DETECTION AND REPORTING 
Decrease the time needed to classify health events as terrorism or naturally 
occurring in partnership with other agencies. 
2A: Percentage of Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping 
data results submitted to the PulseNet national database within 4 
working days of receiving isolate at the PFGE laboratory.  
Target: 4 days or less 
Laboratory 
CDC Preparedness Goal 6: CONTROL 
Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and health guidance to those 
affected by threats to the public’s health. 
6A: Percentage of key response partners that the public health agency 
successfully contacts without using electric grid power and primary 
land-line telephone service. 
Target: Not established 
Communication
6B: Time to notify all primary staff (secondary or tertiary staff as 
needed) with public health agency Incident Command System 
functional responsibilities that the public health agency’s 
Emergency Operations Center is being activated. 
Target: 60 minutes or less 
Communication
6C: Time for primary staff (secondary or tertiary staff as needed) with 
public health agency Incident Command System functional 
responsibilities to report for duty at the public health agency’s 
Emergency Operations Center. 
Target: 2 ½ hours or less 
Response 
CDC Preparedness Goal 9: IMPROVE 
Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations from after-action reports 
following threats to the public’s health. 
9A: Time to complete a draft of an After-Action Report/Improvement 
Plan.   
Target: 60 days or less 
Program 
Implementation 
9B: Time to re-evaluate response following approval and completion of 
corrective action(s) identified in an After-Action 
Report/Improvement Plan.   
Target: Not established  
Program 
Implementation 
 
 
 
 171
 Staff in DSLR’s Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation Branch (OMEB) oversee 
development of the performance measurement system. OMEB is led by a PhD-level 
evaluator and comprised of staff with expertise in evaluation, epidemiology, data 
management, systems development, and public health. Most staff in the branch are 
relatively new to the Division (although not to CDC) having worked in OMEB for two 
years or less. The effort to develop performance measures is a high priority and a critical 
Division activity, and the branch receives strong support from management in both 
DSLR and COTPER’s Office of the Director.  
The history of the development of performance measures for PHEP reflects an 
evolution of measures over time, shaped largely by the expanding scope of the program 
and its political context. Table 15 below summarizes the various iterations of 
performance measures for the program by fiscal year. In general, previous performance 
measure sets were developed under difficult timelines and in response to political 
pressure or policy requirements.  
 
 
Table 15. PHEP Performance Measure System Development, 2003-2008 
Fiscal Year Number of Performance Measures 
2003 120+ measures 
2004 47 measures 
2005 35 measures 
2006 23 measures 
2006 – 2008 6 measures 
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 The most recent development process was initiated in 2007 and is called the 
PHEP Measurement Project. Led by staff in OMEB and supported by two government 
contractors, the purpose of the project is to “develop, test, and implement measures of 
public health capabilities for program accountability and improvement.” A primary task 
of the Measurement Project is to develop a conceptual framework for PHEP based on 
priority program areas from which to identify performance measures and establish 
program standards. OMEB estimates the development of revised and new measures will 
be at least a two year process, although they recognize that performance measurement is 
a dynamic, “self-correcting,” and on-going process. The project is operating parallel to 
other related, but separate, measurement efforts – the requirement to annually report 
GPRA/PART measures, the new PAHPA requirement to institute performance-based 
budgeting in 2009, and another OMEB initiative to develop a larger monitoring system 
comprised of measures of capacity. 
The involvement of stakeholders is viewed as critical to the success of the new 
development process. In December 2007, OMEB invited representatives from ASTHO’s 
Directors of Public Health Preparedness to Atlanta to discuss the project, and in January 
2008, OMEB assembled and convened a PHEP Evaluation Workgroup to provide 
technical support and guidance to the measurement development process. The workgroup 
includes 24 external stakeholders representing state and local health departments, tribal 
communities, and national (e.g., APHL, ASTHO, CSTE, Centers for Public Health 
Preparedness, NACCHO) and federal (e.g., DHS, ASPR, HHS’ Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation) partners. During the January 2008 meeting, the Evaluation 
Workgroup prioritized five PHEP capability areas for measurement development and 
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 offered advice on a measurement approach. The capability areas were derived from DHS’ 
Target Capability List, and these five capabilities represent the foundation of the 
conceptual framework that is intended to better define the PHEP program: (1) incident 
management; (2) risk communications; (3) biosurveillance; (4) countermeasure delivery; 
and (5) isolation and quarantine/community containment. 
Once the five areas were defined, a nomination process was instituted to select 
scientific and program experts to serve on topic-specific (capability areas) subgroups. 
Subgroup members were not limited to the Evaluation Workgroup members. At the time 
of data collection for this study, two of the five subgroups were formed and had convened 
for two-day meetings to conduct process mapping exercises and begin revising existing 
performance measures or developing new ones. Given the difficulty in defining 
“preparedness” described earlier, the expertise of these subgroups was seen as critical to 
the development of a conceptual framework and new or revised measures.  
OMEB has applied a measurement framework focused on capacities, capabilities, 
and performance to design their measurement system. PHEP defined these three 
measurement categories as follows: 
• Capacity Measures The acquisition, development, and maintenance of public 
health infrastructure and assets to support emergency preparedness and response. 
Measures of capacity include equipment, medications, supplies, staff, training, 
and preparedness plans. 
• Capability Measures The ability to demonstrate public health emergency 
preparedness operations or actions. Measures of capability include documentation 
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 of discussion-based and operational-based exercises and/or responses to real 
incidents. Capability = Capacity + Practice/Expertise 
• Performance Measures Characteristics of public health emergency preparedness 
capability associated with the quality of operations or actions. Provides 
quantitative information on how well a process or outcome is performed. 
Measures of performance are often time-based but can also include measures of 
quality, completeness, and accuracy.  
The intention of this latest measurement effort is to develop new performance 
measures by April 2010 along with related data collection guidance, training, and 
technical assistance materials. PHEP estimates that 6-8 new capability-based measures 
will be piloted and implemented annually. While the conceptual framework is perceived 
as a fundamental step in the development process, OMEB must also ensure that any new 
measures and measurement system align with various federal goals (e.g., CDC’s nine 
preparedness goals, DHS target capabilities list) and are in compliance with federal 
reporting requirements (e.g., OMB, HHS, DHS, ASPR). In addition, OMEB must wrestle 
with other top-down political pressures, including the imposition of specific measures 
required by policies such as HSPD-21, which are often viewed as both nonscientific and 
unrealistic.  
PHEP staff referred to the development of performance measures as a “scientific, 
social, and political process” in recognition of the complex array of factors affecting the 
effort. Collaboration with state and local partners, representatives of key national 
organizations (e.g., ASTHO, CSTE), and content experts was viewed as central to the 
performance measurement development process. But collaboration in the networked 
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 environment of preparedness involves a multitude of stakeholders, including those 
working along both vertical and horizontal dimensions and that represent funded and 
voluntary partners. All these groups wield some level of political power and influence on 
the development process. There have been previous missteps in working with grantees, 
including poor communications, which have damaged trust and resulted in grantee 
frustration. At the same time, everyone seems acutely aware of the need to demonstrate 
accountability in a climate of declining funds, and data suggested a sincere commitment 
from both CDC and grantees to work together in order to “get this right.” CDC also 
recognizes the experience and expertise grantees bring to the development process that 
will help ensure that measures are feasible, valid, and relevant.  
4.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design  
In this section, the design of the performance measurement system is described 
highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of measures; 
use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 16 summarizes these 
design features. 
 
 
Table 16. Design Features of PHEP Performance Measurement System 
Design Feature PHEP Performance Measurement System 
Purpose of system Accountability 
Level of measurement Grantee level 
Type(s) of performance measures Process measures that reflect program capabilities 
Use of targets or standards Yes – time-based targets for some measures 
Quality assurance efforts Yes  
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 4.1.3.2.1 Purpose  
The primary purpose for the six existing performance measures is accountability. 
The PHEP program faces political pressure to demonstrate accountability “up” (e.g., to 
Congress, HHS, OMB) in order to justify and defend the resources allocated for the 
program. DSLR staff and grantees felt strongly that they should be held accountable, 
describing accountability in both fiscal and program performance terms. From a fiscal 
perspective, CDC’s responsibility is as a steward of federal funds, assuring appropriate 
use of funds and budgetary practices. Programmatically, PHEP faces the difficult 
challenge of demonstrating accountability for “preparing” the nation, that is, to provide 
evidence that PHEP has improved our country’s preparation for the varied disasters and 
attacks. Given the challenge in defining preparedness described earlier, this is no easy 
task. For now, the existing six performance measures are viewed as a means for CDC to 
satisfy demands for accountability and provide a “snapshot” of program performance to 
vertical network partners “above.” These six measures are not thought to necessarily 
represent the most important priorities for the PHEP program nor are the measures 
perceived as particularly meaningful by grantees.  
In contrast to the demands for “accountability up,” CDC faces pressures from the 
grantees “below” for performance measures that reflect program priorities and that will 
support program improvement. There was a tension between the dual purposes of 
accountability and program improvement, with disparate views held about the ability of 
one set of measures to meet both purposes. PHEP staff view the two purposes as 
requiring very different approaches to performance measurement. From staff’s 
perspective, satisfying accountability necessitates a small set of measures that can be 
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 used to broadly reflect performance to those above CDC. Consequently, the six existing 
performance measures along with three PHEP-related GPRA measures are seen to 
address accountability. 
 For purposes of program monitoring and improvement, PHEP staff suggested a 
more comprehensive set of measures would be needed. While measures for program 
improvement would be correlated to the smaller set of accountability measures, the larger 
set of monitoring data would reflect a much deeper and broader view of program 
implementation that provides CDC and grantees more in-depth information to support 
system improvement. Consequently, staff believe that moving to a performance 
measurement system aimed at program improvement will require implementation of a 
more comprehensive performance management system inclusive of a larger set of 
monitoring data and the development of a culture around data use at all levels (e.g., CDC, 
grantee, local), neither of which currently exists. 
Although there is an interest to have performance measures that also support 
program improvement, most recognize that the developmental stage of the program, 
including the absence of a strong program framework, means that such a system will not 
be in place in the short term. A more fully developed program model is needed to identify 
measures supporting program improvement, and time and resources are needed to build a 
multi-level performance management system and related staff capacity to support 
effective data use. In the meantime, PHEP is committed to the six existing measures that 
will continue to be used through 2008 for program accountability purposes, 
complimented by the three GPRA measures. 
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 4.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement 
As it stands, the current set of measures reflect grantee-level performance rather 
than local level performance. The measures represent a set of programmatic capabilities 
viewed as important in public health preparedness and perceived as adequately 
responsive to calls for accountability. While PHEP recognizes the need to identify 
measures at the local level, the lack of a conceptual framework and concerns about 
inadequate capacity at the local level to collect and report data precludes the inclusion of 
this level of measurement.  
4.2.3.2.3 Types of Measures 
Because outcomes for PHEP had simply not yet been identified, the six 
performance measures are focused on process monitoring. Since multiple factors 
contribute to distal outcomes (mortality) and make it difficult to assess attribution, longer 
term outcomes will not be included in a revised set of measures. Instead, the program 
hopes to design future measures around proximal outcomes that more closely reflect an 
individual grantee’s performance. 
Given the rare occurrence of events within the preparedness arena, PHEP 
primarily relies on measures tied to preparedness “exercises” rather than real events. Five 
of the six measures are based on drills or exercises — CDC requires that exercises be 
conducted at least twice annually. Only measure 2A relates to laboratory testing in 
response to the receipt of actual isolates (e.g., E. coli, listeria).  
 179
 4.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards 
Measurement challenges led to the use of “time” as a proxy for quality in 
measures. For instance, measure 9A requires that an after-action report is completed 
within 60 days of an exercise or real event. Many of the time-based targets are 
developmental given the lack of science-based evidence supporting a standard and little 
trend data collected from programs. And although there was pressure from above to use 
time-based measures, many participants spoke to the limits of time as a proxy for quality. 
For instance, measure 6B relates to the time taken to notify key staff that the Emergency 
Operations Center is being activated. OMEB staff are not necessarily confident that 
“time” is the appropriate emphasis. For example, what may be more important, in this 
instance, is that the “right people” are available to address the problem. 
4.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts 
PHEP has developed a guidance document for the six performance measures that 
details the following: the intent or rationale for each measure; the public health capability 
the measure reflects; the jurisdiction (e.g., state); the target for performance; specific 
definitions of terms; measurement specifications (e.g., numerator and denominator); data 
collection and submission methods (e.g., self-report semi-annually); and other comments 
or clarifications. Grantees are required as a condition of their funding award to report 
data for these six measures twice annually for distinct reporting cycles – three data 
submissions for the existing six measures have been received by CDC to date. Data are 
reported by grantees via the Preparedness Emergency Response System for Oversight 
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 Reporting and Management Services (PERFORMS) – a web-based reporting effort that 
was originally designed as a grants management system in 2002.  
OMEB has given significant attention to issues of data quality and validity. In 
part, the shear number of grantees along with variability in their capacity and resource 
levels, raises concerns about the quality and validity of the performance measurement 
data. PHEP contractors conducted a validation assessment in 2007 revealing a number of 
challenges to data quality including wide misunderstanding across grantees about the 
intent of the measures, uncertainty about how the measures were calculated and how 
measures should be reported, problems adhering to measurement protocols, 
misunderstanding of what data could be used to report on the measures, and others. The 
challenges to data quality and validity in such a decentralized system led PHEP to 
incorporate extensive guidance materials and technical assistance into the performance 
measurement system design. For instance, as part of the first two data submission cycles 
for the six performance measures, OMEB staff made individual phone calls with each 
grantee to review and verify that the data submitted were consistent with the 
requirements for each measure. This was a time-intensive exercise and OMEB does not 
have the capacity to continue the practice for every submission. 
4.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data 
At this time, data from the six PHEP performance measures are used in a limited 
fashion given the recognition that the measures are still developmental and concerns 
about data validity. For the most part, data are used to address the demands for 
accountability and the frequent inquiries from CDC’s federal partners, OMB, Congress, 
and others about whether or not “we are prepared.” In February 2008, the first 
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 Preparedness Report was issued by COTPER that incorporates a variety of data, 
including performance measurement data presented for each grantee. The report was 
released at a national preparedness conference during a plenary led by the CDC Director 
at that time, Dr. Julie Gerberding, and DSLR Director, Dr. Richard Besser. Within CDC, 
the compilation and release of the report was viewed as a significant accomplishment.  
At this stage, PHEP is focused on the development of new measures and a data 
system to support their collection and analysis at CDC. There was little mention of 
specific efforts planned to build a broader system to ensure data use, although staff 
recognize a broader performance management system will be needed to facilitate data use 
in the future. To support data use, an effort will be needed to bring science and evaluation 
closer to program. However, as it stands, staff in other branches of DSLR have limited 
involvement and understanding of the performance measurement efforts. Most 
participants suggested it would be beneficial to have greater participation from program 
consultant staff in the Program Services Branch (PSB) – these staff oversee the PHEP 
cooperative agreements and have close working relationships with staff in the states, 
cities, and territories. Program consultants could be important change agents in the 
adoption and use of performance measurement. However, participants also acknowledged 
that the “brutal” pace and demands of the PHEP program limited program consultants’ 
time to contribute to the effort. 
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 4.2 Findings 
4.2.1 Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and 
grantee control over performance. 
As described in section 4.1.2, public health preparedness demands extensive 
collaboration with network partners at both vertical and horizontal levels. Ensuring an 
effective response to a natural disaster, bioterrorist attack, or nuclear event requires an 
integrated and seamless reaction across levels of government and across multiple sectors. 
The PHEP program’s public health preparedness activities, such as developing plans for 
various scenarios (e.g., pandemic flu) and conducting exercises (e.g., bioterrorist attack), 
are dependent on the participation of others in state departments of health, education, and 
transportation as well as those in local departments of health, schools, first responder 
agencies, health care, and commerce among others.  
The significance of intergovernmental relationships in a preparedness response 
presents a major challenge for CDC, given DSLR’s limited control over the state and, 
especially, the local level, although that is where a significant proportion of the 
cooperative agreement funds end up. While the cooperative agreement provides CDC 
some authority over their grantees (e.g., defining allowable activities, including a 
requirement to report on performance measures), grantees’ control over the local level 
may be limited by their state’s model of decentralization and/or their choice of funding 
tool, both of which vary considerably across the country.  
And while CDC and grantees may be able to exercise some authority through 
policy tools like cooperative agreements and contracts, formal command and control 
structures are virtually nonexistent across the horizontal domain, especially given the 
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 informal nature of these relationships. So while CDC and its grantees are dependent upon 
these partners to participate in public health preparedness efforts for which they lead and 
for which they are accountable, both lack mechanisms of formal control to ensure their 
participation or performance. One participant, speaking about the requirement for states 
to develop a pandemic flu plan, said 
The [state] Health Department has the responsibility for coordinating the 
statewide plan, so the Health Department has to work with the Department 
of Transportation, the Department of Education, the Department of State, 
the Department of Highways, whatever they have in their state. And each 
of them [these partners] has to contribute to this overall plan. Well, you 
know, if they don’t want to, or they don’t get it, or they don’t understand 
how, then it becomes the Health Department’s job also to orient them, and 
educate them, and train them, and nag them to get the documents.   
 
Participants described the challenges associated with previous performance measures that 
required data from sources over which grantees had no formal authority or control.  
A number of the measures that we have collected historically were not 
really under the control of the grantee, which compromised the data. It 
was very difficult for them to get the data because it wasn’t really under 
their purview. We would ask them, let’s say, ‘how fast are you in doing 
this lab test?’ Well, not a lot of the states did those tests – they would have 
triaged those tests out to other labs. So their structure did not support the 
collection of that data or they were reporting on something that they were 
not responsible for.   
 
Grantees contend that performance for some of the existing six measures is 
dependent on the cooperation of informal, unfunded, horizontal partners. For instance, 
grantees’ ability to meet the target on measure 2A is dependent, in part, on receiving 
viable samples from local laboratories that can, in fact, be tested. The team in OMEB 
recognizes the difficulties this issue of compromised control poses for the development of 
performance measures As part of the process to develop a revised set of performance 
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 measures for the PHEP program, the Evaluation Workgroup, a team comprised primarily 
of external stakeholders, established criteria for measure selection. One criterion is that 
selected measures be “under the control” of public health – a recognition of the challenge 
grantees face in affecting performance on measures that may be largely outside their 
direct control. Grantees have pressured CDC to account for this dilemma, casting it as an 
issue of “fairness.” As example, in developing a future measure related to the PAHPA 
requirement that all grantees develop comprehensive pandemic influenza plans, one 
participant representing a grantee said,  
Like for Pan flu –a big piece of it is the school closure issue, and so we’ve 
brought Department of Education to the table. And I think it’s been going 
okay, but I mean obviously it doesn’t go as fast as if it’s requiring the 
involvement of people who aren’t within your purview. But I guess I 
would strongly argue for just holding us [grantees] responsible for health 
and medical indicators. You know, not that it’s not important how other 
agencies do, but there has been a trend to hold us responsible for work that 
is being done by other agencies [that we don’t control], and especially 
with this movement to tie funding to performance—it’s really not fair.   
4.2.2 Network public management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability 
for results, creating challenges for performance measurement.  
As reflected in the case description, the PHEP program is under extraordinary 
pressure to demonstrate accountability for results. The size of the program budget (over 
$700 million annually), the political climate, and the importance of the issue all 
contribute to demands on DSLR staff to demonstrate that “we’re prepared.”  However,  
the challenge of defining preparedness complicates the identification of outcomes for 
which grantees can be held accountable as reflected in this statement:  “Since there are no 
shared-upon standards for things [preparedness], it’s difficult for me to say, ‘they 
[grantees] have been accountable for what they’re doing’, you know, and really mean 
something.” In addition, as discussed above, important outcomes for PHEP, and 
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 preparedness more generally, will likely result from the work of PHEP in coordination 
with many other network partners. So while it is understood that an effective response is 
contingent upon collaboration across sectors and levels of government, both the vertical 
and horizontal relationships muddy efforts aimed at assigning accountability.  
This fragmentation of accountability has consequences for the design of PHEP’s 
performance measurement system. For instance, measurement becomes more complex – 
one participant described the challenges presented by the inclusion of performance 
measures that capture collaborative performance: 
It’s looking at those junctures between the systems [public health, 
transportation, emergency management] as indicators for performance. 
And that’s where it gets tricky because those junctures are a shared goal 
[shared goal across agencies]…Let’s just take it down to the local level—
the emergency management, the fire, the police, the health department. 
How do we work together collectively? Who’s responsible for that 
measurement? I mean, I’m going to boil this down to just the data itself, 
who’s going to collect it?  
 
This statement illustrates one problem for PHEP’s performance measurement 
system generated by the joint production of outcomes inherent in the field of 
preparedness. That is, beyond working collaboratively to achieve outcomes, network 
partners must contend with pragmatic issues related to the complexities and costs of 
measurement. In the networked context, it is unclear who has responsibility for 
developing and managing the performance measurement system, including the data 
management systems, data collection, reporting, and analysis.   
As already mentioned, the issue of control described in 4.2.1 inevitably converges 
with demands for accountability in the PHEP network. As you move along the results 
chain, accountability for outcomes further “out” will be difficult to assign. And as the 
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 achievement of important performance outcomes becomes the providence of multiple 
organizations, issues of fairness again arise when a single organization (the grantee) is 
held accountable for them. Indications from this case study suggest that grantees will 
continue to challenge proposed performance measures for which they will be held 
accountable but that they cannot influence directly. Consequently, OMEB staff will be 
pressured to select measures for which accountability is more straightforward (and for 
which grantees can control performance). More often, such measures will be process and 
output indicators that are more closely aligned with the work of the grantee. 
4.2.3 In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political, 
social, and scientific” process. 
OMEB leadership referred to performance measurement as a “political, social, 
and scientific” process – for the PHEP program, these three contextual factors interact to 
shape the development effort and ultimate performance measurement design. The social 
aspect reflects the need to continually interact with stakeholders at multiple levels in 
building a performance measurement system. In the PHEP program’s network context, 
this translates into engaging an extensive group comprised of CDC leadership, the 62 
grantees, federal partners (e.g., APHL, ASPR, DoD), and policy makers within both the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. One person commented,  
The socialization of the measures, it’s really working with our partners, 
socializing them up [to federal levels above CDC], socializing them out 
[to horizontal partners], and socializing them down [to grantees], you 
know. It’s about change management, buy-in, acceptability…It’s the 
softer side of the work we do, but it’s the most important…It’s looking to 
the people who actually do the work, to say, ‘does this make sense?’ We 
want these measures to be relevant, we want them to be feasible, we want 
them to be reliable, and we want them to be valid. We can definitely look 
at the science-based side of things, the literature, as a guiding principle, 
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 that’s the other bucket. But that only takes you so far because you really 
need to know, in the real world, how does this play out? 
 
At the same time, OMEB staff face political demands and influence from these 
network partners who shape the purpose and selection of performance measures. As 
reflected in section 4.1, the PHEP program resides in a dynamic political context. The 
program has swung from one focus to another as it has expanded in scope in response to 
critical events including 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and hurricane Katrina. One person 
described the increased attention given pandemic influenza, 
The same thing happened two years ago with pan flu. All of a sudden it 
was a ‘presidential emergency.’ So now we’ve infused another $600 
million into the [PHEP] cooperative agreement to say, ‘while we are on an 
all-hazards approach, trajectory, we really need you [grantees] to 
concentrate on pan flu’ which has redirected all of these resources to doing 
something that is against what we said we wanted to do. 
 
This shifting political landscape has made it difficult for OMEB staff to build a 
conceptual framework from which to identify potential performance measures – five 
different sets of measures have been produced over the past six years. Most recently, an 
evaluation workgroup comprised of external stakeholders identified five capability areas 
and assigned individual subgroups of content experts to develop a new program 
framework that can encompass priority areas as diverse as risk communications, 
biosurveillance, and isolation and quarantine. 
Participants spoke extensively about the implications of policy initiatives from 
“above” including PAHPA and HSPD-21, federal level guidelines such as DHS’ Target 
Capabilities List and the HSEEP, and federal guidelines such as the National 
Preparedness Guidelines for the PHEP program’s performance measurement system. 
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 Some of these policies impose specific measures, others set priorities and timelines – and 
most are viewed by participants as both unrealistic and reflecting little understanding of 
public health. One person said,  
The challenge is around the political agendas and the fact that 
Washington, ASPR, HHS, are completely unreasonable in what they 
expect from a measurement perspective. If you look at HSPD-21 that was 
just released in December [2007]. It gave us six months to develop 
measures for countermeasure distribution. The data, the first report has to 
be [submitted] within a year. I mean, it’s just totally unreasonable. 
 
Consequently, OMEB struggles to manage the incongruity between top-down, 
political imperatives and their feasibility for implementation in a network of 62 grantees 
representing varied contexts in regard to risk of hazard (e.g., hurricane, bioterrorist 
attack), geography (e.g., rural, urban), resources, and capacity.  
One way OMEB staff manage the political demands is to apprise network partners 
in Washington D.C. of their work in regard to the performance measures as reflected in 
the following statement. 
The political element is How do we keep the powers that be satisfied with 
the information that we can provide them? And there is a social 
component to that—it means going up to Washington quite frequently, 
talking with them about the measurement strategy that we’re proposing, 
recognizing we have these two tracks. ‘You’re going to get kind of the 
snapshot, quick and dirty data [six existing measures] and then we’re also 
working this track to develop these performance-based measures [new 
measures under development]. I alluded to the idea that quality is harder to 
capture. That’s going to take us some time to get there.   
 
Finally, OMEB staff described performance measurement as a scientific process. 
For now, OMEB staff are faced with developing a performance measurement system for 
a relatively new and complex field with a minimal evidence-base. The complexity of 
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 preparedness and the current vacuum in regard to science challenge OMEB staff to know 
what to measure. One person said, 
You know, for preparedness it’s hard because it’s not concrete, you’re not 
delivering services to patients. It’s not like a healthcare facility where 
you’re measuring outcome in terms of morbidity or mortality -it’s much 
more complex than that. I think that’s why everyone’s grappling with it -- 
because what does it actually mean to be prepared? There’s no actual end 
point. 
 
Some suggested that the lack of a strong science base for the preparedness 
program left DSLR more vulnerable to political influence. In speaking to the 
development of performance measures, one participant said, “I mean, it [the lack of a 
science base] compromises the ability to do it [develop performance measures] plus it 
leaves us wide open for political sway which is typically what’s happened.” OMEB staff 
are left to balance a science-based approach with political imperatives that seem 
indifferent to both the scientific complexities and intergovernmental implementation 
network within which CDC must operate.  
In summary, performance measurement for the PHEP program reflects the 
intersection of political, social, and scientific processes. In developing performance 
measures for the PHEP program, OMEB staff must contend with a significant political 
context, including policy that directly affects the selection of performance measures and 
imposes demands on the development process. At the same time, staff must grapple with 
a complex program and a limited science-base while facilitating an inclusive and 
collaborative process with a large and varied network of partners, all of whom are 
important to ensuring a set of meaningful performance measures that can serve a program 
comprised of 62 diverse programs. 
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 4.2.4 The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly 
shapes the design of its performance measurement system. 
Given that 62 grantees and thousands of local health agencies comprise the 
vertical network of the PHEP program, extensive variability exists in the risk for and 
potential scale of any given event; program priorities and activities; capacity and 
resources; availability of data sources and sophistication of data collection systems; and 
program context. This variability within the network introduces significant challenges for 
performance measurement and requires CDC to develop a system that is sensitive and 
responsive to the diversity among grantees. In many respects, the network demands that 
the development process be a negotiated process. One participant, representing a grantee, 
acknowledged the difficulty in defining a common set of performance measures 
appropriate for such a diverse set of grantees. 
We just have such dramatically different populations. We function very 
different as agencies. I just think there’s great variation in a lot of our 
challenges, in a lot of our structures, so it just doesn’t always work to use 
the same measure for everybody [all grantees]. 
 
Another design challenge imposed by the network structure involves developing 
measures that can be operationalized at the local level. Participants emphasized that 
preparedness starts at the local level. One person said,  
What’s interesting to me is that the whole point [of the PHEP program] is 
to get that local response prepared. I mean, look at the county health 
department if somebody walks in with a potentially flu-like illness 
[pandemic flu], can they put everything in place, from that local health 
department to adjacent ones, all the way up, literally all the way up [to the 
Federal level], to make sure that the effect of an outbreak is minimized?  
 
The extensive decentralization and subsequent variability across local level partners has 
proved a barrier to the identification of local-level performance measures. Consequently, 
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 the six measures currently in place are state rather than local-level indicators. One 
participant described the challenge as follows, 
I’ll bet you’ve heard that all emergencies are local and so all response is 
local. If something happens in a county, it’s not the state that comes in and 
responds, the county immediately responds…And so something about our 
measures needs to reflect how ready the locals are. And in any one state 
there may be 40, 60, 120 different local units. So trying to figure out what 
things they should all be able to do and how to measure those things and 
how to get them all to measure it in a way that rolls up [to the state level] 
is huge. That might be the biggest challenge for [performance 
measurement] in preparedness. 
 
Concerns about capacity at both the state and local level, particularly related to 
data collection and reporting, influences the choice of performance measures. The 
implementation of performance measurement for the PHEP program requires that all 62 
grantees have access to needed data, effective data collection and reporting systems, and 
the capacity for data analysis. One participant said,  
There were other measures that we wanted to include but that, frankly, 
once we looked at how they [grantees and locals] would actually report the 
measures and the systems out there and the assumptions that would have 
to be in place…we couldn’t come up with a way for the grantees to report 
them to us—that was a real eye opening experience for me. 
 
OMEB has already experienced serious data quality problems – grantees have struggled 
to understand the measures and to collect and report data. Consequently, OMEB has 
conducted extensive quality assurance checks for data submissions and will have to build 
in quality assurance mechanisms as they continue to develop the system. The variability 
in capacity, resources, and context also limits CDC’s ability to compare performance 
across the PHEP program grantees. Most participants thought that such comparisons 
 192
 would be looking at “apples and oranges” and saw little benefit in making such 
comparisons.  
And finally, given the obstacles imposed by network variability along with other 
challenges related to program complexity and political pressure, the current set of six 
performance measures were often referred to by participants as “low hanging fruit” – 
common measures that all grantees could feasibly collect and report and are reasonably 
responsive to accountability demands. Despite the challenges posed by the network, staff 
in OMEB continue their efforts to collaborate with their partners to develop a conceptual 
framework for the PHEP program that will lead to more meaningful and useful 
performance measures for CDC and its grantees. 
4.3 Summary 
In summary, program results for the PHEP program ultimately depend on the 
coordinated and seamless response of network partners representing diverse sectors and 
disciplines. Without full control over the production of outcomes, grantees argue that it is 
unfair to hold them fully accountable for their achievement. In the case of the PHEP 
program, establishing a criterion for performance measurement selection related to 
“control” is one way to address dependencies on vertical and, particularly, horizontal 
network partners. But the decision to apply this criterion comes at the cost of limiting the 
choice of performance measures for the PHEP program. Specifically, important outcomes 
related to preparedness but reliant on the performance of the larger network are excluded. 
The choice may result in the inclusion of more measures reflecting outputs and shorter 
term outcomes directly tied to the work of the grantees.   
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 The PHEP case also highlights performance measurement as an intersection of 
political, social, and scientific processes. Network stakeholders exert significant political 
influence throughout the development process, and OMEB staff must also contend with 
policy initiatives imposed from other federal agencies that directly affects the selection of 
performance measures and prescribes demands on the development process. Given the 
broad implementation network, OMEB must also negotiate an inclusive and collaborative 
(social) process to ensure the identification of measures that are meaningful and valid to 
62 diverse grantees and their local level partners. The variability across these grantees 
represents a significant challenge to measurement development – in particular, to develop 
a common set of national measures reflecting local-level preparedness efforts that are 
sensitive to differentials in risk and scope of potential hazards, capacity, and resources. 
And finally, staff must grapple with an extremely complex program which, at this 
time, is supported by a limited science-base. OMEB’s most recent effort to engage 
experts from across the country to participate in constructing a programmatic framework 
around five central program capability areas (e.g., risk communications, biosurveillance) 
reflects a foundational step in furthering the development of their performance 
measurement system. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
COMPREHENSIVE STD PREVENTION SYSTEMS (CSPS) 
5.1 CSPS Case Description 
5.1.1 The Program 
5.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context 
Alongside malaria and polio, CDC’s STD program is one of its oldest, dating 
back to 1957. Today, the program resides within CDC’s National Center for HIV/AIDS, 
Viral Hepatitis, STD and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP), and is managed by the Division of 
STD Prevention (DSTDP). The mission of DSTDP is to provide national leadership, 
research, policy development, and scientific information to help people live safer, 
healthier lives by the prevention of STDs and their complications.  
DSTDP has recently developed a five year strategic plan that identifies seven 
goals related to the prevention of STD-related infertility and HIV prevention, building 
STD prevention capacity and infrastructure, reducing STD-related health disparities, and 
addressing the costs of STDs and their associated sequelae. Specific objectives contained 
in the plan were developed in alignment with several other planning and priority setting 
efforts including the overall CDC goals, CDC’s Coordinating Center for Infectious 
Diseases (CCID) performance goals, and the NCHHSTP’s program imperatives. 
The largest program within DSTDP is its CSPS program which funds 66 grantees 
– public health agencies in all 50 U.S. states, 7 cities (Baltimore, Chicago, District of 
Columbia, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco), and 9 U.S. 
territories. The CSPS was funded through a grant up until the end of 2008. The program 
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 now operates under a cooperative agreement which also includes funding components for 
the prevention of STD-related infertility (i.e., the Infertility Prevention Project or IPP) 
and syphilis elimination in high morbidity areas (i.e., the Syphilis Elimination Program or 
SE). At the time interviews were conducted for this study, the program was nearing the 
end of a five-year grant funding cycle initiated in 2004 and preparing to issue a new five-
year beginning in January 2009. 
In fiscal year 2008, DSTDP provided $104,263,809 in total funding for all three 
program components (CSPS, IPP, SE). Heretofore the overall program will simply be 
referred to as CSPS. Individual grant awards ranged from $43,609 – 6,711,083 with an 
average award of $1,585,575 (median award $1,137,423). CSPS is managed by the 
Program and Training Branch within DSTDP. A unique feature of the CSPS grant is its 
inclusion of “direct assistance,” that is, the assignment of federal employees to some 
grantees to provide on-site managerial and technical support. While the placement of 
CDC “public health advisors” has been dramatically reduced over the past 15 years, CDC 
still supports over 175 federal positions assigned to state and city grantee programs.  
The organizational context for CSPS can be characterized, in part, by the 
program’s maturity and long-term tenure of its staff. Many of those interviewed for this 
study have worked in the STD program for over 15, 20, or 30 years. Staff in the program 
often initiate their careers as federal public health advisors (field assignees) conducting 
the fundamental “gum-shoe” detective work of STD case finding – interviewing patients 
diagnosed with STDs to identify others who were potentially infected and then contacting 
those persons to ensure appropriate testing or prophylactic treatment. Over time, these 
staff are often promoted into state-based management positions and eventually promoted 
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 to CDC headquarters in Atlanta to serve as program consultants providing technical 
assistance to grantees or as managers supporting CSPS and other program efforts. 
Consequently, many staff, particularly those in the Program and Training Branch, bring 
extensive front-line experience to their positions. 
5.1.1.2 Program Goals 
The purpose of the CSPS grant is to support state and local STD prevention 
programs in designing, implementing, and evaluating their programs. The complexity of 
the program is reflected, in part, by the existence of over 25 STDs. DSTDP is responsible 
for all STDs other than HIV/AIDS which falls under the purview of the Division of 
HIV/AIDS Prevention. DSTDP places particular emphasis on preventing and controlling 
syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia. The prevalence of these three STDs varies across the 
U.S. and its territories, and, given their infectious nature, related STD epidemics can shift 
over time both geographically and among sub-populations. For instance, the prevalence 
of syphilis was greatest among southern, heterosexual rural African Americans in the late 
1990s, but a more recent epidemic has emerged among men who have sex with men, 
often those co-infected with HIV.  
The activities supported by CDC’s CSPS grant include providing community and 
individual behavior change interventions; providing medical and laboratory services; 
ensuring partner services; promoting leadership and program management; conducting 
surveillance and data management; providing or ensuring training and professional 
development, and ensuring a documented STD outbreak response plan. Grantees 
receiving funds for the IPP project component are responsible for ensuring the testing and 
treatment of young, sexually active women and their sex partners for chlamydia and 
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 gonorrhea; supporting laboratory testing; developing surveillance systems; and ensuring 
provider training. As a requirement of the award, grantees receiving IPP funds must 
direct 50% of the award to Title X family planning programs for chlamydia and 
gonorrhea screening of women and their partners29. Grantees receiving SE funds are 
responsible for enhancing surveillance efforts, strengthening community partnerships; 
providing rapid outbreak responses; expanding clinical and laboratory services; and 
enhancing health promotion. Grantees eligible for SE funds are those with high syphilis 
morbidity areas as defined by CDC. Similar to the IPP funds, grantees receiving SE funds 
must award 15 percent of the funds to community based organizations (CBOs) that serve 
affected populations.  
Overall, the vast majority of CSPS funds support non-clinical prevention services 
such as education, outreach testing, field investigation efforts, and surveillance activities. 
These activities are largely carried out at the local level with grantees typically providing 
a significant portion of their CDC funds to county health departments, but also Title X 
clinics (IPP funds) and CBOs (SE funds). CDC grantees and their sub-awardees (e.g., 
county-level departments of health) are encouraged to collaborate with public and private 
health care providers (including family planning clinics), community-based 
organizations, and others who serve persons at risk for STDs. Jails and juvenile detention 
facilities are also identified by CDC as important agencies with whom to partner, given a 
higher prevalence of STDs among incarcerated populations than the general public.  
                                            
29 Title X was funded in 1970 as part of the Public Health Service Act. Title X funds are 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Office of Family 
Planning in the Office of Population Affairs and support low cost, confidential family 
planning services for young and low income women. 
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 Participants described a relationship with grantees that has changed over time. For 
many years – in the 50’s, 60s, and 70s – the program was tightly managed by CDC. The 
placement of hundreds of public health advisors in grantee programs allowed CDC to 
exert more direct control and forcefully manage the STD program. During this time, 
extensive data were collected and reported to CDC about case surveillance and program 
activities (e.g., number of persons suspected to be infected with STDs that were 
interviewed within a certain number of days). But by the end of the 1980s, data 
requirements lessened and CDC required little other than surveillance case reports. 
Overall, grantees were given much greater latitude. Some participants suggested that, as a 
result, CDC has allowed each grantee to map their own course rather than provide the 
leadership to guide the national program in a clear direction.  
One program strategy promoted by CDC over the past several years, however, is 
partner relationships. While STD programs have long collaborated with local partners, 
programs are being encouraged to engage public and private agencies, private health 
providers, health maintenance organizations, and others in order to address STDs from a 
broader, state-wide (or territorial-wide, city-wide) perspective. In some respects, the 
approach reflects a philosophical shift – rather than simply focusing on the clinics that the 
grantees fund, they are being asked to develop and leverage partner relationships in order 
to have broader state-wide effects.  
Several factors contribute to the emphasis on what has been termed a “community 
approach.” First, CDC’s budget allocation has remained relatively stagnant for several 
years, and staff recognize the need to leverage partner resources in order to effectively 
address program goals. Second, patterns of health care access and delivery have changed. 
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 Today, some patient populations are more likely to seek STD treatment services from 
private, primary care providers rather than public STD clinics. And third, there is the 
recognition that if CDC aims to have a population effect, they need other partners 
engaged in the effort. Consequently, grantees must involve and influence others who 
either interact with persons at high risk or provide health care services to affected 
populations in order to reduce and control STD infections in the broader community. As 
noted above, moving to an approach centered on community engagement and partnering 
does, to some extent, reflect a paradigm shift for grantees. And the changes require that 
programs recast their perspective to assume broader responsibility and accountability for 
STD prevention and control in their communities or state rather than for only in the 
publicly funded STD clinics.  
One aspect of the community approach is to engage unfunded, informal partners 
(e.g., private medical providers, health maintenance organizations, corrections facilities) 
in the STD prevention and control effort along with those who receive program funding 
(e.g., community based organizations who receive SE dollars). There is an expectation 
that even without funding, STD programs should be able to leverage their status as “STD 
experts” in order to influence others to help address STD prevention and control.  
5.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development  
As noted above, the STD program is one of CDC’s longest standing public health 
programs. But while the program is mature, changes in health care delivery and access, 
shifts in populations affected by STDs, differences in disease burden across grantees, and 
the stagnant funding context require that DSTDP and the CSPS program remain flexible 
in their ability to respond to fluctuations in the public health environment. Participants 
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 suggested this was not necessarily easy. For while the longevity of the program and the 
experience of its staff reflects a well-instituted effort, its history also contributes to a 
culture where change and the adoption of new practices can be difficult. In addition, 
programs have experienced significant autonomy and relatively little oversight over the 
past 15 years.  
5.1.1.4 Budget Stability 
In general, the budget for the CSPS program has stayed relatively steady over the 
past several years. And given annual inflation and small salary increases for staff, flat 
funding results in fewer service delivery dollars. While some grantees receive support 
from their state or local coffers, many others rely solely on federal CDC dollars to fund 
their programs. Staff suggested that STDs are not particularly high profile or a big 
priority for federal support, especially in comparison to HIV/AIDS which receives 
greater attention and significantly more funding. As noted above, funding challenges 
have led, in part, to DSTDP encouraging grantees to leverage partner resources and 
assess how best to spend limited program dollars. In particular, rather than simply 
funding the same local agencies year after year, grantees are encouraged to assess where 
resources are most needed and move dollars if indicated.  
5.1.1.5 Stakeholders 
Data suggest that the grantees and the National Coalition of STD Directors 
(NCSD) represent two key stakeholder groups for the CSPS program. The NCSD is a 
national organization comprised of state, local, and territorial STD directors established 
to promote national awareness of policies that govern STDs. CDC consults regularly with 
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 NCSD on a range of program concerns, and NCSD representatives are often invited to 
participate on DSTDP workgroups convened to address policy and other issues.  
5.1.1.6 Political Context  
At the federal level, participants viewed CSPS as having a relatively stable 
political environment. Among sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS gets the lion’s 
share of political attention and federal resources. Individual grantees and NCSD are 
viewed as having a degree of political influence and power that can be exercised in their 
relationships with CDC. And at the grantee level, there are politics that come into play 
between the grantee and its subcontractors. For instance, grantees may face political 
opposition to move funds from one long-standing subcontractor to another. 
5.1.2 The Implementation Network 
5.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships  
The vertical relationships involved in the CSPS program begin at the federal level 
with a budget appropriation from Congress and the President to HHS. Funds then come 
to CDC and, as described earlier, are distributed to 66 state, city, and territorial grantees 
through cooperative agreements. Given that CSPS program services are primarily 
delivered at the local level, grantees then use contracts, grants, or other funding 
mechanisms to support hundreds of local level implementers in the vertical chain, most of 
which are local public health agencies. The vertical structure within a state, city, and 
territory also varies. For instance, the California state program funds approximately 60 
different local health agencies. Some states may fund at a county level, others at a city or 
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 regional level. In frontier states, services may be provided directly by the state with a 
small staff addressing multiple public health areas (e.g., HIV/AIDS, STDs, tuberculosis).  
As described in section 5.2.1.2 above, at least 50% of IPP project funds must be 
awarded to Title X family planning settings to support chlamydia and gonorrhea 
screening and the treatment of young, sexually active women and their sex partners. 
Recipients of Title X funds include both private and public agencies (e.g., nonprofit 
family planning clinics, hospitals, public health departments, university health centers, 
Planned Parenthood affiliates). Grantees must also award 15% of SE funds to CBOs that 
serve affected populations. Consequently, the vertical chain involves a network of 
funding relationships, primarily through intergovernmental channels (e.g., federal, state, 
local health agencies), but also with private and non-profit groups (e.g., non-profit Title 
X clinics, CBOs).  
Most obvious from the program’s vertical decentralization is that the CSPS 
program achieves its goals through service delivery that occurs several steps removed 
from CDC. As mentioned earlier, up until the late 1980s, the STD program was managed 
from a more strident command and control structure, aided by the extensive placement of 
field staff (public health advisors). Since that time, however, CDC has imposed less 
direct oversight over the grantees, and the grantees have grown accustomed to a greater 
level of autonomy in managing their programs.  
More recently, CDC has attempted to restore some balance between providing 
grantees a degree of latitude that allows them to tailor programs appropriately to the 
disease burden, needs, and contexts of their communities while also imposing some 
expectations and means of accountability to ensure a strong national effort, especially in 
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 regard to data collection and reporting. In theory, everyone is aiming for the same broad 
goals – but the operationalization of a national program through multiple levels (i.e., 
national, state, local) introduces challenges related to the fidelity of implementation and 
accountability.  
5.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
Collaborative, horizontal relationships exist at the federal, state, and local level. 
These relationships are primarily informal, voluntary, and intended to support either 
program integration or improved access to populations at risk for STD infection. At the 
federal level, DSTDP interacts with the other divisions in NCHHSTP (i.e., the Divisions 
of HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Tuberculosis) as well as with other Centers (i.e., Division 
of Cancer Prevention and Control, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion) largely to provide more integrated service delivery. For instance, at 
the time interviews were conducted for this study, DSTDP was collaborating with the 
Division of HIV/AIDS to develop programmatic guidelines for partner counseling. This 
type of collaboration, aimed to provide more comprehensive and integrated services to 
the public, is viewed as essential to achieving DSTDP’s mission. As noted earlier, 
DSTDP also collaborates regularly with the NCSD. While DSTDP works with other 
federal partners such as the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and 
the SAMHSA – both a part of HHS – collaboration could be improved.  
At the state level, similar horizontal partnerships exist, especially in grantee 
agencies that have stand-alone programs for STD, HIV/AIDS, and TB. Grantees with 
smaller departments of health may have a more integrated program for these disease 
areas. The 2009 funding announcement for grantees explicitly encouraged STD programs 
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 to “engage in meaningful collaborations with appropriate public and private health care 
and other non-medical partners, particularly organizations serving at-risk populations.” 
State-to-state collaboration is also occurring as state representatives convene, often on a 
regional basis (e.g., western states, northeastern states), to review surveillance data, 
discuss program activities, and provide peer-based technical assistance.   
The “community perspective” described earlier is largely actualized at the local 
service delivery level where horizontal relationships between STD programs and private 
providers, laboratories, adult corrections, juvenile detention, family planning clinics, and 
CBOs are recognized as central to achieving program goals. Some of these relationships 
are formalized through funding arrangements while others are more informal. 
5.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network 
The CSPS network structure diminishes CDC and grantees’ formal authority and 
control over other network partners. Some control over network partners is facilitated by 
formal, funding relationships which provide a level of authority and subsequent 
accountability. But even with a funding relationship, CDC is struggling to impose 
authority and expectations, particularly around data collection and reporting. Several 
challenges contribute to the problem. As noted above, programs had been left to their 
own for a long time and are relatively resistant to the imposition of new requirements. 
Next, the strength of control is influenced, to some extent, by the funding mechanism 
used. In this case, the grant mechanism30 used by CDC affords grantees extensive latitude 
in program implementation. And even with funding relationships, CDC’s formal control 
is weakened with every step down the vertical implementation chain. For instance, while 
                                            
30 DSTDP used grants as the funding tool for its CSPS awardees up until January 2009. 
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 CDC may have some authority over the state level grantees, its power over the local level 
is limited and primarily exercised through the state-local funding relationship. Most 
grantees, which use a variety of funding mechanisms, also have limited authority over the 
local level implementers.  
More challenging than the vertical funding relationships, however, are the 
voluntary, horizontal partnerships that are frequently informal in nature and unfunded. 
Participants spoke of the challenges in enlisting correction facilities to conduct STD 
screening among inmates and in engaging private physicians. Without mechanisms of 
formal control, DSTDP encourages a model of “influence” as part of the community 
approach – programs using their STD expertise as leverage to influence network partners 
to participate in STD prevention and control activities. But influencing and persuading 
the informal, horizontal partners is complex, challenging, and requires different 
proficiencies than those traditionally held by front-line STD staff.  
5.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the 
Network 
The decentralized nature of CSPS inherently results in differences around 
organizational goals and priorities. While CDC and the grantees share some common, 
broad public health goals related to STD prevention, grantees also hold other priorities 
that may be shaped by their own context and political imperatives. The most significant 
conflicts in mission and goals exist between STD programs and their horizontal network 
partners that represent other sectors or disciplines. These differences challenge the ability 
to forge alliances and engage partners in support of STD prevention activities. For 
instance, while STD programs are encouraged to enlist adult corrections and juvenile 
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 detention facilities in STD screening efforts, those institutions have very different 
missions. Consequently, engaging their involvement is difficult. Similarly, gaining the 
trust and respect of private physicians in a given community can be challenging. 
Participants emphasized the importance of developing personal relationships to overcome 
these differences. Good communication and negotiation skills among staff were cited as 
essential to working with partners, along with strong skills in STD prevention and control 
to secure their status as experts in the STD arena. 
5.1.2.5 Network Function: Context, Resources, and Capacity 
Grantees vary in regard to their context, resources, and capacity. In terms of 
context, grantees differ in their STD epidemiology and in the populations affected. Some 
grantees have a much greater incidence of syphilis, for instance, than others. The 
differences in epidemiology result in variability across grantees in regard to the program 
activities and partnerships emphasized. Even areas with similar disease burden may be 
dealing with very different populations. Context also varies in terms of institutional 
arrangements within a state or territory and has implications for both vertical and 
horizontal collaboration. For instance, some states may support collaboration with school 
districts and others restrict it. 
Grantees also vary significantly in regard to their level of resources and capacity. 
The CDC award size varies across grantees; some have CDC direct assistance while 
others do not; and some receive state sources while others have none. Capacity also 
varies, affected to some extent by resource levels. As noted earlier, a small program may 
be dependent on two or three staff to manage several programs for an entire state (HIV, 
STD, TB) while another may be many disease specialists working all across the state.  
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 5.1.3 Performance Measurement System 
5.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System 
DSTDP staff in the Office of the Director initiated efforts to develop a 
performance measurement system in 1999 enlisting a consultant from Georgia State 
University. The measures have evolved over time – most recently, a revised set of 17 
measures were included in a new five-year cooperative agreement awarded in January 
2009. Table 17 summarizes the 2009 measures according to program area and notes the 
year each measure was originally introduced.  
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 Table 17. CSPS Performance Measures (2009) 
Program Area Performance Measure Year 
Introduced 
MLS 1a. Proportion of female admittees to large 
juvenile detention facilities tested for chlamydia  2004 
MLS 1b. Proportion of female admittees to large 
juvenile detention facilities diagnosed with 
Chlamydia 
2009 
MLS 2a. Among clients of IPP family planning 
clinics, the proportion of women with positive 
Chlamydia tests that are treated within 14 and 30 
days of the date of specimen collection 
2004 
MLS 2b. Among clients of IPP family planning 
clinics, the proportion of women with positive 
gonorrhea tests that are treated within 14 and 30 
days of the date of specimen collection 
2004 
MLS 3a. Among clients of STD clinics, the 
proportion of women with positive Chlamydia 
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the 
date of specimen collection 
2007 
MLS 3b. Among clients of STD clinics, the 
proportion of women with positive gonorrhea 
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the 
date of specimen collection 
2007 
MLS 4. Proportion of primary and secondary 
syphilis treated within 14 and 30 days of the date 
of specimen collection 
2009 
MLS 5a. Proportion of female admittees entering 
selected project area adult city and county jails 
that were tested for syphilis 
2004 
Medical and 
laboratory 
services (MLS) 
MLS 5b. Proportion of female admittees entering 
selected project area adult city and county jails 
tested newly diagnosed with syphilis (any stage).  
2009 
 209
 Program Area Performance Measure Year 
Introduced 
MLS 5c. Proportion of female admittees entering 
selected project area adult city and county jails 
diagnosed with syphilis (any stage) treated within 
14 and 30 days of the date of specimen collection 
2009 
PS 1. Proportion of primary and secondary 
syphilis cases interviewed within 7, 14, and 30 
calendar days from the date of specimen 
collection, per primary and secondary syphilis 
case 
2007 
PS 2a. Number of contacts prophylactically 
treated (disposition A) within 7, 14, and 30 
calendar days from day of interview of index 
case, per case of primary and secondary syphilis 
2009 
PS 2b. Number of contacts brought to treatment 
as new syphilis cases (disposition C) within 7, 14, 
and 30 calendar days from day of interview of 
index case, per case of primary and secondary 
syphilis 
2009 
Partner services 
(PS) 
PS 3. Proportion of ALL gonorrhea cases 
interviewed within 7, 14, and 30 days from the 
date of specimen collection. [for non-HMAs 
only] 
2009 
SDM 1. Proportion of reported cases of 
gonorrhea, Chlamydia, primary and secondary 
syphilis, early latent syphilis, and congenital 
syphilis sent to CDC via the National Electronic 
Telecommunications System for Surveillance 
(NETSS) that have complete data for age, race, 
sex, county, and date of specimen collection 
2004 
Surveillance and 
data management 
(SDM) 
SDM 2. Proportion of reported cases of 
gonorrhea, Chlamydia, primary and secondary 
syphilis, early latent syphilis, and congenital 
syphilis sent to CDC via NETSS within 30 and 60 
days from the date of specimen collection  
2004 
 210
 Program Area Performance Measure Year 
Introduced 
SDM 3. Proportion of reported cases of primary 
and secondary syphilis and early latent syphilis 
sent to CDC via NETSS where sex of the sex 
partners is known 
2009 
 
 
 
The process of developing measures for CSPS has been an evolving and 
incremental one. From 1999 -2001 a multidisciplinary workgroup, including 
representatives from NCSD, developed a program logic model depicting CSPS activities, 
outputs, and outcomes (immediate, intermediate, and longer-term) to help guide 
measurement development. Criteria were defined to aid measure selection (e.g., measures 
should be meaningful, valid, reliable, timely, actionable). The workgroup identified 
roughly 60 candidate performance measures that were piloted by a group of seven 
grantees over a two year period (2001-2003). Based on the pilot and continued efforts of 
the workgroup, the first set of 12 CSPS performance measures was implemented in 2004 
as part of a new five-year funding announcement and made a reporting requirement for 
the grant. Since that time, some measures have been dropped, others revised, and new 
ones added. In 2007, a revised set of 14 measures was introduced, and as data collection 
for this study ended, a revised set of 17 measures was finalized for inclusion in the new 
cooperative agreement awarded January 1, 2009. Grantees are required to report on the 
new 2009 measures twice annually. Table 18 summarizes some of the developmental 
milestones by fiscal year.  
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 Table 18.  CSPS Performance Measure System Development, 1999-2008 
Fiscal Year System Development 
1999 Performance measurement effort initiated by DSTDP’s Office of the 
Director; Interdisciplinary performance measurement workgroup 
convened 
2000 Program logic model finalized specifying inputs, outputs, and outcomes
2001 Two year pilot project launched with 7 grantee sites and roughly 60 
potential measures 
2003 Pilot project ends and participating sites recommend measures to CDC 
2004 12 performance measures introduced for CSPS as part of 2004 five-
year funding announcement 
2004-2007 New division-wide performance measurement workgroup established, 
workgroup charter written, performance measurement guidance 
document developed, annual performance measurement consultations 
convened, performance measures revised, first performance measures 
data report issued, quality assurance learning tours initiated  
2008 New performance measures proposed for fiscal year 2009 funding 
announcement, grantee feedback obtained, 17 measures finalized for 
introduction with new 2009 cooperative agreement in January 2009 
 
 
 
The performance measurement development process can be characterized by 
extensive stakeholder involvement, increasing sophistication in the development process 
itself over time, and an intention to move toward population-based, short- or 
intermediate-level outcome measures reflecting the community approach endorsed by 
DSTDP. Stakeholders are an integral part of the development process helping to ensure 
that multiple perspectives are represented and that a variety of people contribute to 
developing and implementing the measures. Key stakeholders in the development process 
include the grantees, NCSD, and the staff and management of DSTDP. Grantee and 
NCSD representatives have been involved in developing and piloting the measures, 
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 serving on performance measurement workgroups, participating in annual in-person 
consultations, and providing feedback on proposed measures. Stakeholder involvement is 
critical to the measurement development process, in particular, ensuring that the 
measures are meaningful, feasible in terms of data collection and reporting, and support 
the intended purpose of program improvement. Stakeholder involvement is also viewed 
as critical to securing the buy-in needed to effectively implement the measures and 
promote data use.  
The involvement of stakeholders has not been without missteps, however. Most 
recently, proposed measures planned for inclusion in the 2009 CSPS funding 
announcement were not vetted with the grantees and NCSD. Upon realizing the error, 
grantees were given the opportunity to review the proposed measures and their feedback 
led to the exclusion of several of the proposed measures in the final set. In almost all 
respects, however, DSTDP conducts a thoughtful, systematic process in developing its 
measures.  
The performance measurement development process has gained in sophistication 
over time. After the initial measurement workgroup dissipated, an interdisciplinary 
performance measurement workgroup was reconstituted in 2004. The workgroup 
includes representatives from DSTDP branches and management along with four 
members of NCSD’s Program Operations Workgroup. A charter specifying the 
workgroup’s function, membership, management, communication, authority, and 
coordination was drafted in 2004. In 2006, a detailed performance measures guide was 
disseminated to all grantees providing extensive information about each measure. Also in 
2006, DSTDP introduced “performance measure learning tours,” site visits to the 
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 grantees to assess implementation of the measures and learn how the measures have 
affected project areas. DSTDP issued its first report of the performance measures in 
September 2007 based on data collected in 2005-2006. With NCSD and grantee 
agreement, state-specific data were included in the report.  
In anticipation of the forthcoming 2009 funding announcement, the performance 
measurement workgroup led an effort to develop new or revised measures. Proposed 
measures were discussed at the annual performance measure consultation meeting held in 
Atlanta in the fall 2007. The workgroup hosts this consultation each year, inviting 
representatives from the workgroup along with other grantee and NCSD partners to 
provide advice on the development of the CSPS performance measures. Based on the 
consultation and other workgroup meetings, a proposed list of measures was drafted and, 
as noted above, was reviewed by grantees in early 2008. A final list of measures was 
approved by the DSTDP Division Director in March (table 17).  
The brief history of the development process highlighted above reflects the hard 
work of some people in the Division who have championed the performance measure 
project. The leadership of these champions has been central in moving the project 
forward, implementing systems and structures to institutionalize the measures, and 
encouraging its adoption both within and outside the Division. Many on the performance 
measurement workgroup, including NCSD representatives, share the commitment and 
enthusiasm of these champions. At the same time, however, many participants discussed 
concerns that Division leadership and some of the DSTDP program consultants have not 
fully embraced the performance measures or recognized their importance.   
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 Finally, the process to develop performance measures has reflected an attempt to 
develop more ambitious measures over time. The twelve measures originally introduced 
in 2004 were perceived as manageable, feasible, and achievable for the grantees, if not 
particularly challenging. The workgroup called them GRAM measures or “get right at 
‘em” because the measures were the easiest to implement at the time. 
In developing the 2009 measures, the performance measurement workgroup 
proposed several outcome-level measures that were population-based focusing on the 
proportion of diagnosed STD cases that are treated (e.g., proportion of gonorrhea cases in 
men and women that were treated; proportion of diagnosed cases of chlamydia among 
women in juvenile detention facilities that were treated; proportion of diagnosed cases of 
chlamydia among men and women ages 15-25 that were treated). Grantees’ comments 
about the proposed measures, collected through the vetting process, reflect a range of 
concerns including the feasibility of performing well on measures reflecting STD cases 
managed by private providers; the feasibility to perform well on population-level 
measures given limited resources and a lack of control over the broader health care 
system; the potential burden related to data collection and reporting; the capacity of 
grantees to address and achieve performance targets given limited resources; the 
consistency of the measures with program priorities; and the lack of access to data needed 
for some measures. Based on over 80 comments received from about 22 grantees, several 
of the proposed measures were excluded from the final set.  
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 5.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design 
In this section, the design of the CSPS performance measurement system is 
described based on several key aspects of its design. Table 19 summarizes these design 
features. 
 
 
Table 19. Design Features of the CSPS Performance Measurement System 
Design Feature CSPS Performance Measurement System 
Purpose of system Program improvement and accountability 
Level of measurement Local and grantee level 
Type(s) of performance measures Process and immediate outcome measures  
Use of targets or standards Baseline and 3-year targets set by grantees 
Quality assurance efforts Yes  
 
 
 
5.1.3.2.1 Purpose 
Program improvement and accountability are the primary purposes for the CSPS 
performance measures. In addition, the measures are an important means to help focus 
program efforts or, at least, highlight some aspects of a program that all grantees should 
be measuring in order to improve programs. In communications with grantees, the 
purpose of program improvement is largely promoted by emphasizing the value of 
performance measurement for program monitoring, to facilitate comparisons of program 
performance over time, and to help identify best practices. While participants emphasized 
that grantees’ performance on the measures is not tied to funding, DSTDP has a clear 
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 expectation that programs should be held accountable. Grantees are legally required, as a 
condition of funding, to report data for the measures semi-annually. Accountability was 
viewed as an important incentive for improving performance, even without the 
imposition of any sanctions or threat of punitive action.  
Prior to the introduction of the measures, the use of performance data by grantees 
to support their day-to-day program management is unclear. From a national perspective, 
the introduction of the CDC performance measures in 2004 represented the first time 
since 1992 that grantees were required to submit program data other than case-base 
surveillance data. Allaying grantees’ fears and nurturing acceptance of the measures has 
taken time. CDC’s hope, however, is that the performance measures will encourage and 
help direct programs to explore underlying program issues that are behind the 
performance on any given indicator.  
The program-level performance measures are aligned with the Division’s program 
performance measures developed for GPRA and PART, efforts aimed to improve 
transparency and accountability in government. DSTDP has been PART-reviewed by 
OMB twice, most recently in 2007 when a review of the entire NCHHSTP was 
conducted. The STD program-level performance measures were important in securing an 
overall PART rating of “excellent,” the highest qualitative score possible. 
5.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement 
The 2009 performance measures relate to three program areas: medical and 
laboratory services (MLS), partner services (PS), and surveillance and data management 
(SDM). The measures primarily reflect data collected at the local level where program 
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 implementation occurs, although the SDM measures that relate to timely and complete 
data are the responsibility of the grantee. 
5.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures 
All but one of the ten MLS measures focus on the testing, diagnosis, and 
treatment of gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis in specific population groups and 
settings (i.e., female admittees to juvenile detention facilities, women in IPP family 
planning clinics, women in STD clinics, female admittees of adult city and county jails). 
One MSL measures is population-based focused on the treatment of all reported syphilis 
cases. Based on the CSPS logic model, the measures can be categorized as process 
(testing and diagnosis) and immediate outcome (treatment) measures.  
Three of the four PS measures relate to syphilis and the fourth focuses on the 
proportion of gonorrhea cases interviewed in areas that are not categorized as high 
morbidity areas for syphilis. These measures are all population-based and categorized as 
process and immediate outcomes measures. The three SDM measures focus on complete 
and timely data submission and are process measures. 
5.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards 
Given the variability in disease burden across grantees, programs are encouraged 
to establish their own baseline figure for each indicator and set projected, three-year 
targets. Some suggested that DSTDP lacked the data to support target-setting at this point 
in time.  
 218
 5.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts 
Several efforts have been instituted to support data quality. As mentioned, a 
guidance document was produced in November 2006 and has been updated to reflect the 
new 2009 performance measures. For each measure, the guidance document details its 
rationale, specification, and data sources; reporting criteria; and information about how to 
use the measure to improve performance. As example, for performance measure MLS 
1a31, the guidance document provides a rationale for the measure, acknowledging that 
while the STD programs do not have direct control over the juvenile facilities, grantees 
are expected to actively work with facility managers to increase their awareness about the 
importance of chlamydia screening. The guidance document also specifies the definition 
of “large juvenile detention facilities as those that book 500 or more adolescent females 
annually.” In addition, the document suggests possible data sources for both the 
numerator and denominator. Consequently, the guidance document is an important 
quality assurance tool to make certain that all 65 grantees define terms similarly (e.g., 
“C” disposition), calculate the measures in the same way (i.e., numerator and 
denominator), and report the data in a consistent fashion.  
Another important quality assurance initiative is the performance measures 
learning tours. The objective of the learning tours is to assess the implementation of the 
performance measures, and, in particular, to explore issues of data quality. A team 
comprised of the DSTDP program consultant and performance measurement workgroup 
members conduct the two and a half day visit with grantee staff. A detailed learning tour 
                                            
31 MLS 1a. The proportion of female admittees to large juvenile detention facilities that 
were tested for chlamydia.  
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 guide has been developed to facilitate the site visit. The CDC team meets with a group 
from the grantee agency and discusses each measure, looking at overall performance on 
the measure over time, data sources for the measure, and efforts to assure data validity. 
The group also discusses how data are being used to inform program management and 
improve performance – this provides an opportunity for CDC to identify technical 
assistance needs. Following the learning tour site visit, CDC develops a report of 
recommendations and actions for the grantee, for which the program consultant has 
responsibility for monitoring.  
Even with these efforts, however, data quality for the performance measures 
remains a major concern. Internal data analysis and the learning tours have identified 
quality problems the performance measurement report issued in 2007 highlights data 
quality as an important problem. Data problems identified include missing or unreported 
data and the reporting of inaccurate data. Variability across grantees in the data systems 
each uses may be a factor affecting quality. Data quality issues were also highlighted in 
several abstracts accepted for poster presentations at a national STD conference. For 
example, instances have been reported of grantees fabricating data or making rough 
estimates to meet reporting requirements. And nearly all of those interviewed spoke 
about data quality problems including misinterpretation of the measures, the challenge to 
CDC of assessing data validity across so many varied grantees, the lack of buy-in for the 
performance measures that may contribute to poor data quality, and the capacity of 
grantees to collect and report quality data from the local level. 
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 5.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data 
In regard to data use, some applications of the data have been already noted. For 
instance, the implementation of the program-level performance measures were 
highlighted in the most recent PART review and the first data report was produced in 
2007. While that report provided grantee-specific data for each measure, performance 
comparisons across grantees were not particularly useful given the extensive variability 
in epidemiology, context, and resources.  
Overall, use of the measures has been limited despite the mechanisms developed 
to support institutionalization of the performance measures (e.g., guide, learning tours, 
technical assistance, report). Few people interviewed believed the data were being used to 
support program management and many expressed disappointment and frustration about 
its limited use. The lack of buy-in for the performance measures by the CDC program 
consultants and grantees may be one factor affecting use at this time. First, while program 
consultants are viewed as the primary change agents in promoting the adoption and use of 
performance measurement, their endorsement of the measures is mixed and many are not 
yet “managing” with the data in their regular interactions with grantees. Program 
consultants face competing priorities (e.g., personnel issues related to field staff, 
evidence-based action plans) which may interfere with promoting the performance 
measures more ambitiously. 
Second, buy-in on the part of the grantees has been slow to earn. Several 
interviewed said the grantees see the performance measurement effort as an “unfunded 
mandate,” rather than part of their evaluation activities. Many grantees are simply 
collecting and reporting the data to meet the CDC reporting requirement. A few 
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 participants described situations where program consultants sometimes enter the data into 
the web-based system for the grantees. Data revealed little, if any, engagement of the 
local level in use of the performance data. 
However, some grantees are beginning to use the performance data for planning 
and improvement. A few states are developing state-specific measures and others are 
collaborating with neighboring states to review data and discuss opportunities for 
program improvement. Given that few grantee staff were included in this study, little is 
understood about their specific barriers to use (e.g., measures are not perceived as 
meaningful, time and resource constraints, lack of understanding, insufficient tools 
supporting use). 
5.2 Findings 
5.2.1 Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS’ local-level, horizontal network 
partners compromises grantees’ control over performance. 
While CSPS’ decentralized, networked approach is essential to provide STD 
prevention and control services at the local level, it introduces challenges in regard to 
grantees’ ability to control performance on specified measures. As described in section 
5.1.1.2, DSTDP encourages a “community perspective” to more effectively reach 
populations at risk for STD infections and contribute to broader, population effects. The 
community perspective is intended to expand grantees’ responsibility and accountability 
for STD prevention beyond simply efforts within publicly-funded STD clinics. As one 
person asked, 
Is it ‘STD control’ or is it only dealing with the patients that come to the 
STD clinic, or only dealing with the patients that are reported? What we’re 
trying to move people’s thinking to is, ‘you’re responsible for controlling 
STD in your community.’ Obviously there are a lot of things that you can’t 
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 do that go into contributing to STD control in your community, but if we 
narrow it too much to only the things that you can do, you’re not really in 
‘STD control’ anymore – you’re in a ‘clinic control’ model. 
 
The approach involves extending collaborative partnerships, especially with 
horizontal partners, to engage those who have access to high risk populations (e.g., 
primary care physicians, jails, juvenile detention centers). One participant said,  
The community perspective is not just what you have control over, but a 
good STD program should try to influence other parts that you don’t have 
control over. For example, private providers, family planning clinics. Now 
this is different from the syphilis requirement where they actually give 
money to a CBO. This is, we don’t give them any money, we don’t do 
anything, this is just a good [grantee] program should be recognized as the 
STD expert in their county or in their state and therefore, should try to 
influence private providers to screen more, should educate them more 
about recognizing symptoms or how to conduct an interview with a 
teenager about their sexual activity. 
 
But while influencing the practice of physicians, corrections, and others to 
participate in STD prevention is necessary to achieve longer term, population-level 
outcomes, mission and goal conflicts and the lack of formal authority over these 
horizontal partners challenge grantees’ ability to affect performance on measures aligned 
with the approach.32 Mission conflicts frustrate grantees’ efforts to engage horizontal 
partners and the lack of formal authority compromises their influence – both limit 
grantees’ ability to affect performance on identified measures. As one participant stated, 
“The dollar bill usually influences pretty reliably, but the smile and handshake are not 
quite as reliable.” Another person explained,  
I think it’s pretty clear why grantees don’t like that – you’re calling it 
performance, which is a reflection on them, and they’re not performing because 
                                            
32 For instance, performance measure MLS 4, the proportion of female admittees entering 
selected project area adult city and county jails that were tested for syphilis.  
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 someone in their community isn’t supporting them or there are things that are 
beyond their control. And other people just have the luck of being in a place 
where they have a cooperative prison system or something.  
 
Grantees exerted their political muscle to successfully reject some of the 
population-based, performance measures proposed for 2009 (e.g., proportion of 
gonorrhea cases in men and women that were treated) that were viewed as too far outside 
their control. DSTDP has been more successful in incorporating process-oriented, venue 
specific performance measures. The Division’s dilemma around performance 
measurement given the network structure is that while networks are necessary to achieve 
critical outcomes, grantees’ have minimal control over affecting performance on 
measures dependent on informal, horizontal partners. Consequently, DSTDP has been 
limited in the choice and types of measures included in their performance measurement 
set. 
5.2.2 Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated 
and incremental process. 
Efforts to develop a performance measurement system for CSPS were started in 
1999 and have evolved significantly over the past decade. The size of the CSPS 
implementation network, its culture, and network members’ political influence have all 
shaped what has been an incremental development process based on negotiation with 
grantee and NCSD stakeholders.  
The mere size of the network requires that performance measurement be 
understood and adopted by hundreds of network partners. CSPS’ vertical network 
includes 66 state, city, and territorial grantees along with hundreds of local level partners. 
The horizontal network extends that vertical chain at all levels (federal, state, and local). 
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 Consequently, the development and implementation of the CSPS performance measures 
has taken time. Piloting measures is necessary to assess their feasibility and utility across 
a spectrum of grantees; vetting of measures is needed to further assess feasibility and 
build a stake in the system; and technical assistance and training is required to help 
grantees to understand the measures and build necessary data collection and reporting 
systems. 
In developing the CSPS performance measures, DSTDP has faced a stubborn 
institutional culture resistant to CDC oversight and data reporting requirements. Grantees 
had enjoyed extensive autonomy since the late 1980s with few stipulations from CDC. 
And DSTDP’s use of a grant mechanism, a policy tool offering grantees a good deal of 
independence, limited the Division’s authority. In discussing the challenges to developing 
and implementing performance measurement in the CSPS network, one person said,  
I would say the biggest challenge has simply been to change the culture or 
the mindset [of grantees] to view these [measures] as valuable tools to 
manage and run programs. I don’t think that it [performance 
measurement] was part of the culture necessarily. To get people 
comfortable with the idea that you can actually evaluate how your 
program is doing, at least to a certain extent, by coming up with well 
thought out measures that can be quantified and looked at over time – that 
this [performance measurement] is a valuable tool. To me, that’s been the 
number one challenge is to get people into that mindset and it’s still an 
ongoing process. 
 
Champions of the performance measures have also confronted a lack of 
commitment from management and staff within DSTDP that has slowed the effort. 
Leadership from Division management as well as program consultants who work most 
closely with the grantees is essential to promoting performance measurement to the larger 
network. A participant commented, 
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 The other challenge internally is just to get everybody in the Division on 
the same page as far as the importance of the performance measures and 
[the idea that] everybody needs to be working towards the same goal and 
that there should be minimum standards and expectations around what you 
do with regards to performance measures in your day-to-day job. And that 
hasn’t happened yet.  
 
Finally, given CSPS stakeholders’ political influence, the development process is, 
to some extent, a negotiated one. While DSTDP is inclusive in its development process, 
in both good faith and with appropriate intentions (assuring feasibility and acceptance of 
the performance measures), the Division also recognizes that the network commands 
political influence that affects the choice and type of measures selected and requirements 
related to their reporting and use. As noted above, stakeholders rejected several 
population-based measures proposed for 2009 that were excluded from the final set.  
Consequently, the CSPS network has important implications for the development 
process of its performance measurement system. DSTDP has long recognized the 
necessity of involving network stakeholders in the development process. Indeed, 
participants suggested stakeholder participation is essential to assure a feasible and 
meaningful set of performance measures and to build the buy-in needed to facilitate their 
adoption. However, the size of the CSPS network along with its cultural norms and 
political sway all prescribe a more incremental and negotiated development process – one 
that has frustrated DSTDP given what one person called its “glacial progress.”  
5.2.3 Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS’ 
performance measurement system.  
The 66 grantees that comprise the CSPS implementation network represent states, 
cities, and territories that differ substantially in regard to disease burden, populations 
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 affected, geographic context, resources, and capacity. The prevalence of STDs varies 
across the U.S. and its territories – while some states face epidemic levels of syphilis 
infection, others experience few cases in a given year. Grantees also vary in terms of 
populations affected by STDs – states face differing prevalence of disease among African 
Americans, Latinos, Whites, heterosexuals, and homosexual men. Some states have few 
staff and are responsible for expansive geographic areas; others support hundreds of staff 
across rural and urban contexts. Resources range dramatically from just over $46,500 for 
a U.S. territory to over $6 million for a heavily populated state.   
All of these factors affect an individual grantee’s priorities, program activities, 
and ability to achieve results. In designing the CSPS performance measures, then, 
DSTDP must accommodate the variability imposed by the network structure. First, 
DSTDP faces challenges in identifying a common set of measures that has relevance for 
all 66 grantees. One person said,  
I guess that’s probably the biggest challenge [variability across grantees] 
because even being able to come up with the 12 or 14 [measures], 
whatever they have now, and getting everybody to agree. I mean, that was 
a tremendous accomplishment in and of itself.  
 
The syphilis measures present a good example – there are some states with low 
syphilis morbidity for which the measures have little relevance. Consequently, the 
performance measurement workgroup added a partner notification measure related to 
gonorrhea cases for low morbidity areas, a concession that was not necessarily supported 
by all workgroup members. One participant noted, 
I think our challenge has been to identify a set of measures that is useful 
for the majority of project areas, both small and large and that’s been an 
internal debate in the performance measure work group. There are a 
number of participants on the work group who will come out and say that 
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 small states don’t matter, because the real outcome measure is reducing 
morbidity. And reducing syphilis morbidity in New England where all 
together they have 90 cases of P&S [primary and secondary] syphilis a 
year compared to Texas that has 90 in a month – there are advocates for 
not worrying about the small states. 
 
Network variability influenced the original selection of the “get right at ‘em” or 
GRAM measures as the first set of performance measures. Given the diversity in 
grantees, the set of twelve measures was seen as manageable, feasible, and achievable for 
grantees, if not particularly challenging. One person said, 
You know, these measures were not implemented because they were 
necessarily the best measures. They were implemented based upon the 
pilot results that suggested they’re ones we can get. In fact, they were 
called GRAM measures, ‘get right at them’ measures because they were 
the easiest, to be quite frank. 
 
Although DSTDP has worked to introduce more challenging measures over time, 
the network variability continues to pose a quandary. For instance, grantees persist in 
voicing concerns around different priorities for grantees based on disease burden and 
populations affected; the capacity of all programs to access, collect, and report data, 
especially at the local level; and the feasibility of grantees with limited resources to affect 
performance on this measure or that. One participant spoke to resource issues for some 
grantees,  
Some project areas see it [performance measures] more as a burden. I 
would say some of the more rural project areas, the frontier states like 
North and South Dakota, Wyoming, who receive such limited funding to 
offer an STD program. They see an additional mandate from CDC around 
performance measures as a little burdensome because they just don’t have 
the manpower and the resources to focus on it – they may not have the 
staff to do data entry or data collection or analysis to provide the data back 
[to CDC]. So they struggle with that. Even some of the larger program 
areas who have [their own] specific priorities, may not take it seriously.   
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 Consequently DSTPD has needed to design a performance measurement system 
with enough flexibility to accommodate the variability. For instance, grantees have the 
option to simply “opt-out” on reporting on a particular measure if they can provide an 
adequate justification. And, as mentioned, DSTDP includes some “alternate measures” 
for those grantees that are not high morbidity areas for syphilis. Grantees also have the 
flexibility to set their own baseline and three-year targets for each measure. And finally, 
DSTDP recognizes that comparing grantee performance on the measures is not 
particularly useful given their variability. 
Aside from flexibility, DSTDP has also needed to attend to data quality issues. A 
participant said, 
We knew from the pilot that we did back in the early 2000, we knew that 
everybody’s [grantees] interpreting things in their own way. But I think 
that it was a real eye opener for folks when they started going out on the 
learning tours to find out that, oh my God – even though it’s written very 
clearly in the guidance document, [we] thought it was clear as day. Even 
with all of that, people don’t read it and still just interpret it their own way. 
 
The vertical network alone challenges the ability of DSTDP to assure the 
collection and reliable data from hundreds of local level sites – the introduction of 
horizontal partners only compounds the difficulty. One person said, 
Now I feel relatively good about the quality of data coming out of an STD 
clinic but all of a sudden you open it up where 66% of those cases are 
going to be coming from outside the STD clinic?  Who knows what we’re 
going to get.  You know, but again, if the goal is to really prevent 
infertility and measure how well a program is doing, then you’ve got to 
look at the big picture from a national level.   
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 5.3 Summary 
As DSTDP has assumed a more comprehensive, community perspective aimed at 
achieving broader effects, program outcomes often reflect the efforts of local-level, 
funded STD programs and informal network partners. Dependencies are created that 
compromise grantees’ control over performance, introduce difficulties in acquiring or 
collecting data, and diminish data quality. In this context, CSPS grantees are more 
amenable to performance measures reflecting process, outputs, and short-term outcomes 
than longer term or population-based measures. Next, the experience of DSTDP suggests 
that the network context also shapes the development process itself. For CSPS, the 
development of performance measures can be characterized as a negotiated and 
incremental process where adoption of the measures is slowed by the breadth and depth 
of the network as well as CSPS culture. And finally, DSTDP faces extensive variability 
across the CSPS grantees in terms of epidemiology, geographic context, program 
priorities and activities, data availability and sophistication of data management systems, 
and capacity and resources. This variability has challenged DSTDP to identify a common 
set of challenging performance measures equally meaningful and relevant to the 65 state, 
city, and territorial grantees. In addition, differences have required that DSTDP shape a 
flexible performance measurement system and that staff consider individual grantee 
context in data interpretation.  
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
NATIONAL BREAST AND CERVICAL CANCER EARLY DETECTION 
PROGRAM (NBCCEDP) 
6.1 NBCCEDP Case Description 
6.1.1 The Program 
6.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context 
The NBCCEDP was established based on the Breast and Cervical Cancer 
Mortality Prevention Act of 1990 (PL 101-354). The program resides within CDC’s 
National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP) and 
is managed by the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control’s (DCPC) Program 
Services Branch. DCPC develops, implements, and promotes effective strategies for 
preventing and controlling cancer, working with partners at the national, state, and local 
level.  
Congress began funding the NBCCEDP in 1991 providing $30 million which 
DCPC awarded to eight states. Over time, the appropriation has increased and by 1997, 
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, five U.S. territories, and 12 tribes were funded. 
Today the NBCCEDP represents the Division’s largest program. In fiscal year 2008, 
DCPC awarded a total of $157,226,794 to 68 state, tribal, and territorial grantees through 
cooperative agreement awards. The current five-year cooperative agreement (program 
announcement #703) has been in place since June 2007. For the 12-month budget period 
in fiscal year 2008, grantee awards ranged from $75,000 to $8,821,221 with an average 
award of $2,312,159 (median award $2,064,252). In 2007, The National Breast and 
Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 was signed into 
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 law by the President, authorizing the program for another five years. The legislation 
establishing the NBCCEDP proscribes several requirements related to its implementation 
including: 
• Grantees provide matching funds of $1 for every $3 of federal funds.  
• Of federal funds received by a grantee, 60% must be used to directly support 
screening services and no more than 10% may be used for administrative 
expenses. 
• Program dollars may not be used to support costs for the treatment of cancer or 
for research. 
Program consultants in the Program Services Branch of DCPC are responsible for 
providing programmatic oversight and technical assistance to the grantees. Up until 2000, 
the Program Services Branch provided “direct federal assistance” to grantees, that is, 
CDC staff were assigned to work on-site to provide administrative and programmatic 
support. While some program consultants have been with the program for many years, 
staff turnover is not uncommon after three or four years. Physicians, epidemiologists, 
economists, and behavioral scientists from the Division’s other three branches collaborate 
to conduct evaluation and research of the NBCCEDP program. 
Overall, the NBCCEDP is a high profile program for the Division and the Center 
(NCCDPHP) given both the size of its budget and the political environment surrounding 
breast cancer. The CDC Director is well aware of the program. As part the Director’s 
quarterly performance reporting to Health and Human Services (HHS), data on a number 
of indicators related to CDC programs, including a DCPC GPRA measure for 
mammography, are presented. 
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 6.1.1.2 Program Goals 
The NBCCEDP provides breast and cervical cancer screening to low-income 
women (typically at or below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines) who are un- or 
under-insured. Since the NBCCEDP’s inception in 1991, grantees have served more than 
3.2 million women, provided more than 7.8 million screening examinations, and 
diagnosed over 35,000 breast cancers and 2,100 invasive cervical cancers. Up until 2000, 
grantees were challenged to identify resources (e.g., charity care) to assure treatment for 
women diagnosed with cancer through the NBCCEDP given that the program serves un- 
or under-insured populations. But in 2000, Congress passed the Breast and Cervical 
Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000 (PL 106-354) after extensive advocacy on the part 
of the American Cancer Society (ACS), Susan G. Komen for the Cure (heretofore 
referred to as the Komen Foundation), and others. This law provides a waiver to women 
screened and diagnosed with cancer through the NBCCEDP so that they may qualify for 
full Medicaid benefits through the end of their cancer treatment33. The law has been 
instrumental in assuring that women diagnosed through the NBCCEDP receive the 
medical care and treatment needed. 
The NBCCEDP is comprised of eight unique program components including 
program management, client recruitment, screening, quality assurance, professional 
development, data management, partnerships, and evaluation. The screening component 
includes five different program activities: breast and cervical cancer screening, tracking, 
diagnostic follow-up, case management, and re-screening. The NBCCEDP has developed 
a conceptual model representing its comprehensive approach to breast and cervical 
                                            
33 The extension of Medicaid coverage is limited to women served by the NBCCEDP 
who are U.S. citizens. 
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 cancer control. There is strong scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of breast 
and cervical cancer screening in the early detection of disease and reductions in related 
morbidity and mortality, however, less of a science base is in place to inform approaches 
for the other supporting services such as public education and outreach, professional 
education, and case management. Finally, while the focus of the NBCCEDP is on 
screening for medically underserved women, its educational activities, public and private 
partnerships, and quality assurance standards are intended to benefit all women.  
All grantees report a subset of program data to DCPC called the minimum data 
elements (MDEs) as a condition of their funding award. The MDEs are a set of 
approximately 100 standardized data elements considered to be minimally necessary for 
grantees and CDC to monitor client demographics and clinical outcomes of women 
screened with NBCCEDP funds. The MDEs also are used to inform NBCCEDP policies 
and practices, assess the national program’s screening outcomes, and respond to the 
information needs of CDC stakeholders and partners. The nature of the NBCCEDP as a 
clinically-based, service delivery program is relatively unusual for public health. 
Contrary to many other public health programs, the NBCCEDP is more easily monitored 
and evaluated given the ability to measure clinical service provision and related 
outcomes. 
Those involved with the NBCCEDP express a clear and consistent understanding 
of the program and its goals, a program driven by its authorizing legislation and one 
focused, for the most part, on reducing the morbidity and mortality related to breast and 
cervical cancer among low-income, under-insured women served by the program. DCPC 
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 staff and grantees express a sincere appreciation for the gravity of breast and cervical 
cancer and their responsibility to women in achieving NBCCEDP goals and outcomes.  
6.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development  
Although programs were incrementally funded over time, the program is 
perceived as relatively mature. A level of capacity for program implementation has been 
achieved across grantees – both the capacity for service delivery through the 
establishment of a network of screening and diagnostic providers and the capacity to 
collect and report the required MDE data. Program policies and procedures have long 
been in place and stakeholder relationships are well established. The strength of the 
national data system that has been established over time has rendered a program 
perceived as data-driven; MDE data are used extensively to monitor program 
implementation, service quality, and screening outcomes.  
6.1.1.4 Budget Stability 
Funding for the NBCCEDP has remained relatively stable for several years with 
no significant increases in the federal appropriation. DCPC economists collaborated with 
researchers at the U.S. Census Bureau to develop estimates of the NBCCEDP-eligible 
population size by state. Based on existing federal resources, results suggest that the 
NBCCEDP is currently able to screen approximately 14% of the eligible population34 or 
about 1% of the total women in the U.S. (Tangka et al. 2006). Consequently, DCPC 
encourages the program to achieve efficiencies wherever possible. One repercussion of 
                                            
34 Women at 250% or less of the federal poverty guidelines and who are un- or under-
insured. 
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 level funding has been limited resources to recruit many new women to the program 
given that re-screening is an important goal of the program. 
6.1.1.5 Stakeholders 
A strong group of stakeholders orbit the NBCCEDP including its grantees and a 
formal council comprised of the grantee program directors. The council is a committee of 
the National Association of Chronic Disease Directors (NACDD), which also stays 
closely informed of NBCCEDP-related issues. A formal federal advisory committee35 is 
in place for the NBCCEDP and is comprised of national experts and leaders in the field 
of breast and cervical cancer screening. The federal advisory group meets annually to 
review program progress and discuss related policy. 
Other stakeholders include the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials (NACCHO) and cancer-related national organizations such as ACS and the 
Komen Foundation, both of which have state, regional, and/or local affiliates. In addition, 
other CDC-funded programs that have a close relationship to the NBCCEDP include 
DCPC’s National Comprehensive Cancer Control program and the WISEWOMAN™ 
program (Well Integrated Screening and Evaluation for Women Across the Nation). And, 
of course, Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also have an 
important stake in the program. 
6.1.1.6 Political Context  
A significant political context encompasses the NBCCEDP given that it is a 
legislated program, has a relatively large budget compared to other chronic disease 
                                            
35 Based on the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 
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 programs at CDC, and shares company with a group of strong national advocates for 
breast cancer (e.g., ACS, Komen Foundation, National Breast Cancer Coalition). DCPC 
frequently responds to Congressional inquiries, the CDC Director reports quarterly to 
HHS on its performance, and DCPC staff are periodically required to provide 
Congressional testimony about the NBCCEDP.36   
Changes in medical technology and the health care reform movement are having 
direct effects on the program. For instance, while scientific evidence does not support a 
significant clinical benefit to the use of digital mammography over traditional film 
mammography, the technology companies are effectively promoting digital to 
radiologists. Because the cost of digital is significantly higher, grantees are struggling to 
identify mammography facilities willing to provide traditional film mammography or 
those willing to accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate37 for film mammography when 
digital is provided. Consequently, to assure access to screening, CDC recently changed 
its policy to allow reimbursement for digital mammography at the Medicare rate, a 
procedure that currently has no scientifically determined increased benefit. The policy 
change has implications for the program overall – fewer women will be screened with the 
same dollars. The potential for universal health care – whether realized through a national 
plan or state-by-state adoption (e.g., Massachusetts) – also has implications for the 
NBCCEDP although these are less clear at this time.  
                                            
36 Most recently, CDC provided Congressional testimony on January 29, 2008 to the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee chaired by Representative Henry 
Waxman. 
37 NBCCEDP policy requires that reimbursement for screening, diagnostic, and other 
clinical services provided through the program is capped at the Medicare rate. 
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 Advocacy groups were important supporters of the legislation that established the 
NBCCEDP as well as the 2000 Treatment Act, and they continue to be important partners 
to DCPC. However, CDC policies are sometimes in conflict with those of the advocate’s, 
which has led to tension for both CDC and the grantees. Most notable is CDC’s policy 
requiring that 75% of women receiving NBCCEDP-funded mammograms be aged 50 and 
older given greater effectiveness of mammography in detecting breast cancer among 
older women. In contrast, ACS and other groups have issued guidelines that promote 
screening for women 40 and older. Grantees face substantial pressure from the advocates 
to screen this younger age group. 
6.1.2 The Implementation Network 
The NBCCEDP is carried out through a network of agencies including the 68 
grantees and over 22,000 local-level health care providers. The implementation network 
for the NBCCEDP can be described based on five dimensions. The first two relate to the 
structure of the network: 1) vertical relationships and 2) horizontal relationships. The 
other three relate to the function of the network: 3) authority and control within the 
network; 4) shared organizational goals and priorities within the network; and 5) 
variability in context, capacity, and resources. Each of these is discussed below. 
6.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships  
The vertical chain for the NBCCEDP begins in Congress with its annual budget 
appropriation for the program. Those funds come to CDC (DCPC) and are distributed 
through cooperative agreements to the 68 NBCCEDP grantees. A myriad of decentralized 
configurations characterize the dissemination of funds by grantees to local level providers 
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 conducting the breast and cervical cancer screening and diagnostic tests. Some grantees 
contract directly with providers, radiological centers, and laboratories while using their 
own staff to conduct client recruitment, professional education, case management, quality 
assurance, and data management. Other grantees fund regional or local-level agencies to 
implement the program; in fact, some states require that programs be implemented 
through an existing intergovernmental network. In these cases, those regional or local-
level public health agencies will typically initiate contracts with health providers to 
conduct the screening and diagnostics in their service area. The regional or local-level 
coordinating agency could be a local health department, a community-based organization 
(CBO), or hospital and might be responsible for carrying out some program activities 
such as client recruitment, public education, case management, and data management. In 
a few cases, a funded tribe or territory has its own health center and provides the 
screening and diagnostic services directly.  
Three points should be highlighted about the vertical dimension of the NBCCEDP 
network. First, the most significant consequence of the vertical network is that service 
delivery for the NBCCEDP is typically delivered several steps removed from CDC and at 
least one or two steps removed from the grantee. So while DCPC is fiscally and 
programmatically accountable for the NBCCEDP to Congress, OMB, and others, service 
delivery is actually provided by local-level providers at the other end of the vertical 
chain. In addition, the service delivery network is extremely large with over 22,000 
providers involved in delivering screening and diagnostic services for the NBCCEDP.  
Second, the vertical network is comprised not only of intergovernmental 
relationships (e.g., CDC – state health department – county health department), but also 
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 relationships with private non-governmental and public agencies (e.g., CBOs, private 
health care providers, public hospitals, cancer centers, laboratories). These agencies may 
have more or less experience participating in public health efforts. 
And third, the NBCCEDP goals (i.e., early detection of cancer among the priority 
population for the program) are primarily achieved through the actions of the vertical 
network with little dependency on horizontal network relationships. As discussed below, 
this fact has important implications for program oversight and accountability, even when 
the network is as extensive as this. 
6.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
Horizontal relationships are in place at all levels of the vertical structure. CDC 
collaborates with other federal agencies (e.g., National Cancer Institute or NCI), national 
partners (e.g., ACS, NACDD, NACCHO), and the federal advisory committee. Within 
DCPC, the Program Services Branch collaborates with its sister branches including the 
Cancer Surveillance Branch that oversees CDC’s National Program of Cancer Registries 
and with other CDC programs within the NCCDPHP such as WISEWOMAN™.  
Likewise, grantees have established horizontal relationships with local chapters of 
ACS, Komen Foundation, and regional offices of NCI’s Cancer Information Services. 
Grantees also collaborate with state-based cancer centers, academic institutions, and 
private industry. Within the grantee institution, staff leading the NBCCEDP program 
collaborate with other cancer screening programs within their institution (e.g., prostate 
cancer, colorectal cancer), the cancer registries program, the CDC-funded comprehensive 
cancer control program, and WISEWOMAN™ in order to maximize opportunities for 
program integration. If a county or regional system is part of the vertical chain, they may 
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 have horizontal relationships with regional or local ACS, Komen Foundation, and CIS 
programs. And at the service delivery level, horizontal partnerships may be established 
between the provider sites and client referral sites (e.g., Title X family planning clinics, 
CBOs, churches), local ACS chapters, and Medicaid enrollment offices.  
For the most part, the horizontal partnerships (at all levels) are voluntary, 
informal, and un-funded, although grantees may provide funding to some local level 
agencies (e.g., churches, CBOs) to assist with public education and client recruitment. As 
already noted, some of the horizontal relationships help promote service integration so 
that women might receive more comprehensive screening (e.g., breast, cervical, 
colorectal, cardiovascular). But in general, these partnerships expand the reach of the 
NBCCEDP, extending its resources and advancing the broader goals of the NBCCEDP 
such as enhanced access and quality care for all women. Some partners like Komen 
Foundation, the Avon Foundation, and ACS provide additional in-kind and financial 
resources to grantees.  
6.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network 
Authority and control over service delivery within the NBCCEDP are 
compromised given the decentralized program structure. And, as just discussed, the 
structure varies – some grantees directly fund screening providers, others involve local or 
regional-level agencies which then secure providers. In general, as the number of vertical 
links in the NBCCEDP implementation chain increases, DCPC and grantee’s influence 
over program implementation decreases.  
For the NBCCEDP, authority and control over local-level service delivery is 
strengthened with the presence of a funding relationship. The specific funding tool used 
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 will affect the level of authority and determine any sanctions that can be exercised. As 
described, DCPC uses a cooperative agreement as the policy tool to fund the NBCCEDP 
grantees. This funding mechanism supports a collaborative (i.e., “cooperative”) 
relationship between DCPC and the grantees – cooperative agreements offer CDC the 
opportunity to include programmatic and reporting requirements and allow for substantial 
DCPC involvement in programmatic decision making. At the same time, cooperative 
agreements are not as restrictive as a contract and provide NBCCEDP grantees flexibility 
in managing and implementing the program. 
Grantees apply varied funding mechanisms (e.g., contracts, memoranda of 
understanding, grants)38 either directly with providers or with regional or local-level 
agencies. Some NBCCEDP grantees build requirements into the funding arrangements 
that afford them greater control over program implementation and performance. For 
instance, some grantees hold back reimbursement to providers or regional/local agencies 
until those organizations submit required data and invoices. Other grantees use 
performance-based contracts, incorporating screening requirements such as the DCPC-
established performance measures. Funding tools used by DCPC and the grantees may 
also allow for the imposition of sanctions to influence program implementation. For 
instance, in the past, when serious concerns about the quality of screening were 
identified, DCPC has restricted cooperative agreement funds,39 forcing programs to halt 
screening women until problems were resolved. For their part, grantees have cancelled 
                                            
38 A quantitative assessment of the types of policy tools used by grantees or local/regional 
agencies is not available 
39 Restricting cooperative agreement funds typically involves “freezing” a portion of 
funds so that the grantee cannot draw down reimbursement until corrective action has 
been taken. 
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 contracts with providers that do not meet quality requirements or withheld provider 
reimbursement if screening projections are not met or if data submissions are delayed.  
In contrast, little control is possible over unfunded, informal partners, although 
these relationships are typically less significant in achieving program outcomes. For 
instance, programs sometimes struggle to control how quickly family planning programs 
refer women with abnormal Pap tests into the NBCCEDP for diagnostic testing.  
With or without funding, participants discussed the value of building 
collaborative relationships with agencies to increase DCPC’s and grantees’ influence 
with important partners and, ultimately, to yield a greater impact. DCPC program 
consultants who have effective relationships with their grantees may have greater 
opportunity to encourage specific behavior rather than resorting to threats of punitive 
action. And grantees that establish strong working and reciprocal relationships with their 
providers or regional/local partners may be more successful in affecting implementation. 
6.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the 
Network 
Partners within the NBCCEDP network share similar goals, particularly as it 
pertains to the value of breast and cervical cancer screening and its intended outcomes 
(e.g., early detection and treatment). Some differences in priorities are evident, especially 
related to policy issues such as DCPC’s emphasis on screening women age 50 and older 
for breast cancer. As previously mentioned, ACS and others recommend screening for 
women 40 and older. But overall, there is strong consensus on the program purpose and 
goals. 
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 6.1.2.5 Network Function: Variability in Context, Resources, and Capacity 
The NBCCEDP grantees are tremendously variable in regard to their context, 
capacity, and resources. Grantees’ context differs in terms of priority populations, 
demographics, geography, culture, and political environment. While California’s eligible 
population for the NBCCEDP may be ethnically diverse, West Virginia’s is primarily 
white, rural, and poor. The context of tribal and territorial programs is typically in stark 
contrast to a state program. For instance, DCPC funds a tribal program in Alaska that is 
responsible for small pockets of Native Americans scattered over an area 40,000 square 
miles in size. Strategies used to reach women in this context are quite different from 
those used to recruit women for screening in a dense urban population like Chicago. 
Different cultural norms across grantees also have implications for program 
implementation. For instance, women in rural Appalachia have unique barriers to 
screening that likely differ from the barriers facing women in an urban minority 
population. Grantees also vary in their capacity and level of resources. As noted earlier, 
award sizes for the NBCCEDP grantees range from as little as $75,000 to over $8 
million. Grantees funded at smaller amounts and with smaller programs overall likely 
struggle more in terms of capacity, particularly in terms of data management 
requirements for the program.  
6.1.3 Performance Measurement System 
6.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System 
The NBCCEDP performance measures are based on the MDE data which have 
been collected on all women served through the program since its inception in 1991. The 
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 NBCCEDP performance measures were formalized in 2004 as a unique set of priority 
indicators and are summarized in table 20 according to indicator category and include the 
CDC standard or target. 
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 Table 20. NBCCEDP Performance Measures (2008) 
Indicator 
Category 
Performance Measure CDC 
Standard
Percentage of initial program Pap tests that are conducted 
among rarely or never screened women 
> 20% Screening 
Priority 
Population 
Measures Percentage of screening mammograms provided to women > 
50 years of age 
> 75% 
Percentage of abnormal screening results with complete 
diagnostic follow-up 
> 90% 
Percentage of abnormal screening results with time from 
screening test result to final diagnosis > 60 days 
< 25% 
Percentage of women diagnosed with HSIL, CIN2 , CIN3, 
CIS40, Invasive with treatment started 
> 90% 
Percentage of women diagnosed with HSIL, CIN2, CIN3, 
CIS with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started > 
90 days 
< 20% 
Cervical 
Cancer 
Diagnostic 
Measures 
Percentage of women diagnosed with invasive carcinoma 
with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started > 60 
days 
< 20% 
Percentage of abnormal screening results with complete 
diagnostic follow-up 
> 90% 
Percentage of abnormal screening results with time from 
screening test result to final diagnosis > 60 days 
< 25% 
Percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with 
treatment started 
> 90% 
Breast 
Cancer 
Diagnostic 
Measures 
Percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with time 
from date of diagnosis to treatment started > 60 days 
< 20% 
 
 
 
                                            
40 HSIL (High-grade squamous intraepithelial lesion); CIN (cervical intraepithelial 
neoplasia); CIS (Carcinoma in situ) 
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 The NBCCEDP performance measures are fairly well institutionalized and 
accepted by grantees as an important management tool for the program. Table 21 
summarizes some key developmental markers related to the measures.  
 
 
Table 21. NBCCEDP Performance Measure System Development, 1991-2008 
Fiscal Year System Development 
1991 NBCCEDP program implemented in 8 states and the MDE data set 
implemented, reporting required 
1993 Data Quality Indicator Guide (DQIG) report developed; Data 
contractor funded to manage MDE data and provide support to 
NBCCEDP grantees 
1997 All 50 states, Washington D.C., and a group of U.S. territories funded 
2004 11 priority performance measures with standards formalized for 
NBCCEDP 
 
2005 
Coding algorithms for performance measures provided to grantees; 
Subset of measures used as part of broader, performance-based 
budgeting formula 
2006 Software developed and distributed to grantees to calculate their own 
performance reports at any time 
On-going Revisions to measures made as needed 
 
 
 
As noted, the current performance measures are derived from the MDE data 
which have been collected since the program’s inception in 1991. The collection and 
reporting of the MDE data have always been a program requirement for grantees and 
significant resources support the activity. In 1993, a data contractor was secured by 
DCPC to manage the MDE data for the NBCCEDP and provide grantees technical 
support on data management-related issues. All grantees are required to employ a data 
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 manager using CDC funds for the program and support a data management system for the 
collection and reporting of the MDE data. The data contractor has developed a data 
management software program for the MDE data that is available free of cost to any 
NBCCEDP grantee. An MDE Data Users Manual is provided to all grantees; the manual 
includes detailed definitions of all MDE variables. The data contractor employs a team of 
technical consultants with data management expertise and, in particular, an in-depth 
understanding of the MDEs. Each technical consultant is assigned a group of NBCCEDP 
grantees to whom he or she provides technical support. The technical consultant works 
closely with the DCPC program consultant, participating in regular conference calls, all 
site visits, and semi-annual data calls to discuss the MDE data submissions.  
An MDE committee comprised of multi-disciplinary staff from DCPC (e.g., 
program consultants, epidemiologists, medical advisors) and the data contractor meets 
regularly to discuss issues related to the collection and use of the MDE data. In the early 
1990s, the MDE committee developed a report based on the MDE data called the Data 
Quality Indicator Guide or DQIG. The DQIG includes 27 indicators with benchmarks to 
evaluate both data quality and quality of care. In 2004, the “core” performance measures, 
a subset of clinical measures from the DQIG, were identified as a unique, stand-alone set 
of indicators and are considered the most important indicators of NBCCEDP program 
performance. Therefore, the performance measures represent part of a larger set of 
monitoring data that support program improvement. So while the NBCCEDP grantees 
were already familiar with these indicators, the eleven selected measures were given new 
prominence as part of the core performance measurement set. Heretofore, the NBCCEDP 
core indicators will be referred to as the performance measures. 
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 Stakeholders have had a voice in reviewing and refining the performance 
measures over time. A workgroup of grantee staff has been convened in the past to 
review the DQIG. The Council of NBCCEDP Program Directors (heretofore referred to 
as the NBCCEDP Council), a committee of the NACDD, reviews proposed changes for 
the larger MDE data set and has vetted the performance measures in the past. The 
NBCCEDP Council worked closely with CDC in developing a performance-based 
budgeting formula that incorporates seven of the eleven NBCCEDP performance 
measures. In addition, an annual meeting of the grantee data managers provides a regular 
opportunity to discuss the MDE data and performance measures.  
The NBCCEDP performance measures have been adjusted slightly over time. For 
instance, based on discussion with grantees, the standard for one measure related to 
follow-up of abnormal Pap screening results was revised based on practice-base realities. 
More recently, the calculation for the measures on follow-up of abnormal screening 
results was revised given complaints from grantees that they did not have any control 
over the timeliness of women who were screened elsewhere and referred to the 
NBCCEDP for diagnostic services. In addition, a statistical test (z-test) is now applied to 
more accurately determine whether a grantee meets the DCPC standard on a particular 
measure – this has been important for performance measures reflecting relatively rare 
events (e.g., diagnosis of invasive cervical cancer), especially for smaller grantees that 
screen smaller numbers of women overall. Similarly, CDC invoked a policy whereby a 
measure is not calculated if the denominator data is ten or less. Both adjustments account 
for variability across grantees and ensure a more equitable application of the measures. 
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 In 2006, the data contractor developed an edit program specifically for the 
performance measures that was disseminated to all grantees. The computer program 
permits grantees to produce a performance indicator report at any given time using the 
precise algorithms to calculate the measures. Using the edit program, grantees can 
produce the performance report for individual regions within their state, tribe, or territory 
and for individual providers to better monitor program performance. The edit report is 
believed to be a factor contributing to improved performance on the measures during the 
last two to three years. 
At this time, many of the NBCCEDP grantees are meeting the established 
standards for the performance measures. While the standards could be increased for the 
existing measures, NBCCEDP staff suggest that stakeholders would oppose such an 
adjustment. Participants suggested that performance measures will continue to evolve as 
grantees meet existing standards, new priorities emerge, and improvements in 
measurement develop. Currently, there are measurement challenges that limit the choice 
of indicators. For instance, while there is an interest in measuring adherence to 
recommended screening intervals for cervical or breast cancer, women tend to go in and 
out of eligibility for the NBCCEDP complicating the ability to identify denominator data 
for that particular calculation. There is also an interest to expand the measures beyond 
only clinical ones and incorporate indicators reflecting measures of efficiency or other 
program areas (e.g., public education) that are more difficult to measure.  
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 6.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design 
In this section, the design of the NBCCEDP performance measurement system is 
described highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of 
measures; use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 22 summarizes 
these design features. 
 
 
Table 22. Design Features of the NBCCEDP Performance Measurement System 
Design Feature NBCCEDP Performance Measurement System 
Purpose of system Accountability, program improvement, budgeting 
Level of measurement Local level (patient-level clinical data) 
 
Type(s) of performance measures 
Process measures (Priority population measures) 
Short-term and intermediate outcome measures 
(Diagnostic measures) 
Use of targets Yes – Common standards set by CDC 
Quality assurance efforts Yes, extensive 
 
 
 
6.1.3.2.1 Purpose 
The NBCCEDP performance measures serve several purposes including 
accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. The NBCCEDP is accountable to 
three main groups: Congress, the public, and to the women served through the program. 
DCPC staff view the performance measurement data as invaluable evidence that the 
program is serving women of highest need and that timely and quality clinical screening 
and diagnostic services are provided. As noted earlier, both DCPC staff and the grantees 
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 express a sincere responsibility to the women served through the NBCCEDP and view 
the performance measures as a means to demonstrate accountability in meeting that 
obligation.  
The performance measures also support program improvement at all levels. 
DCPC, working with its data management contractor, monitors all MDE data, working 
closely with grantees to provide technical assistance when potential issues are identified. 
Many of the grantees have developed the capacity to use their performance measurement 
data in their own jurisdictions to help identify problems at the local level (e.g., a 
particular provider who might not be conducting diagnostic follow-up in a timely 
fashion). Using these data allows grantees to quickly make programmatic adjustments. 
Interviewees suggested that grantees are more likely to focus strictly on the performance 
measures with their local level agencies or providers rather than the broader set of MDE 
data.  
In 2005, DCPC began using a subset of the NBCCEDP performance measures as 
part of a performance based budgeting formula. The formula also includes a measure of 
fiscal responsibility (i.e., annual spending rate) and a score of the grantee’s annual 
application calculated by the program consultant. Many of those interviewed believe that 
the introduction of performance-based budgeting has led to improved performance by 
grantees. Data comparisons (i.e., pre- versus post- the introduction of performance-based 
budgeting) reflect significant increases in performance although other factors (e.g., 
providing computational tools) have likely contributed to these improvements as well.  
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 6.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement 
As described, the NBCCEDP performance measures are used for multiple 
purposes and reflect patient-level, clinical data collected at the local level.  
6.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures 
The NBCCEDP performance measures include three types: process, short-term 
outcome, and intermediate outcome. The measures of the priority populations (i.e., 
women over 50 for breast, rarely and never screened for cervical) are process-level 
measures while the diagnostic measures reflect short- and intermediate-level outcome 
measures (e.g., diagnosis and treatment). The goals of the NBCCEDP are reflected in 
both the choice of measures and the level of measurement. That is, the performance 
measures are aligned with the program goal of early detection and treatment for women 
served by the program. Consequently, the performance measures reflect clinical 
indicators of follow-up for abnormal screening results and initiation of treatment for 
women diagnosed with cancer. 
6.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards 
DCPC has set a standard for each of the eleven performance measures – standards 
are based on varied sources: available clinical evidence, DCPC policy, cumulative MDE 
data, and expert opinion. The standards allow grantees some flexibility – for instance, 
while DCPC policy encourages that programs screen women age 50 and older for breast 
cancer, the standard allows for 25% to be under age 50. Similarly, CDC has established a 
standard that 90% of women diagnosed with breast cancer should initiate treatment, 
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 allowing for those women who refuse treatment or who may be lost to follow-up. While 
DCPC has been fairly transparent over the years in the development of its MDEs and 
performance measures, participants suggested that there was less explicit rationale about 
some of the standards.  
6.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts 
Like the service delivery models, data systems vary across the 68 grantees. Some 
use more decentralized models of data collection in which MDE data is managed at the 
local or regional level and then submitted to state at required intervals. Others use paper-
based systems in which forms are submitted to the state and data entry takes place in a 
more centralized fashion. The development of web-based systems is on the rise, allowing 
providers or local managers to enter data into a system where the grantee then has 
immediate access to it. As mentioned, DCPC’s data contractor developed a data 
management system for grantees in the mid-1990s – about half of the programs use it 
while others rely on data bases they have developed or modified. One challenge of the 
decentralized system is that so many different people in different roles conduct data entry 
– and with staff turnover, training and re-training are a constant issue. 
DCPC requires, as a condition of funding, that a de-identified, data file be 
submitted to the data contractor by all grantees semi-annually. The data contractor then 
cleans the data, conducts edit checks to assess data quality, develops a set of standardized 
reports, and produces an aggregate data set for DCPC. The standardized reports produced 
by the data contractor were developed in collaboration with DCPC’s MDE committee 
and include detailed edit reports, frequency plots, the DQIG, and a summary report of the 
11 performance measures. The full set of reports is distributed to the grantees, DCPC 
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 program consultants, and DCPC’s NBCCEDP data manager. For each MDE submission, 
a conference call is scheduled between the grantee, their technical consultant (i.e., data 
contractor), and the DCPC program consultant to review the data reports. In advance of 
the call, a detailed set of “data notes” is developed and distributed by the technical 
consultant to the grantee and DCPC staff – these notes reflect any issue (data quality and 
clinical quality) identified by the technical consultant and are used to guide the discussion 
during the call. Following the call, the technical consultant prepares a list of action items 
that require a narrative response by the grantee. This data review protocol has been in 
place for years and is a fundamental component of DCPC’s technical assistance and 
quality assurance process. The approach is soundly geared toward program improvement. 
The technical consultant and the DCPC program consultant work as a team and are both 
considered important resources for on-going support for the grantees. In addition to the 
semi-annual data review, grantees are responsible for data quality assurance efforts. Edit 
checks are regularly conducted by grantees along with periodic chart audits to assess the 
validity of the MDE data against medical records. 
DCPC conducted a study from 2003-2007 to assess the validity of the MDE data. 
Over 5,000 total medical records were extracted and compared against MDE data records 
in six states representing the largest NBCCEDP programs (i.e., numbers of women 
screened). Results reflected high quality MDE data for the national program.  
6.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data 
As already apparent, the NBCCEDP performance measures are extensively used 
in ways consistent with their intended purposes of accountability, program improvement, 
and budgeting. Data suggest that the collection, reporting, and use of the performance 
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 measures (and MDE data, overall) are deeply rooted within the NBCCEDP program 
culture. Several factors contribute to their integration in NBCCEDP management 
practice. First, the MDEs have been collected since the program’s inception, hence, data 
collection and reporting have always been an important and valued program activity. 
Second, the data component is well funded – grantees are provided resources through 
their cooperative agreement award to support data collection and reporting (e.g., staff 
salary for a data manager, data system support), DCPC funds a data contractor, and 
NBCCEDP staff include a senior data manager and programmer to work with the data 
contractor and manage the CDC MDE dataset. And third, the program is “data-driven” – 
all levels of DCPC management, including the program consultants, use these data for 
decision making and program improvement. In fact, there is an expectation that these 
data are an integral component of program operations and management. 
The performance measures are used by DCPC to hold grantees accountability. 
Interviews with two DCPC program consultants and two grantee representatives suggest 
that some grantees are also using the data to hold local, regional, or providers 
accountable. In addition, the performance measures are used for political purposes. 
DCPC and NBCCEDP grantees use the measures to support requests for increased 
funding or defend against funding cuts. DCPC regularly uses performance data as part of 
Congressional testimony or other reports. Next, the performance management system, 
with its regular data reviews, follow-up action reports, and on-going quality assurance all 
support the use of the performance measurement data for program improvement. And 
finally, the use of the performance measures as part of a larger performance-based budget 
formula beginning in 2005 has given the measures even greater attention. Those 
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 interviewed said there was not much pushback from grantees in reaction to use of the 
performance measures in budgeting, perhaps because of the wide acceptability of the 
measures and confidence in the data. There are, however, some unintentional problems 
and “gaming” created by tying the measures to funding, including some manipulation of 
performance to meet CDC standards and changes in program practice that allow grantees 
to more effectively perform on the measures.  
6.2 Findings 
6.2.1 Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program 
implementation, DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in ways 
that support CDC’s and grantees’ control over performances. 
 In contrast to most public health programs, the NBCCEDP is a clinical, service 
delivery program which offers DCPC benefits in terms of its evaluation. In addition, 
DCPC has defined the NBCCEDP goals narrowly to focus on the women served through 
the program rather than aiming for broader, population-level effects. Consequently, 
grantees are accountable only for the women screened through the NBCCEDP. This is 
contrast to the Division’s GPRA and PART measures that are population-based and 
largely viewed as unreasonable standards for which DCPC should be held accountable. 
As noted in section 6.1.1.4, a DCPC economic study conducted in collaboration with the 
U.S. Census Bureau showed that, given resource levels, the NBCCEDP is able to screen 
approximately 16% of the eligible population41 or about 1% of the total women in the 
U.S. for breast cancer. Consequently, achieving population-level effects in regard to 
mortality are viewed as not particularly realistic. As one participant remarked, 
                                            
41 Women at 250% or less of the federal poverty guidelines and who are un- or under-
insured. 
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 The first thing I do is look at it [GPRA/PART measures] and I say, ‘this is 
ridiculous’. You know, these are really bad ways to evaluate this 
program…I always think it’s better to say that this can’t be done or we 
can’t answer this than pretend we can. They [OMB] want to see an impact 
on mortality and they just are not going to see an impact on mortality. 
There are 15 other things they [OMB] could ask us to show to put some 
credibility in the program and to evaluate it. It just tells me that the people 
who are asking the question don’t understand mortality. 
 
With program outcomes based on the women served through the NBCCEDP and 
with the availability of patient-level clinical data (i.e., MDEs), the NBCCEDP has 
selected 11 performance measures that are closely tied to the work of the health care 
providers within the vertical network of the program. Because the NBCCEDP represents 
a service delivery program, DCPC was able to identify a common set of performance 
measures appropriate and relevant for all even though it is comprised of a vast 
implementation network with considerable variability – 68 grantees, 22,000 local 
providers, and horizontal partners at every level. 
The types of measures include process-level measures (e.g., who is screened, 
completeness of data), short-term outcome measures (e.g., timeliness of diagnostic 
follow-up for women with abnormal screening results), and intermediate outcome 
measures (e.g., timeliness from the date of diagnosis to the initiation of cancer treatment 
for women diagnosed with cancer). In this case, the types of measures selected are those 
over which health care providers have the ability to effect. In addition, grantees are able 
to maintain some control over their vertical network partners based on their funding 
relationships and CDC has structured its cooperative agreements to support greater 
authority over grantees. Therefore, accountability within the NBCCEDP is less 
fragmented than in networks heavily reliant on unfunded, horizontal partners. 
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 In regard to the 11 performance measures, grantee staff have complained when 
specific measures are outside what they view as their direct control. Grantees are 
especially sensitive to this issue given that DCPC is using seven of the 11 measures as 
part of a performance-based budgeting formula. In response to grantees’ concerns, DCPC 
has made revisions to its performance measures over time to strengthen grantees’ control 
over them. For instance, one performance measure assesses the timeliness from an 
abnormal Pap screening result to diagnostic follow-up and includes a standard of 60 days. 
Grantees argued it was not “fair” to hold them accountable for the timeliness of women 
referred to the NBCCEDP for diagnostic follow-up who had been screened outside the 
program. That is, grantees argued that they do not have control over the efficiency in 
which horizontal partners refer women to the program for diagnostics or over how long 
women wait to come in for diagnostic follow-up. One person explained, 
A good number of these women are referred in [to the NBCCEDP] for 
diagnostic care because they were screened and identified as having an 
abnormal Pap somewhere else. It might be that the Title X family planning 
program screened a woman, they found an abnormal Pap, but it’s not 
within their purview to provide diagnostic testing, so they refer her to us. 
What the programs don’t have control over is how long it takes that 
woman to show up. 
 
Consequently, DCPC recently changed how the measure is calculated for the 
purpose of performance based funding to adjust for women referred for diagnostic 
follow-up. The adjustment not only addresses grantees’ issues with the measures, but 
should  resolve unintended consequences DCPC had documented stemming from how 
the measure was traditionally calculated – most notably, at least one grantee, worried that 
referral delays were affecting their performance on the measure, had stopped accepting 
diagnostic referrals into their program.  
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 6.2.2 Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance CDC 
and grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures. 
Given that the decentralized network structure of the NBCCEDP compromises 
control within the network, DCPC and grantees apply policy tools and management 
practices to help preserve a level of authority over vertical partners on whom 
performance is dependent. For instance, DCPC uses a cooperative agreement as the 
funding mechanism which affords CDC come control over grantees. One person said, 
The concept [of a cooperative agreement] is that it’s a collaborative 
process. We [DCPC and grantees] set goals together, we monitor progress, 
we work together for improvement, and we make changes as we go 
forward, as needed. So, the whole idea is that the Federal government is 
playing a substantial role in the activities, and that’s what the name of it 
means. A lot of people don’t understand it that way. Most people in the 
health departments in the higher up levels understand it, but it takes some 
reminding sometimes because they’d like to just receive the money and 
check back with you when it’s time to ask for more. 
 
While grantees choose mechanisms to fund local level partners at their discretion, 
this study suggests that some are using performance-based contracting, reimbursement 
policies, or other means to help preserve control over performance that is otherwise 
dependent on local level partners. A participant representing a grantee explained, 
“They’ve [providers] got case load requirements, so if they contract [with us] for a 
thousand women [to screen for the year], they’ve got to serve at least 97% of them in 
order to get paid for their administrative part.” Another grantee representative suggested 
that, over the years, poor performers had simply been replaced. Other grantees withhold 
reimbursement until providers or local level agencies submit required MDE data or tie 
reimbursement to providers’ performance on the NBCCEDP measures. 
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 DCPC also has a powerful monitoring tool in the MDE data set – all grantees are 
required, as a condition of their award, to submit MDE data to DCPC semi-annually. 
Grantees have developed extensive data management systems that allow them to collect 
data from the local level. Consequently, DCPC is able to carefully monitor local-level 
service delivery by continually assessing patient-level screening data and intervene as 
necessary if and when implementation problems are identified. The same is true for 
grantees – for instance, the MDE data can be used to identify specific providers who are 
performing poorly facilitating quick intervention. Therefore, the availability of the 
comprehensive MDE data enhances control within the vertical network even when 
implementation may be several steps removed.  
Finally, developing effective relationships between vertical network partners also 
facilitates control and allows CDC and grantees to better influence performance. A 
representative of a grantee agency explained their success in consistently meeting the 
performance measurement standards this way, 
I think it’s because we have developed really good relationships with our 
contractors [that they have control]. They’re there for us when we need 
something, or we need something done differently, or we’ve identified an 
issue. And we’re there for them, so we’re reciprocating. 
 
6.2.3 The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource 
investments to build a comprehensive performance management system in order to 
ensure data quality and the use of performance measurement data at multiple 
levels. 
NBCCEDP’s network structure requires that DCPC maintain a performance 
management system that supports data quality and the use of the data for accountability, 
program improvement, and budgeting. DCPC has committed extensive resources to this 
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 effort. The provision of resources (e.g., MDE data users manual, data management 
software), technical assistance (e.g., data contractor’s technical consultants, CDC 
program consultants), training (e.g., on-site, annual data managers meeting), extensive 
quality assurance efforts, and the semi-annual data review process are all part of a 
comprehensive NBCCEDP performance management system. These resources represent 
millions of federal dollars and underscore the investment needed to support performance 
measurement in a network context.   
Since the NBCCEDP’s inception, DCPC has nurtured a data-driven culture. MDE 
collection and reporting were a requirement of the first eight cooperative agreements in 
1991. The emphasis on data has been strengthened over time and serious attention to the 
MDE data and performance measures is given by every level of staffing at CDC from 
program consultants, Branch management, and Division and Center leadership. One 
person said, “I think the bottom line is that the programs had a voice in designing the 
MDEs, they grew up with the MDEs, and for the [new] programs that were added on 
later, the data were a given. It’s just part of the programmatic requirement that starts on 
day one.” 
As described in section 6.2.3.1, DCPC hired a data contractor in 1993 to manage 
the MDE data submitted by grantees and provide technical support to NBCCEDP 
grantees. The data contractor has worked with DCPC over time to develop a data 
management software program (that about half the grantees use), the MDE Data Users 
Manual, and provide technical assistance to grantees. Each NBCCEDP grantee is 
assigned a technical consultant (from the data contractor agency) and a DCPC program 
consultant – together this team provides on-going data management and programmatic 
 262
 support through monthly conference calls, site visits, and annual meetings of grantee 
program directors and data managers. Semi-annual data reviews,42 based on each MDE 
submission, represent an important component of DCPC’s performance management 
system. One person said, 
It’s [the data review process] just a cycle that continues forever basically. 
We look at a fairly current period of time and look at performance, 
identify any problems, [including] trend-type problems, and have the 
grantee address it either as a program issue that the CDC program 
consultant would deal with or as a data collection/reporting problem that 
our data contractors could give advice on.  
 
These efforts along with others also help ensure data quality for all MDEs and, 
consequently, for the performance measures. Again, the network implementation 
structure of the NBCCEDP demands the inclusion of extensive quality assurance 
mechanisms at all levels. Edit checks have been built into data management systems, 
grantees perform local level chart reviews, and the data contractor conducts edit checks. 
One participant suggested that data quality is enhanced when all levels of the vertical 
chain are aware of and understand the NBCCEDP performance measures. 
As far as data quality, no matter where the data collection is happening, if 
the grantee relays those [performance] indicators that are expected of them 
down the chain to the providers, or the regional folks, I think that’s when 
we see a good quality data set coming in. Everybody’s on board of what 
the expectations are from the CDC. So the local folks know that they need 
to get in timely and accurate data to their state so that those indicators are 
met. I’ve definitely seen programs that relay that information down, 
especially in the same type of feedback reports that the CDC uses, down to 
their local levels. I think there tends to be cleaner data and more accurate 
data if everybody’s on the same level. 
 
                                            
42 The semi-annual data review process is detailed in section 6.2.3.1 
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 Finally, NBCCEDP’s data-driven culture and DCPC’s investment in its 
performance management system contribute to greater utility of the performance data at 
all levels. One person said, 
 I’ve been extraordinarily impressed with how its [data system] become a 
very sophisticated MDE system, number one. And I’ve been 
extraordinarily impressed with the fact that not only do we collect the data 
but we actually use it, which, in a lot of places, even at CDC, either it’s 
not collected, or it’s not collected well, or if it’s collected, nobody ever 
looks at it or uses it! I think that we [NBCCEDP] have the full spectrum. 
Our Division has a lot to be proud in that regard – we manage with data. 
 
Utility has been enhanced by grantees’ use of the data with their local level partners. A 
participant remarked, 
Some of the states have broken this [performance indicator report] apart 
by their units, their districts, or whatever they have, and say ‘Here’s how 
we performed as the state, but look at your district, it’s much better or 
worse.’ We found that the old saying, ‘what gets measured gets done’ 
works. And people are becoming more accountable by having these 
[performance] reports and being able to see it. That gives them something 
to shoot for, an opportunity to improve. 
 
The most important factor influencing the use of the NBCCEDP performance data 
may be that DCPC and grantees alike view the measures as fair, meaningful, and relevant 
to the program goals. The choice of measures and the types of measures (i.e., process, 
short and intermediate-level outcome) assure that they are tied closely enough to the 
program’s work so that they are, indeed, actionable. Universally, participants suggested 
that the performance measures represented the most important priorities for the program 
– primarily, high quality care for women screened through the NBCCEDP. A participant 
remarked, 
If you did a random survey of the grantees – or asked all of them – I  
would not be surprised if all of them would say they do not want to get rid 
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 of it [performance measures]. This is a security blanket for them. We’re a 
program that screens women for cancer and this is a security blanket for 
them to know that women are followed up, and they’re not going to find 
out 3 to 6 months down the pike that a woman had cancer that they missed 
because they screened her and didn’t follow up. So I think it serves a win-
win purpose there, and I think the programs clearly see that. 
 
6.3 Summary  
The NBCCEDP represents a clinical, service delivery system. Given the 
NBCCEDP’s decentralized program structure, DCPC has designed their performance 
measurement system in ways that increase grantees’ control over program outcomes and 
enhance data utilization. First, rather than assuming a broad population-based 
perspective, DCPC identified program goals that are consistent with the program 
authorizing language and emphasize accountability for only those women screened 
through the program. Second, DCPC selected performance measures that are closely tied 
to the work of providers, network partners in the vertical chain over which DCPC and 
grantees have some degree of control given the existence of funding mechanisms and 
management practices. Third, DCPC has made revisions to the way it calculates some 
measures to reduce grantees’ dependence on factors outside the control of providers. 
Finally, DPCP has made a significant investment in structuring a comprehensive data 
management system that has aided the adoption of the performance measures and 
enhanced utilization of data. In the end, the NBCCEDP performance measures are 
overwhelmingly viewed as meaningful, valuable, and fair by both DCPC staff and 
grantees. This may account for the ability of DCPC to use the measures for strengthening 
accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. One person said, “No matter what 
the programs say, their data basically speak for them. I think it just brings this common 
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 denominator to every program. Despite how they would describe themselves, it’s like, 
well, your data describe you.” 
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 CHAPTER 7 
 
NATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAM (NTCP) 
7.1 NTCP Case Description 
7.1.1 The Program 
7.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context 
In the 1990s, federally-funded tobacco control efforts were supported through two 
different initiatives: The National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) American Stop Smoking 
Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention (ASSIST) Program, a demonstration program, 
and CDC’s Initiatives to Mobilize for the Prevention and Control of Tobacco Use 
(IMPACT). In 1999, these two efforts were combined to form the NTCP, and, under 
CDC’s management, all 50 U.S. states were funded. The purpose of the NTCP is to 
reduce tobacco-related disease, disability, and death. The program is administered by 
CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health (OSH) in the National Center for Chronic Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP).  
Today the NTCP represents OSH’s largest program. In fiscal year 2007, CDC 
awarded a total of $66.1 million to 58 grantees (all 50 states, D.C., and 7 U.S. territories). 
Individual awards ranged from $172,516 to $2,059,294 with an average award of 
$1,140,588 (median award $1,253,543). The current five-year cooperative agreement (PA 
03-022) has been in place since 2003. The agreement was extended for one year in 2008, 
and a new competitive funding announcement (DP09-901) was issued in November 2008 
with an expected award date of March 2009. While some staff in OSH have worked there 
for many years, there has also been turnover in key management positions. The Division 
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 Director position was vacant for several years, and the leader of the Evaluation Team 
within the Epidemiology Branch has had four acting branch chiefs over the course of the 
last 2 to 3 years – the position was permanently filled during the summer of 2008.  
7.1.1.2 Program Goals 
According to the American Cancer Society (ACS),43 lung cancer is the leading 
cause of cancer-related death for both men and women; over 215,000 new cases and 
nearly 162,000 deaths from lung cancer were estimated for 2008. Smoking tobacco is the 
cause of over 80% of lung cancer cases. Tobacco control and prevention is complex – 
multiple factors at the individual, community, and environmental level contribute to 
tobacco use and the consequent risks posed by secondhand smoke.  
OSH established the NTCP to encourage coordinated, nationwide tobacco control 
activities. From the NTCP’s start, the program has articulated four program goals: 
1. Prevent the initiation of tobacco use among young people. 
2. Eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke. 
3. Promote quitting among adults and young people. 
4. Identify and eliminate tobacco-related disparities. 
Given the complexity of tobacco control, OSH and its partners encourage a 
comprehensive approach to tobacco control. In a 2007 report, CDC states, “A 
comprehensive approach one that optimizes synergy from applying a mix of educational, 
clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies- has been established as the guiding 
principle for eliminating the health and economic burden of tobacco use.”44 And 
                                            
43 http://www.cancer.org/downloads/PRO/LungCancer.pdf, accessed January 21, 2009. 
44 CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007. 
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 recognizing that a comprehensive approach cannot be accomplished by any single agency 
or organization, OSH also emphasizes that tobacco control “requires coordination and 
collaboration across the federal government, across the nation, and within each state.”45  
OSH encourages the achievement of the four national goals through community 
interventions and mobilization; counter-marketing; policy development and 
implementation; and surveillance. The NTCP cooperative agreement supports the 
following activities: program and fiscal management, strategic planning, collaboration 
and communication with partners, surveillance and evaluation, training and technical 
assistance, information exchange, and local grants programs to support community based 
coalition building, planning, policy development and implementation, and local-level 
surveillance and evaluation. With the exception of the Quitlines, OSH funds may not be 
used for research or to provide direct services such as individual and group cessation 
services, patient care, personal health services medications, patient rehabilitation, or other 
costs associated with the treatment of diseases caused by tobacco use. 
7.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development  
The NTCP can be described as a mature program – it has been in place in one 
form or another since the mid-1990s and its goals are clear and well articulated. In fact, 
partners at all levels have adopted the four goal areas that comprise the NTCP framework 
and also promote them. Over time, the NTCP has developed logic models for three of the 
four goal areas to model the causal linkages that lead to reductions in tobacco-related 
                                            
45 CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007. 
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 morbidity and mortality46 (see figures 1-3 in section 7.1.3.1). The tobacco control field 
benefits from a strong science base, the result of many years of well-funded research 
efforts. Robust evidence supports a number of effective interventions. Consequently, 
OSH has constructed evidence-based logic models that highlight, from left to right, the 
inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes at three levels – short-term, intermediate, and 
long-term.  
The linkage between behavioral outcomes, such as reductions in tobacco 
consumption, and the distal outcomes (i.e., morbidity and mortality) is well established. 
Various reports including those from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) along with CDC’s 
Guide to Community Preventive Services: Systematic Review and Evidence-based 
Recommendations, provide a valuable synthesis of evidence related to tobacco control 
activities. In 1999, OSH published a guide titled, Best Practices for Comprehensive 
Tobacco Control Programs, to encourage evidence-based practice in the field.47 The 
guide describes evidence-based, best practices for each of five components of a 
comprehensive tobacco control program – state and community interventions, health 
communication interventions, cessation interventions, surveillance and evaluation, and 
administration and management. The guide also provides recommended program 
intervention budgets for each state based on population, prevalence of tobacco use, 
infrastructure costs, the number of local health units, the proportion of the population that 
is uninsured, and other factors. For instance, OSH recommends an annual investment of 
$254.3 million for tobacco control intervention budgets in New York.  
                                            
46 There is not a strong science-base related to the health disparity goal, therefore, a 
related logic model has not been developed. 
47 The guide was updated in 2007. 
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 As a condition of their cooperative agreement awards, NTCP grantees report on 
their progress semi-annually through a web-based system managed by OSH called the 
Chronicle. The system captures both narrative and quantitative data. The Chronicle was 
under a significant redesign effort at the time this study was conducted. Grantees are only 
required to report on activities funded through OSH dollars, not those reflecting the 
totality of their tobacco control funds.  
7.1.1.4 Budget Stability 
Like other programs at CDC, the NTCP has been relatively flat-funded for the 
past six to seven years. The total anticipated award for the fiscal year 2009 program is 
estimated at $63 million48. While the NTCP awards from OSH may reflect the sole 
resources for some grantees, many others receive additional sources of funds, sometimes 
many times the size of their CDC award. Individual settlements with the tobacco industry 
and the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the tobacco industry provided an 
influx of funding to states in the late 1990s and beyond. Today, roughly 90% of funds for 
tobacco control efforts are provided by state legislatures through excise tax revenues and 
settlement funds49. Consequently, grantees often integrate multiple funding streams to 
support the implementation of their comprehensive tobacco control programs. 
Unfortunately, in many states, tax and settlement fund resources have been diverted to 
address other priorities as the country’s economic situation has worsened. Massachusetts 
lost 92% of their state funding in 2002 when the state experienced an economic crisis.  
                                            
48 Fiscal year 2009 federal budget had not been finalized at the time of this writing. 
49 CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007. 
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 7.1.1.5 Stakeholders 
The goals of the NTCP can only be achieved in concert with its many 
stakeholders. Externally these include CDC’s sister agencies such as the NCI and the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). National 
foundations are also critical partners and include the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, 
the American Legacy Foundation, ACS, American Lung Association, American Heart 
Association, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK), and Americans for Non-
Smokers’ Rights, among others. The National Association of Chronic Disease Directors 
(NACDD) is an organization comprised of state and territorial chronic disease directors 
and represents another important stakeholder group. Overall, NTCP enjoys a strong 
commitment across partner agencies to work together in order to achieve the four goals 
highlighted earlier.  
7.1.1.6 Political Context  
The broader political climate around tobacco control extends to the NTCP. OSH 
representatives work closely with Health and Human Services (HHS) offices in 
Washington D.C. to coordinate tobacco control efforts across federal agencies. CDC also 
provides staffing to the U.S. Surgeon General’s office, meeting with the Surgeon General 
several times throughout the year and providing support in developing Congressional 
testimony and other presentations. Over time, the NTCP has benefited from political 
victories related to tobacco control that have resulted in periods of high visibility and 
legislative opportunity. During late 1990s, the first states resolved legal battles with the 
tobacco industry and the MSA with other states was completed. Of course, the tobacco 
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 industry presents a powerful and well-funded political opponent to the entire tobacco 
control community, including the NTCP. Participants spoke about how the political 
context within an individual state may influence the areas of focus for a NTCP grantee 
program. For instance, a particular state may have a strong restaurant and bar lobby that 
makes it difficult to pursue policy related to second-hand smoke.  
7.1.2 The Implementation Network 
7.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships  
NTCP’s vertical chain begins in Washington D.C. with Congress, HHS, and 
others. Federal funds are appropriated to CDC, and staff in OSH’s Program Services 
Branch oversee the 58 NTCP cooperative agreements. As mentioned, these dollars are 
often complimented by other, more significant resources at the state level, although some 
grantees have experienced reductions in state contributions over the past several years. 
For most grantees, a large portion of their NTCP funds are retained by the grantee (state 
or territory) to support staff and other infrastructure costs that allow them to manage a 
comprehensive tobacco control program. Some grantees also use a portion of their NTCP 
funds to support Quitlines50 and grants to local-level partners. Typically, non-CDC 
resources (state and private contributions) are used to fund local-level agencies, mass 
media campaigns, universities, and others. Regardless of how CDC funds are used, 
however, OSH encourages grantees to involve local-level partners.  
In summary, the comprehensive tobacco control approach endorsed by the NTCP 
involves an extensive vertical network of relationships with between CDC, its grantees, 
                                            
50 Quitline services are available in every state. The program provides telephone 
counseling and support for tobacco cessation.  
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 and their partners at the local level, often city or county health agencies or community 
based organizations (CBOs). Therefore, the vertical chain is not strictly 
intergovernmental. In addition, the vertical structure within individual states and 
territories varies – for instance, as a home rule state, Massachusetts must collaborate with 
351 towns, each with its own government, while California works with 61 different local 
lead agencies.  
7.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
Extensive horizontal partner involvement is a prerequisite in achieving a 
comprehensive tobacco control strategy targeting four different goals (i.e., smoking 
initiation, cessation, second-hand smoke, and disparities) through a complement of 
interventions (e.g., educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies). The 
NTCP network includes horizontal relationships at all levels of government, including 
federal, state, and local. OSH collaborates externally with federal partners such as NCI, 
IOM, SAMHSA, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as well as with 
nongovernmental partners including ACS, CTFK, American Lung Association, American 
Heart Association, American Legacy Foundation, Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, 
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights, and others. OSH policy staff meet quarterly with 
many of these partners to ensure coordination of efforts. OSH also works closely with 
national organizations that represent the interests of state and local-level public health 
groups such as the National Association of City and County Health Officials 
(NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), and the 
NACCD. Given that tobacco-use is an important risk factor for other chronic diseases 
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 (e.g., cancer, heart disease, diabetes), OSH staff work with other CDC divisions within 
the NCCDPHP.  
At the state level, extensive collaboration occurs in support of comprehensive 
tobacco control. CDC requires that grantees participate in state-wide tobacco control 
planning and coalition building. States typically collaborate with others in state 
government (e.g., education, environmental health, other public health programs), state or 
regionally-based advocacy organizations (e.g., ACS, CTFK), universities, and 
foundations (e.g., American Legacy Foundation). As a member of these coalitions, the 
state health department is typically viewed as an influential partner, and depending on 
resources, may play the leading role in state tobacco-control efforts. The planning efforts 
help prioritize intervention efforts and coordinate funding support. For instance, the state 
health department may offer a number of local-level grants for second-hand smoke 
reduction, American Legacy Foundation funds may support an intervention for youth, 
and ACS may commit resources to work on state legislative policy initiatives. 
At the local level, horizontal partners are also engaged. Local-level coalition 
building is encouraged and often funded by NTCP grantees to bring together varied 
partners from public health, education, health care, business, and local advocacy groups 
to plan for coordinated tobacco control efforts.  
7.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network 
As noted, OSH uses a cooperative agreement as the funding mechanism to 
support its NTCP grantees. Participants viewed cooperative agreements as facilitating 
“shared ownership,” but not providing them much control or authority over grantees. 
Requirements specified in the program announcement (e.g., reporting requirements) are 
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 relatively minimal and, as already noted, OSH can only require reporting on CDC-funded 
activities. In contrast, grantees more often use contracts to fund local-level partners or 
memoranda of agreement with other partner agencies.  
7.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the 
Network 
Network partners, both vertical and horizontal, share a strong commitment to the 
four program goals discussed earlier. At the same time, however, each organization 
involved in the tobacco control community has their unique agenda and philosophy 
which sometimes introduces relationship challenges. In addition, states and territories 
must contend with the tobacco industry which represents views diametrically opposed to 
their cause. CDC’s endorsement of strategic planning, coalition building, and 
sustainability reflect pointed attempts to bring partners together to build a shared vision 
and priorities. 
7.1.2.5 Network Function: Variability in Context, Resources, and Capacity 
The NTCP grantees vary tremendously in their context, resources, and capacity. 
The individual context of a state or territory may be an important factor driving the 
emphasis of program efforts; one state may focus on second-hand smoke while another 
gives priority to youth access. Resources also vary and often limit the ability of grantees 
to address all four program goals. Across the NTCP grantees, program budgets may 
reflect extreme differentials when all funding sources are considered. And the funding 
context can change quickly and radically as indicated by the Massachusetts experience 
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 when 92% of their state funding was eliminated in a single year. Capacity varies across 
grantees as well, influenced by factors such as staff resources and expertise. 
7.1.3 Performance Measurement System 
7.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System 
In 2005, OSH published an evaluation guide titled, Key Outcome Indicators for 
Evaluating Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs intended for planners, managers, 
and evaluators of state and territorial tobacco control programs and for CDC’s national 
partners. Over a four-year process, an evaluation team led by OSH’s Epidemiology 
Branch developed 120 evidence-based key outcome indicators (KOIs) that are included 
in the guide. Using the three logic models developed for the NTCP program goals as a 
framework, the CDC evaluation team worked to refine the logic models and identify 
relevant short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. The guide does not address 
the “left half” of the logic models, that is, the process measures related to inputs, 
activities, or outputs. Crafted in a “Consumer Reports” format, each of the 120 indicators 
is rated on a number of criteria. Reporting on the KOIs is not required of NTCP grantees, 
but they are encouraged to use the guide and indicators for program planning and 
evaluation and to report measures of their choice. Nearly all grantees report on some 
measures as part of their semi-annual progress reporting through OSH’s Chronicle. 
Soon after the key outcome indicators (KOIs) guide was published in 2005, OSH 
embarked on two other related efforts – to develop process-level indicators and to 
identify a subset of the KOIs called “core indicators” in order to provide a “national 
snapshot” of the program. The 32 core indicators (and the data sources for each 
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 indicator51) are summarized in table 23 and are organized according to the goal area and 
indicator type as defined by the key outcome indicator guide52. Three of the four logic 
models for NTCP goals are included as figures 1-3. The indicator number in the table 
below corresponds to the numbered box in the logic model. For instance, two of the core 
indicators (1.6.3 and 1.6.5) correspond to outcome #6 in the logic model for goal one 
(i.e., figure 1, outcome #6 – “increased knowledge of, improved anti-tobacco attitudes 
toward, and increased support for policies to reduce youth initiation”). Likewise, core 
indicator 1.14.1 corresponds to outcome #14 in the goal one logic model (i.e., figure 1, 
outcome #14, “reduced tobacco-use prevalence among young people”). 
 
 
                                            
51 Addressing Tobacco in Managed Care (ATMC), Survey of Health Plans 1997-1998; 
National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS); Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS); California Adult Tobacco Survey (CATS); Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 
(CTFK); CDC Health Profiles (Profiles); CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking System 
(STATE); CDC Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS); Current Population 
Survey: Tobacco Use Supplement (CPS TUS); Youth Tobacco Survey (YTS) 
52 Two of the 32 indicators are included in two goal areas, therefore, there are a total of 
30 unique core indicators. 
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 Table 23.  NTCP Core Outcome Indicators 
Goal Area Core Indicator and Data Source(s) Indicator Type 
1.6.3  Proportion of students who would ever wear or use 
something with a tobacco company name or picture (YTS) 
Short-term 
outcome 
1.6.5  Level of support for increasing excise tax on 
tobacco products (NATS)  
Short-term 
outcome 
1.7.1  Proportion of schools or school districts reporting 
the implementation of 100% tobacco-free policies 
(Profiles) 
Short-term 
outcome 
1.8.2  Proportion of jurisdictions (State and Local) with 
policies that require retail licenses to sell tobacco products 
(measurement protocol under development) 
Short-term 
outcome 
1.8.7  Changes in state tobacco control laws that preempt 
stronger local tobacco control laws (STATE)  
Short-term 
outcome 
1.9.1  Extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and 
promotions (measurement protocol under development) 
Short-term 
outcome 
1.9.10  Number and type of Master Settlement Agreement 
violations by tobacco companies (measurement protocol 
under development) 
Short-term 
outcome 
1.10.5  Proportion of young people who are susceptible 
never-smokers (YTS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
1.11.1 Proportion of successful attempts to purchase 
tobacco products by young people (YTS, YRBSS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
1.12.1 Amount of tobacco product excise tax (STATE, 
CTFK, State departments of revenue) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
1.13.2  Proportion of young people who report never 
having tried a cigarette (YTS, YRBSS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
Goal One: 
Preventing 
Initiation of 
Tobacco Use 
Among 
Young 
People 
1.14.1  Prevalence of tobacco use among young people 
(YTS, YRBSS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
 
 2.3.7  Level of support for creating tobacco-free policies in public places and workplaces (NATS, BRFSS) 
Short-term 
outcome 
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 Indicator Goal Area Core Indicator and Data Source(s) Type 
2.4.1  Proportion of jurisdictions [State and Local] with 
public policies for tobacco-free workplaces and other 
indoor and outdoor places (measurement protocol under 
development) 
Short- term 
outcome 
2.4.3  Proportion of the population that works in 
environments with tobacco-free policies (NATS, CPS 
TUS) 
Short-term 
outcome 
2.4.4  Proportion of the population reporting voluntary 
tobacco-free home or vehicle policies (NATS) 
Short-term 
outcome 
2.4.6  Changes in state tobacco control laws that preempt 
stronger local tobacco control [clean indoor air] laws 
(STATE) 
Short-term 
outcome 
2.6.1 Perceived compliance with tobacco-free policies in 
workplaces (NATS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
2.7.1  Proportion of the population reporting exposure to 
secondhand smoke in the workplace (CATS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
2.7.3  Proportion of the population reporting exposure to 
secondhand smoke at home or in vehicles (NATS, YTS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
2.7.5  Proportion of nonsmokers reporting overall 
exposure to secondhand smoke (YTS; California 
Independent Evaluation) 
Long-term 
outcome 
 
Goal Two: 
Eliminating 
Exposure to 
Secondhand 
Smoke 
2.8.1 Per capita consumption of tobacco products 
(STATE, State departments of revenue) 
Long-term 
outcome 
 
3.7.1 Number of callers to telephone Quitlines (Quitline 
call monitoring) 
Short-term 
outcome 
3.8.5 Level of support for increasing excise tax on tobacco 
products (NATS) 
Short-term 
outcome 
Goal Three: 
Promoting 
Quitting 
Among 
Adults and 
Young 
People 3.10.1 Proportion of insurance purchasers and payers that 
reimburse for tobacco cessation services (measurement 
protocol under development) 
Short-term 
outcome 
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Goal Area Core Indicator and Data Source(s) Indicator Type 
3.11.1 Proportion of adult smokers who have made a quit 
attempt (NATS, BRFSS, CPS TUS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
3.11.2 Proportion of young smokers who have made a quit 
attempt (YTS, YRBSS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
3.11.3 Proportion of adult and young smokers who have 
made a quit attempt using proven cessation methods 
[measure adults only] (NATS) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
3.12.1 Amount of tobacco product excise tax (STATE, 
CTK, State departments of revenue) 
Intermediate 
outcome 
3.13.1 Proportion of smokers who have sustained 
abstinence from tobacco use (NATS, BRFSS, YTS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
3.14.1 Smoking prevalence [same as 2.8.3] (NATS, 
BRFSS, YTS, YRBSS) 
Long-term 
outcome 
3.14.4 Per capita consumption of tobacco products 
(STATE, State departments of revenue) 
Long-term 
outcome 
 Figure 1. NTCP Goal One Logic Model: Preventing Initiation of Tobacco Use Among Young People 
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Figure 2. NTCP Goal Two Logic Model: Eliminating Exposure to Secondhand Smoke 
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Figure 3. NTCP Goal Three Logic Model: Promoting Quitting Among Adults and Young People 
 
 
 The selection of the core indicators was dependent on the development of the 
KOIs. Consequently, the overall effort can be viewed as one development process and is 
described below. Table 24 summarizes some of the key developmental milestones. 
 
 
Table 24. NTCP Indicator Development, 1999 2008 
Fiscal Year System Development 
2001 Initiated effort to develop key outcome indicators 
2002 Convened expert panel to assist in KOI development 
2003 KOIs disseminated to grantees and entered into Chronicle 
2005 KOI guide published and disseminated to grantees 
2006 Core indicator project launched 
2009 Estimated completion of core indicators  
 
 
 
The development of the KOIs was led by an evaluation team within OSH’s 
Epidemiology Branch. The team, working with contractors, began the project in 2001 
initially thinking they would identify a set of 10-20 outcomes. In brief, the evaluation 
team worked across the three NTCP goal-area logic models, developing potential 
indicators to populate the boxes for short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. 
Although the team had aimed to develop a small number of indicators, the range of the 
three goals areas and the variation in activities implemented by the grantees resulted in 
the development of a much larger pool of KOIs. Once the evaluation team identified 
potential indicators, they conducted a literature review to determine whether an 
association existed between the proposed indicator and the outcome component in the 
logic model. Next, potential data sources for each indicator were identified; if a data 
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 source did not exist, the group developed example questions that could be added to 
existing surveys to collect the data.  
OSH then convened a panel of 16 experts who represented state tobacco control 
programs, universities, cancer or research institutes, and national partners. The panel met 
in Atlanta and reviewed a total of 164 candidate performance measures, rating each on 
the following criteria: strength of evaluation evidence, resources needed for data 
collection and analysis, utility, face validity, conformity with accepted practice, 
uniqueness, and overall quality. After all measures were rated by the panel, the evaluation 
team made a number of revisions, merging some indicators, eliminating others. Next, 
based on advice from the panel, the evaluation team hired an independent contractor to 
conduct a literature review to more thoroughly assess the strength of the evidence for 
each indicator. The contractor reviewed nearly 850 published and unpublished articles as 
part of the comprehensive review process. 
In 2003, OSH distributed a total of 120 KOIs to grantees, inviting them to begin 
using the KOIs and also to provide CDC relevant feedback on the indicators. Staff in the 
Program Services Branch entered all indicators into the Chronicle system. As discussed, 
reporting on the KOIs is not a stipulation of the NTCP funding award, but grantees are 
encouraged to include relevant measures as part of their semi-annual progress reporting 
requirement. The OSH evaluation team continued to develop the KOI guide – it was 
eventually published in May 2005 and includes the 120 key outcome indicators. The 
Guide is organized according to the three goal areas and provides a detailed profile for 
each indicator including an indicator rating table with assessments of the overall quality, 
resources needed, strength of evaluation evidence, utility, face validity, and accepted 
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 practice – all in a “Consumers Report” format mentioned earlier. The profile for each 
measure also includes more detailed information such as a rationale for the measure, 
examples of data sources, other comments, and references.  
Even before the KOI guide was published, the evaluation team had recognized the 
need for a set of core indicators that could be assessed and monitored at the national 
level. OSH staff realized that given the range of KOIs (120 unique indicators) and 
differences in resource levels and areas of programmatic emphasis across grantees, 
reporting on particular KOIs via the Chronicle would likely vary. Using the logic models 
as a guiding framework and the KOIs as the primary pool of indicators, the evaluation 
team initiated an effort to identify a set of core indicators. During the process, new 
indicators that were not part of the KOIs were also introduced for consideration. Several 
criteria informed the selection process. First, the group wanted to select indicators for 
each of the three goal areas and ones that represented each level of outcome (short-term, 
intermediate, long-term) in order to emphasize the causal linkages. Second, the team 
aimed to choose indicators that were most closely aligned with OSH priorities in order to 
convey national priorities and influence practice. Next, the team looked to identify 
indicators associated with outcomes viewed as the strongest levers of change. And fourth, 
selection was influenced, to some degree, by what data were available easily and quickly.  
The first set of 32 core indicators was approved by Division leadership in October 
2005. Since that time, the evaluation group has suffered from staff absences and some 
turnover. More recently, the evaluation team has focused considerable effort to finalize 
the core set. As reflected in table 23, most of the final 30 core indicators can be assessed 
using national-level survey data. Grantees can use those same data at a state-level. At the 
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 time of data collection for this study, the evaluation team was collaborating with others in 
OSH to finalize a new National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS) that will be conducted in 
2010 during the second year of the new 5-year NTCP funding cycle. OSH evaluators 
were working to ensure that the NATS include survey questions relevant to several of the 
core indicators. At the same time, the team has been working to develop data collection 
protocols for five core measures that otherwise lack a data source (i.e., 1.8.2; 1.9.1; 
1.9.10; 2.4.1; 3.10.1). Some of these indicators are particularly challenging, such as 
measuring the extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and promotion (1.9.1) and the 
number and type of MSA violations (1.9.10).  
Of interest, indicators selected as core are fairly consistent with the most frequent 
KOIs voluntarily reported by grantees in the Chronicle. Although such a correlation was 
not a criterion for selecting the core indicators, OSH staff are relieved that the core 
indicators will not represent a major departure from what grantees are already reporting.  
7.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design  
In this section, the design of the NTCP performance measurement system is 
described highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of 
measures; use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 25 summarizes 
these design features. 
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Table 25. Design Features of the NTCP Core Outcome Indicator System 
Design Feature NTCP Core Indicators 
Purpose of system Accountability 
Level of measurement Primarily state but some local level  
 
Type(s) of performance measures 
 
Short, Intermediate, and Long-term Outcomes 
Use of targets Set by grantees 
Quality assurance efforts Use of national survey data, provision of data 
collection protocols for some measures 
Use of performance data Core indicators not yet implemented 
 
 
 
7.1.3.2.1 Purpose 
With the increase in tobacco control resources in the late 1990s and the resulting 
influx of settlement funds, OSH evaluators recognized the importance of developing 
outcome measures to address accountability demands at both the federal and state levels. 
More recent cuts in state tobacco control resources have underscored the importance of 
outcome measurement as a means to effectively defend resource allocations. At the 
federal level, OSH wants to provide a “national picture” of the NTCP for HHS, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and others “above” CDC. Participants also 
suggested that the core indicators will be used for monitoring purposes to assess the 
NTCP at both the state level and national level. 
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 7.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement 
Most of the core indicators reflect state-level measures and are derived from 
survey data including CDC’s youth tobacco survey, CDC’s behavioral risk factor 
surveillance survey, the current population survey, and the forthcoming NATS. National 
monitoring systems such as one maintained by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and 
CDC’s State Tobacco Activities Tracking System also serve as data sources for the core 
indicators. As discussed, a small subset of measures reflects more complex requirements 
for local-level data collection (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and 
promotions). 
7.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures 
The choice by OSH evaluators to focus on outcomes was influenced, in large part, 
by political demands for accountability that emphasized outcomes rather than process-
level measures. The core indicators reflect three levels of outcomes: short-term, 
intermediate, and long-term. In particular, the evaluators wanted to identify outcomes 
where change could be detected within five years or less, rather than longer-term 
outcomes that might take ten or more years to achieve. Given the focus on outcomes, 
OSH recognizes that results reflect the combined work and resources of many agencies 
and organizations involved in the comprehensive tobacco control effort. In other words, 
the outcomes reflect effects of the overall comprehensive tobacco control programs, not 
simply the CDC-funded efforts.  
 290
 7.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards 
The variability in grantee resources and capacity make it difficult to establish 
national targets. In addition, national targets for specific measures such as smoking 
prevalence are challenged by variable prevalence rates across states. Currently, grantees 
specify the goal area, the objective, a baseline, proposed target, and target date when 
reporting on a KOI in the Chronicle. Evaluation team members anticipate that grantees 
will do the same for the core indicators once the measures are finalized, although 
revisions to the Chronicle may have implications for reporting.  
7.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts 
A majority of the core indicators will be calculated based on national survey data 
(or, for grantees, calculated based on state survey data). Consequently, the validity and 
reliability of those data are well established. Appropriate sample sizes are determined for 
both national and state-level assessments ensuring a representative sample size. But while 
there is confidence in the quality of the data, problems have persisted in its reporting, at 
least as it pertains to the KOIs. In particular, OSH has been challenged by grantees’ use 
of “customized” measures rather than the KOIs as defined in the guide. The Chronicle 
allows for grantees to submit customized measures, but the feature has been misused to 
an extent. Grantees have tended to create custom indicators that are similar but slightly 
different from the KOI as defined in the guide. OSH conducted an assessment of the 
KOIs reported in the Chronicle for the period 2007-2008 and found that 38% of the 
indicators reported were categorized as “customized,” and, of these, 56% were similar or 
identical to the evidence-based indicator defined in the guide. Consequently, OSH has 
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 been limited in its use of the KOI indicator data that has been reported through the 
Chronicle, especially in aggregating data across states. 
As discussed, the evaluation team is working to define data collection and 
measurement specifications for five of the core indicators that are more challenging to 
measure (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and promotions). The team is 
developing strict data collection and reporting protocols for grantees to follow (e.g., 
sampling guidelines, observation instructions). But these measures are likely to be 
especially vulnerable to data quality issues given that the data will be collected at the 
local level by staff or volunteers of varied expertise. 
7.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data 
The KOIs have been used by the grantees, even if in a “customized” fashion. The 
assessment recently conducted found that all 50 states and D.C. reported on at least one 
KOI and most (n=44) are using at least one KOI in all three goal areas. Of the 120 total 
indicators, 106 had been used by at least one state since they were introduced. Other than 
the reporting of the KOIs to CDC, grantees’ use of the indicators is not known. At the 
time of data collection for this study, the evaluation team was planning a qualitative 
assessment of the use of the KOIs with a sample of nine states. Many participants spoke 
of the value of the KOI guide and its use by grantees for program planning, in particular. 
Program consultants are especially enthusiastic about the guide’s value and promote it 
extensively among their grantees. In particular, the logic models are viewed as useful in 
helping grantees understand the causal pathways necessary to achieving longer-term 
outcomes. Dog-eared copies of the guide were evident in several offices.  
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 In regard to the core indicators, CDC anticipates using these to characterize the 
national program and help defend resource allocations for the national program. Beyond 
this, participants expressed differing views about their use. Some interviewed suggested 
the core indicators are better defined as part of an evaluation system while others 
suggested they were part of a performance monitoring system. Reporting the core 
indicators will remain voluntary under the forthcoming five-year program announcement. 
The infrequency of data collection inherent in many of the surveys challenges the core 
indicators’ use for on-going data monitoring, and OSH has not developed a performance 
management system (other than functions within the Chronicle) to support data use for 
on-going performance measurement. At the state level, grantees may not have the 
resources to participate in some of the surveys that provide needed indicator data.  
7.2 Findings 
7.2.1 Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data 
facilitate identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control. 
Tobacco control efforts in the U.S. involve a network of agencies and 
organizations that implement a mix of educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and 
social strategies. These efforts are supported by diverse sources of funding from federal 
and state government as well as business and private foundations. State excise taxes on 
tobacco products and settlement funds from legal victories over the tobacco industry 
represent a significant investment in tobacco control efforts in some states, dwarfing 
federal funds provided by CDC.  
The NTCP was established to encourage coordinated, nationwide tobacco control 
activities, and, as noted in the case description, CDC funds are primarily used by grantees 
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 to support program infrastructure costs, coalition building, statewide planning, and 
surveillance and evaluation activities. One person said, 
For most states, we’re [CDC] the backbone of their tobacco program and 
we’re okay with the fact that the whole program is funded by much more 
than us. I mean we’re just that much [indicating a small amount with her 
fingers] of a lot of states in dollars, but they couldn’t get those other funds 
without ours. 
 
CDC funds are often used by the NTCP grantees to leverage other resources that are 
sometimes more restricted in their use (e.g., required to be distributed to local levels). 
Consequently, resources for tobacco control are frequently integrated at the state health 
department to support a range of activities and often complimented by initiatives 
supported by other organizations.  
In 2001, OSH embarked on their effort to develop program performance measures 
so that they could better characterize the NTCP nationally for accountability purposes. 
The political climate and influx of funding in the late 1990s proved an incentive for OSH 
to identify indicators of performance that would help defend resource allocations at both 
the federal and state levels. Given the emphasis on accountability for results, OSH 
wanted to identify outcome measures in particular. One person said about the focus on 
outcomes, 
That was a conscientious decision and we recognized, because 
accountability was driving it, because outcomes are what people want 
from an accountability standpoint, that that was the most important area.  
So we focused on the outcomes piece and we did not focus on the process 
piece initially.   
 
Another participant commented, 
 
The rationale [to focus on outcomes] was a very deliberate decision. 
…And the reason the focus was on outcomes was because OSH felt that 
states needed to demonstrate progress. They needed to, for political 
 294
 purposes, for using MSA dollars and other tax dollars – we really wanted 
to invest in keeping an eye on the outcomes. 
 
The process to develop outcome measures for the NTCP, led by evaluators in 
OSH, has been facilitated by three factors: network consensus around program goals; a 
strong evidence base; and the availability of extensive survey data. 
As noted above and detailed in the case description, a network of agencies and 
organizations are involved in planning, developing, and implementing tobacco control 
efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. Leaders in the field of tobacco control at all 
levels have adopted four program goals to direct tobacco control efforts: prevent the 
initiation of tobacco use among young people, eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to 
secondhand smoke, promote quitting among adults and young people, and identify and 
eliminate tobacco-related disparities. The four goals provide an organizing framework 
from which to structure coordinated and complimentary interventions by varied network 
members in individual states and territories. The network consensus around these four 
goals has aided OSH in identifying program outcomes for which all network members 
are committed and has supported the development of related performance measures. 
Building on the four goals for tobacco control, OSH evaluators, in collaboration 
with network stakeholders, have developed detailed logic models for three of the four 
program goals that explicate relationships between program inputs, activities, and 
outcomes (short-term, intermediate, and long-term). Construction of the logic models has 
been aided by a strong science base, the result of a significant investment in research and 
evaluation efforts over the past decades. In particular, OSH has developed causal 
pathways for each goal and identified 120 key outcome indicators along those pathways 
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 that can be measured to help assess progress in ultimately achieving population-level 
affects on tobacco-related morbidity and mortality. One participant said, 
We know what works in tobacco control, and that’s where the key 
outcome indicators are so helpful. It [the KOI guide] focuses on what data 
sources you need and which of the key outcomes are a little bit more 
effective. So states can look through [the guide] and decide which 
outcomes best meet their needs for what they’re doing. But then it 
provides, like I said, some consistency and some congruency with what 
folks are doing. 
 
Lastly, the development of outcome indicators for the NTCP has been supported 
by the availability of extensive survey data. In many ways, OSH is “data rich” compared 
to other public health programs. As indicated in table 23, survey data is used to calculate 
most of the proposed core indicators at both the state and national levels (e.g., YTS, 
YRBSS, BRFSS, NATS, and STATE). Consequently, OSH can calculate many of these 
measures at the national level independent of grantees’ reporting of data. Not all grantees 
have the resources to support state-level data collection for every survey. One person 
working on the core indicators said, 
In fact, we created a table that took the core indicators and allocated them 
to states and to OSH [in regard to data collection and analysis]. There’s a 
bunch of indicators that OSH can gather, even at the state-specific level, 
without asking the states to do anything. And with the measurement 
surveillance systems that are in existence, even more so now that NATS is 
coming down, the National Adult Tobacco Survey. They’ve asked me to 
cross check NATS drafts with the core indicators specifically. And there’s 
a large percentage of them that will be captured by NATS that will be a 
method to capture a large percentage of core indicators. 
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 7.2.2 The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production 
of outcomes and shared accountability. 
As described, tobacco control is implemented by a network of agencies at 
multiple levels. Vertical relationships, primarily supported by funding arrangements, 
assure the involvement of federal, state, and local health agencies as well as other local-
level organizations. Populating each level are horizontal partnerships representing 
government, nonprofits, academic institutions, health care, and commerce. Working with 
a wide range of these partners, NTCP grantees frequently lead or participate in coalition 
efforts to develop statewide plans for tobacco control that are implemented by a host of 
agencies. For instance, in addressing the goal related to the prevention of tobacco use 
among youth, the National Legacy Foundation might contract with a marketing firm to 
develop a large scale, state-wide, counter marketing campaign. The state department of 
education might endorse an anti-smoking school-based curricula or tobacco-free policies 
for schools. The state health department might fund CBOs at local levels across the state 
to implement anti-smoking interventions for youth. And advocacy groups might 
introduce legislation to strengthen tobacco control laws in ways that protect young 
people. One participant provided this example, 
TFL [Tobacco Free Living] has the money for paid media – the state 
doesn’t, because basically their only funding is from CDC. So in the 
implementation of the smoke free air law education campaign, TFL took 
the lead. They had the money. They had the expertise on site. The state 
would compliment that by looking at activating local mini-grants to get 
earned media at the local level to support the paid media that was going 
on. So again, that’s leveraging, you’re linking.  
 
This comprehensive approach is intended to optimize synergies across network 
contributors in order to maximize program effects. Ultimately, program outcomes reflect 
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 the contributions of the many. In other words, program outcomes are jointly produced by 
network partners. This poses a potential concern for OSH’s venture to develop a set of 
core outcome indicators. Specifically, accountability is less easily appropriated to one 
agency or another – instead, accountability for outcomes in comprehensive tobacco 
control efforts may best be characterized as “shared accountability.” One participant 
described earlier attempts to try and disentangle each funder’s contributions, 
We tried that back in the early ‘90s when there weren’t as many players in 
the game and you still couldn’t do it. I mean, you had NCI who was doing 
the $17 million dollars with the ASSIST program, you had our $5 million, 
and Robert Wood Johnson’s smokeless states that were probably in there 
for about $3 or $4 million. Even with that small amount of resources, you 
still couldn’t ferret out the who’s who, and what money did what, and it 
started driving the states crazy. And it’s like, we can play this game or we 
can actually do public health and have something happen. So we all just 
said look, we’re going to step back and evaluate these things in terms of 
‘what are effective interventions in the direction we have to go as a 
tobacco control community’.  All the major funders came to that 
agreement, because we were driving ourselves crazy, our grantees crazy, 
and we were detracting time from actually doing the real work. 
 
Therefore, for their measurement system, OSH has accepted what some view as a 
limitation and others recognize as an unavoidable consequence of the networked 
environment. That is, the inherent difficulty of assigning accountability for results when 
outcomes follow from multiple and diverse interventions funded and implemented by a 
network of collaborating institutions and agencies. OSH’s answer to this dilemma of 
outcomes, accountability, and networks is to openly acknowledge that the NTCP core 
outcome indicators more accurately represent outcomes for comprehensive tobacco 
control, not simply the CDC-funded program.  
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 7.2.3 Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their 
use.  
NTCP’s extensive network implementation structure has important implications 
for the design of the core indicators. In particular, grantee variability in terms of state or 
territorial context, tobacco control priorities, implementation activities, resources, and 
capacity limits the types, choice, and use of core measures. One person described the 
diversity across grantees as follows, 
You have California that was already allocating $100 million [of state 
funds] back in the ‘90s, so you have that wide range [of resources across 
grantees]. And there’s a level of sophistication in the programs – you have 
some programs that, as I like to put it, are really just doing the basics. 
They’re trying to change social norms, they’re really trying to get the 
word out about why tobacco is harmful, about how the [tobacco] industry 
manipulates you, trying to get local ordinances passed, and that’s where 
they are. Every few years or so, when there’s a perfect storm of 
opportunity that brews up, they’ll try to get an increase in their excise tax 
on tobacco products. But for the most part, they’re just chugging along 
trying to get all their school districts to be tobacco-free, trying to get local 
communities to have secondhand smoke ordinances, and those types of 
things. Then you go and you find other states that are really progressive 
and they’re out there working with the tobacco advocates, beginning to 
work with the Medicaid folks, and are really zeroing in on which 
[segment] of the low income population is still using tobacco during 
pregnancy and developing special interventions and programs for them. So 
you have other states that are really cutting edge and looking at how they 
can use internet blogging and those types of communication avenues for 
cessation programs. So it runs the gambit. 
 
That kind of variability, as well as the breadth of four NTCP goal areas, is what 
led to the initial development of 164 proposed key outcome indicators. Although OSH 
evaluators had originally intended to identify a small set of outcome indicators for 
accountability purposes, the number of indicators quickly expanded as reflected in the 
statement below. 
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 It was [person’s name] that had actually come up with the idea of ‘let’s 
come up with a list of 20 or 30 indicators that we think are important for 
states to measure.’ And that grew into, like 200 indicators, because they’re 
all important, depending on what the state is doing. And that’s where you 
get into, you have 50 different states and 50 different programs, and 
depending on what the state’s working on, they’re going to want to 
measure different things. 
 
“What the state’s working on” often depends on resources and the 
selection of priorities consistent with the organizational and political context of a 
given grantee. While one grantee may prioritize policy efforts to increase smoking 
bans in bars and restaurants, another grantee may face a powerful and well-funded 
lobby that dissuades it from addressing the issue. 
It was also variability that tabled the effort to develop a similar set of 
process measures to accompany the KOIs. OSH evaluators found it impossible to 
develop a common set of process measures given that grantees conducted 
activities in so many different ways. One participant said, 
I went in and told them [Division and Center leadership] that basically, if 
you want indicators I’ll give you indicators. But if you want useful 
indicators, I can’t give you useful indicators even after 3 years [of trying 
to develop process measures]…I mean you’ve got Best Practices, you’ve 
got the Community Guide,53 but you’ve got all that stuff being 
implemented 14 thousand different ways. And so to try to come up with 
useful [process] indicators that would actually contribute to program 
improvement, or give a better understanding of what contributed to the 
outcomes, we just basically said ‘no, we can’t do that.’ 
 
Therefore, the type of measures to include in the core indicators was limited to 
outcome indicators, although, as discussed earlier, OSH evaluators wanted to identify 
outcomes to address accountability. The paradox is, however, that outcome-level 
                                            
53 Best Practices and the Community Guide both provide listings and descriptions of 
evidence-based interventions. 
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 measures typically represent the work of many, not simply CDC. In other words, 
accountability becomes fragmented in the network context and outcomes represent results 
of multiple network partners. 
The choice of measures was also affected by network variability. While 
variability in program activity is what led to developing 120 key outcome indicators, the 
evaluation team has the difficult task of narrowing these to a smaller set of core measures 
appropriate for 58 grantees. As one person said, “We’ve come full circle back to the core 
indicator idea!” Evaluators also considered data availability in their choice of core 
measures. Resource constraints limit some grantees from participating in some surveys – 
especially those that require funds to support specific tobacco-related modules. One 
person said, 
I think in large part it’s about resources. You’re at the state and you can 
collect data, and you know you need your prevalence data – you need it 
for youth, you need it for adults, you need this, and you need that. All 
these things cost money. How much of your budget can go into collecting 
these data and how many of these data? You have to kind of pick and 
choose. It’s a resource issue – you have to hire people who are doing the 
data collection, analyzing the data, and how many people can you hire? 
 
Consequently, data availability was a consideration in selecting core measures. A 
participant described it like this,  
Even if you just take the low hanging fruit, the ‘what’s available’ 
approach. We at CDC are already going to have data on a number of them 
(indicators). So we can think, ‘okay well, there’s a core set’ – just low 
hanging fruit, what’s available. 
 
With so many grantees, OSH evaluators also considered the effects that 
the core measures might have across the national programs and their acceptability 
for implementation.  
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 With the exception of the kind of whacky core indicators, the ones that 
we’re having measurement issues with and that we have to define, it’s not 
as if they’re [grantees] going to have a big program shift and do anything 
differently than they’re already doing. For the most part, they just have to 
keep doing what they’re doing. Which is great because we were worried 
about that – we thought ‘we don’t want to do anything radically different, 
and say okay, we’re going to do this in tobacco control now instead of 
this’ We’re adding a couple of new things like Master Settlement 
violations and the retail observations that are going to be new and different 
for most states, but other than adding those couple of things, everything 
else is pretty standard. 
 
Finally, the selection of outcome-level indicators that are primarily derived from 
periodic survey data may limit their utility as part of a performance measurement system. 
Much of the needed survey data to support the core measures are collected once every 
two to three years – at this time, the NATS is funded for only one year of data collection. 
Consequently, the core indicators may better be used for program evaluation than as part 
of a performance management system that supports on-going program monitoring.  
7.3 Summary 
At the time of data collection for this study, OSH was finalizing its development 
of a set of core outcome indicators for its NTCP. Consequently, findings for this case 
focus on OSH’s development process rather than implementation of the measures. 
Despite the NTCP’s vast network that includes extensive variation across grantees in 
their level of resources, goal priorities, and specific intervention efforts, OSH has been 
able to identify a set of core outcome indicators for NTCP. The consensus on and 
commitment to four program goals by the broad group of stakeholders within the network 
has facilitated this effort as has the availability of a rich evidence-base and extensive 
survey data. And while the network structure leads to the joint production of many 
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 program outcomes, OSH has determined that it would be too costly and burdensome to 
conduct the level of evaluation needed to decipher the unique contribution of individual 
network members in 58 different grantee states and territories. Consequently, OSH and 
its partners have accepted that outcome-based performance measures will typically reflect 
the overall efforts of the tobacco control community as well as other factors.   
In addition, the variability across grantees in context, priorities, intervention 
activities, resources, and capacity has important design consequences for selecting 
NTCP’s core indicators. Type of measure was limited to outcomes given that process 
measures proved impossible to identify at a national level. Choice of measures was 
impacted by resources, data availability, and an interest to ensure their acceptability 
across grantees. And use of core indicator data may more accurately support program 
evaluation efforts than a performance measurement system. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
 
CROSS-CASE RESULTS 
8.1 Introduction 
While the previous four chapters summarized findings from the within-case 
analysis for each program, this chapter presents results from the cross-case analysis. As 
detailed in chapter 3, this study applies an instrumental case study approach. In contrast 
to intrinsic case study that strives to understand a particular case, instrumental case study 
is meant to achieve greater comprehension of a particular phenomenon – the case is used 
to gain broader insight (Stake 2006). By including multiple cases in an instrumental case 
study, the phenomenon is examined in several contexts to achieve a more nuanced 
understanding. For the present study, the researcher has examined four unique cases to 
investigate the implications of networked public management on the design, 
implementation, and utilization of federal-level performance measurement systems. Both 
the unique situational analysis of each case presented in chapters 4-7, and the cross-case 
analysis presented here contribute to a deeper understanding of performance 
measurement as applied in public health programs implemented in networked contexts. In 
particular, greater insight is achieved by studying the similarities and differences 
observed across the four cases in how networks affect the use, design, and impact of 
performance measurement. 
This chapter begins with a descriptive summary of the four cases using the 
typology that was applied for the case descriptions in the individual case chapters (i.e., 
the program, network, and performance measurement system). Next, the cross-case 
results are presented, organized around the three research questions. As detailed in 
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 Chapter 1, Jennings and Haist (2004) propose a set of 25 hypotheses intended to explicate 
assumptions related to the impact of performance measurement (appendix A). More 
specifically, Jennings and Haist organize their hypotheses according to five unique 
groups including incentives and accountability (nine hypotheses), organizational 
characteristics (eight hypotheses), political context (three hypotheses), agency type (three 
hypotheses), and leadership (two hypotheses).  
The three research questions guiding this study were derived from two of the 
three hypotheses related to agency type. Jennings and Haist built these hypotheses from 
James Q. Wilson’s (1989) typology of four agency types: production, procedural, craft, 
and coping agencies. Wilson’s typology incorporates two dimensions, one related to 
whether outputs are observable and another to whether outcomes are observable. 
Jennings and Haist define observability in two ways that relate to performance 
measurement – the ability to measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute 
outcomes to the program of interest (see Chapter 1, section 1.4). The two hypotheses of 
Jennings and Haist and the related research questions for this study are summarized in 
table 26 below. 
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 Table 26. Study Research Questions Related to Jennings and Haist’s Hypotheses of 
Agency Type 
Jennings and Haist Hypothesis Study Research Questions 
Research Question #1.  
How does networked public management 
affect the observability of CDC program 
outputs and outcomes? 
Hypothesis #13 
“The extent to which performance 
measures are used and the types of 
measures used will depend on the degree to 
which outputs and outcomes can be 
observed.” (p.185) 
 
Research Question #2.  
How does networked public management 
influence CDC’s use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance 
measures used? 
Hypothesis #14 
“Measurement will be more common and 
will have greater impact when agencies 
have greater control over outcomes.” 
(p.185) 
Research Question #3.  
How does networked public management 
affect CDC’s control over outcomes and 
the subsequent design and perceived 
impact of performance measurement? 
 
 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, section 3.8.5, the researcher has used various data 
displays to facilitate analysis and the development of individual case findings and cross-
case findings. First, a set of matrices was created summarizing the descriptive 
characteristics of each case using a standard typology that was devised based on the 
literature review and inductive case analysis. These matrices include one for program 
characteristics (appendix I), network characteristics (appendix J), and the performance 
measurement systems (appendix K). Next, tentative findings were developed for each 
case based on the individual research questions (appendix L). From these tentative, case-
specific results, findings were constructed for each case – these are summarized in 
appendix M.  
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 Finally, to aid the development of cross-case results, a matrix was developed to 
relate the hypotheses of Jennings and Haist with relevant research questions and 
individual case findings. This matrix includes information about the effect of each 
finding on the performance measurement system for the specific program, the broader 
implications of each finding for performance measurement, evidence for each finding 
from the specific case, information about the case context that is relevant to the finding, 
and details from the other cases that support or counter the finding. This matrix is 
included in appendix N. 
To aid the reader, acronyms are only used when referring to CDC and 
GPRA/PART. Given that all four cases are discussed in this chapter, Division and other 
organization names, laws and policies, and other terms previously referenced with 
abbreviations are spelled out in full to limit any confusion. The exception to this is in 
table 27 where a list of stakeholders for each case is detailed – for these, please refer to 
the list of acronyms provided at the beginning of the dissertation before the start of 
chapter 1.  In table 27, below, a key is provided clarifying how the four cases will be 
identified throughout chapters 8 and 9. Finally, the terms “program” and “case” are used 
interchangeably and represent the national programs included in the study. 
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 Table 27. Key to Case Names Used in Chapters 8 & 9 
Full Case Name CDC Division and 
Office/Center 
Acronyms Used 
in Chapters 4-7 
Abbreviated 
Name for 
Chapters 8 & 9 
Public Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Division of State and Local 
Readiness, Coordinating 
Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and 
Emergency Response 
PHEP Preparedness 
Program 
Comprehensive 
STD Prevention 
Services 
Division of STD 
Prevention, National 
Center for HIV/AIDS, 
Viral Hepatitis, STD, and 
TB Prevention 
CSPS STD Program 
National Breast 
and Cervical 
Cancer Early 
Detection Program 
Division of Cancer 
Prevention and Control, 
National Center for 
Chronic Disease 
Prevention and Health 
Promotion 
NBCCEDP Cancer Detection 
Program 
National Tobacco 
Control Program 
Office on Smoking and 
Health, National Center for 
Chronic Disease 
Prevention and Health 
Promotion 
NTCP Tobacco 
Program 
 
 
 
8.2 Descriptive Summary of Four Cases 
8.2.1 Program Characteristics  
Several program characteristics were identified from inductive analysis that 
describe the four cases including their organizational context, program goals, stage of 
program development, budget, stakeholders, and political context. Table 28 summarizes 
each of these characteristics; appendix I provides a more detailed synthesis.  
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 Table 28. Summary of Key Program Characteristics by Case 
Preparedness 
Program 
STD Program Cancer Detection 
Program 
Tobacco Control 
Program 
Organizational Context 
62 grantees – 
states, cities, 
territories 
65 grantees – states, 
cities, territories 
68 grantees – states, 
D.C., tribes, 
territories 
58 grantees – states, 
D.C., territories 
Politically-driven 
culture 
Change difficult Data-driven culture Science-based 
Program Goals 
Evolving goals 
over time; 
developing 
program 
framework 
Lacking clear goals 
from CDC 
Goal consensus 
among CDC and 
grantees 
Goal consensus 
among CDC and 
grantees 
Outcomes difficult 
to define 
(“preparing,” 
“preventing”) 
Focus on 3 of 25 
STDs: syphilis, 
gonorrhea, and 
chlamydia 
Focus on clinical 
outcomes for women 
screened 
Focus on evidence-
based outcomes for 
three of four goal 
areas 
Stage of Program Development 
New Mature Mature Mature 
FY 2008 Budget 
$700 million $104 million $157 million $66 million 
Median 
award/grantee: 
$8.9 million 
Median 
award/grantee: $1.1 
million 
Median 
award/grantee: $2.1 
million 
Median 
award/grantee: $1.2 
million 
Stakeholders 
DHS, HHS, ASPR, 
FEMA, ASTHO’s 
Directors of Public 
Health 
Preparedness, 
NACCHO, CSTE, 
APHL, grantees, 
NCSD, grantees, 
other CDC 
programs, OMB, 
Congress 
National 
organizations and 
advocates, NACDD, 
NACCHO, 
NBCCEDP Council, 
grantees, other CDC 
programs, OMB, 
NCI, SAMHSA, 
NIH, National 
organizations (ACS, 
CTFK), NACDD, 
grantees, other CDC 
programs 
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 CDC Director, 
OMB, Congress 
Congress 
Political Context 
Politically visible 
and volatile 
Stable  Politically visible 
given strong 
advocacy community 
Politically visible 
given strong 
advocacy 
community and 
adversary 
 
 
 
8.2.1.1 Organizational Context  
Each case has a unique organizational context that affects the character of the 
program. The Preparedness Program is situated in a highly politicized context influenced 
by public concern about terrorist threats and a steady influx of policy initiatives and 
directives from federal partners in Washington D.C. – Health and Human Services, 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Department of Defense, Department 
of Homeland Security, and others. Since its inception in the late 1999, the program has 
expanded in scope from a focus on terrorism to “all hazards,” responsible for the public 
health in the case of events as diverse as hurricanes and anthrax attacks. The program 
exploded in size after September 11th and the 2001 anthrax attacks from a $45 million 
dollar program in fiscal year 2001 to almost $1 billion in fiscal year 2002. The 
Preparedness Program remains the largest funded single program at CDC. Several 
participants referred to Preparedness Program’s organizational culture as the “wild, wild 
west” reflecting its chaotic, dynamic nature, but also recognizing that preparedness is an 
emerging field in public health that is blazing new paths.  
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 In stark contrast to the Preparedness Program, the STD Program is largely defined 
by its status as one of the longest-standing programs at CDC dating back to 1957. CDC 
staff working with the STD Program often initiated their careers as federal assignees to 
state-based programs conducting disease investigation work. Over time, these staff 
typically advanced from front-line positions to state-based management positions and 
eventually to CDC headquarters in Atlanta. Consequently, many of the CDC staff 
working with the STD Program have decades of experience with the program. While the 
program benefits from well-tenured and experienced staff, the organizational culture is 
viewed as somewhat entrenched and hard to change, making the adoption of new ideas 
difficult.  
The Cancer Detection Program was established by law in 1991 and is unique in 
the fact that it is a service delivery program. The organizational context for the Cancer 
Detection Program can best be described as data-driven. The program benefits from a 
long-standing data management system that supports a large set of clinical and data 
quality variables. Data are used extensively to manage the Cancer Detection Program and 
ensure that women receive quality care.  
The Tobacco Control Program was also initiated in the early 1990s, although 
under a different name. The program benefits from a robust evidence-base reflecting 
years of well-supported research efforts. The organizational culture for the Tobacco 
Control Program can be characterized both by its strong science-base and also its 
collaborative nature – Tobacco Control Program staff at CDC work closely with many 
other national partners on comprehensive tobacco control efforts.  
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 Each of the four cases included in the study support a large number of grantees, 
typically representing government health agencies in states, cities, territories, and tribes. 
The Tobacco Control Program has the smallest number of grantees with 58 while the 
Cancer Detection Program supports the largest with 68; all represent broadly 
decentralized programs managed by CDC, a point discussed further in section 8.2.2 
below. 
8.2.1.2 Program Goals 
Preparedness, STD prevention, breast and cervical cancer screening, and tobacco 
control – four very different programs representing unique sub-fields in public health: 
public health preparedness, infectious diseases, and chronic diseases. As noted above, 
public health preparedness represents a complex area addressing hazards as diverse as 
hurricanes, bioterrorist attacks, and pandemic influenza. States vary in their risk for a 
given event and in the potential scale of an event. As detailed in chapter 4, the Division 
of State and Local Readiness has struggled to define what “preparedness” means and how 
it can be represented in terms of public health outcomes for the Preparedness Program 
given the infancy of the field, the science base for public health preparedness is thin. In 
collaboration with experts from across the country, the Division of State and Local 
Readiness is working to develop a programmatic framework for the Preparedness 
Program based on five key capabilities (i.e., incident management, risk communications, 
biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, isolation and quarantine/community 
containment). Program goals for the Preparedness Program are further shaped by its 
dominant political context. Top-down policy initiatives from the Assistant Secretary for 
 312
 Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, and others dictate 
requirements that may not be consistent with expert opinion or programmatic realities.  
The Division of STD Prevention has struggled to define and communicate 
national-level goals for the STD Program even though it is one of the oldest programs at 
CDC. There are over 25 different sexually transmitted diseases – the Division of STD 
Prevention focuses on three of them: gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis. In 2004, the 
Division of STD Prevention began promoting a broader “community perspective” for the 
STD Program that emphasizes the need to engage and influence community-level 
partners in order to expand the program’s reach, leverage resources, and extend program 
effects. In part, this transformation has been in response to stagnant resource levels, 
changes in health care access and delivery, and a desire to more effectively leverage 
population-level impact. The “community perspective” requires a paradigm shift from a 
more narrow focus on the sexually transmitted diseases clinics, traditionally funded 
through the STD Program, to one that assumes broader responsibility for sexually 
transmitted disease control and prevention in a community or state. The change in 
perspective represents an adjustment in program scope that has implications for program 
priorities and goals. However, as noted above, the organizational culture is somewhat 
resistant to change and the STD Program currently suffers from a lack of consensus about 
the program’s national priorities.  
The Cancer Detection Program is guided by its authorizing legislation. At a 
patient-level, clinical outcomes are straight-forward and can be easily assessed given an 
adequate data collection and reporting system. These outcomes (e.g., timely diagnostic 
follow-up, timely initiation of cancer treatment) are consistent with the overall program 
 313
 goals which are widely accepted across CDC, the grantees, and individual providers 
within the implementation network.  
As described in chapter 7, the Tobacco Control Program is strongly rooted around 
its four national goals (e.g., prevent the initiation of tobacco use among young people, 
eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke). These goals are broad in scope 
and intended to direct efforts of the larger community of stakeholders involved in 
comprehensive tobacco control. The Office on Smoking and Health emphasizes that 
achieving the four Tobacco Control Program goals requires collaboration “across the 
federal government, across the nation, and within each state.” Consensus around program 
goals and the strong science base has enabled the development of detailed logic models 
for three of its four goals specifying outcomes at multiple levels.  
8.2.1.3 Stage of Program Development and Budget  
Three of the four programs can be characterized as relatively mature; the 
Preparedness Program, however, has rapidly expanded in scope since its inception in 
1999 and can therefore be considered less established. For fiscal year 2008, program 
budgets ranged from roughly $66 million for the Tobacco Control Program to over $700 
million for the Preparedness Program whose budget is several times the size of the other 
three cases. Similarly, median grantee awards range from $1.1 million for the STD 
Program to $8.9 million for the Preparedness Program. All four programs have faced 
relatively flat or decreasing program funding over the past several years, and CDC staff 
uniformly expressed concern about the need to defend current allocations given the 
challenging economic climate. Many interviewed described a political climate that 
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 stresses accountability, and they view performance measurement as an important means 
to provide data needed to justify their programs.  
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 8.2.1.4 Stakeholders and Political Context 
All four cases involve an extended network of stakeholders at the federal, state, 
and local-levels. Stakeholders typically include other federal agencies (e.g., Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Health Resources and Services 
Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency), national-level coalitions 
representing state or local health agencies (e.g., National Association of Chronic Disease 
Directors, National Association of City and County Health Officials, National Coalition 
of STD Directors), national non-profit organizations (e.g., American Cancer Society, 
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids), other programs at CDC, the program grantees, and 
local-level agencies primarily responsible for program implementation. These 
stakeholders, especially some of the national organizations and grantees, leverage their 
political power to influence CDC decision making, particularly around issues of program 
policy. Of note is the large number of stakeholders involved in each of these four cases – 
important federal level partners, 58-68 grantees, and hundreds to thousands of local-level 
partners.  
Aside from the political influence of stakeholders, some programs confront a 
more intensive political climate than others. Of the four cases, the Preparedness Program 
clearly contends with the fiercest political climate that imposes significant demands on 
the program. The Cancer Detection Program and Tobacco Control Program also reside in 
a political context. Breast cancer, in particular, has a strong advocacy community with 
whom the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control must collaborate. In contrast, the 
Tobacco Control Program faces a unique political “adversary” in the tobacco industry. 
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 8.2.2 Network Characteristics  
This section summarizes the network characteristics of the four cases including 
aspects of network structure and function. Table 29 summarizes some of the network 
characteristics according to each of the four cases; appendix J offers a more detailed 
listing. 
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 Table 29. Summary of Network Characteristics by Case 
Preparedness 
Program 
STD Program Cancer Detection 
Program 
Tobacco Control 
Program 
Network Structure: Vertical Relationships 
62 grantees; 
thousands of local-
level partners 
65 grantees; 
hundreds of local-
level partners 
68 grantees; 22,000 
local-level providers 
58 grantees; some 
local-level partners 
Most vertical 
relationships 
formalized via 
funding 
Most vertical 
relationships 
formalized via 
funding; dominant 
dimension 
Most vertical 
relationships 
formalized via 
funding; dominant 
dimension 
Most vertical 
relationships 
formalized via 
funding 
Vertical structure 
varies within state, 
tribe, territory 
Vertical structure 
varies within state, 
tribe, territory 
Vertical structure 
varies within state, 
tribe, territory 
Vertical structure 
varies within state, 
tribe, territory 
Primarily 
intergovernmental 
throughout vertical 
chain 
Local-level partners 
include: local public 
health agencies, 
CBOs, family 
planning clinics 
Regional and local-
level partners 
include: public 
health agencies, 
CBOs, private 
providers, 
community health 
centers, family 
planning clinics 
Local-level partners 
include local health 
agencies, CBOs 
(usually funded with 
non-CDC funds) 
Program activities at 
state and local levels 
Most program 
activities at local 
level 
Service delivery at 
local level 
Program activities at 
state and local levels
 
Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
Horizontal partners 
at all levels – 
federal, CDC, state, 
local 
Horizontal partners 
at all levels – 
federal, CDC, state, 
local 
Horizontal partners 
at all levels – 
federal, CDC, state, 
local 
Horizontal partners 
at all levels – 
federal, CDC, state, 
local 
Typically informal 
and unfunded 
Typically informal 
and unfunded 
Some funded, others 
informal and 
unfunded 
Typically informal 
and unfunded 
 318
 Preparedness STD Program Cancer Detection Tobacco Control 
Program Program Program 
Essential to 
achieving program 
goals – program 
outcomes dependent 
on network efforts 
Increasing 
importance of 
partnering with 
horizontal partners 
to access priority 
populations 
Support referral of 
priority populations 
to program services; 
program integration; 
provide advocacy 
Essential to 
achieving program 
goals –  program 
outcomes dependent 
on network efforts 
 
Network Function: Control and Authority Within the Network 
Control and 
authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation  
Control and 
authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
Control and 
authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
Control and 
authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
No authority over 
unfunded, 
horizontal partners 
on which grantees 
are dependent 
No authority over 
unfunded, 
horizontal partners 
In vertical chain, 
control and 
authority facilitated 
by funding and 
mgmt tools, network 
relations 
No authority over 
unfunded, 
horizontal partners 
on which grantees 
are dependent 
Cooperative 
agreement provides 
some authority over 
grantees 
Grant offered 
minimal authority 
over grantees; 
recent shift to 
cooperative 
agreement 
Cooperative 
agreement provides 
some authority over 
grantees 
Cooperative 
agreement provides 
some authority over 
grantees, but not 
exercised  
 
Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the Network 
Differing priorities 
across grantees; 
goal and mission 
conflicts with some 
horizontal partners 
Differing priorities 
across grantees; 
goal and mission 
conflicts with some 
horizontal partners 
Shared goals among 
network partners 
Shared goals among 
network partners 
 
Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources 
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 Preparedness STD Program Cancer Detection Tobacco Control 
Program Program Program 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and 
resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and 
resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and 
resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and 
resources 
Variability in level 
of risk for and type 
of “hazard” 
Variability in STD 
epidemiology 
Variability in 
demographic profile 
of priority 
population; cultural 
barriers 
Variability in 
emphasis around 
goal areas 
 
 
 
8.2.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships 
The network implementation structure for the four cases is comprised of both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. As indicated, all four programs support a large 
number of grantees representing states, cities, territories, and tribal organizations. Those 
grantees, in turn, support hundreds and up to thousands of local-level partners primarily 
responsible for program implementation, although the grantee agency may also conduct 
some program activities (e.g., state-wide planning, surveillance). The Cancer Detection 
Program’s vertical network is the largest with 68 grantees and over 22,000 local-level 
screening and diagnostic service providers. As depicted in figure 1, the vertical network 
structure of the Cancer Detection Program can include up to four levels. 
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Figure 4. Vertical Network Structure for the National Breast and Cervical Cancer 
Early Detection Program [Cancer Detection Program] 
CDC Division of Cancer Prevention and Control 
68 Grantees of the NBCCEDP State A State B 
Regional Health Agencies
Local Level Screening Providers Local Level Screening Providers
 
 
 
For all cases, the vertical relationships typically extend from Health and Human 
Services to CDC to the grantee to local level partners. These vertical relationships within 
the implementation networks are almost always formalized through funding relationships. 
CDC funds its grantees through cooperative agreements and grantees use varied funding 
mechanisms (e.g., grants, contracts, memorandum of understanding) to support local-
level partners. State, city, territorial, and tribal infrastructure differs and their individual 
policies or laws may specify required relationships between, for instance, state and local 
government. The vertical network should not be assumed to be entirely 
intergovernmental – three of the four cases (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection 
Program, Tobacco Control Program) fund local-level, non-governmental agencies such as 
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 community-based organizations, family planning clinics, private health care providers, 
and community health centers.  
8.2.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
All four cases involve lateral partners at the federal, grantee, and local levels. For 
instance, the Office on Smoking and Health collaborates with the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, National Cancer Institute, American Cancer 
Society, and others at the federal level; Tobacco Control Program grantees typically work 
with other divisions within their department of health, advocacy organizations (e.g., 
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids), and non-profits (e.g., American Cancer Society); and 
local-level agencies interact with partners for coalition building and the implementation 
of program activities. Similarly, the Division of STD Prevention works with Health 
Resources and Services Administration, other Divisions within CDC, and the National 
Coalition of STD Directors. STD Program grantees collaborate with other health-related 
departments (e.g., HIV/AIDS) and state peers. And agencies funded at the local-level as 
part of the STD Program work closely with jails, juvenile detention facilities, family 
planning clinics, and private health care providers. While the vertical relationships within 
the implementation structure are, for the most part, formalized through funding 
mechanisms, the horizontal relationships across the four cases are most often informal 
and un-funded. Consequently, while grantees have some level of authority over their 
vertical partners, formal authority over horizontal partners is absent. 
Horizontal relationships serve different purposes for the four cases. For the 
Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control Program, these relationships are essential 
to achieving program goals and are an integral part of overall program implementation. 
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 For instance, an effective response to pandemic flu will require not only the leadership of 
the official health agency in a state, city, or territory, but also necessitates the 
involvement of other departments and sectors to ensure a coordinated, integrated, and 
effective response. Schools may need to be closed, requiring the involvement of the 
Department of Education and local school boards; hospitals will have a critical role in 
caring for the sick; personal mobility may be restricted demanding the participation of the 
Department of Transportation and even the Police Department; and commerce may be 
enlisted to assist with mass dissemination of medication. Similarly, the four program 
goals established for effective tobacco control cannot be achieved by CDC or Tobacco 
Control Program grantee institutions alone. A compliment of coordinated strategies 
involving community interventions and mobilization; counter-marketing; policy 
development and implementation; and surveillance are all needed to affect relevant 
outcomes.  
In contrast, horizontal relationships within the STD Program and the Cancer 
Detection Program primarily support improved access to priority populations for sexually 
transmitted disease testing and treatment and for breast and cervical cancer screening, 
respectively, as well as service integration. For example, STD Program grantees 
encourage their local-level partners to establish relationships with jails and juvenile 
detention facilities in order to provide screening for syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia 
among inmates. As the Division of STD Prevention continues to promote a broader 
“community perspective” for the STD Program and introduces population-based goals, 
horizontal partners will play an increasingly important role in achieving those goals. At 
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 present, however, the STD Program is best characterized as leveraging its horizontal 
relationships to extend access to priority populations.  
In the Cancer Detection Program, horizontal partners provide important public 
education messages and help identify and refer program-eligible women for screening. In 
addition, these partners assure greater integration of service delivery. For instance, 
Cancer Detection Program grantees may work closely with sister programs such as 
WISEWOMAN,™54  comprehensive cancer control programs, and newer state or 
federally-funded colorectal cancer screening programs to facilitate integration of service 
delivery. A program-eligible woman coming to a health clinic for a Cancer Detection 
Program-funded mammogram ideally would also be offered cardiovascular health 
screening funded by the WISEWOMAN™ program and be assessed for colorectal cancer 
screening.  
8.2.2.3 Network Function: Control and Authority within the Network 
In all four cases, CDC’s control and authority over program implementation is 
compromised given the decentralized, networked structure. As indicated by the 
descriptions above, program activities are typically conducted two to three steps removed 
from CDC and one to two steps removed from the grantees. The Preparedness Program, 
Cancer Detection Program, and Tobacco Control Program all use cooperative agreements 
as the funding tool with their awardees; the STD Program moved from a grant to 
cooperative agreement in January 2009. While this particular mechanism supports CDC 
involvement with its grantees in terms of program-related decision making, grantees also 
                                            
54 Well Integrated Screening and Evaluation for Women Across the Nation 
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 have a fair degree of discretion in program implementation. In addition, the level of 
authority exercised by CDC through the cooperative agreement and grant varies across 
cases. Program requirements (as articulated in the funding announcement and funding 
award) differ for each program as does the political will to impose sanctions on grantees 
perceived to be out of compliance. With the absence of a direct funding relationship, 
CDC control weakens considerably at the local level. CDC is dependent on its grantees to 
exercise authority over local level partners through their funding tools or other 
management practices. 
Of the four cases, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control was observed to 
exert the greatest control over its Cancer Detection Program grantees within the vertical 
chain based on the funding awards’ requirements and other management systems in 
place. For instance, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control has established an 
extensive data monitoring system that allows staff to identify potential implementation 
problems and intervene as needed. In addition, Division of Cancer Prevention and 
Control management imposes sanctions on grantees viewed as out of compliance with 
program requirements, particularly if there are concerns about the care of women served 
through the program. The authority relationships between grantees and their local-level 
partners are less understood given that few representatives from grantee agencies were 
included in the study. However, control and authority between grantees and their funded 
partners is also likely influenced, in part, by the funding tool used. Several interviewees 
with the Cancer Detection Program described grantees’ use of performance-base 
contracting and other reimbursement policies that afford them greater control over local-
level providers and, consequently, service delivery. 
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 In all four cases, the CDC, grantees, and local-level funded agencies typically 
lack formal authority over informal, horizontal partners involved in program 
implementation. For the Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control Program that 
rely on horizontal partners to achieve program goals, significant dependencies on partner 
cooperation are created. For instance, the 2006 legislation titled the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act of 2007 requires that Preparedness Program grantees develop 
pandemic flu plans, and a 2007 initiative issued by the White House (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive, #21) requires that grantees ensure local capacity to distribute 
countermeasures (i.e., prophylaxis treatment) to all citizens within 48 hours of an incident 
(e.g., anthrax attack). Both initiatives demand extensive cooperation of horizontal 
partners at the grantee-level and local-level, but neither grantees nor local-level vertical 
partners have formal authority to demand the participation of their horizontal network 
partners.  
8.2.2.4 Network Function: Shared Goals and Priorities within the Network 
The four cases differ in the degree to which they share goals and priorities within 
their individual networks. As noted earlier, the Cancer Detection Program and Tobacco 
Control Program enjoy strong consensus among both vertical and horizontal network 
partners in regard to their program goals and objectives. For the Office on Smoking and 
Health, the broader community of organizations involved in comprehensive tobacco 
control has embraced the Tobacco Control Program’s four goals related to adult 
cessation, youth prevention, second-hand smoke, and reduced disparities. These goals 
drive comprehensive tobacco control efforts nationally, not just for the Tobacco Control 
Program grantees funded by CDC. Similarly, the Cancer Detection Program’s goal to 
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 screen low-income, under-insured women and detect cancer early when it is more 
effectively treated is embraced widely by network partners.  
Conversely, the Preparedness Program and the STD Program experience priority 
and goal differences that may affect program implementation. For instance, the 
Preparedness Program grantees have struggled to engage some horizontal partners with 
differing priorities in efforts to develop pandemic influenza plans. Data suggest these 
partners, often representing other sectors (e.g., emergency response, transportation, 
education), may not yet understand the public health role in preparedness or may, 
themselves, face competing demands that preclude participation. Likewise, STD Program 
grantees have been challenged to involve jails and juvenile detention centers that have 
starkly different missions (i.e., public safety) than sexually transmitted disease 
prevention. Within the network context of these four cases, shared goals and priorities 
seems to facilitate the cooperation of both vertical and horizontal partners in program 
implementation while conflicts in mission, goals, and priorities serve as a barrier to 
coordinated implementation efforts. 
8.2.2.5 Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources 
Common across all four cases is the extensive variability among grantees in terms 
of their context, capacity, and resources. First, the extent and nature of the public health 
problem varies across individual grantees – the incidence and prevalence of specific 
sexually transmitted diseases in Florida differ dramatically from those in New Hampshire 
or South Dakota. The risk for a bioterrorist attack is likely greater in New York than in 
Iowa. And the demographic characteristics and cultural norms of women eligible for the 
Cancer Detection Program in West Virginia are quite different from those in Texas. Other 
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 contextual factors reflect variability across grantees in the four programs as well – 
differing geography (e.g., rural, urban, size in square miles), state laws and regulations, 
and the strength and influence of particular industries (e.g., tobacco industry).  
Capacity, which is influenced by resource levels, also varies from grantee to 
grantee. Capacity is often reflected in the number of staff assigned to the program, the 
expertise available to the program, and infrastructure (e.g., data management systems). 
The structure and capacity of the larger network within a state or territory also varies; 
local-level capacity and overall network infrastructure have important implications for 
program implementation. 
And, as reflected in chapters 4-7, the range of the funding award size is significant 
across all cases resulting in variable resource levels for grantees. For instance, the award 
size for STD Program grantees ranges from $43,609 $6,711,083. In addition, state 
contributions to individual programs will vary as well. In the past, the state legislature of 
California provided over $100 million to augment the Cancer Detection Program funding 
from CDC while other states did not contribute any additional resources. 
Together, all three of these factors – context, capacity, and resources – influence 
each grantee’s program priorities, activities, and ability to achieve goals. Study 
participants for all four cases emphasize that grantee performance should be interpreted 
based on the individual program context. Comparing grantees on measures of 
performance was viewed as futile given their differences. Across cases, each grantee 
program is considered unique. 
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 8.2.3 The Performance Measurement Systems  
The four performance measurement systems studied represent ones in different 
stages of development. All were initiated after the passage of GPRA suggesting the 
importance of that particular policy in advancing performance measurement as a 
management tool for government programs. This section summarizes the process of 
developing performance measurement systems for the four cases, their design features, 
and each case’s current use of performance data.  
8.2.3.1 Development Process 
Although all four programs introduced their first set of performance measures 
between 2003 and 2004, the cases represent systems at different levels of development. 
 The Cancer Detection Program performance measurement system is the most mature; 
minimum data elements providing the basis for the measures have been collected since 
the program’s inception in 1991 and the data quality indicator guide, that includes most 
of the current 11 performance measures, was introduced nearly fifteen years ago in 1993. 
The 11 Cancer Detection Program performance measures were formally implemented by 
the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control in 2004 as “core program performance 
indicators.” Overall, the Cancer Detection Program has the most sophisticated 
performance management system of the four cases and utilizes its performance data for a 
range of purposes including accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. The 
minimum data elements and performance measures are considered vital to program 
management and are widely accepted and viewed favorably by Division management and 
grantees.  
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 The other three cases are more similar in the time line of their development 
process, but still vary in regard to their developmental progress. The Division of State 
and Local Readiness launched its first set of over 120 performance measures for the 
Preparedness Program in 2003, but the program has experienced a significant expansion 
in scope and extensive staff turnover since that time. A revised set of 47 measures was 
put forth in 2004, followed by 35 measures in 2005, and the current set of 6 measures in 
2007. Currently, staff in the Division’s monitoring and evaluation branch are working 
with programmatic and scientific experts, internal and external to CDC, to develop a 
conceptual framework built around five areas of preparedness-related capability (e.g., 
incident management, biosurveillance). The framework is intended to better define the 
Preparedness Program and provide a foundation from which to identify future 
performance measures. As in the Division of STD Prevention, the Division of State and 
Local Readiness faces issues of organizational support, particularly among program 
consultants, and resistance from grantees. Data validity has been a perennial problem 
since the Preparedness Program first launched indicators. 
The Division of STD Prevention initiated efforts to develop performance 
measures in 1999, piloting over 60 measures in seven states over a two-year period 
beginning in 2001. Based on the pilot, twelve measures were included in the 2004 STD 
Program five-year grant agreement as a reporting requirement for grantees. Revisions to 
the measures were made in 2007. Development efforts have continued, and the five-year 
STD Program cooperative agreement funded in January 2009 includes a set of 17 
measures, some from previous years and others newly introduced. Although the STD 
Program performance measures have evolved over time, organizational support for the 
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 system remains inconsistent, data validity is problematic, and use of the performance data 
is limited.  
Finally, the Office on Smoking and Health started their development process in 
2001. In 2005, the Key Outcome Indicator Guide, inclusive of 120 measures for the 
Tobacco Control Program was published. Grantees currently report on measures most 
relevant to their programs, although reporting on the key outcome indicators is not a 
requirement of their funding award. In 2006, the Office on Smoking and Health began 
working on a set of core indicators. A list of 30 approved indicators is being finalized in 
2009, and staff hope that these will provide a “national snapshot” of the program for 
stakeholders “up” the vertical chain (e.g., Health and Human Services, Office on 
Management and Budget). The Tobacco Control Program is considered the least 
developed among the four cases because the Office on Smoking and Health has not 
completed and implemented the core set of performance measures. 
The process to develop performance measures for these four cases can be 
characterized as negotiated and evolving. Adoption of the systems and data use seems to 
occur slowly and incrementally over time. First, given the network structure of the four 
cases, the development of measures becomes a negotiated process between the CDC 
program and those who are accountable for performance and responsible for the relevant 
data collection, reporting, and management – primarily the grantees. Consequently, 
stakeholder involvement is recognized by all four cases as essential to the development 
process. In developing their performance measurement systems, staff in all four cases 
have included representatives from associations representing grantee programs (e.g., 
Directors of Public Health Preparedness, National Coalition of STD Directors, National 
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 Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program Council of Program Directors) and 
grantee staff. These stakeholders and others have been included in performance 
measurement workgroups (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection Program), expert panels 
(i.e., Preparedness Program, Tobacco Control Program), pilot efforts (i.e., STD Program), 
and vetting processes (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, Tobacco Control 
Program). Participants in all four cases emphasized the importance of including 
stakeholders to ensure that program performance measures are feasible, meaningful for 
practice, and valid – a unique challenge with 58 or more grantees. In addition to the 
expertise stakeholders contribute to the development process, study participants stressed 
the importance of stakeholder involvement to building the necessary buy-in needed to 
assure serious participation and data quality. As noted above (section 8.2.1.4), 
stakeholders also possess a level of political power and influence – consequently, the 
development of performance measures becomes a negotiated process between 
stakeholders and CDC. 
In addition, for these four cases, the development of performance measures has 
been evolving. In general, performance measurement systems are expected to be 
dynamic. Periodic revisions to measures based on changes in program priorities, 
improved measurement, increased availability of data, and, for public health, 
advancements in scientific understanding, are expected. The incremental and evolving 
nature of these four performance measurement systems, however, may best be attributed 
to the fact that these systems are in their early development and because the measures are 
meant to apply to broadly decentralized, networked programs. The evolution has often 
been dramatic: the Preparedness Program moved from 120 measures in 2003 to 6 
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 measures in 2007; the STD Program from 60 measures in 2001 to 12 in 2004 and 17 in 
2009; the Cancer Detection Program evolved from a large monitoring dataset with over 
100 variables to the data quality indicator guide in 1993 and 11 core measures in 2004; 
and the Office on Smoking and Health is transitioning from 120 key outcome indicators 
for the Tobacco Control Program in 2005 to 30 core indicators in 2009.  
For the Preparedness Program, the dramatic change in measure composition has 
largely been a factor of its political environment and turnover among evaluation staff. For 
the STD Program, the evolution reflects the development process itself. The program 
started by piloting a large set of potential indicators with a subset of grantees. The 
Division of STD Prevention and Control has gradually refined these over time based on 
field testing and grantee feedback. The Cancer Detection Program implemented its large 
monitoring data set at the time the program was initiated in 1991; that monitoring system 
is still maintained. Core performance measures for the program were introduced later as a 
means to communicate program priorities to the Cancer Detection Program grantees and 
begin performance-based budgeting. In the Office on Smoking and Health the 120 key 
outcome indicators remain intact for the Tobacco Control Program, but given program 
variability, not all 120 measures are relevant or available for all grantees. Consequently, 
the smaller set of 30 core indicators currently under development is intended to provide a 
common set of data that can be assessed across all grantees and used to provide a national 
summary of the program. 
Finally, the adoption of performance data seems slow and somewhat incremental. 
Performance measurement becomes more challenging in the networked environment 
where 58 to 68 grantees must embrace the effort and communicate measures to hundreds 
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 or thousands of local-level partners involved in implementation. For these programs, the 
implementation and adoption of performance measurement systems seems to advance in 
a slow, step-wise fashion that must encompass three to four levels in the vertical chain – 
measures are introduced, data management systems developed for 50 plus grantees, data 
collected and reported, and data quality addressed and improved over time. Data use 
seems to follow as CDC staff begin to use and promote data, grantees take up use of the 
data, and local-level agencies become aware of the importance of the data. 
8.2.3.2 Design Characteristics 
A summary of characteristics for the four performance measurement systems is 
provided in table 30; a more detailed synthesis is included in appendix K. 
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 Table 30. Design Characteristics of Performance Measurement Systems by Case 
 Preparedness 
Program 
STD Program Cancer 
Detection 
Program 
Tobacco 
Control 
Program 
Purpose Accountability Accountability 
and program 
improvement  
Accountability, 
program 
improvement, 
budgeting 
Accountability 
Level of 
Measurement 
Grantee-level Local and 
grantee-level 
Local-level 
(patient-level 
clinical data) 
Primarily 
grantee but 
some local-
level  
Types of 
Measures 
Process 
measures that 
reflect program 
capabilities 
Process and 
immediate 
outcome 
measures  
Process, short-
term and 
intermediate 
outcome 
measures  
Short, 
intermediate, 
and long-term 
outcome 
measures 
Use of Targets Time-based 
targets for some 
measures set by 
CDC 
Baseline and 3-
year targets set 
by grantees 
Common 
standards set by 
CDC 
Baseline and 
targets set by 
grantees 
Quality 
Assurance 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
 
 
 
8.2.3.2.1 Purpose 
All four cases identify accountability as an important purpose for their 
performance measurement systems. Given the current fiscal crisis, participants across the 
cases described the importance of collecting performance data to help preserve funding 
levels and defend against potential budgetary cuts. The priority for the Preparedness 
Program and Tobacco Control Program is to address accountability concerns from 
“above” – that is, for the Division of State and Local Readiness and the Office on 
 335
 Smoking and Health to provide performance measurement data to stakeholders at Health 
and Human Services, the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response, and other federal-level stakeholders in order to demonstrate 
accountability for the national program and its management. The Preparedness Program 
and Tobacco Control Program grantees may also use the performance data to demonstrate 
accountability with their own state-based (city-based, territorial-based) stakeholders to 
defend state or local contributions to the programs if they receive such funds.  
While the Division of STD Prevention and the Division of Cancer Prevention and 
Control also recognize the importance of accountability to federal-level stakeholders, 
CDC staff are more focused on using the performance measurement systems to hold their 
STD Program and Cancer Detection Program grantees accountable for their performance. 
These two programs emphasize the purpose of program improvement, along with 
accountability, as an important driver of their performance measurement systems.  
In regard to purpose, the most interesting dichotomy across the four cases is that 
between the Preparedness Program and the Cancer Detection Program. The Division of 
State and Local Readiness is working to develop unique sets of performance measures to 
serve individual purposes – the six existing performance measures for accountability 
“up,” a new set of measures to meet the performance-based budgeting requirements 
imposed by the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2007, and a larger data 
set of capacity measures to support program monitoring and improvement. The Division 
of State and Local Readiness’ need to develop unique set of measures is influenced, in 
part, by the nascent stage of its overall program development, the nature of the program 
and complexity of the problem, and the political context around the Preparedness 
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 Program. In contrast, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control uses its one set of 
eleven Cancer Detection Program measures for all three purposes – accountability, 
program improvement, and budgeting. As noted above, the Division of Cancer 
Prevention and Control also has its large set of monitoring data (minimum data elements) 
for the Cancer Detection Program.  
8.2.3.2.2 Level of Measurement 
For all cases, much of program implementation occurs at the local-level –
preparedness exercises, STD case finding, breast cancer screening, and school-based 
tobacco control programs. Performance measures for the STD Program and Cancer 
Detection Program – data are collected at the local-level and the performance measures 
typically represent individuals served through the program (e.g., among clients of 
sexually transmitted disease clinics, the proportion of women with positive gonorrhea 
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the date of specimen collection; percentage 
of women screened through the Cancer Detection Program diagnosed with invasive 
carcinoma with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started less than 60 days). Data 
are aggregated at the grantee-level for submission to CDC.  
In contrast, state- or territorial-level survey data will primarily be used to support 
the core Tobacco Control Program performance measures, although a few measures will 
rely on locally-collected data (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and 
promotions). For the Preparedness Program, challenges related to data availability, local-
level capacity, and measurement have all contributed to the reliance on grantee-level 
measurement for now. A common sentiment across three of the four cases (Preparedness 
Program, STD Program, and Tobacco Control Program) has been to select “low hanging 
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 fruit” – measures for which data are available and the capacity to collect and report data 
exists.  
8.2.3.2.3 Types of Performance Measures 
Aside from the Tobacco Control Program performance measures, process and 
short-term outcomes reflect the dominant measure type used for the three other cases. For 
example, the Cancer Detection Program includes process, short-term, and intermediate-
level measures reflecting service delivery (i.e., screening and diagnostic services) in its 
set of 11 indicators. All are consistent with the program’s focus on the women served 
through the program (rather than population-level measures). For all three programs 
Preparedness Program, STD Program, Cancer Detection Program CDC has been sensitive 
to introduce measures and targets that are viewed by grantees as feasible and achievable. 
Participants working with the Preparedness Program and STD Program described an 
intention to introduce more challenging, intermediate-level outcome measures over time 
as grantees become more comfortable with the measurement process. Again, this 
demonstrates the evolving and incremental development process of these systems 
discussed above in section 8.2.3.1.  
In addition, grantees have successfully argued for measures that they can “fairly” 
be held accountable for, that is, measures that are largely under their control. This 
inclusion criterion, whether explicit (Preparedness Program) or not (STD Program, 
Cancer Detection Program), has effectively dismissed longer-term outcomes that are 
often influenced by multiple factors and even some short-term outcomes that are 
dependent on partners over which grantees have little authority. In contrast, the Tobacco 
Control Program key outcome indicators and proposed core measures only include 
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 outcome measures (short-term, intermediate, and long-term). Two factors influenced this 
choice. First, from the outset, the development team aimed to identify outcome-level 
measures given the emphasis by federal-level partners in addressing accountability. 
Second, with 58 grantees implementing “best practices” in different ways, the Office on 
Smoking and Health found it impossible to identify a common set of process measures. 
In focusing on outcome-level measures, the Office on Smoking and Health recognizes 
that the measures represent the results of comprehensive tobacco control efforts, not 
simply the activities supported with CDC funds. In other words, Tobacco Control 
Program grantees are not expected to influence performance on these measures alone. 
The Office on Smoking and Health recognizes that the outcomes will only be achieved by 
the joint efforts of network partners in the tobacco control community. Of note, the 
acceptance of the outcome-based core measures by Tobacco Control Program grantees is 
untested given that the measures have not been introduced. In addition, the planned use 
for the performance data seems limited to federal-level accountability purposes for now.  
Distal measures, typically representing population-level changes in morbidity and 
mortality, have largely been rejected by all cases for inclusion in their performance 
measurement systems. For public health programs, this level of change typically takes 
years to achieve and requires resources beyond those allocated for any of these four 
cases. GPRA/PART measures for the STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, and 
Tobacco Control Program include population-level, distal measures55 which participants 
                                            
55 For example, one GPRA/PART measure for Division of STD Prevention is as follows, 
“Reduce pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in the United States.” Interviewees explained 
that there is not even consensus on how to define PID epidemiologically. One of the 
GPRA/PART measures for DCPC is the “age-adjusted annual rate of breast cancer 
mortality per 100,000 female population.” As noted in Chapter 6, resources for the 
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 in this study generally viewed as unrealistic to achieve based on program funding levels. 
Given that preparedness is not disease-specific and, therefore, lacks incidence and 
prevalence data, the Division of State and Local Readiness has successfully negotiated 
three GPRA/PART measures with the Office of Management and Budget that are directly 
tied to a subset of their six performance measures.  
8.2.3.2.4 Use of Targets 
Both the Preparedness Program and the Cancer Detection Program have 
established standards for their performance measures (e.g., time for primary staff with 
public health agency Incident Command System functional responsibilities that the public 
health agency’s Emergency Operations Center is being activated – target 60 minutes or 
less; percentage of abnormal screening results with time from screening test result to final 
diagnosis greater than 60 days – target 25% or less). Neither the STD Program nor the 
Tobacco Control Program have set targets for their performance measures due to 
variability in disease burden across grantees and the absence of adequate trend data to 
help substantiate a standard. The Division of STD Prevention encourages grantees to 
document a baseline for their performance measures and set individual targets based on 
their epidemiology, resources, and capacity. Similarly, the Office on Smoking and Health 
currently requires Tobacco Control Program grantees to set a baseline and three-year 
target for any key outcome indicator that grantees report through CDC’s web-based 
reporting system. 
                                                                                                                                  
Cancer Detection Program support screening for approximately 1% of women in the 
United States. Consequently, interviewees for this study argued that the Division of STD 
Prevention cannot fairly be held accountable for achieving the related benchmark for this 
measure. 
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 8.2.3.2.4 Quality Assurance Efforts 
All programs with performance measurement systems in place (Preparedness 
Program, STD Program, Cancer Detection Program) require their grantees to submit data 
twice annually to CDC. Web-based systems are used by all three programs to report data 
or submit a data file. The Tobacco Control Program uses a web-based system for 
voluntary reporting of the key outcome indicators already in place. Data quality (e.g., 
complete data, valid data) emerges as a predominant concern for all four cases given their 
extensive decentralization. For programs that rely on local-level data collection and 
reporting like the STD Program and Cancer Detection Program, data quality is 
particularly challenging. And even for the Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control 
Program that involve grantee-level data collection, CDC has experienced data quality 
problems. Recognizing that the data will be relatively meaningless if quality is poor, staff 
in all four programs are making efforts to address quality assurance.  
Data quality problems may largely reflect the developmental stage of the 
performance measurement systems. For instance, the Cancer Detection Program seems to 
have the strongest data quality systems instituted of the four cases – cooperative 
agreement funds support a data manager for each grantee, a standard data management 
software is available to all grantees, on-going technical assistance for data management is 
provided by a data contractor, regular edit checks are conducted at the grantee level and 
by the Cancer Detection Program’s data contractor, edit reports are produced, and data 
quality is closely examined as part of semi-annual data reviews for each grantee. In 
addition, a national data validation study of the minimum data elements was conducted 
from 2003-2007 and results reflected high quality data for the national program.  
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 In contrast, the Preparedness Program and STD Program have both faced 
significant data quality problems which the Division of State and Local Readiness and 
the Division of STD Prevention are working to address. Participants in the Division of 
STD Prevention suggested that data quality is improving with time and increased 
technical assistance efforts. Both the Preparedness Program and STD Program provide 
grantees performance measurement guides with detailed information about each 
measure’s intent, operational definition, data sources, numerator and denominator 
specification, and references supporting the measures. However, staff working with the 
Preparedness Program and STD Program expressed frustration for grantees’ lack of 
compliance with the guidance. 
8.2.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data 
Use of the performance measurement data varies across cases. The Cancer 
Detection Program is the most sophisticated user of their performance data employing it 
for the multiple purposes of accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. Data 
use for the Cancer Detection Program is supported by two key factors. First, the Cancer 
Detection Program has established a strong data-driven program culture – as noted, the 
minimum data elements have been an integral part of the program since its inception in 
1991. As described in chapter 6, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control has long-
supported a comprehensive and well-funded performance management system. For 
instance, grantees are provided resources through their cooperative agreement award to 
support data collection and reporting (e.g., staff salary for a data manager, data system 
support). In addition, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control funds a data 
contractor to manage the national data set for the Cancer Detection Program. Technical 
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 consultants working for the data contractor are assigned to work with grantees to provide 
on-going data management support. And Cancer Detection Program staff at CDC include 
a senior data manager and programmer to work with the data contractor and help manage 
the national dataset. Second, the performance measures are overwhelmingly viewed as 
meaningful and valid measures that represent program priorities and support program 
management. In other words, the perceived value of the performance measures support 
and reinforce their use.  
Consistent with the Division of State and Local Readiness’ stated purpose for its 
performance measures, staff are using Preparedness Program performance measurement 
data to respond to accountability demands from the Office of Management and Budget 
and other federal-level partners, although data quality problems have limited its utility. 
More importantly, however, the Division of State and Local Readiness staff and grantees 
interviewed for the study recognize that the current set of six measures is not perceived as 
particularly meaningful or useful to grantees. Grantees would prefer performance 
measures that better reflect program priorities and that will support program 
improvement. Staff with the Preparedness Program recognized that wider adoption and 
use of performance measures for the program will be influenced by their ability to 
identify more relevant measures as part of the current development process. In addition, 
program consultants in the Division have had little to no involvement in the development 
efforts; as the primary CDC contact with grantees, their participation and investment in 
the effort will be needed to support data quality and data use by grantees.  
The use of the STD Program performance measures has been influenced by data 
quality concerns, the lack of organizational support within the Division of STD 
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 Prevention from management and program consultants, and resistance from grantees. 
Staff working on the STD Program performance measures have been frustrated by the 
lack of buy-in for and support of the effort – while some grantees are using the measures 
and even developing their own measures, adoption across the broader network is 
perceived to be limited. 
Use of the Tobacco Control Program core performance measures is, as yet, 
untested given that the indicators are still in development. Grantees voluntarily report key 
outcome indicators of their choice as part of regular progress reporting. Of interest, the 
Office on Smoking and Health did not mandate reporting of the new core performance 
indicators (or key outcome indicators) in the new five-year funding announcement issued 
in 2009.  
Overall, several factors seem to influence the use of performance measurement 
data for the cases included in this study. These include the perceived relevance of the 
measures to grantees, how well the measures reflect program goals and priorities, data 
quality, the existence of a performance management system supporting data use, and 
stakeholder buy-in– especially by CDC program consultants, management, and grantees. 
In addition, results suggest that adoption of performance measures in these large 
networked contexts takes time and an investment of resources to facilitate their 
acceptance and use. 
8.3 Cross-Case Results 
Findings from the cross-case analysis are presented in this section. Table 31 
provides a summary of the cross-case results organized by Jennings and Haist’s 
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 hypotheses and the research questions for this study. As a reminder, a listing of results 
from the with-in case analysis is provided in appendix N.  
 
 
Table 31. Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
Jennings and Haist, hypothesis #13: The extent to which performance measures are 
used and the types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and 
outcomes can be observed (2004, p.185). 
Finding 8.3.1.1 Observability (measurement) of 
program outputs and outcomes is primarily related to 
the complexity of the public health problem, but 
network differences in program priorities, activities, 
epidemiology, and resource levels do challenge the 
ability to observe program outputs and outcomes 
across all grantees. 
Research Question #1.  
How does networked public 
management affect CDC’s 
observability of program outputs 
and outcomes? 
Finding 8.3.1.2 While networked public 
management is necessary to achieve program 
outcomes, it compromises observability (attribution) 
and fragments accountability. 
Finding 8.3.2.1 The use of performance 
measurement is an expectation of the political and 
administrative context and is not influenced by the 
network structure.  
Research Question #2.  
How does networked public 
management influence CDC’s use 
of performance measurement and 
the types of performance 
measures used? Finding 8.3.2.2 The types and choice of performance measures are affected by network 
variability, the political influence of network 
stakeholders, and the network structure which 
compromises control over outcomes. 
Jennings and Haist, hypothesis #14: Measurement will be more common and will have 
greater impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes. (2004, p.185) 
Research Question #3.   
Does networked public 
management affect CDC’s control 
over outcomes and the subsequent 
design and perceived impact of 
performance measurement? 
Finding 8.3.3.1 Dependencies on both vertical and 
horizontal network partners diminish CDC and 
grantee control over outcomes, restricting the design 
and impact of performance measurement. 
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 8.3.1 How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC’s 
program outputs and outcomes? 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Jennings and Haist (2004) define 
observability as it relates to performance measurement in two ways – the ability to 
measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to the program of 
interest. Two related findings are presented below. 
8.3.1.1 Observability (measurement) of program outputs and outcomes is primarily 
related to the complexity of the public health problem, but network differences in 
program priorities, activities, epidemiology, and resource levels do challenge the ability 
to observe program outputs and outcomes across all grantees. 
The ability to measure outputs or outcomes for these four cases is primarily 
influenced by the complexity of the problem each addresses rather than the network 
implementation structure. The nature of the program (e.g., preparedness, infectious 
disease control and prevention, health care service delivery, prevention of chronic 
diseases), the available evidence base, the complexity of the problem – these are the most 
important factors influencing whether the four programs’ outputs and outcomes can be 
measured.  
As a service delivery program, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control can 
easily measure both outputs and short-term and intermediate outcomes for the Cancer 
Detection Program. A CDC staff person commented, 
This program certainly has advantages in that we’re able to quantify things 
in a way that other people can’t. But that’s purely because we are a direct 
service delivery program, where you can count the number of women 
screened, you can count the number of tests provided, you can count how 
many [tests] were abnormal, you can count how long it took to get from an 
abnormal screening result to a follow-up test, and from diagnostic 
determination of cancer to [cancer] treatment. We have the luxury of 
doing that. 
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 The Preparedness Program, however, represents a much more complicated 
problem – preparedness for the public health consequences of disasters as diverse as 
flooding and bioterrorist attacks. During a presentation at the national preparedness 
conference (2008), a lead evaluator from the Division of State and Local Readiness 
suggested that public health emergency preparedness is not an “end state” reflected in 
specific outcomes, but rather, an on-going process to build and maintain infrastructure, 
partnerships, and plans for demonstrating capability to respond in real emergencies. 
Unlike many other public health areas, preparedness lacks disease-specific incidence and 
prevalence data. One participant said,  
We’re not so sure what it means to be prepared; is emergency 
preparedness all about getting everybody trained in incident command and 
setting up an emergency op [operations] center and getting everybody 
there in 15 minutes from the time that you know there’s an emergency, is 
that what emergency preparedness is all about? Well, that might be a little 
part of it, but it’s also about how quickly you stand up your points of 
distribution following an anthrax event…I would say the biggest challenge 
[for performance measurement] is defining what it is we really need to 
measure that will have a meaningful interpretation in the world of public 
health emergency preparedness. 
 
Even for infectious diseases like sexually transmitted diseases that benefit from 
robust surveillance data, some important outcomes for the STD Program are difficult to 
measure. For instance, although one of the three GPRA/PART measures for the Division 
of STD Prevention is to reduce pelvic inflammatory disease, researchers lack consensus 
on how to measure it. Likewise, while the Division of STD Prevention (STD Program), 
Division of Cancer Prevention and Control (Cancer Detection Program), and the Office 
on Smoking and Health (Tobacco Control Program) all intend to reduce racial and ethnic 
disparities in disease impact, an evidence-base supporting how to reduce disparities (and, 
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 therefore, what to measure) is lacking. From a CDC staff person working with the STD 
Program, 
Another major Division commitment is to reduce “disparities.” Okay. 
What does that mean from a process measure, not from just showing this 
is the rate in whites, blacks, and then it happens to come down, but 
[measuring] what are you doing [to reduce disparities]? Let’s say you’re 
tackling African-Americans – what is it that you want to do that you think 
is on the pathway to improving [STD] rates among African-Americans?  
We’re way, way far from having any kind of agreement. Is it having a care 
home, is it having access to care? Short of being able to find that ‘what’, 
there’s no measure. 
 
Likewise, sexually transmitted disease infections prevented or tobacco 
consumption prevented is nearly impossible to measure. And in all four cases, even when 
outcomes are measurable, population-based outcomes such as morbidity and mortality 
may take years to observe making related measures impractical to include in a 
performance measurement system. 
Although networks do not affect the ability to measure outputs or outcomes, 
networks can challenge the capability to observe outputs and outcomes consistently 
across the grantees for any given case. That is, outputs and outcomes for the four cases 
are not equally observed across the grantee networks due to differences in epidemiology, 
program priorities and activities, network capacity, and resources. This variability within 
the network has implications for the performance measurement system and is discussed 
in 8.3.2 below. 
8.3.1.2 While networked public management is necessary to achieve program outcomes, 
it compromises observability (attribution) and fragments accountability. 
For all four cases included in this study, program outcomes are, to some extent, 
jointly produced by both vertical and horizontal partners within the implementation 
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 network. The complexity of the public health problems addressed by each case demands 
networked approaches not only to achieve longer-term goals, but also, for some cases, to 
achieve outputs, short-term outcomes, and intermediate-level outcomes. 
Dependencies on vertical and horizontal partners are greatest for the Preparedness 
Program and Tobacco Control Program given that established goals will only be achieved 
through collaboration. For example, moderating the effects from a bioterrorist event 
requires an integrated response across levels of government, numerous departments, and 
diverse sectors. In such an emergency, a local health department is dependent on an array 
of other agencies and organizations at the local level as well as state and federal 
government. A representative from a grantee agency funded as part of Preparedness 
Program described the networked response in preparedness. 
I think in this arena [preparedness] there’s an enormous component that is 
relationships, that is coordination. A great deal of what you do is 
absolutely not under your control but is critical to any type of success. 
You really are mobilizing and enabling others, coordinating across 
networks, managing loosely defined networks. 
 
Similarly, eliminating nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke cannot be achieved 
by government alone; other agencies and organizations must bring resources to bear in 
order to meet this goal. Educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies 
are all needed in order to have an impact on secondhand smoke.  
As the Division of STD prevention expands its goals for the STD Program to 
assume the broader ‘community perspective’ described earlier (rather than a narrow focus 
on public STD clinics), the role of partners becomes increasingly important. As noted, 
trends of health care access and delivery have shifted; patients are less likely to seek 
treatment at publicly-funded sexually transmitted disease clinics than in the past, instead 
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 turning to private, primary care providers. A participant working with the STD Program 
said, 
Syphilis used to be ninety percent or more treated in public STD clinics. 
Now more than half are treated outside of STD clinics. Particularly men 
who have sex with men, a lot of them are HIV infected. They have care 
providers and they get treated by those care providers. And so they never 
enter the public system. So in order to reach people with syphilis, you’ve 
got to reach beyond just the STD clinics. 
 
Consequently, engaging agencies and partners that interface with populations at 
higher risk of sexually transmitted diseases such as private health care providers, schools, 
departments of corrections, and drug treatment facilities is necessary to effectively 
address the problem. Even the Cancer Detection Program, a program that predominantly 
relies on partners within the vertical implementation chain (i.e., CDC, grantee, local 
health providers) to achieve outcomes, depends on horizontal-level community partners 
to conduct public education and support client recruitment efforts. To an extent, 
effectively screening women is a product of collaboration across partnering agencies – 
some that make the public aware of the importance of screening through educational 
efforts, others that help identify program-eligible women and refer them to participating 
providers, and the physicians, radiologists, and surgeons who screen and diagnose them. 
The statement below, from the most recent funding announcement for the Cancer 
Detection Program, reflects the program’s emphasis on partnerships for all of its program 
components. 
Program components of the NBCCEDP [Cancer Detection Program] 
include program management; screening and diagnostic services to 
include case management for follow-up of abnormal results; data 
management; quality assurance/quality improvement; evaluation; 
partnerships; and professional development and recruitment.  These 
program components are carried out at the local, State and national levels 
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 through collaborative partnerships with State health agencies, community-
based organizations, tribes and tribal organizations, universities, a variety 
of medical care providers and related agencies and institutions, and the 
business and voluntary sectors.  
 
For the four cases in this study, collaboration with network partners, whether 
intentional, planned, or otherwise, is meant to support the realization of outcomes. All 
four programs leverage network partners to achieve synergies, increase resources, and 
promote the diverse strategies needed to address these complicated public health 
problems that are influenced by multiple factors. At the same time, however, assigning 
attribution for specific results to a specific program becomes much more challenging in 
these networked environments where outcomes (and even outputs in some cases) are 
jointly produced. For instance, even with a strong evidence base supporting causal 
pathways, disentangling which outcomes should be attributed to what agency becomes 
impossible without employing sophisticated evaluation approaches. Typically, 
performance measurement does not entail the methodological rigor to unravel attribution 
for outcomes.  
In addition, when multiple network partners are all contributing to improved 
outcomes, accountability becomes fragmented. For example, which agency is ultimately 
accountable for achieving the Tobacco Control Program’s short-term outcome measure 
#2.3.7, the “level of support for creating tobacco-free policies in public places and 
workplaces?” As discussed in chapter 7 (section 7.3), the Office on Smoking and Health 
has made a conscious decision to only include outcome-level measures in its set of 
Tobacco Control Program core indicators. Recognizing that the outcomes are jointly 
produced by many network partners involved in comprehensive tobacco control efforts, 
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 assigning accountability for these outcomes to a single agency is impossible. In many 
ways, this example best represents one of the conundrums of performance measurement 
as applied in networked contexts – that is, while these four cases all state accountability 
as a primary purpose for their performance measurement systems, it is often difficult to 
assign accountability for jointly produced outputs and outcomes. This issue is discussed 
in more depth in 8.3.3 below.  
Although not the focus of this study, per se, accountability for GPRA/PART 
measures was often discussed by study participants. In theory, CDC programs are held 
accountable for these measures and program results are used to inform federal-level 
budget decisions. For the cases of the STD Program, the Cancer Detection Program, and 
the Tobacco Control Program that all have population-level, distal outcome indicators as 
part of their GPRA/PART measures, participants were adamant that CDC alone should 
not be held accountable for achieving them given several factors including limited 
resources, the network structure that diminishes control over implementation, and the fact 
that longer-term program outcomes are typically influenced by multiple factors. A 
participant from Tobacco Control Program said,  
At CDC we’re the translation agency so we’re not, at least in chronic, 
we’re not doing the bench science that’s really easy to measure your 
outcome. We’re about setting up programs. We give money [to grantees], 
we give program guidance, and we kind of hope that things happen, and 
we think we know what the outcomes should be if the guidance is 
implemented. But we don’t have any direct control over it…You don’t 
have direct control like you do over your checkbook, and so you say, well 
I can do this and if good things happen I think I was a part of it but I can’t 
claim credit.  
 
And from the STD Program,  
 
Accountability is awfully hard to measure. These are very broad – this is 
population-based national stuff, and activities that impact on whether 
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 people are being screened, whether they’re being treated, whether their 
partner’s being screened and treated – that’s all happening three steps 
removed from us [CDC] with money that comes to us, to send down there 
[to grantees] that is completely inadequate. And getting more inadequate 
by the day when we have this pathology of flat funding when flat funding 
means less every year. 
 
8.3.2 How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used? 
8.3.2.1 The use of performance measurement is an expectation of the political and 
administrative context and is not influenced by the network structure.  
The networked public management context did not influence the decision for staff 
in any of the four cases to use performance measurement. Instead, data suggest that 
program staff and stakeholders assume that performance measurement is the best means 
to address demands for accountability. The study provides no evidence that 
representatives from these cases assess the appropriateness of performance measurement 
for their particular program or context. In part, this finding is based more on what was not 
said by participants than what they discussed. Results suggest that measurement has 
become an expectation for programs, one widely accepted and unquestioned. The 
assumption that performance measurement should be employed is probably influenced by 
GPRA, PART, and other performance-based initiatives established at CDC. One person 
said, “HHS wants it, the top at CDC wants performance measures.” Reflecting a common 
sentiment among participants, one person from the Preparedness Program remarked, 
I believe in performance measures. You know, ‘what gets measured gets 
done.’ I’ve always believed that. And I’ve always believed in looking at 
things that measure whether or not your program is meeting what you 
want your program to do. I’m not sure we’re there yet. And we still have a 
long way to go [in developing measures]. 
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 A participant from the Division of STD Prevention discussed how GPRA and 
PART, while not particularly useful to their program, are used to justify the importance 
of accountability and the use of performance measurement with grantees. 
It’s very useful politically for us to say, ‘There’s an era of greater 
accountability, and we need to be documenting and demonstrating,’ which 
is not untrue. GPRA is not coming and going, they were smart – it passed 
Congress and so it’s a law. The actual [GPRA] measures for us are a little 
less useful and we don’t really manage around it, so it has not really 
directed what happens out there. But as a concept, as something that isn’t 
going to be going away, as part and parcel of this greater era of 
accountability – that is quite useful for us. 
 
Overwhelmingly, study participants in all cases suggested the budget crisis in 
government has further intensified the need for performance measurement as a means to 
demonstrate measurable progress so that programs can defend resource allocations. A 
representative from a Tobacco Control Program grantee program said, 
I was able to convey to the staff the idea that we always have to be able to 
say what we do. And we always have to be able to measure stuff, because 
the program has been cut so badly. And part of that [having their budget 
cut] was because we were not able to articulate what we did and what the 
numbers were and how the program and the state and the citizenry would 
be harmed by cuts to the program.   
 
And from someone with the Preparedness Program,  
 
We’ve got to have information to defend this program, that’s the bottom 
line. And, and maintain it. We’re faced with funding cuts on a yearly basis 
and although it is highly funded as a program, its intent is to build the 
public health infrastructure so that we’re in a much better position to 
respond to emergencies. And I think if we can demonstrate that [being 
prepared] through our measurement system, this program is going to be 
much stronger going forward. 
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 8.3.2.2  The types and choice of performance measures are affected by network 
variability, the political influence of network stakeholders, and the network structure 
which compromises control over outcomes. 
In these four cases, the networked implementation influences the types and choice 
of performance measures in three different ways. First, as evident in the description 
provided in section 8.2.2.5, the decentralized program implementation of the four cases 
results in extensive variation across the program grantees and their local level partners. 
Second, the network structure inherently results in a greater number of stakeholders with 
whom the performance measurement system must be planned and negotiated. And third, 
the network structure lessens the control that CDC and grantees have over outcomes. All 
three, network variability, the political influence of network members, and compromised 
control within the network, have implications for the types and choice of measures 
included in the performance measurement system. In this section, the first two factors are 
addressed; the last is discussed in section 8.3.3 below. 
Network variability in all four cases is represented in terms of the extent and 
nature of the public health problem (e.g., infectious versus chronic disease, epidemiology, 
demographics of those affected); context (e.g., state laws, presence of advocates and/or 
adversaries); organizational priorities, resources, and capacity (e.g., grantees’ activities, 
budget size, staffing, expertise); and network capacity (e.g., local-level capacity, 
infrastructure). Together, these kinds of variability affected the types and choice of 
measures included in the four performance measurement systems.  
Variability in disease incidence and prevalence challenged CDC’s ability to 
identify a common set of performance measures across grantees. As example, the 
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 epidemiology of sexually transmitted disease varies across states – syphilis is much more 
prevalent in Texas than Vermont. A representative of STD Program said, 
Absolutely there are different disease burdens. I think our challenge has 
been to identify a set of measures that is useful for the majority of project 
areas, both small and large and that’s been an internal debate in the 
performance measure work group. There are a number of participants on 
the work group who will come out and say that small states don’t matter, 
because the real outcome measure is reducing morbidity and reducing 
syphilis morbidity. In New England where all together they have 90 cases 
of P&S [primary and secondary] syphilis a year compared to Texas that 
has 90 in a month, there are advocates for not worrying about the small 
states…Some of these are specifically for syphilis high morbidity areas. 
There are a couple of measures that we’ve created so that the non-syphilis 
morbidity areas have something else to do. If you don’t have syphilis, then 
you should be concentrating on gonorrhea and here’s a measure to take a 
look at that. 
 
Likewise, in regard to preparedness, New York is more vulnerable to an anthrax 
attack than New Mexico. A participant with the Preparedness Program said,  
There’s a lot of concern from grantees about, you know, that West 
Virginia doesn’t need to be as prepared for a hurricane as Florida does. Or, 
Idaho doesn’t need to be as prepared for a biochemical attack as New 
York City does. So what should our measures truly try to address? And is 
it as critical that certain states be able to do stuff as quickly or whatever as 
others?  
 
For the three cases that confront variability in disease incidence and prevalence 
(STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, and Tobacco Control Program), programs 
have been forced to incorporate a degree of flexibility into their performance 
measurement systems. For instance, in the STD Program, a grantee does not have to 
provide data for performance measures that may not be relevant for their state, city, or 
territory as long as they provide a rational justification. For the Cancer Detection 
Program, if a grantee has a sample size less than ten for a specific performance measure 
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 (e.g., percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with treatment started, target – 
90% or greater), the indicator is not calculated given that the small numbers skew the 
measurement. And in the cases of both the Tobacco Control Program and STD Program, 
grantees will establish their own targets based on baseline data specific to their own state 
or territory. From a participant with the Tobacco Control Program, 
See that’s [setting targets] the challenge, especially when you fund 50 
states [laughing]. I don’t know how those would be set. The target would 
have to be different for each program because every state has different 
resources, and different goals, and different activities, so I’m not quite 
sure [about setting a national target].  
 
And from a staff person with the STD Program,  
 
We’ve opted against things like benchmarking or setting goals. We’re 
going to have to revisit that because I think there’s value in that. But 
because there’s such variability between programs we didn’t set a national 
goal [grantees set their own]. And to get people used to the idea of setting 
their own goals, realizing, OK, you know better than we do what your 
resources are, what your limitations are. So don’t focus on how you 
compare to Texas or how you compare to Washington State. Focus on 
where you are now compared to where you could be and then set your 
goals accordingly. What we’ve [CDC] learned is that we need to do some 
training on how to set goals. They’re all over the place. 
 
Variability in context as well as organizational priorities, resources, and capacity 
also had implications for the selection of performance measures. The unique needs of a 
given grantee’s population along with its resources and capacity will inform the program 
goals it establishes and program activities it implements. As example, CDC has 
established four national goals for the Tobacco Control Program, but grantees prioritize 
them differently based on need, resource levels (e.g., CDC award size, state 
contributions), or capacity (e.g., the network relationships needed to address a particular 
goal area). Consequently, program activities implemented within a given state or territory 
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 will vary as one grantee focuses on secondhand smoke and another on preventing the 
initiation of tobacco use among young people. The Office on Smoking and Health has 
found that even for the Tobacco Control Program that benefits from a strong science-base 
and identified best practices, implementation of program activities differs tremendously, 
even within a state (i.e., different communities within a state implement different 
activities). In part, this led to the initial development of 120 key outcome indicators 
which CDC is struggling to narrow down to a core set of national outcome indicators. 
Also, given the extensive variability in implementation efforts, the Office on Smoking 
and Health found it impossible to identify a limited and common set of process and 
output measures. One person representing the Tobacco Control Program said,  
They [Office on Smoking and Health] really wanted to identify process 
indicators that mapped onto short-term outcomes. But when we started 
going out and interviewing states and talking to them, we realized that 
every one of them was doing it so differently that coming up with one or 
two or three process indicators that all the states were using was going to 
be just a huge task – almost impossible. 
 
This kind of variability in regard to processes and outputs was observed in three 
of the four cases, the Preparedness Program, STD Program, and the Tobacco Control 
Program. In contrast, however, the Cancer Detection Program is a service delivery 
program which is an anomaly among programs supported by CDC. For the Cancer 
Detection Program, grantees are responsible for the delivery of the same activities 
screening and diagnostic tests for breast and cervical cancer. Because the performance 
measures are almost entirely tied to the delivery of these services, the network’s 
variability has had less affect on the types and choice of performance measures. All 68 of 
the Cancer Detection Program grantees work with local health care providers to recruit 
 358
 and screen women, conduct follow-up to assure timely diagnostic follow-up, and ensure 
that women diagnosed with cancer initiate needed treatment. These activities are easily 
measured, regardless of the type of measure (i.e., process, short-term outcomes, and 
intermediate-level outcomes).  
Next, variability in network capacity also affects the performance measurement 
systems for these four cases. Variability in network capacity is represented by differences 
in local-level expertise, resources, staffing, and infrastructure that affect the availability 
of data, the ability to collect and report valid data, and the adequacy of data management 
systems within a given state. Consider the range of funding, alone. For the Preparedness 
Program, grantee awards range from $330,000 to over $50 million; for the Cancer 
Detection Program, awards range from $75,000 to nearly $9 million. Resource level is a 
major factor affecting all aspects of an individual grantee’s program, including staffing 
and data management systems, and the amount of resources available for local-level 
implementers.  
The lack of local-level infrastructure and capacity in the Preparedness Program 
led to the Division of State and Local Readiness’ decision to include only grantee-level 
measures in its current set of performance measures. For the Preparedness Program, STD 
Program, and Tobacco Control Program, variability in network capacity led all three 
programs to initially select what several participants referred to as “low hanging fruit” or, 
in the case of the STD Program, “get right at ‘em” measures. For these programs, the idea 
of “low hanging fruit” or “get right at ‘em” measures not only reflects the need to identify 
measures that are acceptable to most grantees in order to build buy-in, but also the need 
to select measures for which data are available and that are feasible for grantees to collect 
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 and report given their diversity and capacity. That is, CDC must identify performance 
measures for which data are available across the grantee network and measures for which 
local-level partners have the capacity to collect and report the needed data. From the 
Preparedness Program, a participant talked about their choice of performance measures 
that are meant to be manageable, and therefore, acceptable to grantees. 
I think it’s a good move for now from the measurement perspective – I 
think we considered these six ‘low hanging fruit’ and we thought that they 
[grantees] would too, so there were fewer complaints (laughing). But I 
think that it was partially to get their buy-in and so that they would agree 
that, ‘Yes, these are reasonable measures, and yes, we do these things 
anyway, and it’s not out of order for CDC to ask us for data on these [six 
measures].’   
 
A representative from the STD Program also commented on the challenges of selecting 
measures for which all grantees have the capacity to collect and report.  
I guess probably it’s [variability across grantees] the biggest challenge 
because even being able to come up with the 12 or 14 measures that 
everybody [all grantees] can actually collect data on and do it in a 
reasonably [valid] sound way was a major accomplishment.  
 
Finally, for all cases, variability limits the ability to compare performance across 
grantees. The unique contextual characteristics of each grantee necessitate careful 
interpretation of performance data; CDC staff consistently expressed the importance of 
assessing grantees’ performance based on their individual situation. From the STD 
Program, 
I can’t compare North Carolina and South Dakota. They’re two entirely 
different environments, as far as what they’re operating in, what they’re 
trying to do. So I don’t look at what one project area is doing versus 
another. I can’t see the benefit to that. But I will look at the individual 
grantee, knowing what a project area does, and then look at those 
performance measures.   
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 The network also influences the type and choice of performance measures 
through the political influence of its members, primarily grantees, but also other 
stakeholders in the network. In contrast to a contract, the cooperative agreement funding 
tool used by these four cases is premised on a collaborative relationship between CDC 
and grantees. In all cases, data suggest that grantees hold and exercise political influence 
in regard to performance measurement systems as well as in other areas of program-
related policy and decision making. For instance, an observation of a performance 
measurement workgroup meeting revealed that the Division of STD Prevention 
management was extremely sensitive to grantee concerns about a proposed set of new 
performance measures. As each individual performance measure was discussed, 
representatives from the management team inquired about any concerns that grantees had 
expressed about that particular measure, giving those concerns significant weight in the 
considering whether or not to include the measure. In an interview, one person described 
how the Division management sometimes relents to pressure from grantees on issues 
related to the performance measures. “Well, they [grantees] didn’t like some measure we 
had, and so they put pressure on him, that they don’t want this as a measure. And he does 
give in to the field [grantees] a good bit.”  
Similarly, the Cancer Detection Program grantees will use political influence 
when necessary to affect decision making related to the performance measures. A 
representative from a grantee who was interviewed suggested grantees could have 
Congressmen calling CDC if some performance measures were introduced that grantees 
opposed.   
Some of the things that CDC’s talking about now [ideas for future 
performance measures] that aren’t performance measures of clinical things 
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 – you may have Congressmen calling! I mean, it’s different. These 
[current measures] are tangible – you can count days, you can count 
[screening] results, you can count the number of women who have had 
cancer diagnosed and, whether or not they got into treatment.   
 
A staff person with the Cancer Detection Program also remarked about the 
potential backlash from grantees if benchmarks for the performance measures 
were made more difficult.  
[Laughing] I think we’d all get shot if we raised the benchmark because 
we’ve been standing behind them so long that they’re adequate the way 
they are. Because in the same way we refused to lower them, I think we’d 
get in much more trouble with grantees if we tried to raise them for the 
same reason. 
 
For the Preparedness Program, federal-level stakeholders have been influential in 
shaping the performance measures through the imposition of specific policies that require 
related performance measures and even specify the type of measure or measure itself. As 
detailed in chapter 4, policies such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 
2007 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive #21 have significant implications for 
the Preparedness Program’s performance measurement system. Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive #21 states, 
(a) within 270 days after the date of this directive, (i) publish an initial 
template or templates meeting the requirements above, including basic 
testing of component distribution mechanisms and modeling of template 
systems to predict performance in large-scale implementation, (ii) 
establish standards and performance measures for State and local 
government countermeasure distribution systems, including demonstration 
of specific capabilities in tactical exercises in accordance with the 
National Exercise Program, and (iii) establish a process to gather 
performance data from State and local participants on a regular basis to 
assess readiness; and  
 
(b) within 180 days after the completion of the tasks set forth in (a), and 
with appropriate notice, commence collecting and using performance data 
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 and metrics as conditions for future public health preparedness grant 
funding. 
 
A participant remarked, 
I think it was in the fall or maybe December [2007] that HSPD-21 was 
approved. But it gave us six months to develop measures for 
countermeasure distribution. The data, the first report has to be within a 
year. I mean, it’s just totally unreasonable.  
 
The Preparedness Program grantees also exert political influence around the 
selection and development of performance measures. As observed at both a conference 
and a performance measurement workgroup meeting, grantees were forceful in sharing 
their views about the performance measurement design and the choice of measures that 
would be acceptable to the grantees. 
8.3.3 How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
8.3.3.1 Dependencies on both vertical and horizontal network partners diminish CDC and 
grantee control over outcomes, restricting the design and impact of performance 
measurement. 
As reflected in section 8.2.2.3, CDC’s control over outcomes weakens as the 
network descends both vertically and horizontally. Diminishing control over 
implementation and subsequent outcomes due to network structure was observed in all 
four cases, albeit to different degrees. First, in regard to vertical network relationships, 
CDC and grantee control is exerted based primarily on institutional and funding 
relationships. However, a central challenge of the vertical structure is CDC’s diminishing 
level of influence on program implementation (and outcomes) with each step down the 
chain. While these four CDC programs have some formal authority over grantees based 
on the cooperative agreement or grant, programs have no direct relationship with vertical 
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 partners at the local-level. Instead, CDC is dependent on grantees’ control over local-
level implementation which will be influenced, in part, by grantees’ choice of funding 
tool and model of decentralization. From the Cancer Detection Program, 
I think it [control over the local level] depends on how they’re [grantee 
programs] structured. I know, for instance, that a state that works with 
county health departments – maybe where the county health departments 
are their own unique entity – they [state grantee] don’t have as much 
control over service delivery as a grantee that has individual contracts with 
providers where the state could cancel their contract, or decrease their 
funding, or something like that. 
 
A representative from the STD Program also discussed how the infrastructure 
within a state affects control over the local level.  
Their [grantees] administration is different. In some areas the disease 
intervention specialists, the DIS, who would be doing the interviewing, 
they’re state employees in a central location. And in other areas they’re 
[DIS] maybe county employees. And so those kinds of things make it a 
little more difficult [to control implementation]…there is so much 
variation in staffing and the types of staffing and it just makes it more 
difficult.   
 
Of the four cases, the Cancer Detection Program is most adept at using 
management tools to enhance control and authority within the vertical network, even 
down to the local-level. CDC closely monitors clinical service delivery through its large 
monitoring dataset and is able to intervene with grantees as necessary. The Division of 
Cancer Prevention and Control has not shied away from imposing sanctions on grantees 
(e.g., withholding funds, requiring a corrective action plan) when quality of care issues 
are involved. A representative of the Cancer Detection Program noted, 
In our case, we have the MDEs [minimum data elements] that we’re 
always analyzing. We’re always looking at it [the data]. We’re always 
providing feedback to the states and working with them. And we do 
impose sanctions, if I could call it that, when a program that we fund gets 
too far out of compliance.   
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Use of the Cancer Detection Program performance measures as part of the 
budgeting formula also serves as an incentive for grantees to enhance their mechanisms 
of control over local-level performance. Several participants mentioned grantees’ use of 
performance-based contracts and reimbursement policies as means to exert influence over 
local-level partners.  
In contrast, the Division of STD Prevention has afforded greater latitude to STD 
Program grantees over the years leading to a culture of grantee autonomy that has been 
difficult for CDC to shift. A participant described the tension between the Division of 
STD Prevention and its grantees, “You know, [grantees think] it’s my money, and I get to 
do this with it, and I’m running my program. But, aren’t there expectations?” This 
institutionalized culture has compromised CDC’s influence over grantees. The Office on 
Smoking and Health also provides extensive leeway to its Tobacco Control Program 
grantees as reflected in the statement below.   
We [CDC] have traditionally been non-prescriptive. We want states to use 
our money for what they need our money for. If that [a particular goal 
area] is not a priority to the state, then we may not require them to do 
anything on it. We want the programs to be as effective as they possibly 
can and as specific as they possibly can to the needs of their state. 
 
Dependencies on horizontal partners impose the greatest challenge for control and 
authority in these four networks given that the relationships are typically unfunded and 
informal – that is, neither CDC nor grantees have any formal authority over their efforts. 
Horizontal partnerships serve different purposes in the networks of these four cases. For 
the Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control Program, outcomes are jointly produced; 
therefore, significant dependencies emerge between grantees and the horizontal partners 
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 needed to achieve results. As noted earlier, an effective response to an emergency, 
whether a hurricane or bioterrorist attack, cannot be addressed by CDC grantees alone – 
they are dependent on partners in varied sectors and at multiple levels of government to 
contribute to the effort. But without formal authority, Preparedness Program grantees 
must rely on their ability to influence horizontal partners, an endeavor that itself can be 
made more difficult when priority and goal conflicts exist. The Director of a state grantee 
program for the Preparedness Program said,    
You’re dependent on all these programs to have the agency be prepared. 
You need to have them come to the table for planning, and for 
participating in training and exercises. But you’re just another “ask” on 
top of the work they already have to do. 
 
Like the Preparedness Program, the Tobacco Control Program operates from a 
collaborative, networked model. Tobacco control will only be achieved through the 
implementation of multiple, complimentary interventions and community mobilization 
that address diverse areas such as policy, public education, and clinical care. Because 
CDC funds are primarily retained by the grantees to support infrastructure, data revealed 
less about their relationships with network partners, including grantees’ ability to exert 
control over either vertical or horizontal partners. However, one can assume that similar 
issues of control may exist. 
The STD Program and Cancer Detection Program grantees along with their local-
level vertical partners rely on horizontal network members to facilitate access to target 
populations and support the integration of service delivery. As in the cases of the 
Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control Program, formal control over horizontal 
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 partners is absent. For STD Program grantees, the ability to influence them is further 
challenged by mission and goal conflicts. One interviewee noted, 
There’s challenges in working with entities whose mission is not public 
health. You know, even those of us who have set up jail screening 
programs, or worked with provider visitation, or worked with laboratories, 
it’s still a challenge that comes up. Convincing people to do our work for 
us without any money is what we’re doing and [helping them] understand 
how they fit into the public health equation is difficult. It’s a challenge. 
 
In these cases, the loss of control over implementation and outcomes imposed by 
the network structure has implications for their performance measurement systems. In 
particular, the Preparedness Program, STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program all 
experience grantee resistance to performance measures viewed as “outside their control,” 
specifically, those indicators for which grantees (or their local-level implementers) are 
dependent on horizontal partners over whom they have no authority. In the statement 
below, a representative with the STD Program argues that grantees should not be held 
accountable through performance measurement for processes that are not “our work.” 
If we are trying to measure our work, the STD Program, it makes more 
sense to me to measure from date of assignment rather than specimen 
collection. [Grantees can’t control how long it takes laboratories to 
process and report a case to the health department]. It [influencing the 
laboratories] is potentially a piece that we can help to better, but it isn't 
actually our work. 
 
A staff person with the Cancer Detection Program described grantees’ concerns over a 
performance measure they viewed as “outside their control.” 
If a referral is made [by a network partner] to a woman with an abnormal 
PAP to go to the B&C program [an Cancer Detection Program-funded 
provider] down the street, they [grantee] don’t have control over how long 
it takes that woman to show up, and that delays their follow-up time [a 
performance measure]. And we counted the clock [calculated the measure] 
from the time that woman was diagnosed with an abnormal result, not 
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 from the date they entered our program. So programs felt disadvantaged 
because they can only control the timeframe from the time the woman 
walks in the door, as opposed to when they were originally screened and 
diagnosed to have an abnormal test. 
 
Staff in the Preparedness Program and STD Program also expressed concern 
about the reliance on horizontal partners for data collection and reporting. For instance, 
STD Program grantees are dependent on jails and juvenile detention facilities to screen 
new admittees. Given that these partners are typically unfunded by STD Program 
grantees, concerns about both data access and data quality arise. One participant 
discussed why grantees are opposed to measures that depend on jail personnel. 
I think it’s pretty clear why grantees don’t like that – you’re calling it 
performance, which is a reflection on them. They may not be performing 
well because someone in their community isn’t supporting them or there 
are things that are beyond their control. And other people just have the 
luck of being in a place where they have a cooperative prison system or 
something.  
 
In response to grantee resistance, all three programs the Preparedness Program, 
STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program – have altered one or more of their 
measures to strengthen grantee control over performance. As discussed in more depth in 
the individual case chapters, the Division of State and Local Readiness has added a 
criterion of “under public health’s control” for the selection of future performance 
measures for the Preparedness Program; STD Program grantees rejected several proposed 
measures for 2009 that were viewed as “outside their control;” and the Division of 
Cancer Prevention and Control recently revised the calculation of a measure to reflect 
performance that is strictly under the control of agencies in the vertical network. In all 
cases, the consequence has been a tendency to select measures that are more closely tied 
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 to the work of the grantee or those in the vertical chain. Typically, these include process, 
output, and short-term outcome indicators. A representative from the Preparedness 
Program described how CDC has tried to revise measures in ways that maximize control 
for the grantee. 
There’s a whole lot of things that they [grantees] don’t have control over 
because of working with such diverse partners. For example, if they’re 
doing an exercise with five other partners at the state, but they’re not 
leading it [the exercise], that could cause delays in certain things. It 
wouldn’t be their fault. So we had to really play with the language to find 
out how we can phrase this measure so that they provide what they’re 
responsible for verses depending on somebody else to facilitate something.  
I think that’s a good move.   
 
Overall, the network implementation structures represented in these cases lead to 
diminished CDC and grantee control over outcomes. Grantees, whose buy-in is needed to 
assure data quality and data use, are resistant to the inclusion of performance measures 
that rely on unfunded, informal horizontal partners. For the Preparedness Program and 
Cancer Detection Program that will use performance data to inform budgeting 
decisions56, grantees seem to have a “zero-tolerance” for measures viewed as “outside 
their control” given the implications of the performance data. As a consequence, the 
choice and types of measures included in the performance measurement systems for the 
Preparedness Program, STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program have all been 
constrained by the need to assure that grantees have “control” over related performance. 
                                            
56 The Division of Cancer Prevention and Control currently uses seven of its 11 
performance measures as part of a broader, funding formula. The Division of State and 
Local Readiness will begin using performance measures to inform budgeting in 2010 
based on the requirements of some federal policies (e.g., Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act of 2007). 
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 A representative from the Preparedness Program articulated the important compromise 
this limitation presents in a networked context, 
In the long term, I don’t know if we can move that way [including 
measures over which grantees have less control]. I don’t know if we can 
get the buy-in from them [grantees] if their situation at the home front 
doesn’t change to where they feel like, ‘Yeah, we can be responsible and 
accountable for measures that really test that synergy of working among 
different partners. I think that’s important. That’s critical. Because that’s 
what makes or breaks a good response in public health or any other area.   
 
8.4 Summary 
Cross-case findings suggest that networked public management has important 
implications for the design of performance measurement systems in the four cases studied 
here. While the involvement of vertical and horizontal partners is essential to effectively 
address these complex public health problems, networks impose limitations and force 
compromises in the design of performance measurement systems. For these four 
programs, networks make the attribution of outcomes to specific agencies or programs 
difficult, if not impossible. For the Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control 
Program, where program outcomes are dependent on collaborative network efforts, 
accountability becomes fragmented. In addition, networks create dependencies that 
challenge grantees’ ability to control performance for important outputs and outcomes, 
especially when they are reliant on unfunded, horizontal partners over whom they have 
no formal authority.  
Variability across the grantee network in regard to the extent or nature of the 
public health problem, context, organizational features, and network capacity influenced 
the types and choice of measures selected, challenged CDC to define common measures, 
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 set national targets, and forced programs to incorporate flexibility into their performance 
measurement systems. Finally, the political power of network stakeholders, especially the 
influence of grantees and federal policy initiatives, has shaped the performance 
measurement systems for these four cases. Even for the Cancer Detection Program where 
the nature of the program (i.e., service delivery) has facilitated the selection of common 
performance measures and primary reliance on vertical partners has limited 
dependencies, variability across the network and stakeholders’ influence have affected 
the design, choice of measures, and target setting.  
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 CHAPTER 9 
 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the study purpose, theoretical 
framework, research questions, and design. Next a summary of the findings are presented 
situated within the broader literature related to networked public management and 
performance measurement. Third, implications for theory, practice, and policy are 
provided reflecting on the theory building of Jennings and Haist and considering the 
relevance of this study for federal-level performance measurement in public health. 
Fourth, recommendations for future research are provided. The chapter closes with a 
summary of the study’s conclusions. As in chapter 8, shortened program names will be 
used for the four cases (see table 27, chapter 8). 
9.1 Summary of Study Purpose and Design 
The purpose of the study was to investigate the implications of networked public 
management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance 
measurement systems. My intention was to contribute both to the practice of performance 
measurement and to expand early theory building initiated by Jennings and Haist (2004). 
While much has been written about the importance of performance measurement for 
managing in the public sector, little research has addressed its practice in settings where 
implementation is carried out through collaborative networks. In particular, there is a lack 
of empirical research exploring how networked contexts affect the design, 
implementation, and utilization of performance measurement. Given the limited 
understanding of this topic, a qualitative, descriptive study design was utilized. 
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 Qualitative methods are most suitable when a subject is insufficiently understood and 
researchers are exploring “how” and “what” (Creswell 2007).  
Although exploratory in nature and not intended to test a particular hypothesis, 
the research was informed by a set of 25 hypotheses proposed by Jennings and Haist 
(2004) related to the impact of performance measurement (appendix A). Jennings and 
Haist offer a set of hypotheses about the potential impact of performance measurement 
given varied conditions and factors, with the intent to set a theoretical foundation for 
performance measurement and spur empirical study. While none of Jennings and Haist’s 
25 hypotheses explicitly addresses decentralized or networked implementation structures, 
two related to agency type were selected to guide this study given their emphasis on 
organizational context and function: 
• Hypothesis #13: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the 
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes 
can be observed.” (p.185) 
• Hypothesis #14: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater 
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes.” (p.185) 
These two hypotheses provided the theoretical focus for the study; from them, 
three research questions were developed to further guide the investigation, each centered 
on the role of networked public management. 
• How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC 
program outputs and outcomes? 
• How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used? 
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 • How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Given the exploratory nature of the research, a multiple, instrumental case study 
design was used. Four public health programs funded by CDC and implemented 
nationally through vertical and horizontal network structures were included as unique 
cases. For the four cases, data collection included 50 in-depth interviews with 52 
individuals, formal review of 57 documents and websites, and 12 formal observations. 
Standard qualitative analysis techniques, including those derived from grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2006) were applied. A detailed summary of the research methodology is 
provided in chapter 3. Results of individual case analysis are presented in chapters 4 
through 7; findings are summarized in appendix N. Cross-case findings, presented in 
chapter 8 and organized around each research question, provided greater insight by 
studying the similarities and differences across the four cases in how the networks affect 
design and implementation of federal-level performance measurement systems. 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
Cross-case findings suggest that the networked implementation structures for 
these four federal-level public health programs have important implications for the design 
of the performance measurement systems. Specifically, the performance measurement 
systems were affected by four consequences of the implementation networks:  
• the political influence of collaborative stakeholders,  
• network variability, 
• dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners to achieve outputs 
and outcomes, and  
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 • jointly produced outcomes that compromise assigning agency-specific 
attribution and accountability.  
While these four factors did not deter the use of performance measurement by any 
of the programs, all had important consequences for the development and subsequent 
design of the performance measurement systems, including limiting the choice and types 
of measures, level of measurement, potential uses of the measures (e.g., accountability, 
comparing performance across grantees), and resources needed to implement and support 
the system. In addition, results suggest that the adoption of these systems across vastly 
decentralized implementation structures takes considerable time. After briefly describing 
the networks involved in the four cases studied, I will address each of the four factors 
listed above in turn. The section closes with a discussion about CDC’s decision to use 
performance measurement in these four cases. 
9.2.1 Network Description 
The networks of these four public health programs involve formal and informal 
network partners, some intergovernmental, but others representing different agency types 
(e.g., community-based organization) and sectors. Although all four programs involve 
networks with both vertical and horizontal dimensions, the Preparedness Program and the 
Tobacco Control Program are more reliant on horizontal partners to achieve outcomes 
than the STD Program or the Cancer Detection Program. In general, these networks 
maintain traditional hierarchical, vertical relations based on funding relationships, but 
they also extend horizontally in order to reach high risk populations, integrate service 
delivery, and facilitate coordinated prevention strategies more effectively. This finding is 
consistent with earlier descriptions on network structure (Heinrich, Hill and Lynn 2004; 
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 Milward and Provan 2004), although this study identified ways in which programs 
benefited from these horizontal relationships that had not been discussed previously (e.g., 
extending program reach to high risk populations, facilitating coordinated prevention 
strategies). During the past several years, researchers have proposed various typologies of 
network types (Agranoff 2003; Milward and Provan 2006); these cases may best reflect 
service implementation networks characterized by Milward and Provan (2006). 
While public health has traditionally relied on vertical relationships with state and 
local partners to implement programming appropriate to the needs of individual 
communities, the involvement of horizontal partners in these four cases may be explained 
by the growing recognition about the complexity of the problems faced (e.g., 
preparedness, health care system issues) and the need to bring multiple sectors, 
nontraditional partners, diverse strategies, and greater resources to bear. This supports, in 
part, O’Toole’s (1997) proposition that awareness of more “wicked” social problems is 
contributing to increased networks in public management. 
9.2.2 The Political Influence of Collaborative Stakeholders 
As detailed in chapters 1 and 2, network governance represents a shift from 
traditional, hierarchical government to an approach that recognizes the public sector’s 
interdependent relationships with vertical and horizontal partners at multiple levels (Kettl 
2002; Stoker 1998). For the four cases in this study, a collaborative relationship between 
CDC and its grantees is reinforced through the choice of policy tool for funding, a 
cooperative agreement. Although CDC maintains some authority, grantees enjoy a level 
of autonomy that allows them to structure program implementation in ways appropriate 
to community needs and priorities. In regard to local-level partners, CDC concedes direct 
 376
 control entirely. And the extent of grantees’ control and authority over local-level 
implementers may be dependent, in part, on the funding tool used, the existing state, 
tribal, or territorial infrastructure for implementation, and relevant laws or policy57. CDC 
and grantees both lack formal authority over voluntary, horizontal partners that may exist 
at multiple levels, although dependencies exist as their participation is needed to achieve 
program outputs and outcomes. Some suggest that the interdependencies, whether 
between vertical partners or vertical and horizontal partners, created in a networked 
environment lead to power differentials, rendering networked governance an inherently 
political concept (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). 
This is the case as it applies to the development of the performance measurement systems 
studied here. Findings suggest that grantees and their partners hold substantial political 
influence in their relationship with CDC that forces a degree of bargaining and 
compromise in the design of the performance measurement systems. For the majority of 
cases studied, the development of the performance measurement systems is a negotiated 
and collaborative endeavor between CDC, the grantees, and, in some cases, other 
stakeholders. 
The importance of involving stakeholders has long been recognized by experts of 
performance measurement to ensure that systems are feasible and that buy-in, needed to 
support data quality and data use, is achieved (Hatry 2007; Poister 2003). But results 
from this study also suggest that for these cases, network stakeholders at multiple levels 
                                            
57 The relationship between grantees and their local-level partners was not the focus of 
this study. A limited number of stakeholders representing the grantees were included in 
the study given limits on the number of non-federal employees that could be included in 
the research. Consequently, less is understood about the authority relationships between 
grantees and their local-level, funded partners (sub-grantees). 
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 exercise political influence that shapes aspects of the performance measurement systems 
including the choice and types of measures and system design. Grantees are willing to 
flex their political muscle to influence CDC decision-making related to the performance 
measurement systems, especially if performance data will be used to inform budgeting. 
This finding lends support to another of Jennings and Haist’s (2004) hypothesis #12: 
“Significant mobilization of interests adverse to the measures will reduce the impact of 
performance measurement” (p.182). Findings suggest that in these networked contexts, a 
participative process of system design was required. Like Radin (2006) who dismisses 
the one-size-fits-all approach for performance measurement, the network context 
demands a more nuanced, collaborative, and negotiated strategy to develop systems 
appropriate to the needs not only of CDC, but to a variety of stakeholders. This idea of a 
collaborative approach to the development of performance measurement systems has 
been forwarded by Goddard and Mannion (2004) as more appropriate in a networked, 
horizontal environment (see chapter 2, table 6). 
9.2.3 Network Variability 
In this study, network variability was identified as an important consequence of 
network structure and a key factor influencing the performance measurement systems. 
Variability within the networks of each program was observed in the extent and nature of 
the public health problem; the state, tribe, or territorial context; grantee priorities, 
resources, and capacity; and network capacity. This variability challenged programs to 
identify common measures, led to the selection of “low hanging fruit” for initial sets of 
measures, necessitated that programs incorporate a degree of flexibility in their 
measurement systems to accommodate the diversity across grantees, affected the level of 
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 measurement for one program, required programs to incorporate extensive data quality 
systems, and compromised the utility of comparing performance across grantees within a 
particular program (e.g., Preparedness Program, STD Program). Variability continues to 
challenge programs once performance measures are developed and implemented; in 
particular, the sheer number of grantees along with variability in network capacity 
contributes to on-going challenges in regard to data quality and validity. Studies of 
GPRA by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others have identified 
similar issues related to variability for programs implemented through decentralized 
intergovernmental structures (GAO 1997a; GAO 1998a; GAO 2004; Mihm 2004). 
The extent of variability within each of these four programs should not be 
underestimated. Not only does the Cancer Detection Program work with 68 different and 
unique grantee programs, but an additional 22,000 local providers are involved in service 
delivery and, consequently, with the collection and reporting of data that support the 
performance measures. This magnitude of decentralization, the related variability, and the 
implications for performance measurement cannot be easily dismissed. As Fossett, Gais, 
and Thompson (2001) contend, “Proclaiming the virtues of mission-driven federalism is, 
of course, one thing and success in implementing it quite another. Intergovernmental 
arrangements complicate virtually all aspects of performance management – agreement 
on key goals, the development of indicators, the timely collection of pertinent and valid 
performance data, the interpretation of these data, the implementation of an incentive 
system (e.g., rewards for strong performers), and more” (p. 208). 
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 9.2.4 Dependencies on Voluntary, Horizontal Network Partners to Achieve Outputs 
and Outcomes 
Study results provide empirical support for some of the critical challenges related 
to managing in networks that have been described in the literature. In nearly all cases, 
grantees struggled to engage voluntary, unfunded network partners needed to achieve 
outcomes. Grantees in Preparedness Program found it difficult to bring other partners to 
the table for preparedness planning; local-level public health agencies with STD Program 
wrestled to make in-roads with jails to allow for STD screening; and grantees with the 
Cancer Detection Program were frustrated in attempting to ensure timely referrals from 
unfunded, partner agencies for women needing diagnostic services. O’Toole and Meier 
(2004) and Agranoff (2003) have dubbed this the joint production problem -- the 
challenge of achieving program success in an environment that involves voluntary 
collaboration with actors over whom public managers have little formal authority. 
Among the four cases studied here, there was also evidence of mission and priority 
conflicts that challenged collaboration further. 
In this study, the consequence of the joint production problem was grantees’ 
effective dismissal of performance measures reflecting jointly produced outputs or 
outcomes. Such measures were viewed as “outside of the control” of grantees given 
inherent dependencies on the compliance of others over whom they had no formal 
authority. Such power dependencies created in networked environments have been 
described by others (Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). In several cases, grantees successfully 
argued that it was “unfair” to include such measures – the Division of State and Local 
Readiness had gone so far as to include an inclusion criteria for measure selection that 
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 assured proposed indicators were “within the control of public health.” By effectively 
excluding important outputs and outcomes given this lack of control, potential limitations 
on the impact of performance measurement are created. In particular, performance 
measures will more likely reflect process and short-term outcome measures more closely 
tied to the efforts of those funded in the vertical chain. 
9.2.5 Jointly Produced Outcomes that Compromise Assigning Agency-Specific 
Attribution and Accountability 
As discussed in chapter 2, accountability is another major challenge in networked 
environments. The dilemma of accountability in a governance framework is well 
established in the literature (Kettle 2002; O’Toole 1997; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 
1998). In the four cases studied here, the layers of decentralization and joint production 
of outcomes both contribute to a fragmentation of accountability structures. While all 
four cases prioritized accountability as a primary purpose for their performance 
measurement systems, programs either had to re-conceptualize the notion to one of 
“shared accountability” as seems to be the case with the Tobacco Control Program, or 
select measures more closely tied to the work of the grantees for which agency-based 
accountability can be assigned. The latter represents another potential limitation to the 
impact of performance measurement; similar to the joint production problem, process and 
short-term outcome measures may predominate.  
Among the four cases, performance measurement seemed most effective for the 
Cancer Detection Program, a service delivery program. For this program, issues of 
variability are diminished because grantees provide, for the most part, the same set of 
services. In addition, dependencies are limited given primary reliance on vertical, funded 
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 network partners. And accountability problems are minimized since providers in the 
vertical chain, over whom there is some authority, are mainly responsible for producing 
program outcomes of interest. Although the case benefits from these attributes, the extent 
of decentralization (i.e., over 22,000 local providers) is significant and presents obstacles 
for performance measurement. But to its credit, the Division of Cancer Prevention and 
Control has been relatively successful in managing these challenges. The Division 
effectively uses policy and management tools (e.g., cooperative agreement, a large 
monitoring data base) to preserve authority and support accountability within the vertical 
chain. Although not the focus of this study, there is some evidence that some grantees of 
the Cancer Detection Program use performance-based contracts or reimbursement 
strategies that strengthen their authority over local-level providers, thus preserving 
vertical authority throughout the implementation chain. In addition, the Division of 
Cancer Prevention and Control has made an enormous investment in its performance 
management system (e.g., data contractor, available software, extensive monitoring 
system, data validation study) that contributes to institutionalized data use and to strong 
data quality and validity, perennial challenges in such decentralized structures.  
But, as a service delivery program, the Cancer Detection Program is an anomaly 
in public health at CDC; most programs are more similar to the other three cases -- 
grantee variability is extensive, outcomes may be more difficult to measure and 
dependent on voluntary, network partners to produce, and the ability to hold individual 
agencies accountable is difficult. These cases represent more complex situations for 
assessing performance than within a hierarchical context where accountability structures 
are clear (Frederickson 2003; Goaddard and Mannion 2004).  
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 9.2.6 Use of Performance Measurement 
Interestingly, cross-case analysis suggests the compromises to the potential 
impact of performance measurement imposed by the network structure were not a factor 
in determining whether or not to use performance measurement. Instead, findings suggest 
an expectation of use implicit in the administrative and political climate that drives the 
uptake of performance measurement by staff with these programs. This finding supports 
others’ view that “performance” has been embraced by public managers, often without 
critical deliberation (Behn 2003; Blalock and Barnow 2001; Coplin, Merget, and 
Bourdeaux 2002; Grizzle 2002; Radin 2006). Although Jennings and Haist (2004) 
hypothesize that the use of performance measurement will be tied to the observability of 
outputs and outcomes, the authors also acknowledge that political and social imperatives 
can take precedence in demanding performance-based accountability. This seems to be 
the situation here. Participants across all four cases reiterated the adage, “what gets 
measured, gets done” as endorsement for their commitment to develop and implement 
federal-level performance measurement systems to support accountability. At CDC, this 
expectation of use may reflect the institutionalization of performance measurement for 
assessing public health programs. Similar to the Office of Management and Budget using 
GPRA measures to hold federal agencies accountable, CDC is developing program-
specific performance measurement systems to hold grantees accountable and improve 
programs, although without critical assessment of its potential impact as a monitoring 
tool given the complexity of the program or its networked context. 
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 9.3 Implications for Theory, Practice, and Policy 
Although these research findings are not generalizable beyond the four cases 
included in the study, results nonetheless offer insights for public health, public 
management, and public policy. This exploratory study provides empirical evidence for 
potential limitations in the use of performance measurement outside of traditional, 
hierarchical contexts where its practice has primarily been described. As the adoption of 
networked governance expands and federal-level public health leaders continue calls for 
greater integration of program strategies, a better understanding of how performance 
measurement works in these settings and its potential limitations as a management tool is 
needed. In this section, implications of this study for the theory of performance 
measurement, its practice, and related policy are presented. Particular attention is given to 
federal-level performance measurement in public health. 
9.3.1 Implications for Theory and Research 
As summarized in 9.1, two hypotheses from Jennings and Haist (2004) guided 
this study.  
• Hypothesis #13: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the 
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes 
can be observed.” (p.185) 
• Hypothesis #14: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater 
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes.” (p.185) 
With these two hypotheses, Jennings and Haist theorize that performance 
measurement will vary in its impact depending on the type of agency involved. Using 
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 Wilson’s (1989) typology of agency-type, the authors suggest that performance 
measurement used in production agencies, those organizations with observable outputs 
and outcomes, will have greater impact than when applied in craft, procedural, or coping 
agencies, all of which have either outputs or outcomes (or both) that are not observable. 
Jennings and Haist define observability in two ways – the ability to measure outputs and 
outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to the efforts of a particular agency. As 
noted in chapter 1, none of the hypotheses developed by Jennings and Haist, including 
the two used to guide this research, explicitly addresses the potential influence of 
decentralized program implementation structures characteristic of the four cases included 
here. Consequently, this study has provided the opportunity to better understand how 
network implementation structures influence the design and implementation of 
performance measurement.  
For the four cases studied here, findings suggest that network structures invite 
extensive political influence of stakeholders, introduce significant variability within the 
network, weaken control over outcomes given dependencies on horizontal network 
partners, and compromise observability (when defined as attribution) based on jointly 
produced outputs and outcomes  These aspects of the programs’ networked 
implementation structures influenced the design of their performance measurement 
systems by limiting the choice and types of measures, level of measurement, potential 
uses of the measures (e.g., accountability, comparing performance across grantees), and 
resources needed to implement and support the system. Based on results, one may 
speculate that the networked structure compromises the impact of performance 
measurement.  
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 Consequently, I propose adding three58 new hypotheses, expanding upon those 
offered by Jennings and Haist (2004), in order to elaborate the implications of networked 
environments for performance measurement: 
• Network variability (e.g., extent and nature of the problem, program context, 
network capacity) imposes limitations on the design and utilization of 
performance measurement. 
• Dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners for program 
implementation weaken principal and agent control over outputs and 
outcomes and, consequently, reduce the impact of performance measurement. 
• Networked implementation structures compromise the degree to which 
outputs and outcomes can be observed, limiting the inclusion of outcome 
measures and, therefore, lessening the impact of performance measurement. 
9.3.2 Implications for Practice and Policy 
Results of this research may have implications for the practice of federal-level 
performance measurement when applied to decentralized, public health programs 
implemented through collaborative networks. Given that this was a small, qualitative 
study, individual readers must assess the relevance of these recommendations for their 
particular program and setting. Several recommendations for practice are proposed 
including: 
• Evaluate the decision to develop a performance measurement system and set 
reasonable expectations for what the system can accomplish.  
                                            
58 A new hypothesis related to the political influence of stakeholders is not proposed 
given that Jennings and Haist’s hypothesis #12 discussed in section 9.2.2 above 
adequately encompasses this issue. 
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 • Involve network stakeholders in the development process.  
• Utilize available management tools to strengthen authority within vertical 
network structures. 
• Allocate adequate resources to support the success of the system.  
• Recognize that time is needed for the adoption of performance measurement 
systems in vastly decentralized and networked settings. 
• Consider more rigorous evaluation methods if agency-based attribution is 
important to determine. 
First, my findings suggest that programs may benefit from critically assessing 
aspects of the program itself and the implementation network that may influence the 
potential impact of performance measurement before endeavoring on the development 
process. Not unlike evaluability assessment, described by Wholey (2004), results here 
suggest that program staff should consider several factors in weighing the decision to 
develop a measurement system and setting expectations for its contribution to program 
management. Factors such as the complexity of the program (e.g., the ability to measure 
outputs and outcomes); the types of stakeholders with an investment in the program; the 
extent of vertical and horizontal decentralization that encompasses program 
implementation; the level and kinds of variability across implementation sites; 
dependencies on horizontal, voluntary partners needed to achieve outputs and outcomes; 
and the available management tools to support authority relationships within the vertical 
network dimension should all be considered. In better understanding the extent of 
program complexity and networked implementation context, program staff will gain 
insights for structuring the development process and set more reasonable expectations 
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 about the types of measures that can be included in a system, the possible uses for the 
performance measurement system (e.g., accountability, program improvement, 
budgeting), resources needed to support a system, and the potential impact of the 
performance measurement system. 
Second, results suggest that characteristics of performance measurement may 
differ from what has been traditionally described (i.e., use in two-party, hierarchical 
contexts where accountability structures are relatively straightforward) when applied in 
networked settings. In particular, conducting a participative and collaborative process to 
develop performance measurement is recommended in order to design systems 
responsive not only to federal-level interests, but also to the needs of state and local 
stakeholders. In addition, flexibility in system design may be needed to accommodate the 
diversity of grantees and their contexts. If performance measures are included that reflect 
jointly produced outputs or outcomes, developers must be sensitive to how data are used. 
For instance, grantees will likely oppose the use of performance data to inform budgeting 
decisions if they have minimal control over the performance on the measures. Further, 
agency-specific accountability may need to be recast as “shared accountability” for 
jointly produced outputs and outcomes. 
Next, while participative approaches may be more appropriate for the 
development of performance measurement systems in networks, programs should use 
available mechanisms to support control and authority. As evident from this study, these 
opportunities will primarily rest within the vertical network relationships and involve 
funding tools, management practices, and partner relationships. Performance 
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 measurement in networked contexts may necessitate achieving a balance between where 
authority can be exercised and where collaboration is needed.  
Fourth, in vastly decentralized and networked programs like the cases studied 
here, performance measurement systems require a significant investment of resources to 
ensure data validity and data use. The Cancer Detection Program has spent over fifteen 
years and millions of dollars to develop its monitoring system that provides the data 
needed to calculate their performance measures – this commitment has contributed to a 
performance measurement system that supports accountability, program improvement, 
and budgeting. As described in chapter 6, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control 
maintains a data contractor who supports data management software available to all 
grantees and provides technical consultants who are assigned to individual grantees to 
provide on-going data management support. In addition, a systematic, semi-annual data 
review process is institutionalized to support program improvement. Finally, training is 
routinely provided given staff turnover at both the state and local levels and quality 
assurance efforts are on-going. Consequently, leaders of national programs must carefully 
consider the resources needed to support an effective performance measurement system 
before committing to the effort. However, once in place, the performance measurement 
systems can be leveraged to help build capacity in the areas of monitoring and evaluation 
among state and local level partners. 
Results also hint that, given the vast decentralization reflected in these four cases, 
adoption of performance measurement by grantees and local-level partners likely requires 
significant time. Although training and technical support may facilitate adoption, the 
development and implementation of data management systems, development of data 
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 collection protocols and related technical assistance materials, provision of training, and 
pilot testing will take time. Even when a data management software package is made 
available, grantees may choose to develop their own in order to integrate with existing 
state-based data systems. More importantly, building grantees’ understanding and 
appreciation of the system’s value will take time and depend, in part, on the perceived 
success of the system. Particularly challenging is making local-level partners aware of the 
system. But as reflected in the following comment from a CDC staff person with the 
Cancer Detection Program, this seems an important goal,  
I think communicating [the measures] to every level is essential…I’m 
talking about the fact that it is decentralized. You have a federal central 
level, and then you have a state, and then the state is divided up into a 
variety of counties and communities. And each one of those may have 
either a centralized provider group or individual providers. So in order to 
make this work [performance measurement], the lowest level of function 
has to be working on this in order to make it work at all.   
 
Finally, if programs need to assess agency-based accountability – that is, to 
confidently attribute specific outcomes to a particular program – other means of 
evaluation should be considered. The methodological limits regarding performance 
measurement and attribution are well established (Hatry 2001; Poister 2003). 
Unfortunately, there remains an inaccurate assumption that performance measurement 
assumes causality (Blalock and Barnow 2001; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; 
Radin 2006). This limitation must be more effectively communicated to both policy 
makers and federal agency leaders. 
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 9.4 Recommendations for Research 
Although this was a relatively small, qualitative study, it offers insight for areas of 
future investigation that will help researchers better understand and define the practice of 
performance measurement in networked contexts. First, further qualitative studies that 
encompass all levels of the network may help illuminate factors that influence both the 
adoption of performance measurement throughout a given network and its impact. A 
focused study of state and local level partners involved in a federally-funded grantee 
program like the ones studied here, would be useful in expanding understanding about the 
design, implementation, and adoption of federal-level performance measurement.  
Second, this study involved a particular type of network (i.e., collaborative). 
Other network types have been described (Agranoff 2003; Milward and Provan 2006)59. 
Similar descriptive studies of performance measurement as applied in other network 
types may also begin to shed light on these more challenging contexts.  
Although not the focus of this study, these results point to two areas of particular 
interest adoption time and cost. What factors facilitate adoption of performance 
measurement in these networked contexts? What are the long-term costs of developing, 
implementing, and maintaining performance measurement systems for federally-funded 
grantee programs that are vastly decentralized? Quantitative studies, including cost 
analysis, may be most appropriate to address these questions. 
                                            
59 See chapter 2, section 2.6.3. Agranoff (2003) describes information networks, 
developmental networks, outreach networks, and action networks. Milward and Provan 
(2006) describe service implementation networks, information diffusion networks, 
problems solving networks, and community capacity building networks. 
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 Finally, this study identified potential factors related to network structures that 
compromise the impact of performance measurement. These factors include the extent of 
vertical and horizontal decentralization, stakeholder involvement, network variability, the 
extent of dependencies on voluntary, horizontal partners to achieve outputs and 
outcomes, the extent of jointly produced outputs and outcomes, and funding mechanisms 
used within the vertical chain. These factors may contribute to modeling the potential 
impact of performance measurement in a variety of network contexts and testing my 
proposed hypotheses. 
9.5 Conclusions 
My interest to conduct this study stems from my experiences at CDC in managing 
and evaluating federally-funded public health programs implemented through our state 
and local partners. While strongly committed to community-based approaches, I also 
know, first-hand, the challenges network structures present for program management. At 
CDC, program implementation typically takes place two to three steps removed from the 
agency; thousands of local-level public and non-profit agencies may be involved in 
carrying out program activities or delivering services of a single national program. In 
addition, horizontal, voluntary partners are engaged at every level in order to provide 
more integrated service delivery, facilitate coordinated public health program efforts, 
extend our reach to vulnerable populations, and contribute resources. 
Given the emphasis in government today on performance measurement as a tool 
of public management, my study aimed to better understand how networked public 
management affects the design, implementation, and utilization of federal-level 
performance measurement systems. With pragmatic intentions, but also an interest to 
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 advance nascent theory building, this exploratory study contributes to a small, but 
emerging literature addressing performance measurement in the context of networked 
public management. Results suggest that for the national public health programs included 
in the study and others like them, networked structures impose important limitations on 
the practice of performance measurement and likely compromise its impact.  
While further research inclusive of the full network is needed to better 
comprehend how these implementation contexts affect performance measurement, results 
provide insight for both practice and theory. In particular, in practicing performance 
measurement, a balance must be struck between leveraging existing authority 
relationships within the vertical chain while also recognizing the limits to performance 
measurement introduced by the variability within the network, the political influence 
wielded by network partners, the inherent dependencies introduced by network 
relationships, and compromises to agency-based attribution and accountability brought by 
jointly produced outputs and outcomes. In these contexts, a more collaborative and 
negotiated approach to performance measurement is called for -- one that reflects 
compromises made among all stakeholders in order to best meet their varied needs and 
accommodate this difficult implementation context. In addition, in developing theory that 
attempts to explain the impact of performance measurement, this study suggests that 
factors related to networked contexts must be considered. 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
JENNINGS AND HAIST’S TWENTY-FIVE HYPOTHESES FOR 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
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 Twenty-five Proposed Hypotheses for Performance Measurement  
(Jennings and Haist 2004) 
 
Code Description 
H1 
The more widespread the sharing of performance 
information, the greater the likelihood of positive effects on 
performance (p.176). 
H2 
The greater the belief of service providers and administrators 
that officials and citizens care about and will use 
performance information, the greater the likelihood of 
positive effects on performance (p.176). 
H3 
The more extensive the mechanisms of control available to 
principals, the more likely it is that agents will react 
positively to performance measurement (p.176). 
H4 
The more an organization’s resources are dependent on 
measured performance, the greater the impact of 
performance measurement (p.177). 
H5 The greater the competition faced by the organization, the greater the impact of performance measurement (p.177). 
H6 
Incomplete systems of performance measures are likely to 
distort agency behavior and reduce attainment of policy 
goals (p.178). 
H7 
Performance measures have greater impact when principals 
give them more attention, have more resources to shape 
agent behavior, and use the resources to pursue performance 
goals (p.178). 
H8 
Performance measures have greater impact when service 
providers and managers believe they are accurate reflections 
of performance (p.179). 
Incentives and 
Accountability 
H9 
Performance measures have greater impact on outcomes 
when managers believe that the organization’s performance 
on the measures affects their own economic well-being, 
career opportunities, power, or professional prestige and the 
organization’s access to resources of authority and finance 
(p.179). 
H10 
The greater the agreement among principals with respect to 
goals and measures, the greater the effect of measurement 
(p.181). 
H11 
The greater the agreement between principals and agents 
with respect to goals and measures, the greater the impact of 
performance measurement (p.181). 
Political 
Context 
H12 Significant mobilization of interests adverse to the measures will reduce the impact of performance measurement (p.182). 
Agency Type H13 
The extent to which performance measures are used and the 
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which 
outputs and outcomes can be observed (p.185). 
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 H14 
Measurement will be more common and will have greater 
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes 
(p.185). 
H15 
The impact of performance measurement depends on the 
design of a set of measures appropriate to agency task and 
goals (p.186). 
H16 
The closer to the level of service delivery a performance 
measure is implemented, the greater the impact on output or 
outcomes (p.187). 
H17 
Performance measures that are compatible with the existing 
use and distribution of skills, tasks, and resources will result 
in greater and more immediate impact. Conversely, 
performance measures that require significant disruption of 
skill utilization or task organization may experience delayed 
or dysfunctional response in adoption (p.187). 
H18 Performance measures will have greater impact in more homogeneous organizational settings (p.187). 
H19 
The more consistent performance measures are with an 
agency’s culture, the greater the likelihood of a positive 
impact (p.188). 
H20 Performance measures that enhance the mission of the organization will have a positive effect on outcomes (p.188). 
H21 
Agencies with low agreement among members regarding the 
organization’s mission (agencies experiencing low policy 
consensus) are more likely to experience dysfunctional 
responses to performance measurement (p.188). 
H22 
Agencies staffed by professional whose norms are aligned 
with the goals of performance measures are more likely to 
experience positive response in adoption of performance 
indicators (p.188). 
Organizational 
Compatibility 
H23 
Agencies staffed by professionals with strong norms of 
autonomy are more likely to experience delayed or negative 
response to adoption of performance measures (p.189). 
H24 
Leadership that demonstrates high commitment to mission, 
effective goal setting ability, and ability to cope with 
(external) political and (internal) administrative challenges 
specific to performance measures will result in positive 
impact of performance measures (p.190). 
Agency 
Leadership 
H25 
For organizations staffed largely by professionals, 
recognition of professional competence of the leader is 
critical to the impact of performance measures (p.191). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT 
 
Summary of Empirical Research on Performance Measurement (PM) 
 
 Findings Research Methods 
Level of 
Study Citation 
Features of 
PM System 
Vertical and horizontal 
features of PM systems are 
present 
Systematic 
review 
National-
level, United 
Kingdom 
Goddard and 
Mannion 
2004 
Widespread adoption of 
performance budgeting among 
states based on legislative and 
administrative mandates 
Survey States 
Melkers and 
Willoughby 
1998, 2004 
Widespread adoption of 
management for results 
systems among all 50 states 
Survey States 
Mohnihan 
and Ingraham 
2003 Adoption of 
PM Adoption of PM influenced by 
technocratic and rational 
factors such as goal 
orientation, resources, etc.; 
Implementation of PM 
influenced by political and 
cultural factors 
Survey State and local 
Julnes and 
Holzer 2001 
68% of respondents said either 
all departments or at least half 
of their departments use PM 
Survey State and local 
Melkers and 
Willoughby 
2005 
40% or less of cities used PM 
in “meaningful ways” to 
support management and 
decision processes 
Survey City Poister and Streib 1999 
22% of cities used PM to track 
progress in meeting goals and 
objectives of strategic plans 
Survey City Poister and Streib 2005 
33% of counties used PM of 
some type; only 20% 
demonstrated “high use” 
Survey Counties Berman and Wang 2000 
Level of Use 
of PM 
Although the use of 
administrative data is 
imperfect for the measurement 
of results, PM information is 
still useful 
Survey Federal Heinrich 1999 2002 
Factors 
Affecting 
Use of PM Technical capacity and Survey Counties Berman and 
 Findings Research Methods 
Level of 
Study Citation 
of PM; widespread use 
increases satisfaction with the 
impact of PM 
Managerial commitment to the 
use of PM, decision making 
authority, and training in PM 
techniques have a significant 
influence on its development 
and use 
Survey Federal 
Cavalluzzo 
and Ittner 
2003 
Lack of authority to make 
changes based on performance 
information limits use 
Interviews Federal 
Hatry, 
Morley, 
Rossman, and 
Wholey 2004 
PM found useful for 
communications and 
management activities such as 
strategic planning 
Survey City/County 
Melkers and 
Willoughby 
2005; 
Willoughby 
and Melkers 
2000 
PM found useful for 
managerial purposes Interviews Federal 
Frederickson 
2003 
PM not used for budgeting 
and fiscal decision making 
Survey`Inte
rviews 
City/County/
Federal 
Melkers and 
Willoughby 
2005; 
Willoughby 
and Melkers 
2000; 
Frederickson 
2003 
Mixed results regarding the 
use of PM for program 
improvement 
Survey Federal GAO 2004 
Desire to use PM for 
improved decision making and 
accountability, not simply 
reporting 
Survey Cities Poister and Streib 1999 
Types of Use 
PM used to trigger action, 
identify and encourage best 
practices, motivate, and plan 
Interviews Federal 
Hatry, 
Morley, 
Rossman, and 
Wholey 2004
 Findings Research Methods 
Level of 
Study Citation 
Outcomes of 
PM 
Federal managers report 
having more outcome 
measures as required by 
GPRA, identified positive 
effects of GPRA on 
requirements for planning and 
reporting, and had more 
results-based goals in place 
Interviews Federal GAO 2005 
Goal related Challenges: 
• Goal conflicts 
• Translating long term 
goals into annual 
performance goals 
• Coordinating across 
federal programs 
• Mission fragmentation 
Interviews 
and Case 
Studies 
Federal 
GAO 2004; 
Frederickson 
2003; GAO 
2000a; GAO 
1999; GAO 
1997a; GAO 
1997b 
Measurement Challenges: 
• Developing outcome 
measures 
• Identifying useful 
outcome measures 
• Obtaining valid and 
reliable data 
• Obtaining timely data 
• Old data not useful 
• Outcomes can take 
years to achieve 
• Data not disaggregated 
Interviews 
and Case 
Studies 
Federal 
GAO 2004; 
GAO 2000a; 
Hatry, 
Morley, 
Rossman, and 
Wholey 2004 
Data Collection Challenges 
• Collecting outcome 
data 
Interviews 
and Case 
Studies 
Federal GAO 2004; GAO 2000a 
Causal Attribution Challenges: 
• Inability to attribute 
changes in outcomes to 
particular programs 
Interviews 
and Case 
Studies 
Federal 
GAO 2004; 
GAO 2000a; 
GAO 1997b; 
GAO 1996b 
Challenges 
in 
Implementi
ng PM 
Challenges of Decentralized 
Implementation Structures: 
Interviews 
and Case 
Federal GAO 1998a; 
GAO 1998b; 
 Findings Research Methods 
Level of 
Study Citation 
• Compromises data 
quality and introduces 
variability in data 
collection across sites 
• Difficult to control 
data collection 
collected by 3rd parties 
• Challenges to 
aggregate data 
nationally 
Capacity and Training 
Challenges: 
• Limited understanding 
about how to use 
performance 
information 
• Limited analytic and 
methodological 
expertise 
• Lack of training in PM 
techniques 
Interviews 
and Case 
Studies 
Federal 
Hatry, 
Morley, 
Rossman, and 
Wholey 
2004; GAO 
2004; GAO 
2000a 
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INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW GUIDE 
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 Individual Interview Guide 
Performance Measurement Study 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. The interview will take about 60 
minutes and I will be asking you about different aspects of the performance measurement 
system for [Program Name]. Your participation in this interview is voluntary and you can 
end the interview at any time. Data collected will be kept confidential. Results will be 
presented in aggregate for your program and quotes will not be attributed to any specific 
individual. The risks associated with your participation are minimal, however, you will 
have the opportunity to review this interview transcript before analysis is conducted and 
remove any statement(s) for which you have concern. 
 
I am conducting this interview as part of my dissertation research. The research and 
interview have been approved by both the GSU and CDC human subjects review boards 
[pending]. Would you please read and sign a copy of the consent form if you are 
comfortable with it [provide at interview]. [If the interview is conducted by telephone, 
the consent form will be sent electronically in advance and the participant will be asked 
to fax a signed copy to the researcher in advance of the interview.] Please keep one copy 
for yourself. 
 
Do you have any questions before we get started? May I have your permission to audio 
record the session?  ⁭ Yes ⁭ No 
 
1. What are the more immediate program outputs for the program? 
a. What factors affect those outputs? 
b. How does your program contribute to achieving those outputs? 
c. From your perspective, how much influence does your program have on 
affecting those outputs? 
 
2. What are the long term goals or outcomes for the program?  
a. What factors affect those outcomes? 
b. How does your program contribute to achieving those outcomes? 
c. From your perspective, how much influence does your program have on 
affecting those outcomes? 
d. Has a program logic model been developed? [If so, request a copy] 
 
3. Describe the implementation structure for your program. 
a. What are the critical activities that the grantee staff must conduct to 
achieve program goals? 
b. Typically, what types of agencies does the grantee collaborate with at the 
state or more local levels, both funded and non-funded, to achieve its goals 
and outcomes? 
c. How important is collaboration (at the grantee level) in achieving program 
goals and outcomes? If it’s important, why is it important? 
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4. Describe your performance measurement system. 
a. What is the purpose or purposes of the system? [Probe on accountability 
purpose] 
b. How did you develop and select the measures (e.g., from a logic model, 
strategic plan? with stakeholder involvement?) 
c. Describe the measures. What types of measures are they (e.g., process, 
intermediate outcome)? 
d. What factors influenced the selection of measures and/or measure types? 
e. How did the implementation structure influence the design of the system? 
How did it influence measurement selection? 
 
5. What were the most significant challenges you faced in developing your 
performance measurement system? 
a. How did you address the challenges? 
b. What compromises do you feel you had to make, if any? 
 
6. How does the performance measurement system relate to GPRA or PART 
requirements for your program? 
a. How does your Division leadership perceive the performance 
measurement system as it relates to policy? What purpose do you think the 
leadership views the performance measurement system serving? 
b. How do you perceive the performance measurement system? What 
purpose do you think the performance measurement system serves? 
 
7. How are you (CDC) using the performance data?  
a. What factors influence CDC’s use (or non-use) of the data? 
b. How are grantees using the data? 
c. What factors influence grantees’ use (or non-use) of the data? 
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 Georgia State University 
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Informed Consent for Individual Interviews 
 
Title: Federal-Level Performance Measurement in Networked Public Management 
Environments 
 
Principal Investigator: Theodore Poister, Ph.D. 
Student Investigator: Amy DeGroff, MPH 
 
Purpose 
Georgia State University and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
invite you to participate in a research study. Your participation is entirely voluntary. 
Please ask questions if there is anything you do not understand. The purpose of this 
research is to better understand the performance measurement systems developed for 
some of CDC’s public health programs that are implemented nationally through 
decentralized program structures. The information will be used to better understand the 
issues related to developing and implementing performance measurement in these 
contexts.  
 
Procedures 
This research is being conducted by Amy DeGroff, a CDC employee and doctoral 
candidate at Georgia State University, as part of her dissertation research. The research 
involves approximately 32 individual interviews with staff and key stakeholders who 
have been involved in the development, implementation, and / or management of the 
performance measurement system. One focus group comprised of a subset of 8 
interviewees will also be conducted. Based on your involvement with the [program 
name] performance measurement system, you have been selected to participate in a 60 
minute interview. The interviews are one-time episodes, although the researcher may 
contact participants again for clarification of comments made in the interviews. Again, 
your participation is entirely voluntary. Interviews will be conducted at your convenience 
in a private office at CDC. If it is not possible to conduct the interview in person, the 
interview will be conducted by telephone; the researcher will conduct the interview from 
a private office.   
 
Confidentiality 
Any information you provide will not be associated with your name and the information 
you provide will be kept private to the extent allowed by law. The researcher will not 
reveal the names of participants to anyone. The interview will be audio recorded with 
your permission; individual names will not be included in any transcriptions, the 
dissertation, reports, or manuscripts. However, the larger program (e.g., the National 
Diabetes Prevention and Control Program) will be named and identified in transcriptions, 
the dissertation, reports, and/or manuscripts. The broad role of a person associated with a 
quote, such as CDC staff or CDC stakeholder, may be noted in the dissertation, reports, 
and/or manuscripts. The researcher will permanently delete all audio files from 
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 interviews as written transcriptions of the interviews are completed. Transcriptions will 
be maintained in a locked filing cabinet. 
 
Risks 
Risks associated with participation are minimal but may involve inferred identity by 
colleagues who may have a close understanding of the program and its performance 
measurement system. You will have an opportunity to read the interview transcript and 
delete any statements for which you have concern. The researcher may contact 
participants again for clarification of comments made in the interview.  
 
Benefits 
Although you will not benefit personally by participating in this study, your participation 
will contribute toward a better understanding of the development of performance 
measurement systems at CDC and, optimally, to the improved practice of performance 
measurement at CDC.  
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You have the right to refuse to 
answer any question. You also have the right to end your participation at any time. 
Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
Contact Persons 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Theodore Poister at 404-413-
0129 or Amy DeGroff at adegroff@cdc.gov or 770-488-2415. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a study participant, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of 
Research Integrity at Georgia State University at 404-413-3513. You may also contact 
CDC’s Acting Deputy Associate Director for Science at 1-800-584-8814 and leave a 
message with your name, phone number, and refer to CDC protocol # 2550, and someone 
will call you back. 
 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio recorded, please sign and 
date below. 
 
You have been told about the study. You have been allowed to ask questions. You had all 
of your questions answered. You would like to be in the study.  
 
 
 
____________________________________                        _______________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date 
 
 
____________________________________  _______________________ 
Signature of Principal Investigator    Date 
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 Document Review Form 
Performance Measurement Study 
 
 
 
Date Reviewed  
Document Name  
Document Date  
Document Author  
 
 
General Description of Document: 
 
 
 
 
Information about networked structure: 
 
 
 
Information about observability of program outputs and outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
Information about CDC’s influence/control over program outcomes: 
 
 
 
 
Information about performance measurement design: 
 
 
 
 
Information on types of performance measures: 
 
 
 
 
Information on use of performance measurement system and resultant data: 
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SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED BY CASE 
 410
 Summary Of Documents Reviewed By Case 
 
 
Federal Register Announcement, vol. 69, no. 139, Wednesday, July 
21, 2004 / Notices. Funding announcement  pp. 43595-43595
Performance Measures – Quick Reference Guide (2007)
STD Prevention System Logic Model (2000)
Comprehensive 
STD Prevention 
Systems 
 
 
  Division of STD Prevention webpage 
http://cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/aboutdiv.htm  (accessed Nov 2008)
2007 Performance Measures Companion Guidance; CSPS, IPP, SE 
Program Announcement (2006) 
STD Performance Measures: 2005-2006 Data Report (2007)
2009 Performance Measures (2008)
Charter of the Performance Measurement Workgroup, January 
December 2007 (2007)
PM Evaluation Criteria Definitions (2001)
ExpectMore, Program Assessment, National Center for HIV/AIDS, 
Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, and Tuberculosis 
Prevention (accessed 2008)
Performance Measures Learning Tour Guide (2006)
2009 Performance Measures: Feedback from Grantees (2008)
HHS, CDC, Request for Applications 9S09-902 2008. Five year 
funding announcement for CSPS (2008)
Hubley T. Lessons from a project to create performance measures 
for public health. Evaluation and Program Planning, Vol. 31 
(2008): 410-415
Materials from the Maine state program about their 2007 Regional 
Program Performance Measures and Benchmarks (2007)
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Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (AA154) 
Budget Period 08, Continuation Guidance (2007)
Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (AA154), 
Budget Period 08, Performance Measures, Definitions and 
Guidance (2007)
Public Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness  
 
CDC Connects (CDC Intranet): “States, Localities Better Prepared” 
(February 2008)
 
 
Key Findings from Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State 
by State; A CDC Report on the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (February 2008)
 
 
 
PHEP Evaluation Workgroup Meeting: January 24-25, 2008, 
Arlington, VA – Draft Summary Notes
 
 
PHEP Cooperative Agreement: Performance Measures Data 
Quality Assurance and Improvement Process – Letter Report, 
November 27, 2007
 
 
 
Division of Strategic National Stockpile: Local Technical 
Assistance Review – October 2007
 
 
Division of Strategic National Stockpile: State Technical Assistance 
Review – October 2007
 
 
Historical Overview of the Evolution of the Evaluation Focus for 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program –presentation 
(2007)
 
 
PART Measures for PHEP (2008)
 
 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, December 
19, 2006
 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, October 2007  
US Office of Management and Budget website: ExpectMore.gov 
(accessed May 2008)
 
 
 
FY 2009 Congressional Justification – Department of Health and 
Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(2008)
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Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (07-703) Budget Period 
08, Continuation Guidance (2007)
Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (07-703), Budget Period 
08, Performance Measures, Definitions and Guidance (2007)
NBCCEDP Data Management Web Conference Series: De-mystifying MDE 
Feedback Measurements  (presentation hand-out) (2006)
Core Program Performance Indicators (2006)
National 
Breast 
and 
Cervical 
Cancer 
Early 
Detection 
Program 
MDE Data Quality Indicator Guide Template (2006)
 
DP07-703 NBCCEDP Performance Measures assessment tool (2008)  
 
Program Data Review Worksheet Summary: NBCCEDP October 2007 MDE 
Submission (2008)
 
 
ExpectMore.gov Detailed Information on the Chronic Disease Prevention 
Assessment (accessed April 2008)
 
 
Update to the FY 2008 NBCCEDP Funding Process 
(presentation handout) (2008)
 
 
NBCCEDP Policies and Procedures Manual (not dated) 
Funding Announcement for the National Comprehensive Cancer Control 
Program, the National Program for Cancer Registries, and the National Breast 
and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program; United States HHS, CDC 
NCPCP; Billing Code: 4163-18-P (2007)
Summary of MDE Validation Project – Internal CDC Report (2007)
The National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program: 1991-
2002 National Report 
(http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/nbccedp/bccpdfs/national_report.pdf) (not dated)
Key Outcome Indicators for Evaluating Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs (2005)
Introduction to Program Evaluation for Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs (2001)
National 
Tobacco 
Control 
Program 
Funding Announcement Program Announcement 03022 – (2003)
OSH Consensus Core Indicators (2008)
Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs (2007)
Introduction to Process Evaluation in Tobacco Use Prevention and Control 
(2008)
 413
 Measurement development options for non-standard OSH core indicators 
(internal correspondence report, 2007) 
Use of Outcome Indicators for Planning and  Evaluating NTCP presentation 
given by Paul Hunting, MPH, at the National conference on Tobacco or 
Health, Minneapolis, MN (2007)
ExpectMore.gov Detailed Information on the Chronic Disease Prevention 
Assessment (accessed April 2008)
CDC OSH Website, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco  (accessed December 2008)
CDC NTCP Website, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/stateandcommunity/i
ndex.htm  (accessed December 2008)
Core Indicator Workgroup meeting notes (July 2007)
Collaborative Chronic Disease, Health Promotion, and Surveillance Program 
Announcement: Healthy Communities, Tobacco Control, Diabetes Prevention 
and Control, and Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System CDC RFA- DP 
09-901 FOA (November 2008)
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OBSERVATION GUIDE 
 415
 Observation Guide 
Performance Measurement Study 
 
 
Date of Observation  
Role of Observer  
Description of the 
Observation Event 
 
 
 
 
Description of Setting/Context: 
 
 
 
 
Description of Participants: 
 
 
 
General Observations: 
 
 
 
Observed Nonverbal Communications: 
 
 
 
Observed Informal Interactions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Field Notes (to be completed following observation): 
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ANALYTIC CODEBOOK 
 
 417
  
Dissertation 
Codebook 
 
 
Code Number:  001  
 
Code Name:  Context: Fed level   
 
Brief Description: Contextual factors at the federal level  
 
Long Description: Contextual factors at the federal level which are relevant to CDC 
programs and the development or use of performance measurement 
 
When to Use: Apply code to text referencing federal level contextual factors such 
as diminishing federal resources, federal level policies and 
legislation, health care reform, HHS-related (HP 2010), federal 
emphasis on accountability or results.  
 
When NOT to Use: Do not use this code for GPRA/PART issues.  
 
Coding Rules: If GPRA/PART related, code one of the two "GPRA/PART" 
codes. If related to political factors directly affecting the 
development of a particular PM system, double code as "Process: 
Political Factors."   
 
Example:  "…but they also understand that in light of these funding 
restrictions and/or reductions, they need to start demonstrating 
accountability and that this is a very difficult area to do, to do so."  
 
Code Number:  002   
 
Code Name:  Context: CDC 
 
Brief Description: Contextual factors at the CDC level 
 
Long Description: Contextual factors at the overall CDC level which are relevant to 
CDC programs and the development or use of performance measurement 
 
When to Use: Apply code to text referencing overall CDC level factors such as agency 
mission, goals; issues of alignment with agency strategic goal planning; CDC Office of 
the Director views on value of performance measurement; issues of overall agency 
resources. 
 
 418
 When NOT to Use: Not for CDC program-specific level (e.g., COTPER, NBCCEDP) 
unless the program specific issues relate to larger CDC context (e.g., mission, goals). Do 
NOT use for political factors at CDC level (e.g., CDC OD/OD – Gerberding)  
  
Coding Rules: Double code text that relates to CDC context and program-specific PM 
system (e.g., alignment). If policy/political factors at CDC level, code as “Process: 
Policy/Political Factors” 
 
Example:   "they're [the PM] tied to the nine [CDC] preparedness  goals." 
 
“If the political system lets us do it.  And if CDC lets us do it."  
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Code Number:  003   
 
Code Name:  Culture: Shift to PM  
 
Brief Description: PM as a shift in organizational mgmt/culture 
 
Long Description: Descriptions of the adoption of performance measurement as 
requiring a shift in organizational management or culture. The shift may be evident in 
change in how work is done, shift in how PM is perceived, shift to new view of PM as 
institutionalized, PM as new, established culture norm, shift to new view of valuing PM, 
diminishing resistance to PM. 
 
When to Use: Apply code to text that describes the adoption of PM as a mgmt or cultural 
shift, the need for a culture shift in order to adopt PM, or the lack of acceptance at a 
broad organizational level for recognizing value or importance of PM. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do not use when culture shift refers to move toward networked 
structures and approaches. 
 
Coding Rules: If relates to culture/organizational shift to networks, code as “Culture: 
Shift to Networks” 
    
Example:  “I personally think it’s a really critical piece.  I don’t think we do enough 
of it in public health.  I don’t think we have the skill set, I mean, well we have lots of data 
analysis skill sets, I don’t think we have a staff level understanding of it as much as we 
should.  I think the danger is we tend to develop performance measures without 
developing a performance management system.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  004   
 
Code Name:  Culture: Shift to Networks  
 
Brief Description: Cultural shift to use of network approaches 
 
Long Description: View of move to network approach as a cultural shift in 
perspective. In public health, programs have more traditionally viewed their 
responsibility as related to the program activities funded by CDC and the carrying out of 
public health work through traditional, vertical, intra-governmental relationships.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes recognition that working through 
networks is important, that such a shift may require a change in role for the public health 
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 worker, the consequences of moving to a network, the need for moving to network 
approaches. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do not use this code for reference to characteristics of the 
networks themselves (vertical dimensions, variability inherent in networks) 
 
Coding Rules: Code any references to network characteristics as any of the Network 
Characteristics code family. If relates to shift in culture/organizational mgmt to adopt 
PM, code as “Culture: Shift to PM” 
 
Example:  “You realize that public health does not work in a vacuum”  
 
“It was obvious right from the beginning you know that you needed a broader 
perspective.”  
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Code Number:  005   
Code Name:  Design: Control over Performance on Measures  
 
Brief Description: Level of control over the performance on PM 
 
Long Description: Factors may affect the grantees’ level of control over their 
performance on a particular measure  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects issues that compromise control over the 
performance on performance measures – system-level challenges (e.g., provider capacity 
to perform colonoscopies), dependencies on network partners (e.g., labs, jails), level of 
outcome (e.g., mortality), other factors affecting outcome (e.g., homelessness, drug use, 
poverty). Also apply code when text addresses the intentional development of PM for 
which grantees will have extensive control 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: If appropriate, double code to the relevant code in “Network 
Characteristics” family of codes. May be instances when it’s appropriate to double code 
to “Design: Control within Network” (e.g., text about lack of control over jails for whose 
performance you’re dependent). 
    
Example:  “So, at this point, I feel like our, the grantees have a fair amount of control 
over this set of six measures.”   
 
“It’s, it’s difficult to understand who owns the performance at the state level or even at 
the local level.  And what, what we can say about that networking piece is that states 
want a lot of credit for that” 
 
 
Code Number:  006   
Code Name:  Design: Control within Network  
 
Brief Description: Level of control over network partners 
 
Long Description: Given network structure, CDC and grantees often do not have 
direct relationships or command and control authority over local level implementers.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text references limited control over network partners 
[e.g., local implementers, lack of direct relationship with local levels, network partners 
over which grantee or CDC has little to no control (e.g., jails), structural challenges that 
impede control over partners (e.g., governance structures)]. 
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 When NOT to Use: Do not use when text relates to bargaining, consensus building, or 
building networks. Do not use when text relates to control over the performance on a 
particular measure. 
 
Coding Rules: Code references to bargaining, etc. within a network as “Network 
Characteristics: Bargaining, Consensus Bldg, Bldg Networks”. Code references to control 
over performance on measures as “Design: Control over Performance on Measures”  
 
Example:  “I mean we don’t have a direct relationship, with the exception of 4 or 5 
cities, you know, any direct relationship with the counties.  We can’t ask them to do 
anything so, or get really any information from them it all has to go through the state.”  
 
“I think people still think, you know, they’re concerned about the things that they control 
in their program and if you go on a statewide or a jurisdiction wide basis, they feel like 
they’re being held accountable for things that they don’t really have power over.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  007   
 
Code Name:  Design: Conveying Priorities  
 
Brief Description: Performance measures reflect program priorities 
 
Long Description: Performance measures typically reflect key priorities of a given 
program and are intended to influence program behavior by providing a focus in key 
performance areas. In decentralized contexts, it may be difficult to identify measures that 
are priority and meaningful for both the federal and state levels. Some programs may not 
have a strong sense of what their priorities should be. 
  
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to whether or not the program’s performance 
measures reflect program priorities (or goals) for the national program, act as incentives 
for programs to focus on certain areas (“what gets measured gets done”), or if programs 
face challenges identifying key priorities. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT apply “PM: Value”  
 
Coding Rules:  If text relates to other purposes/uses/value of PM, code as “PM: 
Value”  
 
Example:  “I’m not so confident in our measures to say that if somebody modeled a 
program after them in a sense that they were really trying to focus in on something that 
we focused in on, that it would do good and not harm, you know” 
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 Code Number:  008   
 
Code Name:  Design: Fairness  
 
Brief Description: PM perceived as “fair” (or not); or applied “fairly” across network; 
or used in a “fair” way  
 
Long Description: PM may or may not be perceived as “fair” – whether they are seen 
as fair may influence their acceptability for purposes such as accountability and 
budgeting. In networks, the variability inherent among actors challenges the notion that a 
“fair” set of indicator can be developed, or that “fair” targets can be set for all. Likewise, 
the use PM data may be perceived as unfair (e.g., ranking). 
 
When to Use: Apply code when issues of fairness are implied or explicit in the text.  
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: If text also relates to fairness of targets, double code to “Measurement: 
Targets” or “Measurement: Target Challenges.”  
 
Example:  “To me as long as the measures are clear, the performance expectation is 
clear, the technical assistance to help programs get to the level of performance we expect 
is clear, that we apply it fairly across all funded programs is transparent and clear, it 
should be fine.”  
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Code Number:  009   
 
Code Name:  Design: Flexibility  
 
Brief Description: Flexibility needed in PM system 
 
Long Description: In network context, flexibility may be needed in the design or 
implementation of the PM system (e.g., choice of measures, choice of targets, data 
system, data sources).  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses issues of flexibility (e.g., incorporating 
flexibility, not allowing flexibility) in the design and/or implementation of the PM 
system.  
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text addresses issues focused on 
variability of activities, data collection, etc. 
 
Coding Rules: Code issues of variability under appropriate “Network Characteristics” 
family of codes. If text relates to flexibility and program priorities, double code to 
“Design: Conveying Priorities” 
 
Example:  “So, we’ve tried to steer clear of optional measures or allowing them to, 
you know, on the one, on the Chlamydia screening in juvenile detention, we do allow 
some flexibility in which sites they pick but we’re, you know, for the big cities with more 
than 500 [people in the facility], you’ve got to report on all of them” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  010   
 
Code Name:  Design: Frameworks  
 
Brief Description: Frameworks to structure development of PM system 
 
Long Description: Frameworks such as logic models, process mapping, evaluation 
frameworks, and other unique constructs may be used to guide the PM development 
process. 
 
When to Use: Apply code to text that refers to such a framework or rationale that guides 
development of the PM system. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
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Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “The second set of information is on capabilities which are what can they 
do with those capacities that they just bought. How can they demonstrate that they can do 
something with that, that infrastructure?”  
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Code Number:  011   
 
Code Name:  Process: Time  
 
Brief Description: Time is needed to develop PM  
 
Long Description: Recognition that developing PM is a (learning) process that takes 
time, usually a significant amount of time. Process may be incremental in nature, an 
iterative process of trial and error, piloting, etc. Recognition that time is needed to build a 
worthwhile PM system. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses the inevitable passing of time involved in 
the process of developing PM. Text may mention frustration with amount of time needed, 
importance of the process itself, the learning process inherent as time passes, and idea 
that PM must be gradually (i.e., incrementally) implemented. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code text that relates to the idea that it takes time to gain 
stakeholder buy-in to the appropriate “Stakeholders” family of codes.  
 
Example:  “We want to improve program, you know, and it’s, it’s been a long haul, 
quite frankly.” 
 
“That it’s going to take us time to get to an established set of measures that everybody is 
going to feel comfortable in gathering the data in the same way and find that those 
measures are useful for program planning and program improvement.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  012   
 
Code Name:  Process: Measures Evolve  
 
Brief Description: PM / PM system evolves as system is developed 
 
Long Description: Programs often started with large set of “pilot” measures or 
worked to fine tune or improve measures as the PM system was developed and improved 
upon. In other cases, programs are trying to develop new, additional measures to capture 
more complicated constructs. This approach may relate to the incremental nature of 
developing a PM system in a decentralized system – need to start more simply before 
moving toward the more complex.  
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 When to Use: Apply code when text addresses change, adaptation, or evolution in the 
measures or when text describes efforts to move toward adding targets, adding more local 
measures, or removing measures that were unsuccessful or didn’t work. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:  Double code text to “Stakeholders Buy-in: Strategies” when 
appropriate.  
 
Example:  “The, the first set was very, for the most part, very specific. We had a set 
of syphilis measures that looked at traditional STD program activities such as 
interviewing index patients and interviewing cluster patients and suspects and associates, 
looking how quickly programs were able to do that.”  
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Code Number:  013   
 
Code Name:  Process: Stakeholder Involvement  
 
Brief Description: Stakeholder involvement in the development of the PM 
 
Long Description: Given the network, many different stakeholders may be involved 
in the development of the PM system. There may be national groups, state grantees, or 
other partners who play some role in the development of the measures (e.g., reviewing 
draft measures, participating on PM work groups, piloting measures). This may reflect a 
collaborative approach to development of the measures and some give/take between CDC 
in the selection of measures. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects stakeholder involvement in the 
development of the PM system (e.g., suggest measures, pilot measures, provide feedback) 
or the range of stakeholders that should be engaged in the process. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text relates to stakeholders or stakeholder 
involvement outside of their participation in the development of the PM system.  
 
Coding Rules: Code other stakeholder-related text using the “Stakeholder” family of  
codes.   
 
Example:  “Well, a lot of them [the measures] came from them [grantees].”  
 
“I think we, we’d get in much more trouble with programs if we tried to raise them 
[targets] for the same reason.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  014   
 
Code Name:  Process: Resources 
 
Brief Description: Resources needed to support PM 
 
Long Description: Resources are needed to support the development, implementation, 
and maintenance of PM. Resources may include consultants hired to help develop the 
system, staff expertise, funding for data system development and maintenance, funding 
for contracts that support data management, funding support for on-going maintenance, 
technical assistance, training, etc. 
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 When to Use: Apply code for text referring to or describing resources used or needed to 
support PM (i.e., development, implementation, or maintenance). 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: If appropriate, double code to “Use – Technical Assistance/Tools” if 
resources relate to the training and TA.  
 
Example:  “Well, part of it has been not having a budget internally [to pay for TA to 
the grantees]. I mean, for us to, to function with it, to never know how much money and, 
you know, it’s been good that we’ve been able to have a consultation on an annual basis.” 
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Code Number:  015   
 
Code Name:  Process: Policy/Political Factors  
 
Brief Description: Political factors affecting the development/implementation of PM 
 
Long Description: Policy and political factors seem to affect the development of the 
PM system. These factors could include requirements passed down from other Federal 
agencies (e.g., Dept of Defense’ Target Capabilities List), policies (e.g., PAHPA, HSPD 
#21), investigations (e.g., GAO, IG), Congressional inquiries or hearings, CDC OD OD 
(Gerberding), or political scrutiny and pressures.  
 
When to Use: Apply code to text reflecting policy or political factors that affect the 
process of developing or implementing PM. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for broader political pressures and policies at the 
Federal level that do not directly affect the development of the PM. Do NOT use for 
GPRA/PART related text. 
 
Coding Rules: Code broader federal level political pressures and policies as “Context: 
Federal”. Code GPRA/PART issues as one of the two “GPRA/PART” codes.  
 
Example:  “The challenge is around the political agendas and the fact that 
Washington, ASPR, HHS, are completely unreasonable in what they expect from a 
measurement perspective. If you look at HSPD 21 that was just released in December I 
think…”    
 
 
Code Number:  016   
Code Name:  GPRA/PART: Perceived Value, Accountability, Attribution 
Brief Description: Perceived value of GPRA/PART – related issues of accountability, 
attribution 
 
Long Description: Both GPRA and PART are federal policies that require the use of 
performance measurement for federal programs. The implementation of PART for CDC 
programs has changed over time – not all of the four cases were directly reviewed for 
PART by OMB. Perceptions of the GPRA/PART policies vary from useful to “absurd.” 
Both policies aim to increase government accountability for performance. Issue of 
attribution are also relevant here if GPRA/PART are used for accountability and for 
Federal (Congressional) level funding appropriations. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses the perceived value of GPRA/PART 
(either good or bad); views of the PART/GPRA measures themselves; text about the 
experience of being reviewed, text addressing GPRA/PART and issues of accountability, 
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 attribution, and federal level funding appropriations from Congress; or text re: alignment 
of program level PM with GPRA/PART measures 
 
When NOT to Use:  
Coding Rules:    
Example:  “But it (GPRA) is as a concept, as something that ain’t going to be going 
away, as something that’s going to one, stay with us, and is part and parcel of this greater 
era of accountability, that is quite useful for us starting the programs, and this is part of it 
you know. PART is a huge pain in the rear end.”  
 
“The first thing I do is look at it and I say, you know, ‘this is ridiculous’ [GPRA].    You 
know, these are really bad ways to evaluate this program.” 
 
“A whole other sort of thing about you know, GPRA did a good thing GPRA asked 
‘what’s your business’? But whether your business was a lot of what you were 
measuring, it wasn’t it went to sort of, not clear what your business was about.” 
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Code Number:  017   
 
Code Name:  Management: Policy Tools in Networks 
 
Brief Description: Mechanisms used to assert control in networks 
 
Long Description: Policy tools used to assert control in network contexts such as 
cooperative agreements, CDC field staff, formal agreements/MOUs, funding restrictions, 
PM itself, performance-based contracts, etc. Can include limits of those tools, as well 
 
When to Use: Apply code for text referring to any policy tools or other means used to 
assert control within network structures. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to whether or not a particular agent 
has control or not over network partners. 
 
Coding Rules: Code text related to whether a particular agent has control or not over 
network partners (e.g., local implementers) as “Design: Control within Network”  
 
Example:  “You know, telling, telling providers, yes, we’ll pay for something when 
you should be telling them, no, we don’t pay for that.” [provider reimbursement as a form 
of control over network partners] 
 
 “And, you know, they’re putting out, like, mutual aid agreement templates and stuff for 
grantees to be able to use because it’s so clear that there is so much reliance on different 
entities.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  018   
 
Code Name:  Management: Unintended consequences  
 
Brief Description: Unintended consequences of PM 
 
Long Description: Both positive and negative consequences / effects that may occur 
based on the development and implementation of PM. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects any type of unexpected or unintended 
consequence of the PM system (e.g., improved relationships, more collaboration, 
unintentionally encouraging unfavorable practice, unintentionally creating frustration for 
grantees because PM don’t reflect everything they do) 
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 When NOT to Use: Do not use when text describes efforts of “gaming” 
 
Coding Rules:  Code text describing “gaming” of the PM as “Measurement: 
Gaming”  
 
Example:  “It, it has, our challenge with that has more been implementation in terms 
of we already kind of put out exercise schedules when that first came in so we didn’t, 
like, redo all of our schedules and things and there was also some preliminary that needed 
to be done to be able to put the right groups of people in there to do that.”  
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Code Number:  019   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Common Measures  
 
Brief Description: Identification of a common set of federal-level PM 
 
Long Description: Federal-level PM typically involves identification of a common set 
of PM that can be used to describe the program nationally/in aggregate. Network 
structures make this difficult given variability in several key areas, including program 
activities.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes issues or challenges related to the 
identification of a common set of federal-level PM. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: When appropriate, double code text to “Network Characteristics” family 
of codes (in particular, ones related to variability of activities, data collection, etc.).  
 
Example:  “Listeria.  And, but there are a whole host of other.  We just chose those 
two [infections] because they had enough numbers that everybody [all grantees] would be 
reporting on.”  
 
 “I think it’s very appropriate for all programs, if you screen a woman and they have an 
abnormal Pap, that they get into diagnostic [care], and if they have a diagnosis of cancer 
they get into treatment.  So these to me are very, I’m not sure the right word is generic, 
but these are measures that are relevant to everybody [all grantees].” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  020   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Challenges  
 
Brief Description: Challenges to measurement 
 
Long Description: A variety of challenges to measurement confront the development 
of a PM system for “wicked problems” in a decentralized context. These may include a 
lack of science or scientific standards, undefined programs where outcomes aren’t clear – 
don’t know what to measure, sample sizes that are small, analytic challenges, could be 
measuring the wrong thing, or finding that a measure doesn’t work well. 
 
When to Use: Apply code to text that reflects challenges to measurement  
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When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when measurement challenge relates to what 
programs find hard to measure (e.g., level of catastrophe, prevention, PID) 
 
Coding Rules: If text relates to things that are hard to measure, code as “Measurement: 
Hard to Measure” 
 
Example:  “So, can we have, like, the same measure [local-level measure] and then 
just roll it up and have it be an aggregate that represents what’s happening at the state 
level or are they not really roll-upable?  You know, like, how, how is it that you actually 
measure what’s happening at the local level and somehow aggregate it to get a sense of 
how prepared a state is.”  
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Code Number:  021   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Hard/Impossible to Measure  
 
Brief Description: PM that are difficult or impossible to measure because they are 
complex or data is unavailable 
 
Long Description: Indicators or constructs that are analytically challenging or 
impossible to measure such as indicators that require a proxy, vague constructs like 
prevention or collaboration, staff capacity, or indicators for which data are unavailable. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text implies indicator is difficult or impossible to 
measure 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for more general measurement challenges 
 
Coding Rules: For measurement challenges that do not meet this definition, code as 
“Measurement: Challenges”  
 
Example:  “You know, we have this continued idea or we have a need to figure out 
some way to measure syphilis prevention during pregnancy.  We just haven’t figured out 
how to do that yet because pregnancy is not reportable.  We’ve tried various ways to 
come at it and nobody’s been happy with the outcome.”  
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  022   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Criteria 
 
Brief Description: Criteria used for measurement selection 
 
Long Description: Criteria are frequently used to select performance measures from a 
larger set of candidate measures or to simply rate a set of proposed measures. Criteria 
may include face validity, extent of a science-base, consistent with goals/objectives, and 
relevancy (whether the measure is “meaningful” from the perspective of various 
stakeholders), among others. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes or refers to criteria used to judge potential 
performance measures. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
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Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “It’s looking to those people who actually do it to say, does this make 
sense? We want these measures to be relevant, we want them to be feasible, we want 
them to be reliable and we want them to be valid.”  
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Code Number:  023   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Interpretation/Definitions 
 
Brief Description: Interpretation of the PM and how it is calculated 
 
Long Description: Given the network structures, network actors (e.g., grantees, local 
level implementers) may interpret or define the performance measures differently – this 
refers to both an understanding of the intent of the measure and the calculation of the 
measure. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to grantees interpreting the measure 
differently, interpreting the intent of the measure differently, defining data sources 
differently, other definitional issues, lack of consistency in how things are measured 
 
When NOT to Use: When text refers to variability factors that are un-related to the 
consistent interpretation of the measure itself 
 
Coding Rules: If relevant to the interpretation of the measure, may also double code to 
“Network Characteristics: Variability – Data Sources, Collection, Reporting, Systems” 
 
Example:  “And that was one issue.  The other issue is, even though we sent out the 
guidance, they didn’t read it so they defined things their own way.” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  024   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Gaming  
 
Brief Description: Grantees’ / or CDC’s manipulation of the PM system or 
calculation of a particular measure 
 
Long Description: “Gaming” can occur when there are incentives that drive programs 
to manipulate data or circumstances to improve the level of performance on a particular 
measure. Gaming is used to make the data seem better than they actually may be. For 
CDC, gaming may involve developing measures to “game” political requirements like 
PAHPA. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes examples of gaming. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
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Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “I think that, especially those 75% of women screened [for breast cancer], 
I’ve seen programs structure their funding to meet that, they have algorithms that they’ve 
developed to make sure that, we’ve seen programs be rated 75.1%.  It’s hard to tell 
whether programs might hold data that is not complete, like get it complete so that it 
doesn’t effect it [the PM], I would not be surprised if that’s happening”  
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Code Number:  025   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Process 
 
Brief Description: Process-level PM (typically program activities/outputs) 
 
Long Description: Process measures typically reflect the activities and outputs that 
lead to outcomes 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects information about process measures as part 
of a PM system 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for reference to proximal or longer-term outcome 
measures, unless text relates the two (relates process and outcome measures in some way) 
 
Coding Rules: Reference to outcome measures should be coded as “Measurement: 
Outcomes.” Double-code text that refers to both process and outcome measures, to 
“Measurement: Outcomes.”  
 
Example:  “…and in some ways, the more typical of CDC, than some other 
government kind of programs that for a lot of government programs you have a shit load 
of process measures and not a whole lot of outcome measures, you know, and in fact it’s 
not even clear what your outcome is or there is less agreement about outcome whereas, it 
seems we got turned topsy-turvy, you know we can agree we want to reduce rates of 
disease and have measures of rates of disease but we just don’t know what to do here 
[black box in between activities and outcomes].” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  026   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Outcomes  
 
Brief Description: Outcome-level PM (typically reflect changes resulting from 
program activities) 
  
Long Description: Apply code when text reflects information about outcome 
measures, regardless as to whether they are immediate, intermediate (proximal), or long-
term. In public health outcome measures may be tied to changes in behavior, knowledge, 
attitudes, policies, morbidity, mortality, etc. 
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 When to Use: Apply code when text reflects information about any type of outcome 
measure, whether immediate, intermediate (proximal), or long-term 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for reference to process measures, unless text relates 
the two (see example below) 
 
Coding Rules: References to process measures should be coded “Measurement: Process.” 
Double-code text that refers to both process and outcome measures.  
   
Example:  “Yet the reality is we’re still very much in process monitoring rather than 
outcome monitoring.  We’re working towards developing those measures but it’s taken 
some time because it does take time if you want to do it right.”  
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Code Number:  027   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Targets 
 
Brief Description: Established targets or benchmarks for performance measures 
 
Long Description: Targets may or may not be used as part of a PM system. 
Approaches to setting targets vary (e.g., based on science, policy, past performance, 
individual grantee).  
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes views on targets and approaches to 
establishing targets  
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text describes challenges related to setting 
or using targets with PM. 
 
Coding Rules: References to target-related challenges should be coded “Measurement: 
Target Challenges”  
 
Example:  “Right, so that was part of the process.  And, you know, and that’s 
sometimes the argument I get from some programs is they say, we can’t possibly have all 
the women meet that [the target] and I say, well, you only need to have 75% to meet it.  
You know?”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  028   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Target Challenges  
  
Brief Description: Challenges to using/setting targets or benchmarks for PM 
 
Long Description: Given “wicked problems” and a networked context, challenges 
exist in setting or using targets or benchmarks for PM. For instance, variability in 
programs may inhibit the ability to set a standard; a lack of science or trend data may 
challenge the ability to set a defensible target; variability in context and programs may 
compromise the utility of comparing sites based on targets. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to challenges in using/setting targets and 
when text addresses the utility of comparing sites based on their performance. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use this code when text refers to approaches to setting 
targets and views on the use of targets for decentralized public health programs. 
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Coding Rules: References to approaches to setting targets or views on the use of targets 
should be coded as “Measurement: Targets”  
 
Example:  “I mean, I can’t compare North Carolina and South Dakota.  I mean, it’s 
two entirely different environments, as far as what they’re operating in, what they’re 
trying to do.” 
 
 “There’s no factor in our measure that take into consideration scalability and that goes 
back to, you know, 48 hours is, is the same for Boise as it is for New York City.”  
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Code Number:  029   
 
Code Name:  Measurement: Data Quality / Validity Challenges  
 
Brief Description: Perceptions of data quality and concerns about data validity 
 
Long Description: Ensuring the validity of data is important for ultimate 
interpretation and confidence in the performance data. In networked contexts, data 
validity is challenged by a number of issues including the multitude of different 
people/agencies involved in data collection and reporting, the variability in data sources 
and data systems, and differentials in staff capacity and resources. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to perceptions of data quality and issues 
of data validity / reliability 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT code text that refers to methods of ensuring data quality – 
use “QA: Methods”. 
 
Coding Rules: If text refers to methods to ensure data quality, code as “QA – Methods.”  
Double code text to others that may be relevant such as those in the Network 
Characteristics family (e.g., variability: data collection) or the Measurement 
Challenges/Measurement: Hard to Measure.  
 
Example:  “I think part of it is because they have, that, that it’s too difficult to get the 
right data and they will sort of estimate. They will give us estimates rather than accurate. 
You know, than actual data, they’ll estimate because it’s too difficult to get the correct 
data.” [Double code to Measurement: Hard to Measure”] 
 
 
 
Code Number:  030   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Horizontal   
 
Brief Description: Reference to horizontal or lateral network partners/relationships 
 
Long Description: Networks are typically comprised of both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. Horizontal relationships may exist at multiple levels (e.g., federal level 
agencies – CDC, HHS, NCI; within CDC – DCPC, OSH; and at state, regional, and local 
levels). 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text references or describes horizontal relationships 
(or the need for these relationships) as they relate to performance measurement. This can 
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 be when text names those partners (e.g., fire dept.) or use code for text that references 
indicators for which performance relies, to some extent, on horizontal partners. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to vertical dimensions. 
 
Coding Rules: If text refers to both horizontal and vertical dimensions, double code for 
both; If text refers to vertical dimensions only, code as “Network Characteristics: 
Vertical”  
 
Example:  “Yeah, and I think a lot of project areas have done this community thing, 
and they have established a relationship with the CBOs and the agencies within their 
community already.  That’s a given, that’s established, that’s not going anywhere because 
they understand that relationship and that partnership is beneficial to both.  But, I think 
we haven’t done as much with the private docs, you know, in even the laboratories as 
well.”  
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Code Number:  031   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Vertical   
 
Brief Description: Reference to vertical network partners/relationships 
 
Long Description: Networks are typically comprised of both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. Vertical relationships are often inter- or intra-governmental (e.g., CDC – 
State – local), but could reflect vertical relationships between other agencies as well (e.g. 
National organization, State health department, local advocacy group). The vertical 
relationships may also reflect more traditional hierarchical arrangements in government. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text references or describes vertical relationships (or 
the need for these relationships) or structures as they relate to performance measurement. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to horizontal dimensions. 
 
Coding Rules: If text refers to both horizontal and vertical dimensions, double code for 
both; If text refers to horizontal dimensions only, code as “Network Characteristics: 
Horizontal”   
 
Example:  “Not because anybody, again, is doing anything on purpose, but because 
when you have layers and then you’re moving vertical and then horizontal and then doing 
that, coming back…”  [double code with “Network Characteristics: Horizontal”  
 
“I’m not sure how deeply involved with STD history you’ve been but the STD program 
had been run top down for a lot of years, very strongly managed, well forcefully 
managed.” 
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Code Number:  032   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts   
 
Brief Description: Conflicts/issues between network partners around values, goals, 
mission, priorities, etc. 
 
Long Description: Given the network structure, conflicts or issues may arise in 
developing performance measurement related to differing agency values, goals, mission, 
priorities, areas of responsibility / turf, culture, etc. These conflicts may impede the 
development of a common set of measures or the collaboration needed to collect/report 
performance related data. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to or describes tensions between network  
partners that is related to fundamental differences in values, goals, etc. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “Human nature, again, I could be part of this myself if I was out there, I 
have been out there in the past, but you’ve got your own little kingdoms and queendoms 
and fiefdoms and all that and the HIV STD programs are a great example of that.  
They’re still not really working together out there and it’s now 2008.”    
 
“You know, I think each State determines who their screening population is going to be, 
and in Washington it’s not just Department of Health at the site, we have stakeholders, 
and we have a really strong Komen presence in our State” [referring to partners who want 
women aged 40-50 screened vs. CDC policy of screening women 50-64] 
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Code Number:  033   
 
Code Name: Network Characteristics: Bargaining, Consensus Building, Building 
Networks   
 
Brief Description: Efforts of bargaining and consensus building in networks 
 
Long Description: Bargaining and consensus building are recognized as important 
strategies in a network context – taking the place of traditional command and control 
structures/approaches in hierarchical arrangements. Building relationships with network 
partners is essential – through consensus, compromise, collaboration, respect, etc. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects efforts of bargaining or consensus building, 
efforts of reciprocity or give/take, negotiation, collaboration, etc. – Or other strategies to 
build network relationships (at all levels, including CDC). 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:   
 
Example:  “I think so, but I think it’s because we have developed really good 
relationships with our prime contractors and, you know, they’re there for us when we, 
you know, need something or we need something done differently, or we’ve identified an 
issue, and we’re there for them, you know, so we’re reciprocating.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  034   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Variability Activities 
 
Brief Description: Variability across grantees in the program activities implemented 
at each site. 
 
Long Description: Public health endorses the use of approaches and strategies suited 
to the unique context and needs of particular communities. For a national program 
operating through a network structure, this results in extreme variability in program 
activities which make identification of common codes difficult.  
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to the variability across grantees in their 
activities/ in how they do things and/or when text refers to the effects of this variation on 
the development of PM  
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 When NOT to Use:   
 
Coding Rules:  Double code text to “Measurement: Common Measures” if 
appropriate  
 
Example:  “Because they’re so different, every place is so God damn different and it 
does not help you very much, sometimes, but this is a big problem I’ve had conceptually 
across the states and even in terms of the groups they think they get a lot more having 
people come in telling them what to do, looking over your state, looking over the fence.  
They would be far more advised to look closely at their own system and understand the 
difference.”  
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Code Number:  035   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Variability – Capacity/Resources 
 
Brief Description: Differences across grantees or other network partners in staff 
capacity, agency resources, agency infrastructure 
 
Long Description: Given the network structure, there is variability in the capacity, 
infrastructure, and resources of individual grantees and other network partners. This 
variability has implications for performance measurement in terms of collecting and 
reporting data, availability of adequate data systems, staff to manage and interpret data, 
etc. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to differences in capacity or resources across 
the grantees or network partners – may be both a lack of or a richness of resources, 
capacity, infrastructure 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT code text that refers to issues of resources needed to 
support the development/implementation of the overall PM system (national level). 
 
Coding Rules: If text relates to broader resource issues for the overall PM system, code 
as, “Process – Resources”  
 
Example:  “The diversity in the programs is, is a big issue because large programs 
have larger staff and, and more opportunity to develop the infrastructure necessary to do 
some things sometimes.  They also have much more disease and a far more complex 
program.  Smaller programs don’t have any resources or staff.” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  036 
 
Code Name: Network Characteristics: Variability – Data Sources, Collection, 
Reporting, Systems  
 
Brief Description: Variability in grantees’ data systems and data sources, collection, 
and reporting processes 
 
Long Description: Given the network structure, there is variability in grantees’ data 
systems and in the data source for the measures, as well as the way the data is collected 
and reported. This poses several challenges, including ones of data validity, for the PM 
system.  
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When to Use: Apply code to text that refers to variability across grantees in data sources, 
data systems, data collection, or data reporting. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code text to others that may be relevant such as “Measurement: 
Data Validity”  
 
Example:  “They collect data differently and they, you know, store it differently, and 
they can report on it differently.  So, that’s something that’s always been, you know, hit 
and miss with us, as far as data we’re going to get, and can this, is it going to be, you 
know, valid and useable.” 
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Code Number:  037   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Variability – Context (comparing too)  
 
Brief Description: Contextual variance across network members (e.g., grantees) 
 
Long Description: In a networked structure, programs may vary extensively in regard 
to their overall context (e.g., size, capacity, disease burden, cultural norms, demographic 
factors). Given this, the interpretation of PM data may need to account for those 
contextual factors – similarly, these contextual differences may compromise the value of 
comparing the PM data for state A to state B.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects issues of variance in grantee context; or 
when text references the role of context in the interpretation of data. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to variability in activities (what 
grantees do) 
 
Coding Rules: If text relates to variability in grantee activities, code “Network 
Characteristics: Variability – Activities”  
 
Example:  “I think it’s [grantee context] very important, I think Bill eluded to it 
before, because some of the indicators you really need to know how the program is 
structured and whatever other things are going on, just like with the funding source, so a 
program that has a large non-federal grant, or money coming in, has the flexibility to 
pinpoint which mammograms they’re paying for with federal funds…”  
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  038   
 
Code Name:  Network Characteristics: Value   
 
Brief Description: Perceived value of networks and networked approach to public 
health 
 
Long Description: The literature suggests that networks provide a number of 
advantages in addressing complex problems – together, network partners can tackle the 
varied factors contributing to social problems, networks leverage scarce resources, and 
networks extend programs’ reach (among other things). 
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 When to Use: Apply code when text reflects perceptions of the value of networks and 
networked approaches to public health – also the value of particular network partners 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “I mean, my understanding is that is, it’s [collaboration] extremely 
important because a lot of the, I think a lot of the, the work that STD needs to have done 
or things that STD needs to accomplish is, are in areas that are essentially outside their 
direct control.  Like, for instance, with the jails and the family planning clinics and things 
like that.  And so to be able to actually work with those people in other, other programs 
to, to get them to buy into your goals and, and to participate in your process is, seems to 
me to be very critical.”    
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Code Number:  039   
 
Code Name:  Performance Measurement: Value  
 
Brief Description: Perceived value of performance measurement 
 
Long Description: Performance measurement may be perceived as an invaluable 
management tool, a meaningless burden, a defense against funding cuts, etc. Value may 
be expressed generally, but also reflected in intended uses or purposes. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text reflects the value (or lack of value) of 
performance measurement for their program, include text about potential use/users and 
purposes. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “[The biggest benefit of PM has been in] defining the program.” 
 
“So, they get that, but they also understand that in light of these funding restrictions 
and/or reductions, they need to start demonstrating accountability and that this is a very 
difficult area to do, to do so.  So they really want, there’s a, there’s a fairly large 
constituency of folks who really want to get this right.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  040   
 
Code Name:  Program Characteristics: Developmental Stage of Program  
 
Brief Description: Program’s maturity or developmental stage 
 
Long Description: Programs vary in their developmental phase or level of program 
maturity. The STD program is one of the oldest at CDC; PHEP is one of the newest. A 
program’s developmental stage may be reflected in its articulated goals, program 
experience, level of institutionalization, etc.. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the maturity of a program, their stage of 
development, experience – and when text explicitly recognizes a relationship between 
developmental stage and the PM system. 
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 When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text refers to the developmental phase of 
the performance measurement system – unless a direct correlation is made. 
 
Coding Rules: If text refers to the performance measures or measurement system, code as 
“Process: Measures Evolve.” If text makes a direct correlation between developmental 
phase of the program and developmental phase of the PM, double code with “Process: 
Measures Evolve.” 
 
Example:  “You know, so our STD programs are well entrenched and some of them 
have trouble moving with the environment.  So, yeah, I think the first set of measures was 
our attempt to get them used to the idea that, you know, you really do need to collect data 
that gives you information about what you’re doing and how you’re performing.  There 
were obvious deficiencies with the current set as far as aggregating the data for a national 
measure.”  
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Code Number:  041   
 
Code Name:  Program Characteristics: Disease Burden 
 
Brief Description: Variability or changes in disease burden or emergency incidents 
across grantees / network 
 
Long Description: Given the variability in disease burden (e.g., syphilis), emergency 
incidents (e.g., anthrax attack in NY vs Nebraska; scale of incidents), and populations to 
be served (breast cancer screening in Alaska vs. California), performance measures may 
be more or less meaningful to a particular grantee/jurisdiction. Similarly, disease burden 
may shift in regard to certain high risk populations, with the potential to affect the utility 
of a particular PM.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text references disease burden, variability in types of 
emergency hazards and scale of incidents, etc. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code for descriptive text about program context in 
general 
 
Coding Rules: May double-code text that is related to both disease burden and 
measurement (e.g., Measurement: Hard to measure); May double code text that is also 
related to identifying common measures (e.g., Measurement – Common Measure); If 
relates to program context more generally, code “Program Characteristics: Goals & 
Scope of Program”  
 
Example:  “We’re, you know, we’re finding gonorrhea and Chlamydia in, in these 
settings and, and it’s a worthwhile activity and it’s important.  You know, that’s 
something that could change if, you know, like syphilis, you know, historically it was a 
heterosexual disease and now it’s becoming much more MSM disease.” 
 
“ A couple of big states are a bit concerned because they have overwhelming numbers 
and they don’t normally follow up on Chlamydia and gonorrhea because they’ve got so 
much syphilis.  But we think this is going to be a good measure over time.” 
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Code Number:  042   
 
Code Name:  Program Characteristics: Goals, Scope, Context, Culture of CDC 
Program  
 
Brief Description: Information about the goals and scope of the national program 
 
Long Description: General information about the nature of the program, its goals, and 
its scope (e.g., the STD program addresses several diseases, preparedness is really broad, 
etc.) 
 
When to Use: Apply this code to text that reflects aspects of the national program’s 
scope, its goals, and/or its inherent challenges also characterizations of the program or the 
program context / program culture 
 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:    
 
Example:  “I think we’re just in an evolutionary phase of our, of, of this as a public 
health discipline and I think of it a little bit loose --, because while it is a new section or 
sector within public health, certainly new responsibilities and new scope of activities, you 
know, where everyday public health ends and public health preparedness begins is a very 
fuzzy line.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  043   
 
Code Name:  Purpose: Accountability Fiscal  
 
Brief Description: Accountability as stewards of federal funds  
 
Long Description: As a public agency, CDC has responsibility to act as proper 
stewards of federal funds (tax dollars).  
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to CDC’s accountability for federal 
dollars. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when accountability is related solely to demonstrating 
performance. 
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 Coding Rules: If text relates to accountability for performance, code as “Purpose: 
Accountability – Performance” Double code with “Accountability – Performance” 
if text addresses both (see example below). 
 
Example:  “Yeah, I think it, I think it’s tremendously valuable because I think for one 
thing just simply to, to, to justify, you know, what the money is being used for and how 
the, how the program is actually performing in these core areas and to be able to, you 
know, essentially to, to put a number on it or at least to have a formal definition and be 
able to monitor people’s progress because we’ve never done that, you know, consistently 
in the past.  
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Code Number:  044   
 
Code Name:  Purpose: Accountability Performance  
 
Brief Description: Accountability for performance  
 
Long Description: Performance measurement is intended to promote accountability 
for achieving outputs and outcomes, to demonstrate success. 
 
When to Use: Apply to text referring to issues of accountability or responsibility for 
outputs, outcomes, or for performance in general. Also code for text that addresses 
challenges around accountability as it relates to performance, issues of responsibility, or 
policies (other than GPRA/PART) that dictate accountability (e.g., PAHPA) – and for 
instances where text describes grantees avoiding accountability. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when accountability is related solely to fiscal 
accountability. Do not use when addressing GPRA/PART. 
 
Coding Rules: May double code with “Performance Measurement: Value” if appropriate 
(e.g., text refers to PM as an incentive for holding people accountable). May double code 
with “Purpose: Accountability – Fiscal” if text refers to both. If relates to GPRA/PART, 
code as “GPRA/PART: Perceived Value, Accountability, Attribution” 
 
Example:  “You’re responsibility for the whole state in terms of your data, but there 
seemed to be no movement within the programs to take responsibility for the activities 
that would affect that whole state’s rate.” 
 
“Because all of them, you know, just, they’d just say give me the money and, you know, 
let me run my, let me run my program the way I want.”   
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Code Number:  045   
 
Code Name:  Purpose: Accountability Beliefs  
 
Brief Description: Individuals’ beliefs about accountability, attribution 
 
Long Description: People have differing views about what accountability means, the 
importance of accountability 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the interviewee’s beliefs about 
accountability, also when text refers to issues of attribution 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text relates to fiscal accountability, accountability 
for performance, or GPRA/PART. 
 
Coding Rules: Code fiscal issues as “Accountability – Fiscal”; code performance issues 
as “Accountability – Performance”; code GPRA/PART issues as “GPRA/PART” 
 
Example:  "And then I guess we took credit for what else was going on [laughing].  
But we never really, you know, we never really reported it that way, we just knew that, 
and we didn’t have to, to Congress or anybody, but we knew that if our dollars weren’t 
going to support the infrastructure in Massachusetts or New York, they couldn’t have, 
they couldn’t have implemented their program" 
 
“You think about the STD program, Division of STD, has never really collected anything 
other than case-based surveillance data.  Now all of a sudden they want hard data about 
program.  Well, it’s a little intimidating for people in the field that never had to report on 
what they’re doing.  It’s absolutely appropriate and necessary.”  
 
“Well I think program improvement is joined at the hip with accountability.” 
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Code Number:  046 
   
Code Number:  046 
 
Code Name:  Purpose: Budgeting  
 
Brief Description: Performance measurement and its use/relationship to budgeting 
  
Long Description: Performance measurement may be used to inform budgeting 
decisions. Some suggest using PM for budgeting encourages improved performance 
while others have concerns it will lead to gaming, misuse, teaching to the test, etc. Fears 
that PM may be used (punitively) for budgeting also infuses skepticism into the process 
(trust) and may compromise the level of buy-in for PM.  
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to individual perspectives on the use of 
PM for budgeting (including its value for budgeting, fears about its use), current use for 
budgeting, formulas for budgeting.  
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:  Double code if appropriate to “Use – Punitive” or “Use – Misuse”  
 
Example:  “No science base, no consistency of definitions or anything like that, so 
you are going to have teaching to the test, I think you see it in our data right now even 
though it’s not even, it’s low stakes now, because they can just, some of them just say 
we’re not even going to report it you know.  So they teach to the test, they say you want 
us to convene in an hour? Well we’ll do it, we’ll figure out a way to do it.” 
 
 “Everybody was afraid.  Oh my God, if they do this, they’re going to take money away 
from us if we don’t perform well” 
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Code Number:  047   
Code Name:  Purpose: Program Improvement  
 
Brief Description: Performance measures as means for program improvement 
 
Long Description: Performance measurement is viewed as an important monitoring 
tool that can identify problems early, track trends over time, etc. – all of which can 
inform the improvement of the program (through program adjustments, new strategies, 
etc.) 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when the text refers to issues of program improvement 
and the use of PM for program improvement. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for other purposes (accountability, budgeting), unless 
the text reflects two or more ideas 
 
Coding Rules: Double code with other purposes if text addresses accountability and/or 
budgeting as well as program improvement (see example below).  
 
Example:  “It’s, all the other things in between, like accountability, seriously 
responding to a measure when you’re not meeting it, looking for alternatives on how to 
meet it, how to meet that measure How to keep improving, that’s the nature of the whole 
thing.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  048  
 
Code Name:  Quality Assurance Methods  
 
Brief Description: Methods used for quality assurance of PM data/system 
 
Long Description: Quality assurance is an important component of a performance 
measurement system. Various strategies or methods can be used for quality assurance 
such as computer edit programs, periodic audits, peer review, data validation efforts, and 
involvement of workgroups, etc. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes QA methods or strategies or groups 
working on QA efforts 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:    
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Example:  “So the calls actually quickly morphed into not just quality assurance of 
the data reported, but technical assistance on the measurement, on what was expected in 
terms of measurement as well.”  
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 Code Number:  049   
 
Code Name:  Quality Assurance Benefits  
 
Brief Description: Benefits to performance measurement of QA efforts 
 
Long Description: Quality assurance is an important component of a performance 
measurement system. Quality assurance efforts are undertaken to improve the collection 
and reporting of data or to identify potential problems/issues in the PM system. Benefits 
are typically reflected in improved data quality or PM systems. 
 
When to Use: Apply to text that reflects perceived benefits to the PM data or system 
based on QA efforts 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for QA Methods 
 
Coding Rules: Use “Quality Assurance – Methods” if text references specific QA 
strategies  
 
Example:  “And then from the [QA] calls we revised the measures slightly and put 
out the guidance for the following year, you know, for the following budget period.”  
 
“We actually found [from the validation study] that the national data was very, I mean, 
very good, for the most part. There are problems with particular variables, and a lot of 
that, I think, has to do with, frankly, CDC’s lack of guidance.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  050   
 
Code Name:  Stakeholders Buy-In Importance  
 
Brief Description: Importance of stakeholder buy-in in developing PM 
 
Long Description: The literature suggests that the support and involvement of 
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success. 
Stakeholders are relevant at every level (CDC management, grantees, local level 
implementers) 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text addresses the value and importance of 
stakeholder support, involvement, buy-in to the development and implementation of PM  
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 When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing examples of good/successful buy-
in, addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders,  or 
strategies to build support 
 
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition 
above 
 
Example:  “It’s about change management, buy in, acceptability.  All of those, you 
know, important aspects. It’s the softer side of the work we do but it’s the most 
important.” 
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Code Number:  051   
 
Code Name:  Stakeholder Buy-In Strategies  
 
Brief Description: Strategies used to nurture buy-in for PM from key stakeholders  
 
Long Description: The literature suggests that the support and involvement of 
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success. 
Various strategies may be employed to nurture or build buy-in from key stakeholders 
including engaging them in the development process, providing training on the PM, etc. 
Stakeholders are relevant at every level (CDC management, grantees, local level 
implementers) 
 
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes approaches to building stakeholder 
support for PM 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing examples of good/successful buy-
in, addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or the 
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM 
 
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition 
above  
 
Example:  “I think we considered these six low hanging fruit and we thought that 
they would too, sort of.  (Laughing)  So, you know, there were fewer complaints but still 
some but, you know, I think that it was partially to get their buy in too and to hopefully 
see that they, that they would agree that, that, yes, these are reasonable measures”  
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  052  
 
Code Name:  Stakeholders Buy-In Good 
 
Brief Description: Examples of good/successful buy-in from stakeholders  
 
Long Description: The literature suggests that the support and involvement of 
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success. 
 
When to Use: Apply this code to text that describes “good” buy-in on the part of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders could be at any level, including CDC (e.g., mgmt). 
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 When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in, 
addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or the 
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM 
 
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition 
above  
 
Example:  “I mean it was at that point I think, you know, I don’t want to say it was a 
sea change but there was something of that, there was something that said it no longer 
was ‘our’ thing we’re foisting on the program, but it became something that had real 
program ownership” 
 
 “Most project areas, when you talk with the STD program directors, are in favor of 
performance measures.  They just may not like the specifics on the ones [measures] that 
we have.” 
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Code Number:  053 
 
Code Name:  Stakeholders Buy-In Challenges 
 
Brief Description: Challenges to achieving buy-in from key stakeholders  
 
Long Description: The literature suggests that the support and involvement of 
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success. 
 
When to Use: Apply to text reflecting challenges to achieving stakeholder buy-in (all 
levels of stakeholders) 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in, 
addressing examples of successful buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or 
the importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM 
 
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition 
above  
 
Example: “One of the things I think we’ve learned here is some of the program 
consultants probably shouldn’t go.  And we’re dealing with that.”  
 
“Especially in project areas where you have so many different people involved in the 
performance measure, and they may not even know there’s a performance measure that 
you’re dealing with like IPP.  A lot of the IPP clinics may not understand that part of the 
data that they’re providing relates back to performance measure.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  054 
 
Code Name:  Stakeholders – Names/Types 
 
Brief Description: Specific Names/Types of Stakeholders 
 
Long Description: Identity of relevant stakeholders to a program’s PM system 
 
When to Use: Apply to text that identifies relevant stakeholders (e.g., CDC mgmt, CDC 
program consultants, national organizations, Congress, grantees, local level 
implementers) 
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 When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in, 
addressing examples of successful buy-in, describing challenges to buy-in, or the 
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM 
 
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition 
above  
 
Example: “Well, you know, there’s a lot of politics around it and, you know, we 
have the National Coalition of STD Directors and we have a process where we get input 
on those performance measures and then there’s, after we’ve drafted proposed new ones, 
there’s a period that we’re in right now for, for commenting and, and feedback.”  
 
“And HHS, ASPR, yeah.”   
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Code Number:  055  
 
Code Name:  Use – Technical Assistance/Tools 
 
Brief Description: Technical assistance and tools meant to support the use of PM 
 
Long Description: Performance measures should be used in order to achieve their 
benefit. The literature suggests technical assistance and training are important to provide 
to users of the PM system. Other tools or strategies may also support use (e.g., 
dissemination of data reports to state and local levels) 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes TA efforts (e.g., PM guides, TA calls, 
training) and other tools to support the use of PM – or the lack thereof 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:  
 
Example:  “And I think there’s been a lack of really good technical assistance from 
CDC on this project, so there’s a little bit of frustration that”  
 
“We [IMS] have 7 technical consultants, but we actually prefer to have 8.” & “Once the 
measure were, were developed, then we could come along behind and say, OK, you’ve 
got, like, 12 measures and I can, I can write a report that out of our, our system we can 
produce seven of them.” 
 
 
 
Code Number:  056 
 
Code Name:  Use Grantees Use (or Non-Use) /Capacity for PM 
 
Brief Description: Grantees use of PM data and challenges to their use 
 
Long Description: Grantees’ capacity or motivation to use PM data may differ given 
their variability  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes grantees’ use of PM, their lack of use, 
their capacity to use PM, and challenges to their use  
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:  
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Example: “They may be something that, you know, find it’s just another data 
collection exercise the CDC wants, they’ll collect whatever data, but they may not 
actually be using the performance measures to kind of, you know, direct their program 
and improve on that -identify weaknesses, or something like that.” 
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Code Number:  057  
 
Code Name:  Use – Misuse / Punitive Use 
 
Brief Description:  Punitive use of PM or other misuse of PM data 
 
Long Description: Concerns about punitive use of PM or other misuse may inhibit 
buy-in for the PM system.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to concerns or experiences of punitive use or 
misuse of PM data; when text describes a lack of trust on the part of grantees or others on 
how the PM data will be used 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code to “Purpose – Budgeting” if appropriate 
 
Example: “And, and, you know, and again, I mean, just getting back to this whole, 
whole idea that we’re trying to be punitive to them, that we’re looking for every reason to 
ding them rather than to help them.”  
 
 
 
Code Number:  058 
 
Code Name:  Use – Program Consultant Role 
 
Brief Description: Program consultant’s role in PM 
  
Long Description: Program consultants have an on-going working relationship with 
grantees and may be critical ‘change agents” in the adoption and use of PM 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the role of Program Consultants in the PM 
system – whether positive or negative – Their role could involve promoting adoption, 
supporting use, providing technical assistance, etc. 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code with the “Buy-In” family of codes if relevant 
 
Example:  “So, I mean, maybe they’re [program consultants] put in, well, they are 
put in a, a delicate position where they kind of have to be the enforcer.”  
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 “A lot of that performance measure kind of implementation lands on us as program 
[consultants], because we have to go out and implement it to the grantees.” 
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Code Number:  059 
 
Code Name:  Use Political 
 
Brief Description: Use of PM for political purposes 
 
Long Description: PM may be used for political purposes – to argue for more 
funding, to defend against funding cuts, to support policy changes, to back up 
GPRA/PART, for inclusion in reports that are used as political tools, etc. 
 
When to Use: Apply to text that reflects political use of PM  
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code to “Use – Misuse” if appropriate 
 
Example: “Well, [use PM for] bragging rights, first and foremost [laughing].  I think, 
you know, we use it as a way, in my grant applications, whether it’s to CDC or outside 
entities, that, you know, in order to be a quality program this is what, this is your 
documentation that supports you, you have a quality program.”  
 
“And then, you know, state and federal legislatures are going to have to make a decision 
about what’s important, but right now we don’t have any sort of national data to say, you 
know, we need more resources.” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  060 
 
Code Name:  Great Quote 
 
Brief Description: Really great quote, regardless of topic 
  
Long Description:  
 
When to Use: Use for any text identified as a terrific quote that may be particularly 
illustrative of an issue/idea  
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules: Double code with relevant code 
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 Example: 
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Code Number:  061 
 
Code Name:  Design: Data Sources, Collection, Reporting, & Management 
 
Brief Description: Issues of data sources, collection, reporting, or data management 
related to the design of the PM system 
  
Long Description: Data sources, collection, reporting, and management systems are 
central to the design of a PM system. In networked context, issues of capacity and 
potential burden must be considered in developing these systems. In public health, the 
collection of data may involve extensive data lags which may affect the utility of the data.  
 
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to issues of the data system as it relates to the 
overall design of the PM system (e.g., concerns about data lags, burden of data collection 
requirements, use of existing data mgmt systems). 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to issues of data quality, data 
validity, or QA methods and benefits. 
 
Coding Rules: If text refers to issues of data quality and validity, code as “Measurement: 
Data Quality / Validity Problems”.  
 
Example: “So I don’t know if we’re going to be requiring measurement at the local 
level in the near future.”  
 
“So, I mean, she can tell you a lot of, you know, the frustrations, the good, the bad, and 
ugly about the Chronicle.” 
 
“… the data is fairly old by the time the program uses it to award money.  It’s at least two 
or three years old.  Because you always have to give enough time for everything to have 
happened.  And then for the reports to come from IMS and so forth.  So, there are times 
when we know that things are really turned around but they’re being punished for 
behavior from three years ago.” 
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Code Number:  062 
 
Code Name:  Program Characteristics: Wicked / Complex Problems 
 
Brief Description: Descriptions or references to “wicked problems” confronting 
public health 
  
Long Description: The literature has coined the term “wicked problems” to refer to 
complex social problems that are typically influenced by multiple factors and require 
multidisciplinary/multi-sector approaches to effectively address them. 
 
When to Use: Apply code when text describes the public health problem being addressed 
by the program (OSH, COTPER) – When text may refer to the lack of or existence of a 
strong science base for the problem. 
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use this code when text is addressing issues of 
MEASUREMENT for complex issues 
 
Coding Rules: If text addresses issues of Measurement – look to “Measurement: 
Challenges” or “Measurement: Hard/ Impossible to Measure”  
 
Example: “And then in terms of another major division commitment is to reduce 
“disparities” OK.  What does that mean?” 
 
 “Joe and I were trying to figure out, what is, how do we measure preparedness?  
And, you know, for me, the, the term preparedness sprung up with no real definition 
around it.  I mean, are we saying that before we coined that term we were unprepared? Or 
anything that’s, that we know about that’s preventable that we’re not preventing, does 
that mean we’re not prepared?” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  063  
 
Code Name:  Use: CDC Use / Non-Use 
 
Brief Description: Use or Non-Use of PM data by CDC 
  
Long Description: CDC leads the PM development process but may or may not 
effectively use the data collected for management or other purposes. 
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 When to Use: Apply code when text describes use or non-use of PM data by CDC 
 
When NOT to Use:  
 
Coding Rules:  
 
Example: “I’ve been extraordinarily impressed with the fact that not only do we 
collect the data but we actually use it, which in a lot of places, even at CDC, you know 
either is not collected, or is not collected well, or if it’s collected nobody ever looks at it, 
or uses it, and I think that we have the full spectrum, so our Division has a lot to be proud 
in that regard, we manage with data.” 
 
 “Interviewer.  OK.  OK.  And then just, one of the last questions is about how 
you’re using the data right now.  Interviewee.  We’re not [laughing].  Really, to be 
honest.” 
 
 
 
 
Code Number:  064 
 
Code Name:  Purpose: Tension between Accountability & Program 
Improvement 
 
Brief Description: Perceived contradictory purposes for PM of accountability and 
program improvement  
  
Long Description: Some suggest that it is difficult or impossible to develop PM 
systems that serve both the purpose of accountability and program improvement. The 
literature has suggested that systems for each of these would require different types of 
measures, etc.  
 
When to Use: Apply code to text describing tension between the two purposes of 
accountability and program improvement  
 
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code if text is just addressing accountability or just 
addressing program improvement…or if it’s addressing both but not insinuating any 
tension between the two 
 
Coding Rules: If text is addressing accountability: “Purpose: Accountability (fiscal, 
performance)”; If text is addressing program improvement: “Purpose: Program 
Improvement.”  
 
Example: “Ideally, see, that’s, this is the constant battle we have internally between 
accountability and program improvement for measure, for measures and I think, you 
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 know, because of the legislation that we have in place, our number one requirement right 
now is to provide measures of accountability.” 
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SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA BY CASE- 
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS 
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PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS 
Organizational Context 
Originally funded in 
1999; PHEP established 
in 2002 
Program established in 
1957; one of oldest at 
CDC 
Program established by 
law in 1990 
Initial efforts in early 
1990s; NTCP 
implemented in 1999 
62 grantees representing 
states, cities, and 
territories 
65 grantees representing 
states, cities, and 
territories 
68 grantees representing 
states, tribes, and 
territories (and D.C.) 
58 grantees 
representing states and 
territories (and D.C.) 
Largest grantee program 
at CDC 
Largest program within 
DSTDP 
Largest program within 
DCPC 
Largest program within 
OSH 
Extensive staff turnover 
in all parts of DSLR 
Staff often start as CDC 
field staff working in 
states; long-term tenure 
Turnover frequent among 
program consultants 
More recent turnover 
throughout OSH 
Context of constant 
change and political 
volatility 
Institutionalized culture 
where change can be 
difficult 
Data-driven program 
culture 
Science-based program 
culture 
Politics compromises 
science 
Grantees have had 
extensive autonomy and 
have grown resistant to 
CDC oversight 
Legislated program 
requirements 
Faces political 
opponent in the tobacco 
industry 
Program Goals 
Evolving goals and 
expanding scope over 
time to “all hazards” 
Lacking clear goals and 
direction from CDC 
Consensus on program 
goals among CDC and 
grantees 
Consensus on four 
program goals among 
CDC, grantees, and 
other national partners 
No consensus on 
defining public health 
“preparedness”; limited 
science base 
Focus on syphilis, 
gonorrhea, and 
Chlamydia 
Narrow focus on women 
screened through the 
NBCCEDP only 
Focus on smoking 
initiation, smoking 
cessation, second-hand 
smoke, and reducing 
disparities 
Complexity: Program 
outcomes for 
“preparing” and 
“preventing” difficult to 
define 
Complexity: 25 
different STDs, shifting 
disease burden and 
epidemiology, 
prevalence differences 
across grantees, 
changing health care 
delivery patterns 
Program outcomes reflect 
clinical outcomes for 
women served through 
the NBCCEDP 
Program outcomes 
reflect a comprehensive 
tobacco control effort 
inclusive of 
educational, clinical, 
regulatory, economic, 
and social strategies 
implemented by 
multiple agencies and 
supported by diverse 
funding sources 
Outcomes dependent on 
integrated and seamless 
emergency response at 
the local, state, and 
federal levels; 
collaboration essential 
Grantees support a 
range of program 
activities implemented 
at the local level by 
diverse agencies 
Service delivery occurs 
primarily at the local 
level 
Service delivery occurs 
at local and grantee 
level; collaboration and 
coalition building 
emphasized 
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Stage of Program Development 
New; blazing new 
paths, in development 
Mature Mature Mature 
CDC recognizes that it 
must meet states “where 
they are” given stage of 
program development 
Programs must stay 
responsive to changes in 
the health care 
environment and in 
epidemiology 
State grantees have been 
funded for 11 or more 
years 
Strong tobacco control 
community 
OMEB working to 
develop a conceptual 
framework for PHEP 
Institutionalized culture 
difficult to shift 
Well established service 
delivery infrastructure 
with local providers 
Evidence-based logic 
models developed for 3 
of 4 program goals 
Program Budget 
$700 million FY 2008 $104 million FY 2008 $157 million in FY 2008 $63 million in FY 2008 
Median award $8.9 
million 
Median award $1.1 
million 
Median award $2.1 
million 
Median award $XX 
million 
Declining federal 
funding 
Flat funding Flat funding Flat funding 
PAHPA (2006) requires 
performance based 
budgeting beginning in 
FY 2009 
HIV/AIDS gets greater 
percentage of resources 
State legislatures 
contribute resources in 
some states; advocates 
are a source for resources 
as well 
State contributions 
from excise taxes and 
settlement funds 
dropping or 
disappearing 
completely given state 
budget crisis 
Multiple sources of 
preparedness funds to 
states from federal 
government (CDC, 
DHS, ASPR) 
STD not viewed as high 
priority 
Focus on achieving 
efficiencies given flat 
funding 
90% of funding for 
tobacco control are 
from excise taxes and 
settlement funds rather 
than CDC 
Stakeholders 
Congress, GAO, OMB, 
President 
Congress, OMB Congress, OMB, GAO Congress, OMB 
High powered national 
stakeholders – DHS, 
HHS, ASPR, FEMA 
 National advocates – 
Susan B. Komen for the 
Cure, ACS 
National advocates – 
ACS, ALA, AHA, 
CTFK, Legacy 
Foundation) 
ASTHO’s Directors of 
Public Health 
Preparedness, 
NACCHO, CSTE, 
APHL 
NCSD NACDD, NACCHO, 
NBCCEDP Council of 
Program Directors 
NACDD 
CDC Office of the 
Director; other CDC 
Centers 
Division of HIV/AIDS 
Prevention, CDC, 
Division of Cancer 
Prevention and Control, 
Division of 
CDC’s WISEWOMAN™ 
and CCC programs  
Other CDC programs, 
especially in the 
NCCDPHP, that share 
tobacco use as a risk 
factor (e.g., heart 
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Reproductive Health disease, diabetes, 
cancer) 
Grantees Grantees Grantees Grantees 
Political Environment 
Dominant theme – 
public visibility, 
perceived threat of 
hazards, pressures to 
“get states prepared” 
Stable Politically visible 
program given attention 
to breast cancer – CDC 
Director reports on 
related GPRA measure at 
quarterly HHS briefing 
OSH active in CDC 
D.C. office 
Political influences of 
other federal agencies 
(DoD, FEMA, HHS, 
ASPR). Top-down, 
compliance orientation 
– PAHPA, HSPD-21 
 Policy differences exist 
across states, especially in 
regard to mammography 
screening for younger 
women aged 40-49 
Political context in 
individual states can 
have important 
programmatic 
implications for 
individual NTCP 
grantee programs 
Interferes with CDC’s 
control over program 
implementation 
  Adversary represented 
by the tobacco industry 
Grantees have political 
influence 
Grantees have political 
influence 
Grantees have political 
influence 
Grantees have political 
influence 
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NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS  
 485
 PHEP CSPS NBCCEDP NTCP 
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
Network Structure: Vertical Relationships 
62 grantees; thousands of 
local-level partners 
65 grantees; hundreds 
of local-level partners 
68 grantees; 22,000 local-
level providers 
58 grantees; some 
local-level partners 
Congress – HHS – CDC 
– grantees, local-level 
Congress – HHS – 
CDC – grantees, 
regional (sometimes), 
local 
Congress – HHS – CDC 
– grantees, regional 
(sometimes), local 
Congress – HHS – 
CDC – grantees, local 
(if resources permit) 
Most vertical 
relationships formalized 
via funding 
Most vertical 
relationships formalized 
via funding; dominant 
dimension 
Most vertical 
relationships formalized 
via funding; dominant 
dimension 
Most vertical 
relationships formalized 
via funding  
Vertical structure varies 
within state, tribe, 
territory 
Vertical structure varies 
within state, tribe, 
territory 
Vertical structure varies 
within state, tribe, 
territory 
Vertical structure varies 
within state, tribe, 
territory 
Primarily 
intergovernmental 
throughout vertical chain 
Regional and local-
level partners include: 
local public health 
agencies, CBOs, family 
planning clinics 
Regional and local-level 
partners include: public 
health agencies, CBOs, 
private providers, 
community health 
centers, family planning 
clinics 
Local-level partners 
include local health 
agencies, CBOs 
(usually funded with 
non-CDC funds) 
Program activities at state 
and local levels 
Most program activities 
at local level 
Service delivery at local 
level 
CDC funds primarily 
support grantee 
infrastructure; program 
activities at state and 
local-level  
CDC accountable for 
performance of network 
partners 1-2 steps 
removed  
CDC accountable for 
performance of network 
partners 2-3 steps 
removed 
CDC accountable for 
performance of network 
partners 2-3 steps 
removed 
CDC accountable for 
performance of network 
partners  steps removed 
Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships 
Horizontal partners at all 
levels – federal, CDC, 
state, local 
Horizontal partners at 
all levels – federal, 
CDC, state, local 
Horizontal partners at all 
levels – federal, CDC, 
state, local 
Horizontal partners at 
all levels – federal, 
CDC, state, local 
Typically informal and 
unfunded (e.g., at state-
level Departments of 
education, transportation, 
emergency response; at 
local-level schools, first 
responders, commerce, 
transportation) 
Typically informal and 
unfunded (e.g., jails, 
private providers, 
juvenile detention 
facilities) 
Some funded (e.g., CBOs 
to conduct outreach and 
recruitment), others 
informal and unfunded 
(e.g., community health 
agency to assist with 
referral) 
Typically informal and 
unfunded (e.g., at state-
level – Department of 
education, other public 
health departments, 
advocacy organizations; 
at local-level – health 
care systems, schools) 
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Essential to achieving 
program goals – program 
outcomes are dependent 
on network efforts 
Increasing importance 
of partnering with 
horizontal partners to 
access priority 
populations that do not 
seek STD services at 
public health clinics or 
are incarcerated 
Support referral of 
priority populations to 
program services; provide 
advocacy 
Horizontal partners are 
essential to achieving 
NTCP program goals – 
program outcomes are 
dependent on network 
efforts 
Some horizontal partners 
are funded for 
preparedness efforts by 
other federal and state 
sources, but not for the 
public health component 
Horizontal partners 
typically facilitate 
program integration and 
improved access to 
populations at risk for 
STDs 
Horizontal partners 
typically extend program 
reach, increase access to 
priority populations, 
support program 
integration (e.g., 
WISEWOMAN™, and 
contribute to broader 
public education efforts 
that benefit all U.S. 
women 
 
Horizontal partners are 
integral to any emergency 
response 
“Community paradigm” 
recognizes horizontal 
partners as means to 
expand influence and 
contribute to 
population-based 
effects 
  
Network Function: Authority and Control Within the Network 
Control and authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation  
Control and authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
Control and authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
Control and authority 
compromised in 
decentralized 
implementation 
As vertical 
decentralization 
increases, CDC’s 
authority and control 
decreases 
As vertical 
decentralization 
increases, CDC’s 
authority and control 
decreases 
As vertical 
decentralization 
increases, CDC’s 
authority and control 
decreases 
As vertical 
decentralization 
increases, CDC’s 
authority and control 
decreases 
No authority over 
unfunded, horizontal 
partners on which 
grantees are dependent 
No authority over 
unfunded, horizontal 
partners – some of 
which grantees are 
dependent  
In vertical chain, control 
and authority are 
facilitated by funding and 
management tools (e.g., 
MDEs), network relations 
No authority over 
unfunded, horizontal 
partners on which 
grantees are dependent 
Cooperative agreement 
provides some authority 
over grantees 
Grant offered minimal 
authority over grantees; 
recent shift to 
cooperative agreement 
beginning in January 
2009 
Cooperative agreement 
provides some authority 
over grantees 
Cooperative agreement 
provides some authority 
over grantees, but not 
exercised  
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Limited control over 
local-level within vertical 
chain; grantees models of 
decentralization may 
hinder authority by 
grantee over local-level 
CDC has not exercised 
much authority over 
grantees during the past 
15 years 
Dominance of vertical 
network in NBCCEDP 
facilitates authority and 
control over performance 
at all levels 
Grantees are given 
extensive autonomy 
and have minimal 
reporting requirements 
Building relationships to 
facilitate coordination is 
essential in preparedness; 
Developing relationships 
with horizontal partners 
at state and local-level is 
a critical part of a public 
health manager’s role 
Skills to negotiate 
partner relationships 
important, but viewed 
as weak among 
grantees and local-level 
staff 
  
Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the Network 
Differing priorities across 
grantees; goal and 
mission conflicts with 
some horizontal partners 
Differing priorities 
across grantees; goal 
and mission conflicts 
with some horizontal 
partners 
Shared goals among 
network partners 
Shared goals among 
network partners 
Goal conflicts with 
vertical partners; 
Priorities of upstream 
partners (ASPR, HHS, 
DoD) privileged 
Vertical network 
partners often have 
their own priorities 
Some policy differences 
within vertical chain (e.g., 
screening ages for 
mammography) 
Each organization 
involved in 
comprehensive tobacco 
control has their own 
agenda and perspective 
depending on the 
constituency they 
represent 
Public health is new to 
the “emergency 
preparedness” arena and 
is challenged to “earn a 
place at the table” 
Different disease 
burden (epidemiology) 
likely an influence on 
goal and priority 
differences 
Some policy differences 
between CDC and 
national advocates 
 
Risk for different hazards 
(and the potential scale of 
a hazard) likely an 
influence on goal and 
priority differences 
   
Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and resources 
Extensive variability 
across grantees in 
capacity and resources 
Variability in level of risk 
for and type of “hazard” 
Variability in STD 
epidemiology (disease 
burden, populations 
affected) 
Variability in 
demographic profile of 
priority population; 
cultural barriers 
Variability in emphasis 
around goal areas; 
Political climate within 
states often influence 
program priorities 
 488
 PHEP CSPS NBCCEDP NTCP 
Program performance 
must be interpreted based 
on the unique context, 
capacity, and resources of 
the individual grantee 
Program performance 
must be interpreted 
based on the unique 
context, capacity, and 
resources of the 
individual grantee 
Program performance 
must be interpreted based 
on the unique context, 
capacity, and resources of 
the individual grantee 
Program performance 
must be interpreted 
based on the unique 
context, capacity, and 
resources of the 
individual grantee 
Variability in level of 
state contributions 
Laws and regulations 
vary by state – affects 
authority relationships 
Variability in level of 
state contributions 
If include all resource 
contributions for 
tobacco control within a 
state or territory, there 
is huge variability 
across grantees 
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 SYSTEMS 
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
Purpose 
Accountability “up” to 
OMB, Congress, and 
others “above” CDC 
Accountability for 
performance and 
program improvement  
Accountability to the 
women served, 
Congress, OMB, and 
the public 
Accountability “up” to 
OMB, Congress, and 
others “above” CDC, 
and to state legislatures 
Pressured to demonstrate 
that the nation is 
“prepared”  
Adamant that 
performance measures 
will not be used for 
budgeting 
Program improvement 
at all levels; a subset of 
the performance 
measures are part of a 
budgeting formula 
Important to 
demonstrate 
accountability for CDC 
and other funding (e.g., 
excise tax revenues, 
MSA settlement funds) 
Other sets of measures 
will be used for 
monitoring, program 
improvement, and 
budgeting 
Performance measures 
intended to communicate 
program priorities 
Performance measures 
intended to 
communicate program 
priorities 
Performance measures 
intended to provide a 
“national picture” of 
comprehensive tobacco 
control efforts 
The 3 GPRA/PART 
measures relate closely 
to six PHEP performance 
measures 
Performance measures 
are aligned with 
GPRA/PART measures, 
although all but 1 of the 
GPRA/PART measures 
are population-based 
Of the 3 GPRA/PART 
measures, 1 is specific 
to women served in the 
NBCCEDP and the 
other two are 
population based 
Of the 3 GPRA/PART 
measures, one is a core 
indicator – all our 
population-level 
measures 
Level of Measurement 
Grantee-level Primarily local-level 
with a couple that are 
grantee-level related to 
timely and complete data 
submissions to CDC 
Local-level  Primarily grantee but 
some local-level  
Six measures considered 
“low hanging fruit” – 
that is, what most 
grantees can address and 
those measures for which 
data are available for 
most grantees 
First group of 
performance measures 
were “GRAM” (“get 
right at ‘em”) measures, 
that is, what most 
grantees can address and 
those measures for which 
data are available for 
most grantees 
Patient-level, clinical 
measures 
A consideration in 
selecting core measures 
were those “low 
hanging fruit” – 
measures for which data 
are available for most 
grantees 
 
 
Types of Performance Measures 
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The current six measures 
are process measures 
reflecting “programmatic 
capabilities” 
Process measures (e.g., 
proportion of females 
admittees to large 
juvenile detention 
facilities tested for 
chlamydia) 
Process measures (e.g., 
percentage of screening 
mammograms provided 
to women aged 50 and 
older) 
Program found that 
common process 
measures were 
impossible to identify 
given variation in 
program priorities and 
activities across 
grantees 
Core measures reflect 
outcomes at the 
immediate, 
intermediate, and long-
term levels 
Intention to develop 
intermediate measures in 
the future 
Short-term outcome 
measures (e.g., among 
clients of STD clinics, 
the proportion of women 
with positive chlamydia 
tests that are treated 
within 14 and 30 days of 
the date of specimen 
collection) 
Short-term outcome 
measures (e.g., 
percentage of abnormal 
screening results with 
time from screening 
test to final diagnosis 
less than 60 days)  
and 
Intermediate-outcome 
measures (e.g., 
percentage of women 
diagnosed with breast 
cancer with treatment 
started) 
Concerns about data 
availability for core 
indicators across all 
grantees given cost to 
participate in various 
surveys from which 
most data are derived  
Distal, population-level 
measures  (e.g., 
changes in morbidity 
and mortality) viewed 
as not helpful for 
performance measures 
given that multiple 
factors contribute to 
them, they can take 
years to achieve, and 
CSPS resources cannot 
support a population-
level impact 
Distal measures are 
unlikely to be included in 
future performance 
measures given that 
multiple factors 
contribute to them 
Distal, population-level 
measures  (e.g., changes 
in morbidity and 
mortality) viewed as not 
helpful for performance 
measures given that 
multiple factors 
contribute to them, they 
can take years to achieve, 
and CSPS resources 
cannot support a 
population-level impact 
3 GPRA/PART measures 
reflect 3 of the 6 
performance measures 
aggregated at the 
national level 
Population-based 
GPRA/PART measures 
viewed as unrealistic and 
not useful 
Population-based 
GPRA/PART measures 
viewed as unrealistic 
and not useful 
Population-based 
GPRA/PART measures 
viewed as unrealistic  
Use of Targets 
National standards set by 
CDC for 4 of the 6 
measures  
Grantees set their own 3-
year targets given their 
individual baseline.  
National standards set 
by CDC for all 11 
measures 
Grantees set their own 
targets given their 
individual baseline.  
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 DSTDP does not believe 
there is enough trend 
data to consider national 
indicators 
 Targets based on trend 
data for national 
program and policy 
decisions  
Variability across 
grantees in terms of 
baseline data for the 
measures makes 
establishing national 
standards difficult. 
Quality Assurance Efforts 
OMEB staff conducted 
individual telephone 
calls with grantees to 
address data quality 
issues for the first two 
data submissions 
Different people with 
different skill levels enter 
data from local and state 
levels. 
Different data systems 
across grantees used 
although CDC provides 
an optional software 
system for data 
management to 
grantees 
Not reporting on core 
measures yet – still in 
development 
National validation 
study of MDE data was 
conducted and 
supported strong data 
quality for program. 
Some individual 
grantees conduct chart 
reviews and use other 
quality assurance 
practices to assess data 
quality. 
In regard to broader set 
of key outcome 
indicators, data 
concerns relate to 
frequent 
“customization” of the 
measures rather than 
following measurement 
protocol and definition. 
Data quality problems 
have been identified and 
documented including 
misunderstanding the 
measures, capacity issues 
affecting data collection 
and reporting from local-
level, and differences in 
data management 
systems across grantees. 
Challenging for DSTDP 
to assess quality across 
so many grantees. 
Validation assessment 
conducted in 2007 
identified major quality 
assurance issues (e.g., 
misunderstanding about 
the intent of the 
measures, uncertainty 
regarding the definition 
of the measures and how 
each is calculated, poor 
adherence to 
measurement protocols) 
Much of the data 
supporting the core 
indicators will come 
from survey data and 
should be of high 
quality. A few of the 
core indicators require 
local-level data 
collection using data 
sampling and collection 
protocols that may be 
difficult for some 
grantees or may not be 
implemented 
consistently across 
grantees.   
Extensive data quality 
system in place 
including standard edit 
programs to assess data 
quality, technical 
consultants who work 
for the NBCCEDP data 
contractor that work 
individually with 
grantees on data-
related issues, semi-
annual review of data 
quality as part of MDE 
data assessment. DCPC 
provides grantees a 
detailed MDE data 
dictionary CDC 
requires that grantees 
include a staff position 
for a data manager. 
OMEB has provided 
guidance to grantees on 
the performance 
measures including a 
document with detailed 
definitions, measurement 
specifications, and data 
collection methods. 
DSTDP has developed 
technical assistance 
materials and strategies: 
A guidance document on 
the performance 
measures with detailed 
information about the 
intent of each measure, 
definitions, measurement 
specifications, data 
sources; Performance 
measurement “Learning 
Tours” involving on-site 
review of data quality 
and provision of 
technical assistance 
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 Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program 
outputs and outcomes?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ-1 
Variability of “hazards” across network 
and rarity of hazards affects observability 
of specific outcomes. Risk of hazard varies 
(e.g., hurricanes not likely to be observed in 
some parts of network). Common 
“observable” measures may be difficult to 
define in a network. Also feasibility of 
accomplishing some possible outcomes varies 
given grantee context (48-hr prophylactic 
distribution). Together, the complexity of 
preparedness and network structure leads to 
challenges in observing outcomes. 
Relates to challenge of 
identifying common  
measures that are 
meaningful to all network 
partners. “Low hanging 
fruit” selected early on. 
H PHEP 
Network fragments accountability for 
outcomes. Complexity of problem 
necessitates network response (at multiple – 
vertical – levels AND from multiple – 
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be 
attributed to grantee alone. 
Based on observability as 
perspective of attribution 
and accountability 
H 
Political environment (top level federal 
partners in network) contradicts science-based 
approach to identifying or defining observable 
program outcomes. 
PAHPA, HSPD-21 Unique to 
PHEP 
Complexity of preparedness is an 
important factor in challenging 
observability of program outcomes.  
Complexity is reflected in the lack of a 
conceptual framework for PHEP which means 
OMEB cannot identify outcomes; lack of 
science base; expanding scope; need for 
multi-sector response at all levels of 
government; and difficulties to measure  
“prevention” “synergy” “collaboration.”. 
PHEP measures represent process measures 
more than outcomes since outcomes are 
difficult to identify at this stage of the 
program’s development. 
M What is it to “be 
prepared”? Unique 
political context which 
has contributed to an 
expansion of program 
scope and demands, “Are 
we prepared?” Important 
to discussion of interplay 
of  program complexity 
and networks 
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Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ2 
Need to “meet states where they are.” 
Broad network led to choice of “low hanging 
fruit” to accommodate varied capacity, 
resources, data availability, and to respond 
to accountability demands from above. 
Complexity, political 
context, and stage of 
program development also 
relevant 
H PHEP 
Political influence of network members 
affects types of measures selected. Push-
back from grantees if types of PM do not 
seem realistic, feasible, meaningful, or if 
grantees do not feel they have control over 
affecting performance for the measures. The 
network (especially grantees) requires a 
negotiation over types of measures selected. 
Policy requirements (political context) 
require use of performance measures and 
even specifies use of some measures (top-
down network influence) by PHEP. Political 
pressure for accountability “up” 
Policy tool may be a factor 
here  given “cooperative” 
nature; HSPD-21, PAHPA 
– Unique to PHEP 
H 
Network influences level of measures 
selected. For PHEP, difficult to include 
local-level outputs and outcomes because of 
network structure – local level network 
partners lack capacity to collect and report 
data at local level in network. Using state-
level measures for now. 
Newness (stage of 
development) of program 
may contribute to lack of 
data collection/reporting 
infrastructure 
M 
Network blurs who is responsible for 
what. Hard to know WHO (which network 
member) is responsible for WHAT 
indicators given that outputs/outcomes often 
reflect work of many. 
Fuzzy boundary and joint 
production problems 
M 
Different network partners want PM to serve 
unique purposes (CDC wants PM for 
accountability; grantees want PM for 
program improvement) – Purpose affects 
types of measures selected 
Tension between 
accountability and program 
improvement unique to 
PHEP 
H 
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Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 3 
As vertical and horizontal decentralization 
increase, DSLR’s ability to influence 
performance on outcomes decreases.  CDC 
has little to no control over local level network 
partners; vertical structures vary within states; 
preparedness demands reliance on horizontal 
partners. Goal conflicts between vertical and 
horizontal partners further reduces control over 
outcomes. 
Preparedness is achieved 
through joint production 
– contributions from 
varied levels of 
government and from 
various sectors 
H PHEP 
Grantees demand measures that reflect 
outputs and outcomes for which they have 
control – leads to process measures. Expert 
groups added criteria related to “control” for 
measure selection. Grantees argue it is not fair 
to make them accountable for performance on 
measures for which they don’t have control. 
Network may lead to choice of measures 
“closer to the work” of grantees (that they have 
control of and can affect and can be 
accountable for). May support selection of 
process measures. 
 H 
Institutional and funding arrangements 
facilitate authority and control within 
vertical network. For PHEP, virtually no 
control over horizontal partners – but PHEP 
dependent on them. 
Joint production of 
outcomes by vertical and 
horizontal partners  
M 
Network demands extensive stakeholder 
involvement in development of PM system – 
collaborative effort rather than a CDC 
effort alone. Network partners influence 
design. Need extensive QA to assure data 
validity in network. Adoption incremental 
given number of grantees. 
  
Network demands sophisticated performance 
mgmt system to facilitate use 
Data validity problems to 
date 
M 
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Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program 
outputs and outcomes?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 1 
Variability across network in STD 
epidemiology challenges observability of 
outcomes.  Outcomes may be observed in 
some parts of network and not in others (e.g., 
outcomes related to syphilis may not likely to 
be observed in some parts of network). 
Common “observable” and meaningful 
measures may be difficult to define in a 
network.  
STD identified alternative 
measures for low 
morbidity areas, but some 
thought they were not 
priority measures 
H CSPS 
Complexity issue Some longer-term effects 
may take years to detect, especially given 
minimal resources to affect them. Science 
base lacking for some measures and don’t 
know how to measure some outcomes (PID). 
25 different STDs, differing and shifting 
disease burden. 
Important to discussion of 
interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
M 
Network structure fragments 
accountability. Complexity of problem 
necessitates network response (at multiple – 
vertical – levels AND from multiple – 
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be 
attributed to grantee alone. DSTDPs move to 
a ‘community approach’ shifts public health 
role to influencing partners (jails, private 
providers).  
Based on observability as 
perspective of attribution 
and accountability. 
Important to discussion of 
interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
H 
Differences of opinion across networks of 
what outcomes should be observed. 
Extensive network has led to differences in 
ideas about what key outputs and outcomes 
should be prioritized – There is a lack of 
consensus about priority outputs and 
outcomes needed to reduce long term 
morbidity and mortality related to STDs. 
Participants suggest lack 
of leadership at CDC to 
define clear goals and 
priorities – Unique to 
DSTDP 
L 
Capacity and resource differentials across 
network limit ability collect and report 
data outcomes.  Outputs and outcomes will 
be observed several levels below CDC (local 
level) and across 100’s of network partners. 
While the outputs and outcomes may be 
observable, there may be challenges related to 
data availability across network and/or ability 
to collect/report output and outcome data to 
grantee. 
 M 
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 Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 2 
Choose “get right at ‘em” measures. Broad 
network led to choice of GRAM (“get right at 
‘em) measures  to accommodate varied 
capacity, resources, data availability of 
grantees and to support grantee buy-in – 
DSTDP hopes for more sophisticated 
measures in future 
Complexity and political 
context also relevant 
H CSPS 
Network influences level of measures 
selected. Local level measures used given that 
most program activities occur at this level (2-
3 steps below CDC) 
Level of measurement H 
Political influence of network members 
affects types of measures selected. Network 
members have political influence and resist if 
types of PM do not seem realistic, feasible, 
meaningful or consistent with their priorities 
Types of measures – 
Some proposed 2009 
measures rejected  
H 
Changes in context and network structure 
effects types of measures included. 
Complexity: Changing patterns in health care 
seeking behavior (shift from pubic STD 
clinics to private providers) results in changes 
in network structure and need to move to 
broader, population-level PM 
Complexity of public 
health problem interacting 
with network structure 
 
Variability in network. Large network 
introduces data quality issues that affect use 
of PM data; use of PM to make comparisons 
across grantees not helpful given their unique 
context, resource differentials, etc. With broad 
network that includes 100s of local level 
partners, the adoption of PM and the use of 
PM data has been slow.  
 L 
Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 3 
CSPS Authority and control over outcomes 
compromised given network structure. 
Control weakens with greater vertical 
decentralization (local level partners) and out 
(no authority over horizontal, unfunded 
Control over jails, juvenile 
centers, some family 
planning clinics difficult  
H 
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 partners); varied state structures affect level of 
control; funding tools vary between grantees 
and local partners; laws and regulations differ 
in states.  
Mission and goal conflicts lessen control 
and authority with local and horizontal 
partners. 
Jails have mission of 
public safety vs. public 
health 
H 
Pushback from grantees for PM where 
performance is reliant on partners over 
which they have little control.  More 
process/short-term outcomes (venue-specific) 
selected vs. population level outcomes. 
Guidance acknowledges 
measures outside their 
control. 
H 
PM help communicate program priorities 
within a broad network. Cooperative 
agreement as means to strengthen 
authority in requiring reporting of PM. 
  
Network demands extensive stakeholder 
involvement in development of PM system 
– collaborative or negotiated effort rather 
than a CDC effort alone.  
Network partner 
influences PM design 
 
Network requires that flexibility needed in 
PM system. Grantees set their own targets 
given variability in terms of disease burden, 
but also in resources, capacity, and context. 
Also, some choice in 
measure selection for low 
morbidity areas (syphilis) 
 
Incremental approach needed given 
extensive network. Time for adoption and 
buy-in to occur at all levels – even CDC. 
Champions in DSTDP. GRAM measures 
first selected.                         
Organizational culture 
resistant to PM 
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Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program 
outputs and outcomes?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 1 
Nature of the program (service delivery) 
and decision to focus on outcomes only 
for women served through the program 
facilitates observability of program 
outputs and outcomes. HOWEVER, some 
outcomes less observable in parts of 
network given community size (tribes and 
territories have smaller numbers of cervical 
cancer cases) 
Unique to NBCCEDP H NBCCEDP 
Nature of program, dominance of 
vertical dimension, and use of specific 
polity tools facilitate attribution of 
outcomes to program.  
Based on observability as 
perspective of attribution 
and accountability. 
Important to discussion of 
interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
H 
Some longer-term effects may take years 
to detect, especially given minimal 
resources to affect them (NBCCEDP 
serves 1% of population). Science base 
lacking for some measures (re-screening 
rates) and don’t know how to measure some 
outcomes (disparities).  
Important to discussion of 
interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
M 
Outputs and outcomes will be observed 
several levels below CDC (local level) and 
across 1000’s of network partners. 
Outputs and outcomes are observable, in 
part, given large investment in data 
management system and staff capacity to 
collect/report data.  
Offers contrast to CSPS 
and PHEP 
M 
 
Observability of treatment initiation 
(outcome) obscured by policy factors within 
network (HIPAA) that require use of proxy  
 L 
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Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 2 
Purpose of PM, nature of program, and 
network all influence type of measures 
selected. Types of measures influenced more 
by program goals/priorities and the nature of 
the NBCCEDP as a service delivery program 
– led to selection of PM related to clinical 
services. Selected types of measures for 
which programs can be held accountable and 
are actionable. 
Recognition that 
population-level 
measures would not 
provide useful 
information in network 
context.  
H NBCCEDP 
Political influence of network members 
affects types of measures selected. Network 
members (grantees) push-back if types of PM 
do not seem realistic, feasible, meaningful or 
consistent with their priorities (issues with 
cervical measure). DCPC has revised 
measures based on their feedback. 
Types of measures H 
Extent of network and its variability has 
effects on PM lends comparisons across 
grantees not helpful given unique context, 
resource differentials; adoption of PM has 
taken time given size of network (time to 
create a data-driven program culture at all 
levels that supports submission of quality data 
and use of PM data); requires incremental 
implementation/use of PM over time. Large 
network introduces data quality issues that 
require extensive QA and TA system. 
 L 
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Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 3 
Service delivery occurs 2-3 steps below 
CDC and some authority and control is 
compromised given network structure.  
CDC has little influence 
on local level providers 
H NBCCEDP 
Funding relationships strengthen 
authority and control down vertical chain 
within NBCCEDP. Cooperative 
agreement used by DCPC to improve 
authority in requiring PM Focus on 
program-funded screenings also facilitates 
authority and control. Dependence largely 
on vertical chain increases authority and 
control.  
Funding tools important 
– partner relationships 
important 
H 
PM communicate program priorities 
within a broad network. Strong consensus 
across network on program goals and 
priorities 
 M 
Network demands extensive stakeholder 
involvement in development of PM 
system – collaborative and negotiated 
effort rather than a CDC effort alone. 
Push back on measures seen outside 
grantees control (cervical measure); revise 
measures seen as problematic. 
 H 
Network variability requires some 
flexibility needed in PM system. 
PM not calculated if 
small numbers 
M 
Longer term outcomes not viewed as fair 
to be held accountable for (GPRA 
measures) given network structure and 
complexity of problem. 
Morbidity and mortality 
influenced by other 
factors than screening 
alone 
L 
Incremental approach to PM 
implementation needed given extensive 
network – time for adoption and buy-in to 
occur at all levels. 
 M 
PM design involves extensive 
performance management system that 
supports quality and use. 
Significant and sustained 
investment by CDC 
H 
Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program 
outputs and outcomes?  
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 Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 1 
Network structure fragments 
accountability. Complexity of problem 
necessitates network response (at multiple – 
vertical – levels AND from multiple – 
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be 
attributed to grantee alone (especially since 
CDC primarily supports infrastructure vs. 
implementation activities). OSH has 
accepted this as a given and aims to observe 
effects of comprehensive tobacco control 
efforts broadly. 
Based on observability as 
perspective of attribution 
and accountability. 
Important to discussion 
of interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
H NTCP 
Variability across network in smoking 
prevalence challenges observability of 
outcomes. Variability across grantees in 
priorities (which goal area) affects 
observability of outputs and outcomes. 
Science base strong (logic models) and has 
facilitated identification of observable 
program outputs and outcomes. 
HOWEVER, tobacco burden varies across 
grantees making some outcomes more or 
less observable across network. 
Important to discussion 
of interplay of  program 
complexity and networks 
M 
Network has adopted four goals which 
facilitates identification of program outputs 
and outcomes. HOWEVER, the extensive 
NTCP network challenges ability to identify 
common outputs and outcomes given that 
grantees address different goal areas (due to 
resource limitations, political context, etc.) 
and that grantees implement different 
activities. 
OSH was unable to 
identify common process 
measures given 
variability in which 
activities are 
implemented and how 
they are implemented 
H 
Capacity and resource differentials across 
network limit ability to collect and report 
data (“observe”) outcomes.  While outputs 
and outcomes may be observable, there are 
challenges across network to 1) 
collect/report local-level valid data given 
resource and capacity issues and 2) data 
availability across network (expense of 
survey data). 
 M 
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Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance 
measurement and the types of performance measures used?  
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 2 
Select “low hanging fruit.” OSH selected PM 
for which most/all states have data – the 
“what’s available” approach. 
“Low hanging fruit” 
concept also observed in 
PHEP and CSPS 
M NTCP 
Consensus across network on broad goals, 
purpose of system, and strong science base 
facilitate decisions around types of 
measures included. Agreement on four goal 
areas, outcomes for accountability, science 
base supporting outcomes at three levels.  
Goal consensus – also 
exists in NBCCEDP 
M 
Variability across network in program 
activities influences type of measures used. 
Outcomes versus process measures. 
Common process 
measures possible for 
NBCCEDP, PHEP, CSPS 
H 
Variability across grantees in goal area 
priorities, program activities, and 
implementation approaches, influences 
choice of PM used. 
 H 
Extent of network and variability of network 
have led to data quality concerns for KOIS. 
Comparisons across grantees not  helpful 
given unique context, resource differentials, 
etc. 
Core indicators not 
implemented yet 
L 
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Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes 
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Case Findings Notes Importance of 
Case to RQ 3 
Choice of outcome-level measures means 
grantees have little control over outcomes.  
Integrated funding streams and broad 
comprehensive tobacco control approach 
leads to outcomes that reflect comprehensive 
tobacco control efforts.  
Recognition that 
outcomes would only be 
affected through 
integrated, comprehensive 
approach. May support 
evaluation more than PM. 
H NTCP 
Challenge to identify a small, core set of 
indicators. Grantees focus on different goal 
areas and implement different activities.  
Couldn’t identify common 
process measures 
M 
Decentralization lessens CDC control over 
local level activities.  CDC  dollars typically 
support grantee infrastructure and may be a 
small part of overall resources in a given state. 
Large contributions to 
tobacco control efforts 
from excise taxes and 
MSA funds 
M 
Flexibility needed in system given grantees 
focus on different goals, different political 
context, and different activities.  
Target setting, choice of 
KOIs 
L 
QA challenges will likely emerge with local-
level core measures in decentralized 
context. 
Core measures not 
implemented yet – 
specialized protocols for 
data collection under 
development. 
L 
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MATRIX TO FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-CASE FINDINGS 
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 Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis: “The extent Research Question #1: How does networked 
to which performance measures are used and the pubic management affect the observability of 
types of measures used will depend on the degree program outputs and outcomes?  
to which outputs and outcomes can be observed” [Jennings and Haist define observability defined as 
(p185) ability to measure outputs and outcomes and ability 
to attribute outputs and outcomes to the program] 
Finding #1: Network pubic management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability for results, 
creating challenges for performance measurement. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Process measures selected that are more closely tied to the work of 
grantees; Grantee-level measures selected rather than local level 
measures that may be jointly produced 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Problematic to include output and outcome measures that are jointly 
produced; Impossible to discern accountability or attribution for 
jointly produced outputs and outcomes, especially outcomes further 
along the results chain; Pragmatic challenges of data collection and 
management for jointly produced outputs and outcomes; Challenges to 
measure some constructs such as collaboration and synergy.  
Case examples Difficult to get partners to participate in public health-related 
preparedness activities (e.g., planning for pandemic flu); Grantees 
resistant to performance measures that they feel are unfair to be held 
accountable for because performance on the measure is outside their 
control. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Achieving outcomes for preparedness demands a coordinated response 
across levels of government and sectors at each level – vertical and 
horizontal relationships involved in a response muddy efforts to assign 
accountability. 
Other supportive case examples Network also fragments accountability in CSPS and NTCP; NTCP 
closest example to jointly produced outcomes. 
Negative case example NBCCEDP processes, short-term and intermediate outcomes are easier 
to observe because program involves service delivery and relate only 
to women served through the program – accountability is more easily 
maintained within the network 
 
Finding #2: Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data facilitate 
identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Network consensus on four goals is part of what facilitates 
identification of 120 key outcome measures for NTCP from which 
core indicators have been selected. Strong science base allows focus 
on outcomes. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Network consensus on goals facilitates identification of common 
performance measures even with variation in processes across grantees 
– accountability assigned to efforts of entire comprehensive tobacco 
control program, not just CDC-funded efforts (conscious decision to 
accept limitations related to attribution). 
Case examples Four program goals with three evidence-based logic models facilitated 
the identification of 120 KOIs using rigorous, panel process; More 
challenging to identify small set of core indicators (that all grantees 
will report) from that larger set because grantees focus on different 
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 program goals and few have resources to address all four.  
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
National partners in tobacco control and all grantees have adopted four 
common goals for tobacco control; Strong evidence base after years of 
well-funded research; Extensive survey data available at national level 
from several sources; performance measurement  needed for 
accountability “up” and to defend resources at state and federal levels; 
CDC interest to provide a “national snapshot” of tobacco control. 
Other supportive case examples Network consensus on program goals and activities in the NBCCEDP 
facilitates identification of common outputs and outcomes. 
Negative case example Lack of consensus on goals (more an issue that the program is not well 
understood yet – a developmental issue), weak science base, no survey 
or surveillance data challenge PHEP to identify outcome measures; 
Weak agreement on program goals (including weak leadership on 
goals and priorities at CDC) challenges identification of outcomes for 
CSPS, although logic models help. 
 
Finding #3: The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production of 
outcomes and shared accountability 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Decision to focus on outcomes and to openly recognize that outcomes 
are jointly produced with shared accountability for outcomes among 
all those participating in comprehensive tobacco control work. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Accountability is fragmented in a network structure that involves a 
dominant horizontal dimension; Impossible to decipher who is 
accountable for what. 
Case examples KOIs and core indicators represent outcomes for "comprehensive 
tobacco control" efforts, not CDC-funded NTCP; Explicit examples 
available for each program goal. 
OSH funds for NTCP primarily support infrastructure costs for 
grantees, not program delivery; CDC funds are often only a fraction of 
state funds available (excise taxes and MSA); Strategy of 
comprehensive tobacco control recognizes importance of multiple 
types and levels of interventions. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Other supportive case examples PHEP reliant on jointly produced outcomes to ensure “preparedness;” 
CSPS increasingly reliant on networked response involving private 
physicians, jails, etc. in order to achieve population-level effects 
inherent in their “community perspective.” 
Negative case example NBCCEDP outputs, short-, and intermediate outcomes observable 
because all programs do the same thing (service delivery) and focus on 
same goal; Accountability more easily maintained within vertical 
network. 
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Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis: “The extent Research Question #2: How does networked 
to which performance measures are used and the public management influence the use of 
types of measures used will depend on the degree performance measurement and the types of 
to which outputs and outcomes can be observed” performance measures used? 
(p185) 
Finding #1: In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political, social, and 
scientific” process. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Performance measurement development process is negotiated and 
incremental; Political initiatives shape the performance measurement 
system; Lack of science makes system vulnerable to political 
influence. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Multiple factors influence the design of performance measurement 
system; Network structure implies many levels of stakeholders 
involved in development and implementation process; performance 
measurement development is incremental and negotiated process 
adoption will take time. 
Case examples Multiple performance measurement sets developed for different 
purposes for PHEP; Evolving mission and expanding scope reflecting 
political influence; Policy initiatives HSPD-21, PAHPA big factors 
affecting PHEP performance measurement; Extensive stakeholder 
involvement in process via Evaluation Workgroup, expert groups, 
meetings with federal stakeholders in D.C. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
PHEP in highly political context; Lack of science base; Extensive 
network interested in performance measures and pressure for 
performance measures as means to show that “we’re prepared” 
grantees, ASPR, Preparedness Directors, HHS, DoD, DHS, etc. 
Other supportive case examples PHEP more or less unique in the extent of political influence; 
NBCCEPD has political influences on some measures – i.e., to allow 
flexibility in measure on providing mammograms to women ages 40-
49. 
Negative case example Less political influence in CSPS and NTCP, although grantees as key 
stakeholders have political power and influence. 
 
Finding #2: Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated and 
incremental process. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Process to develop performance measures has been slow and 
negotiated; Adoption has been challenging which has affected use and 
data quality (lack of endorsement by DSTDP management and 
program consultants; resistance to performance measurement by 
grantees). 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Network structure implies many levels of stakeholders involved in 
development and implementation process; performance measurement 
development is incremental and negotiated process adoption will take 
time; For CSPS, adoption is required at hundreds of local-level sites; 
To facilitate adoption in a network, extensive management system is 
needed to support data quality, use, buy-in. 
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 Case examples CSPS is not yet a data-driven culture; Grantees are resistant to 
requirements; Program consultants sometimes entering data for 
grantees; Process of workgroups negotiating measures, piloting, vetting 
processes; Poor data quality at this time, although improving; Grant 
has given much autonomy to grantees – move to cooperative 
agreement with new five-year award in January 2009. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Organizational culture issues Much autonomy and few requirements 
for grantees over the years; Not particularly a data-driven 
organizational culture; Long-standing program with institutionalized 
organizational culture that is difficult to shift. 
Other supportive case examples NBCCEDP and PHEP also incremental and negotiated performance 
measurement development processes. NBCCEDP has incrementally 
expanded the use of their measures – most recently to budgeting. 
Negative case example N/A 
 
Finding #3: The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly shapes the 
design of its performance measurement system. [Variability: risk and scale of potential event/hazard; 
Program context; Program priorities and activities: Capacity and resources; Data availability and 
sophistication of data collection systems]. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
DSLR selected "low hanging fruit" at start; Can't compare grantees' 
performance; Data quality issues; Selection of grantee-level measures 
vs. local-level measures; Difficult to identify common measures. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Network variability in vertical chain – in terms of characteristics of 
public health problem (risk/scale of hazard), in grantee organizations 
(resources, capacity, context, data availability); Overall, variability 
effects all aspects of the performance measurement system – choice of 
measures, level of measurement, design of system (data quality 
mechanisms, flexibility in system). 
Case examples Capacity and data availability issues led to selection of grantee-level 
measures even though “all preparedness is local;” Extensive quality 
assurance problems with individual telephone calls to grantees needed; 
Selected “low hanging fruit” at start viewed as ones acceptable by 
grantees and for which data was available across the grantees; Decision 
not to compare grantee performance given their unique contexts. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Huge variation in resource levels across grantees that affect capacity 
for performance measurement, including data collection; Differences 
in risk levels, potential hazards, and scale of event lead to different 
priorities and activities across grantees; Limited control over local-
level although they get 50% of grantee funds. 
Other supportive case examples Three of four cases selected "low hanging fruit" at start in order to 
accommodate variability across grantees, especially in regard to 
capacity and data availability; None of the four cases compare 
performance across grantees; Quality assurance big issue for all four 
cases; Flexibility in performance measurement system is built into 3 
cases. 
Negative case example Common set of performance measures possible for NBCCEDP given 
that service delivery is same across grantees and program priorities are 
tied to those services; Local-level measures possible given outcomes 
tied to local-level service delivery; Capacity developed over time for 
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 data collection/reporting – large commitment of CDC resources to 
build that capacity and support data quality.  
 
Finding #4: Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS performance 
measurement system. [Variability in epidemiology disease burden, populations affected; Geographic 
context; Capacity and resources; Program priorities and activities; Data availability and sophistication of 
data collection systems]. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Difficult to identify common set of measures meaningful to all 
grantees; Selected GRAM (easiest) at start; Need for flexibility in 
system for grantees; Can't compare grantee performance; Data quality 
issues. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Network variability in vertical chain: Variability in terms of 
characteristics of problem (STD burden; populations affected); 
Variability in terms of grantee organizations (geog context, resources, 
capacity; data availability) DO THEY HAVE DIFFERENT 
IMPLICATIONS? In total variability effects all aspects of the PM 
system choice of measures, level of measurement, design of system 
(data quality mechanisms, flexibility in system. 
Case examples Some states with little syphilis, so syphilis-related measures not really 
relevant; Added choice of measures for low morbidity areas (but some 
staff disagreed with approach); Allow grantees to set their own 
baseline and targets; Selected GRAM measures; Decision not to 
compare grantees since "apples and oranges." 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
25 different STDs and CDC focuses on 3; Epidemiology of these 3 
STDs varies by grantee in terms of disease burden and populations 
affected; Some states have huge geographic area and part-time staff 
given small resources while others have lots of DIS and CDC 
assignees. 
Other supportive case examples All four cases are confronted with this issue of variability – 
NBCCEDP’s variability seems to have the least affect on their 
performance measures given it is a service delivery system. However, 
even the NBCCEDP has had to accommodate this variability in their 
system by not calculating measures if a small “n,” not comparing 
grantees given variable context, etc. 
Negative case example N/A 
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Finding #5: The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource investments to 
build a comprehensive performance management system in order to ensure data quality and the use 
of performance measurement data at multiple levels. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Large financial investment in performance management and data 
monitoring system for NBCCEDP; Strong data quality; Data reporting 
requirements in cooperative agreement. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Implementing performance measurement in a large network context 
requires extensive resources and commitment to build adequate 
performance management system to support data quality and data use at 
all levels. 
Case examples NBCCEPD has supported a data contractor since the program’s 
inception; Requirement of data management staff for all grantees; 
Training provided on-going; Extensive technical assistance for data 
management efforts; Monitoring cycle instituted to regularly review 
and discuss data with grantees; Software provision; Consistent 
managing with data. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
DCPC has built a data-driven culture around the NBCCEDP from the 
start; DCPC has advantage of a service delivery program with the 
NBCCEDP that has made measurement of relevant processes and 
outcomes feasible. 
Other supportive case examples PHEP and NTCP do not have mature enough performance 
measurement systems to assess this aspect.  
Negative case example Use of performance data and data quality are limited in CSPS because 
DSTDP lacks a data-driven CSPS program culture; Lacks sophisticated 
performance management system to reinforce data use and data quality. 
 
Finding #6: Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their use 
[Variability: state political context; tobacco control priorities; program priorities and activities; capacity 
and resources]. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Could not identify common process measures; Difficult to select 
common outcome measures because grantees  focus on different goals  
"low hanging fruit" a factor for selection since data is not available for 
all grantees; Use of performance data may be limited to evaluation 
given focus on outcomes; Grantees select KOIs and reporting is 
optional (flexibility); Reporting of core indicators is not a requirement 
of new 2009 FOA. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Within vertical network, variability in grantee's resources, goal 
priorities, and context influences choice and types of performance 
measures. 
Case examples Only outcome measures are used because grantees implement activities 
(even “best practices) in too many different ways to identify common 
process measures; Data availability and grantee capacity a 
consideration in selecting "low hanging fruit" (easiest); Data collection 
infrequent for surveys (every 2-5 years) which may limit use of 
performance data to evaluation rather than performance 
management/monitoring. 
Issues of case context Grantees have different focus on the four goal areas sometimes choice 
is influenced by political context; Although best practices & 
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 (situationality) community guide provide extensive information on evidence-based 
program activities for tobacco control, implementation happens in many 
different ways; Costly to conduct/participate in all the varied surveys 
(tobacco supplements, etc) so not every grantee will have data to 
calculate core measures. 
Other supportive case examples All cases support this issue of the effects of network variability on 
performance measurement 
Negative case example N/A 
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Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis: Research Question #3: How does networked 
“Measurement will be more common and will public management affect CDC’s control over 
have greater impact when agencies have greater outcomes and the subsequent design and 
control over outcomes” (p185) perceived impact of performance measurement? 
Finding #1: Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and grantee 
control over performance. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Process measures selected that are more closely tied to work of 
grantees and for which grantees feel they have greater control. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Issue of control effects types and choice of measures. 
Case examples PHEP has applied a criteria for selection of new performance measures 
titled, "under control of public health"; Concerns about "fairness"; 
Grantees reject measures viewed as too far outside their control. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
PHEP outcomes are not yet well defined; Outcomes for preparedness 
are jointly produced; Goal conflicts with horizontal partners from other 
sectors. 
Other supportive case examples CSPS and NTCP – all involve dependencies on vertical and 
HORIZONTAL partners 
Negative case example NBCCEDP has greater dependence on vertical partners with whom 
some authority can be exerted through policy tools, network 
relationships, etc. 
 
Finding #2: Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS local-level, horizontal network partners 
compromises grantees’ control over performance. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
Selection of process and immediate outcome measures and venue-
specific measures that grantees feel they have more control over.  
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Problematic to include intermediate or long-term outcome measures 
that are jointly produced; Data availability and quality problematic 
when relying on unfunded, informal partners; Hard to discern 
accountability for longer term outcomes. 
Case examples Grantees oppose performance measures viewed as too far outside their 
control; Priority and goal conflicts with vertical and horizontal partners 
public health vs. public safety (corrections) – makes it difficult to 
identify incentives for unfunded, horizontal partners with other 
priorities; No formal authority over jails, physicians outside the funded 
STD clinics and family planning sites, juvenile detention; Dependent 
on jails, physicians, and others to participate in STD screening and 
treatment AND to provide data for performance measures; Grantees 
reject population-based measures other than for syphilis (2009 
proposed measures); DSTDP think GPRA measures at population-level 
are unrealistic. 
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 Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
DSTDP advocating "community perspective" and greater focus on 
population effects, but recognizes that their limited resources are 
inadequate to have population effects on their own; Emphasis on 
engaging network partners like private providers, jails, juvenile centers 
in order to access high risk populations; Changes in broader health care 
access affecting program goals; Stubborn institutional culture resistant 
to change; Grant as funding mechanism does not support much control 
within vertical network and DSTDP has not demanded much 
accountability in past; Inadequate resources to have population-level 
effects on disease prevalence and incidence. 
Other supportive case examples PHEP, NTCP 
Negative case example NBCEDP has less dependencies given greater reliance on vertical 
partners. 
 
Finding #3: Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program implementation, 
DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in ways that support CDC’s and grantees’ 
control over performances. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
DCPC designed the program in ways that enhance control: Narrow 
focus on women served, rather than broader, population-level focus; 
Selected performance measures aligned with program priorities and 
consistent with service delivery implementation that grantees can 
control process, short-term, and intermediate performance measures 
related to service delivery; DCPC has made revisions in measures to 
strengthen grantee’s control over measured performance; Allows 
multiple uses of performance measurement data for accountability, 
program improvement, and budgeting. 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Network consensus on program goals facilitates selection of 
performance measures; Reliance on vertical network with less 
dependence on horizontal increases control over performance and 
accountability is less fragmented; Grantees view performance 
measurement as meaningful, fair, valid, and relevant to priorities 
allowing data to be used for multiple purposes, including budgeting. 
Case examples Revised calculation of measure (cervical measure related to time to 
diagnosis) to assure grantee control; Performance measures tied to 
work of providers in vertical network; policy tools used strengthen 
control within vertical network. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Narrow focus on women served through NBCCEDP; Service delivery 
dependent primarily on vertical network; Strong consensus within 
network on program goals; Control over vertical network through 
policy tools, management practice, and network relationships; 22,000 
local providers in system. 
Other supportive case examples Less grantee resistance to measures for which they have greater control 
– in CSPS, more support for measures that are dependent on work of 
vertical, funded partners; in PHEP, greater support for measures that 
grantees directly affect. 
Negative case example NTCP has made decision to include outcomes that are jointly produced 
– performance is dependent on comprehensive activities implemented 
by multiple partners and at multiple levels. 
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 Finding #4: Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance DCPC and 
grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures. 
Effect on performance 
measurement system 
DCPC and grantees feel greater control over performance on measures 
Reporting of performance measures is a requirement of cooperative 
agreement; Performance measures is included as a requirement in 
grantee contracts with providers (not clear how many grantee use 
performance-based contracts). 
 
Broader implication for 
performance measurement 
Policy tools, management practices, and partner relationships can 
strengthen authority within vertical network to give grantees more 
control over performance. 
Case examples CDC's use of MDE monitoring data to enhance control over local level 
through on-going monitoring of extensive program data (service 
delivery data); Cooperative agreement requirements for MDE 
reporting; States use of performance-based contracts or other 
reimbursement policies to influence performance; CDC's use of 
performance measures for budgeting increases importance of measures 
to grantees; Grantees’ relationships with providers supports control as 
it facilitates greater influence with these partners. 
Issues of case context 
(situationality) 
Mature program with long-standing relationships with grantees and 
with local level providers; Some grantees willing to apply 
performance-based contracts using the NBCCEDP performance 
measures; Extensive and sophisticated data management/monitoring 
system (MDEs); Data-driven organizational culture endorsed at all 
levels of CDC management; Grantee buy-in on importance and value 
of performance measures for assuring accountability with women 
served in program. 
Other supportive case examples Less evidence across other cases in use of policy tools, etc. to 
strengthen control.  
Negative case example CSPS and NTCP do not exert much authority through their policy tools 
(grant, cooperative agreement). 
 517
 APPENDIX N 
 
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL CASE FINDINGS 
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 Summary of Case Findings 
 
 
Public Health Preparedness Program (PHEP) 
 
1. Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and 
grantee control over performance. 
 
2. Network public management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability for 
results, creating challenges for performance measurement.  
 
3. In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political, social, 
and scientific” process. 
 
4. The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly shapes 
the design of its performance measurement system. 
 
 
Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems (CSPS) 
 
5. Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS’ local-level, horizontal network 
partners compromises grantees’ control over performance. 
 
6. Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated and 
incremental process. 
 
7. Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS’ 
performance measurement system.  
 
 
National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) 
 
8. Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program 
implementation, DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in 
ways that support CDC’s and grantees’ control over performances. 
 
9. Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance CDC and 
grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures. 
 
10. The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource 
investments to build a comprehensive performance management system in order 
to ensure data quality and the use of performance measurement data at multiple 
levels. 
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 National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) 
 
1. Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data 
facilitate identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control. 
 
2. The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production of 
outcomes and shared accountability. 
 
3. Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their use.  
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